THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN W. P.No.10720 of 2025and W.M.P.No.12072 of 2025 Dr.Navis Jai Chithra … Petitioner Vs. 1. The Director of School Education,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on 06.08.2025
Pronounced on 26.08.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN
W. P.No.10720 of 2025and
W.M.P.No.12072 of 2025
Dr.Navis Jai Chithra … Petitioner
Vs.
1. The Director of School Education,
College Road,
Nungambakkam, Chennai, Chennai – 600 008.
2. The Joint Director (Secondary) & Appellate Authority,
Directorate of School Education, College Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai – 600 008.
3. The Chairman,
Central Board of Secondary Education,
Shiksha Kendra,
No.2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, New Delhi – 110 092.
4. The School Management Committee,
Rural Institute for Community Education, Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114. Krishnagiri District.
5. Meru Miller,
The Secretary,
Rural Institute for Community Education (RICE), Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114. Krishnagiri District.
6. A.Stephenraj Jayakumar,
The Correspondent/Joint Secretary,
Rural Institute for Community Education, Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114.
7. The Chairman,
Rural Institute for Community Education,
Mathakondapalli Model School,
Mathakondapalli – 635 114. … Respondents
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of the show cause notice dated 29.01.2017 issued against the petitioner by the sixth respondent & the letter of suspension dated 04.06.2024 issued by the seventh respondent, and quash the same being violative of the provisions of CBSE Bye-laws and Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools Regulation Act, 1974, and consequently direct the seventh respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service and pay all the attending benefits along with all other attendance and service and monetary benefits of the petitioner.
For Petitioner : Mr.V.Prakash, Senior Counsel for Ms.K.Jayasudha
For Respondents : Mrs.S.Mythreye Chandru,
Special Government Pleader
(for R1 & R2)
Mr.T.Sri Krishna Bhagawat (for R3)
Mr.P.Wilson,
Senior Counsel
for Mr.R.Kanna (for R4 to R7) *****
O R D E R
The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned show-cause notice dated 29.01.2017 issued by the sixth respondent and the letter of suspension dated 04.06.2024 issued by the seventh respondent.
2. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Prakash, appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had been working in the fifth respondent school as a Senior Principal since June 2015. Meanwhile, she was issued an order of suspension on 12.04.2017, and subsequently, a charge memorandum dated 15.07.2017 was issued to her. Following this, a domestic enquiry was conducted. Aggrieved with the charge memorandum and suspension, the petitioner preferred Writ Petitions in W.P.No.22305 of 2018 and W.P.No.12261 of 2020. After the orders were passed in the Writ Petitions, Writ Appeals are now pending. Meanwhile, the petitioner was again issued with another show-cause notice dated 29.01.2017 and a suspension order dated 04.06.2024, which are under challenge in the present Writ Petition. Though the petitioner has raised various grounds, and to challenge the above impugned order, given the primary contention raised by the fifth respondent regarding maintainability, it is appropriate to first decide on the maintainability before delving into the merits of the matter.
2.1. With regard to the maintainability, it is the specific contention of the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Prakash that, though the writ petition is filed against a private school, still the same is maintainable because of the duty imposed on statute under the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). To substantiate the above submission, they rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, reported in (2003) 10 SCC 733. Apart from that, the learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 449, and Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 541 to support his case that even in respect of service matters, the Writ petitions are maintainable against the private unaided educational institutions.
2.3. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel that, by virtue of Section 22(3)(b) of the Act, the suspension shall not be beyond a period of two months, and if so, approval of the competent authority is required. Therefore, contended that when the statute mandates certain things and imposes a duty upon the private school, on its non compliance, a writ petition will be maintainable. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.P.Wilson in St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498, is not applicable to the case in hand, as the above judgement deals with office employees of private school, whereas in the instant case, the petitioner is the Senior Principal qua the teaching staff. Hence, would contend that the present writ petition is maintainable.
3. Per contra, the said contention was stoutly objected by Mr. P.Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the fourth to seventh respondents, by relying the judgment in St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra). According to him, the above judgment has clearly distinguished the earlier judgment of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case (cited supra), wherein, it was the Government stand that approval of the Government is mandatory for appointment and removal. In the present case, such thing are not come within the purview of any statutory authority. Therefore, would contend that the present writ petition is not maintainable.
3.1. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel
Mr.P.Wilson that, the contention of the respondents that, the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra) is not applicable to teaching staff, is erroneous, inasmuch as the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in S. Matilal Benedict v. The Secretary, reported in MANU/TN/7611/2023, has applied the ratio of the above Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment even against the teaching staff. Therefore, would contend that a mere reference of office employee in the penultimate paragraph will in no way affect the ratio of the Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment Hence, prayed to dismiss the present writ petition on the ground of maintainability.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to either side submissions.
