THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM THE HON’BLE  MR.JUSTICE KRISHNAN RAMASAMY AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE K.SURENDER W.A.Nos.2683 and 2860 of 2025 AND C.M.P.NOs.23141 & 21550 OF 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 07-04-2026

CORAM

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM

THE HON’BLE  MR.JUSTICE KRISHNAN RAMASAMY

AND

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE K.SURENDER

W.A.Nos.2683 and 2860 of 2025 AND
C.M.P.NOs.23141 & 21550 OF 2025

 

1.     The State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Fort St. George, Chennai – 009.

2.     The State of Tamil Nadu
Rep by its Principal Secretary to Government Commercial Taxes Department, Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai- 600 009.

3.     The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
4th Floor, Ezhilagam building, Kamarajar Road, Chepauk, Chennai-5.

4.     The Deputy Commissioner (Inspection)
Commercial Taxes Department, Villupuram District, Villupuram.

..Appellants

-vs-

1.     J. Thirumalainarayanan

2.     The Principal Accountant General

(Tamil Nadu),

O/o.The Principal Account General,

AG’s Office Complex, 361 Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai.

..Respondent(s)

WA No. 2860 of 2025

1.    The State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department Fort St George Chennai 600 009.

2.    The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government and Commissioner, Commissionerate of Revenue Administration and Disaster Management, Ezhilagam Chepauk, Chennai- 600 005.

3.    The District Collector
Kancheepuram District,

Kancheepuram.

… Appellants

-vs-

1.    P. Rathinavelu

2.    The Principal Accountant General

(Tamil Nadu),
O/o.The Principal Accountant General,

AG’s Office Complex, 361,

Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai- 600 018.

… Respondents

WA No. 2683 of 2025

Prayer: To set aside the Order dated 18.03.2024 made in WP No.34752 of 2022 and allow this Writ Appeal.

WA No. 2860 of 2025

Prayer: To set aside the order dated 18-03-2024 made in WP.No.34785 of 2022.

For Appellants:

Mr.P.S.Raman, AG,

Mrs.Dakshayani Reddy, Spl. Panel Counsel

Assisted by Mr.C.Harsha Raj

Spl. Govt. Pleader (Taxes)

in W.A.No.2683 of 2025

Mrs.Dakshayani Reddy, Spl. Panel Counsel

Assisted by Mr.S.John J.Raja Singh

Additional Government Pleader

in W.A.No.2680 of 2025

For Respondents:

Mr.J.Jayamalan for R1

Mr.S.Mahesh

For Mr.V.Vijayashankar for R2
(in both)

C O M M O N  J U D G M E N T

 

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.M.Subramaniam,J.)

                  1) Factual matrix warranted for the Division Bench to refer the matter for a decision of the Full Bench are as under:

                  i) Writ Petitions have been filed, seeking a direction against State to sanction retirement benefits including regular pension, by counting the period of service rendered by the petitioners in the posts of Typist, Junior Assistant, etc., including the period of break in service with all service and consequential monetary benefits.

                  ii) A batch of Writ Petitions have been decided by learned Single Judge, vide order dated 18.03.2024 and a direction was issued to sanction retirement benefits by counting the period of services rendered by employees on temporary basis, including the period of break in service with all consequential service and monetary benefits.

                  iii) State preferred an appeal against the common order passed in W.P.No.34779 of 2022. Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by State. SLP filed by State also came to be dismissed on 25.07.2025 at the admission stage. Batch of other matters were subsequently allowed based on the above judgment.

                  iv) Another Division Bench heard the matter elaborately. The legal position in the context of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred as ‘Rules 1978’) has not been discussed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.618 of 2025. However, subsequent Division Bench elaborately considered the legal position in the context of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 and formed opinion that earlier decision of the learned Single and Division Bench granting benefit of counting of temporary period of services, including the break in service is not in consonance with the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules. Since the earlier order came in the way of the subsequent Division Bench to take a different view, the matter has been referred to Full Bench. Hon’ble Chief Justice constituted this Full Bench to answer the reference raised.

                  v) Division Bench in its order dated 02.09.2025 in W.A.No.2683 of 2025 elaborately discussed the scope of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 as well as the right of employees to seek counting of period of service rendered as temporary employees, including break in service. Division Bench formed an opinion that if at all those factors had been taken into account, including the legal position, either the writ court or the Division Bench would have taken a different view. Accordingly, the following issue has been framed:

    “In that view of the matter, an authoritative pronouncement on the issue is required, especially, in the context of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978, as to whether the large number of employees who had not approached this Court or the Tribunal (as it then was), would be entitled to get included the break in service for calculating qualifying service for the purpose of total pensionable service or not.”