5. As the very maintainability is in question, it is apt to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691, where it was held that judicial control over the fast-expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people, should not be put into a watertight compartment. With this objective in mind, let us proceed to determine whether the petitioner can maintain the present writ petition.
6. It is an admitted fact that the fifth respondent educational institution is an unaided private educational institution. It is further not in dispute that the petitioner is a teaching faculty and was holding the post of Senior Principal on the date of the impugned charge memorandum and the suspension. Against this factual background, let us first consider the ratio of St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra). For a better understanding, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the relevant paragraphs, viz., paragraphs 54, 66, and 67, which read as follows:
“54. Thus, the aforesaid order passed by this Court makes it very clear that in a case of retirement and in case of termination, no public law element is involved. This Court has held that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against a private educational institution shall be maintainable only if a public law element is involved and if there is no public law element is involved, no writ lies.
….
66. Merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law. It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction then every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It largely depends upon the nature of the dispute and the enforcement of the right by an individual against such institution. The right which purely originates from a private law cannot be enforced taking aid of the writ jurisdiction irrespective of the fact that such institution is discharging the public duties and/or public functions. The scope of the mandamus is basically limited to an enforcement of the public duty and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the court to find out whether the nature of the duty comes within the peripheral of the public duty. There must be a public law element in any action.
67. Our present judgment would remain incomplete if we fail to refer to the decision of this Court in Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya [Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303]. In the said case this Court considered all its earlier judgments on the issue. The writ petition was not found maintainable against the Mission merely for the reason that it was found running a hospital, thus discharging public functions/public duty. This Court considered the issue in reference to the element of public function which should be akin to the work performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. This Court took the view that every public function/public duty would not make a writ petition to be maintainable against an “authority” or a “person” referred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless the functions are such which are akin to the functions of the State or are sovereign in nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
According to the above ratio, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a private educational institution shall be maintainable only if a public law element is involved. It further held that cases of retirement and termination do not involve public law elements.
7. After the above discussion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India summed up the final conclusion at paragraph 75, which reads as follows:-
“ 75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:
75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.
75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.
75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the Court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty.
75.5. From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character.”
(emphasis supplied) While looking at the above summation, ordinary contract service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot come under judicial review.
8. However, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Prakash would contend that the judgment in St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra) deals with office employees, whereas in the present case, the petitioner is a teaching staff, therefore, the applicable case law is Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case (cited supra). In this connection, it is appropriate to extract the relevant paragraphs of the judgment of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case
(cited supra), which read as follows:-
“1. The main question for consideration in the appeal is as to maintainability of writ petition as against private school receiving grant in aid to the extent of dearness allowance. The appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 30-1-2009 [Asha Srivastava v. State of W.B., 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 242] passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta whereby the appeal filed by Respondent 1 was allowed directing her reinstatement along with back wages.
….
19. Similarly, in Sushmita Basu v. Ballygunge
Siksha Samity [Sushmita Basu v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity, (2006) 7 SCC 680 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1741] the appellant was working in a recognised private educational institution in the State of West Bengal. The schools were not receiving grants in aid from the government but were getting dearness allowance component of the approved teachers working in the school. The issue was with respect to the applicability of recommendation of the First Pay Commission and that of Second Pay Commission though there was no statutory provision or even government order directing private unaided educational institutions to implement the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, they were implemented by the schools as part of their agreement with the teachers. Though the management also implemented the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission in the sense that the salaries of the teachers were hiked in terms of the said report, the institution refused to give retrospective effect to the enhancement. The institution refused to give effect to the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission retrospectively w.e.f. 1-1-1998. Ultimately, this Court observed in Sushmita Basu [Sushmita Basu v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity, (2006) 7 SCC 680 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1741] that the Writ of Mandamus by the Court issued against the private institutions would be justified only if a public law element is involved.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Though in the judgment of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has ultimately concluded that the writ petition of a teaching faculty is maintainable, the peculiar fact that necessarily needs to be deduced is that the Marwari Balika Vidyalaya school had received grant-in-aid to the extent of the dearness allowance. Therefore, though it is a private school, when it receives grant-in-aid to the extent of the dearness allowance, automatically, government control comes into play.
10. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to the submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr.P.Wilson. He would invite the attention of this Court about the paragraph 62 of the judgment of St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has distinguished the judgment of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case (cited supra), and observed that in the Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case, the State Government took a specific stand before the Court that its approval is required both for the appointment and the removal of a teacher. In this regard, it is appropriate to extract paragraph 62 of the judgment of St. Mary’s
Education Society’s case (cited supra), which reads as follows:-
“62. We may say without any hesitation that Respondent 1 herein cannot press into service the dictum as laid down by this Court in Marwari Balika
Vidyalaya [Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava, (2020) 14 SCC 449 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 854] as the said case is distinguishable. The most important distinguishing feature of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya [Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava, (2020) 14 SCC 449 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 854] is that in the said case the removal of the teacher from service was subject to the approval of the State Government. The State Government took a specific stance before this Court that its approval was required both for the appointment as well as removal of the teacher. In the case on hand, indisputably the Government or any other agency of the Government has no role to play in the termination of
Respondent 1 herein.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Apart from that, even in Raj Kumar’s case (cited supra), the specific defence of the Government is that, the Government approval is a must. Therefore, as long as the Government has authority in the service related issues, then as a natural corollary, the writ petition is maintainable. In the present case, in order to invoke government control, the petitioner would rely upon Section 22(3)(b) of the Act. For ready reference, the same is extracted hereunder:-
“22(3)(b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee:
Provided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher or other person.”
By referring to the above Section, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the suspension shall not remain in force for more than a period of two months, and if the suspension continued beyond the period of two months, then the competent authority has to record the reasons in writing for such continuation.
12. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Prakash that, when a statutory duty is vested upon them to give reason for extending suspension, and when it is not followed, then the writ petition would lie against the fifth respondent, and to support such contention relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Federal Bank Ltd.’s case (cited supra).
13. In this regard, it is appropriate to refer to the judgment of St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra), which arose in a case against an private educational institution, wherein in paragraph 74, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India distinguished the judgment of Federal Bank Ltd.’s case (cited supra) and held that merely because the State Government has regulatory power, the same, by itself, would not confer any such status upon the institution (school) nor put any such obligations upon it which may be enforced through the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Accordingly, though the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Prakash relied upon the judgment of Federal Bank Ltd.’s case (cited supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra), had ultimately concluded that, the regulatory power by itself will not confer any such status upon the institution so as to file the writ petition against them. For ready reference, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to paragraph 74 of the judgment, which reads as follows:-
“74. In the aforesaid context, we may only say that merely because the State Government has the regulatory power, the same, by itself, would not confer any such status upon the institution (school) nor put any such obligations upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in Federal Bank [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733] . While deciding whether a private bank that is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges any public function, this Court held thus : (Ramakrishna Mission case [Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303] , SCC pp. 315-16, paras 33-35)
“33. …‘33. …‘in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We do not find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent’s service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank.’ (Federal Bank case [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas,
(2003) 10 SCC 733] , SCC pp. 758-59, para 33)
34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K.K. Saksena [K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 654 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] this Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed.
35. It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation and registration of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act, inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved.”
(emphasis in original and supplied) (emphasis supplied by this Court)
15. In the above background let use go into the factual position, this is case filed by the Senior Principal of the fifth respondent school against the fifth respondent, which is the private educational institution, and such educational institution admittedly has not received any grant-in-aid from the Government. Furthermore as per the Rule 15, condition of service of the teacher is based on an agreement as provided in Form VII-A of the Rule. Therefore, I am of the firm view that the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case (cited supra) and Raj Kumar’s case (cited supra) are not applicable to the present facts of this case, and this case squarely comes within the ratio of the judgment of St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra). We must also keep in mind with the appellate remedy available to the petitioner by virtue of Sections 23 and 41 of the Act, which also a ground to hold that the writ is not maintainable in the place of equally efficacious alternative remedy.
16. Though a feeble attempt was made by the learned Senior Counsel
Mr.V.Prakash that the judgment of St. Mary’s Education Society’s case (cited supra) relates only to office employees, as already submitted, the said judgment was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in S. Matilal Benedict’s case (cited supra) in favour of teaching staff. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even though private entity is performing a public duty, unless the act alleged has a nexus with the public duty, the question of maintaining the writ petition does not arise. In the present case, the act challenged has no nexus with the public duty of the fifth respondent. Here, the act complained of is petitioner’s service related issued, which squarely falls beyond the public duty undertaken by the fifth respondent. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the present writ petition is not maintainable.
17. In the result, this Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.
26.08.2025
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Index : Yes/No
Speaking order /Non Speaking Order
Neutral Citation : Yes/No
To
1. The Director of School Education,
College Road,
Nungambakkam, Chennai, Chennai – 600 008.
2. The Joint Director (Secondary) & Appellate Authority,
Directorate of School Education, College Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai – 600 008.
3. The Chairman,
Central Board of Secondary Education,
Shiksha Kendra,
No.2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, New Delhi – 110 092.
4. The School Management Committee,
Rural Institute for Community Education, Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114. Krishnagiri District.
5. The Secretary,
Rural Institute for Community Education (RICE), Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114. Krishnagiri District.
6. The Correspondent/Joint Secretary,
Rural Institute for Community Education, Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114.
7. The Chairman,
Rural Institute for Community Education, Mathakondapalli Model School, Mathakondapalli – 635 114.
C.KUMARAPPAN, J.
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Pre-Delivery Order in
W.P.No.10720 of 2025
26.08.2025