2. Contentions of the learned Advocate General:

                  i) Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General would submit that actual services from the date of regular appointment have already been counted both for failed candidates, whose services were subsequently regularized as well as the candidates, who have succeeded in the special qualifying examinations conducted for their permanent absorption. In order to maintain consistency amongst the failed candidates and passed candidates in the special qualifying examinations, they were treated equally and the benefit of counting of services have been extended to all the temporary employees from their respective date of appointment. Further, the break in service for a considerable length of time and in several cases more than eight years cannot be reckoned as qualifying services under the Pension Rules. Therefore, State has filed an appeal and the Division Bench, in view of the earlier orders of the Division Bench referred the issue for the decision of the Full Bench.

                  ii) Learned Advocate General would further submit that the scope of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 is crystal clear in the language of the provision and there is no ambiguity. The earlier decision of this Court in W.A.No.618 of 2025 dated 10.03.2025 has not considered the scope of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 as well as the conditions stipulated therein. Therefore, if break in long temporary services is reckoned as qualifying service, it will be directly violative of Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 and would result in huge financial constraint to the State. That apart, these temporary employees, during the long length of break in service could be employed elsewhere or doing some other job. Therefore, long length of break in service of the temporary employees cannot be counted. These temporary employees were absorbed in the sanctioned post in the regular establishment vide G.O.(Ms) No.89, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (P) Department dated 28.07.2020. The said Government Order relates to Special Qualifying Examination, 1995, Conditions of Services and clarification to Tamil Nadu Special Qualifying Examination Rules, 2000. Even in the said Government Order, the following clause has been incorporated:

    “f) Break in service (of both passed/failed candidates during their temporary service period). No provision available in Fundamental Rules for regulating the break in service period. As per rule 25 of Tamil Nadu Pension Rule the break in service shall be treated as condoned and the pre-interruption service if any shall be treated as qualifying service for pensionary benefits and the period of interruption shall not count as qualifying service.”

                  iii) Having accepted the condition at the time of appointment, the employees cannot turn around subsequently and claim that they are entitled to treat the long break in service as qualifying service for pension and pensionary benefits.

3. Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents:

                  i) Learned counsel for the respondents would oppose, by stating that respondents were appointed on temporary basis. Their services were terminated. Thereafter, these employees were not re-appointed. Respondents and many number of similarly placed persons were temporarily appointed either as Steno-Typists or Typists or Junior Assistants in the Ministerial Services in various Departments in the Government of Tamil Nadu from the year 1986.

                  ii) In 1991, Government issued orders in G.O.(Ms) No.185, Personal and Administrative Reforms (Per.J) Department dated 15.05.1991, imposing ban for appointment. Thereafter, all these temporarily engaged employees were ousted from service in the year 1991. In G.O.(Ms) No.433 Personal and Administrative Reforms (Placement Cell) Department dated 14.12.1993, the Government had decided to conduct special qualifying examination for these ousted employees to get them qualified by securing minimum marks in the examination. Subsequently, special qualifying examination was conducted. Passed candidates were issued with appointment orders. Failed candidates approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal granted the relief to Failed Candidates. However, Tribunal granted the relief beyond the relief granted by Tamil Nadu Government to Passed Candidates. Failed candidates were directed to be reinstated with retrospective benefit from the date of their initial appointment. However, their continuity of service was not taken into account for the purpose of pensionary benefits.

                  iii) Since through Court orders these failed temporary employees secured the relief of retrospective appointment without the benefit of continuity of service for pensionary benefits, the Government thought fit and extended the same benefit to the Passed Candidates. Accordingly, both Passed Candidates and Failed Candidates were appointed with retrospective effect. However, their continuity of services were not taken into account for pensionary benefits. Further, long break in service was not reckoned as qualifying service for pensionary benefits or pension. Under these circumstances, again these employees approached the Court for counting of the break in service period for pensionary benefits. That came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 18.03.2024, which was confirmed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 10.03.2025 and SLP filed by State was also dismissed at the admission stage.

4. Findings:

                  4. This Full Bench has considered the totality of the factual aspect as well as the legal issue raised in the context of Rule 25 of the Rules, 1978.

                  5.  At the outset the language used in Rule 25 has to be examined. An extract of the Rule is produced below:

“1[25. Condonation of interruption in service. – (1) In the absence of a specific indication to the contrary in the Service Book, an interruption between two spells of Civil Service rendered by a Government servant shall be treated as automatically condoned and the pre-interruption service treated as qualifying service.

(2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to interruption caused by resignation, (or) removal from service or for participation in strike.

(3) The period of interruption referred to sub-rule (1) shall not count as qualifying service.]’

                  6. The language used in Rule 25 is crystal clear whereby the first clause states that an interruption between two spells shall be condoned and the pre-interruption service treated as qualifying service. In addition to this, clause (3) elucidates further that the period of such interruption shall not count as qualifying service. So the scope of section 25 can be derived clearly. That any interruption of service apart from those caused by resignation, (or) removal from service or for participation in strike shall be treated as condoned and pre interruption services can be treated as qualifying service. However the period of actual interruption itself cannot be counted as qualifying service.

                  7. Further for the sake of clarity it is pivotal to refer to Rule 24 of the Pension Rules also. Rule 24 states as follows:

“24. Effect on interruption in service. – (1) The interruptions in service shall not entail forfeiture of past service except when a person was removed and re-employed. The actual interruptions in service shall not, however, count for pension.

(2) The services rendered in temporary or permanent department or in substantive office shall also count for pension even if any interruptions exist]”

                  8. The wordings in Rule 24 also entails and reaffirms the proposition that actual interruptions in service shall not count for pension. Therefore on close examination of both Rule 24 and 25 it can be asserted that the period of interruption in service itself, as such, cannot be counted as qualifying service under the Rules, 1978.

                  9. In the light of the above, the decision in. W.P. No. 3472 of 2022 is to be examined. The crux of the petition pertains to counting of the actual period of break in service as qualifying service for payment of revised pension and other retirement benefits. The learned Single Judge had allowed the Writ petition and directed the sanction of retirement benefits by counting the period of service rendered by petitioners in their respective posts including the break in service with payment of revised pension and other retirement benefits. When the matter was brought up on appeal, the learned Division Bench of this Court had referred this matter to this Full Bench to state the correct position of law pertaining to counting the period of break in service as qualifying service for pension.

                  10. The reference was made since a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others vs K.Maria Antony Ruswald[1], held that when the Government had regularised the services of those who failed in Special Qualifying Examination without break in service, the same benefit must be extended to the candidates who cleared the exam. This proposition is unacceptable as it goes against the well settled Rule 25 of Pension Rules. There is an explicit clause preventing the treating of actual break in service period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. In the presence of an explicit clause to that effect, there is no justified reason to override it and extend such unjust benefits limitlessly. Though a group of individual may have been benefited out of such Court orders, this cannot be taken as a precedent and applied to a plethora of cases that follow suit thereby causing distress to the State treasury.

                  11. In the past, individual and independent Court orders have been granted in few cases and the grounds of relief are based more on misplaced sympathy than on the foothold of the Rules/law in place. Consequently such individual orders have been followed as precedent in the consequential similarly placed cases, creating a spinning wheel of precedents to choose from, thereby causing inconsistencies diluting the actual Rules/law.

                  12. This Court hence finds the decision in State of Tamil Nadu and others vs K.Maria to Antony Ruswald (supra) to be a bad precedent and cannot find application in the present case, since it goes directly against Rule 25 r/w Rule 24 of the Pension Rules. It was brought to the notice of this Court that an SLP was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the decision in State of Tamil Nadu and others vs K.Maria Antony Ruswald and that the SLP was dismissed. It is trite law that in-limine dismissal of Special Leave Petition at the threshold without giving any detailed reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.

                  13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa vs. Dhirendra Sundar Das & Ors[2] observed as follows:-

“9.27. It is a well-settled principle of law emerging from a catena of decisions of this Court, including Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187, paras 22 and 23 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] and State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, paras 112 and 113 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 496 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] , that the dismissal of an SLP in limine simply implies that the case before this Court was not considered worthy of examination for a reason, which may be other than the merits of the case. Such in limine dismissal at the threshold without giving any detailed reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.”

                  14. In the case of P.Singaravelan vs. District Collector, Tiruppur[3], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“6. It is evident that all the above orders were non-speaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At this juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger. The following discussion on this proposition in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] , is relevant in this regard:

“(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.

(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

 

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

This view has also been adopted in a plethora of decisions of this Court, including the recent decision in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. [Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376]”

5. Conclusion:

                  15. In view of the discussions above, the reference made by the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 02.09.2025 in W.A.No.2683 of 2025 is answered as follows:

    a) Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 entails that an interruption in service shall be treated as automatically condoned apart from the situations mentioned in Clause (2);

    b) The pre-interruption ‘service’ shall be treated as qualifying service. However the actual period of interruption itself as such cannot be counted as qualifying service;

    c)  The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Others vs K.Maria Antony Ruswald is held to be bad in law;

    d) In the light of the above interpretation to Rule 25 r/w Rule 24 of the Pension Rules, the question of extending the said Rule en masse in respect of employees, who have not approached the Court of Law does not arise.

(S.M.S.,J.)      (K.R.,J.)      (K.S.,J.)

07-04-2026

Index: Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes/No

AR

To:

The Principal Accountant General (Tamil Nadu),
O/o.The Principal Accountant General,

AG’s Office Complex,

361, Anna Salai, Teynampet,

Chennai- 600 018.

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM,J.

KRISHNAN RAMASAMY,J.

AND

K.SURENDER,J.

AR

W.A.Nos.2683 and 2860 of 2025

07-04-2026

[1]W.A.No.618 of 2025 dated 10.03.2025

[2](2019) 6 SCC 270

[3](2020) 3 SCC 133