Judgment on Admission verbatim is dealt under Order XII Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. As simple as it may seem, it is imminent to understand, what is admission, what constitutes valid admission, where must such

JUDGMENT ON ADMISSIONS

By,
R.Devi advocate

1. INTRODUCTION

Judgment on Admission verbatim is dealt under Order XII Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. As simple as it may seem, it is imminent to understand, what is admission, what constitutes valid admission, where must such admission be made and under what circumstances such a Judgment under this provision can be passed. The intent of this Article is to deal with the above conundrum. There is no doubt that admission is a common law principle. The primary object of this Rule is to enable a party obtain speedy judgment where such admission. The nuance lies in beneficial interpretation of this rule considering the facts and circumstances of each case to enable speedy justice while remaining cautious not to snatch the right of fair defense.

Order XII Rule 6, CPC

Judgment on admissions

(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.”

2. DISSECTION OF THE RULE
The Rule when dissected has the following salient concepts;
a. Admission,
b. In pleading or otherwise,
c. Oral or in Writing,
d. Court May,
e. Any stage of the suit,
f. Either by Application of party or of its own motion,
g. Without waiting for determination of any other question;
h. Make order/judgment as it may think fit,
i. Decree shall be drawn up;

2.1. ADMISSION:
2.1.1. The term Admission has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence it is necessary to borrow the definition from Evidence Act, 1872;

“Sec.17 – Admission Defined
An admission is a statement,1[oral or documentary or contained in electronic form ], which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.”

2.1.2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines Admission as “Any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgement that facts are true. Admission against interest as – A person’s statement acknowledging a fact that is harmful to the person’s position as a litigant. An admission against interest must be made either by the litigant or by one in privity with or occupying the same legal position as the litigant.”
2.1.3. Admission is the unassailable requirement to attract the operation of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Admission can be of several types, and the types of admission shall be dealt later in this Article. The an admission to qualify as valid admission should be Unequivocal, Unambiguous, Unconditional, should be made with intend to be bound by it, should be a valid admission independently without having to be proved by adducing evidence and should entitle the other party to succeed .
2.1.4. There is no hard and fast rule on what constitutes admission as it is highly dependent on the facts of each case. A statement made can be admission in one case and not in another. Admission necessarily means a statement made, either in pleadings or otherwise to conclusively determine an issue made by a party intending to be bound by it.
2.1.5. There are several methods to secure admission;
a. Under Order XII CPC:
A party to the suit can issue a notice to admit truth of the case (Rule 1) or to admit documents (Rule 2) or to admit specific facts (Rule 4) to the other party or the court can under Rule 3-A require a party to admit or deny a document. When a party is put on notice to admit either the facts or the documents, the party shall either admit or deny them. When no specific denial is made by the party to such documents, the documents are deemed to be admitted under Rule 2-A. However court has power to require documents so admitted to be proved independent of such admission.

Order XII Rule 2A. Document to be deemed to be admitted if not denied after service of notice to admit documents
(1) Every document which a party is called upon to admit, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of that party or in his reply to the notice to admit documents, shall he deemed to be admitted except as against a person under a disability :
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion and for reasons to be recorded, require any document so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
(2) Where a party unreasonably neglects or refuses to admit a document after the service on him of the notice to admit documents, the Court may direct him to pay costs to the other party by way of compensation.]

b. Under Order VIII CPC:
In the written statement, the defendant shall specifically deny the allegations of facts in the plaint otherwise such allegation in plaint shall be deemed to be admitted. In the event where written statement is not filed at all, the court may pass a judgment based on the plaint facts. Under these circumstances the court power to require facts so admitted to be proved independent of such admission.
Order VIII Rule 5 Specific denial.— [(1)] Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability:
Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
(2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved.

For the purpose of these provisions in my opinion person under disability would be as defined under Sec. 6 of Limitation Act.

Further the denial or dispute should be clear and sufficient to disprove the admission. For instance, if A filed an agreement between A and B where B agreed to pay INR. X to A. B need to raise a dispute and denial bearing substance sufficient to dispute admission. B can allege that the document is forged or the document forms part of some other transaction or that the document should be read with a series of documents on the same dispute. B cannot plainly mention a vague arrangement to make the admission bad in the eyes of law.

In M.M. Chhabra & Sons (Huf) v. M/s. Colour Plus Fashions Limited 2010 SCC Online Del 2502 which is out of a suit for recovery of possession upon termination of tenancy by efflux of time. The lease was valid for five years and upon expiry, by option, it can be extended for another 4 years. The plaintiff averred that the defendant failed to exercise this option and the defendant alleged that the Plaintiff is receiving rent without any objection after expiry and thus the lease is deemed as renewed. The defendant contended that the question of whether lease is extended by accepting rent is a question of fact and that cannot be decided under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. However, the court held, necessary admissions are gathered from the pleadings, ie., landlord-tenant relationship, lease deed, expiry of lease, etc., and allowed the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court also held that mere dispute and mention of vague arrangement are insufficient to dispute an admission.

Similarly in Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik ILR (2003) I Delhi 269, the respondent is the plaintiff in the suit for recovery of possession, upon termination of tenancy by efflux of time. Upon completion of pleadings, an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was filed by the respondent. The Appellant contested the application by claiming that dispensation of notice under Sec. 106 of Transfer of Property Act is a question of fact which needed to be decided by trial. In this case, interestingly, the court propounded that ‘constructive admissions’ are valid and they need not be specifically or expressly made. However constructive admissions can be determined only coupled with the facts of each case. The trial court allowed to application for judgment on admission and on appeal the Delhi HC upheld the judgment. The test proposed to test admission is (i) whether admission of fact is made, (ii) is the admission plain, unequivocal and unambiguous, (iii) whether the defence setup requires evidence (iv) whether the objections go to the root of the matter or is inconsequential. The Court held there is no relatable proof of existing or renewed tenancy to go into the question of Sec. 106 TP Act notice. Application for judgment on admission allowed.
Extract:
“8. The provision confers almost sweeping powers on the Court to render a speedy judgment in the suit to save the parties from going through the rigmarole of a protracted trial. The only pre-requisite for this is that there must be admissions of fact arising in the suit, be that in the pleadings or otherwise or orally or in writing. Such admission of facts must be clear and unequivocal, unconditional and unambiguous and may relate to the whole claim or a part of it. These need not be made specifically or expressly and could be a constructive admissions also. Whether or not such admission arose in the suit would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. If it involved disputed facts, claims and counter claims requiring evidence of parties for determination of issues or where the defense of a party touched the root of the matter, a judgment could not be passed under Order 12 Rule 6 dispensing with the trial because the valuable right of going to trial could not be taken away from the party unless the claim was admitted. A duty was, Therefore, cast on the court to ascertain the admission of facts and to render judgment on these either in respect of the whole claim or a part of it.
9. The test, Therefore, is (i) whether admissions of fact arise in the suit, (ii) whether such admissions are plain, unambiguous and unequivocal, (iii) whether the defense set up is such that it requires evidence for determination of the issues and (iv) whether objections raised against rendering the judgment are such which go to the root of the matter or whether these are inconsequential making it impossible for the party to succeed even if entertained. It is immaterial at what stage the judgment is sought or whether admissions of fact are found expressly in the pleadings or not because such admissions could be gathered even constructively for the purpose of rendering a speedy judgment.
12. It is no longer a grey area that where a tenancy had otherwise expired by efflux of time but the tenant continued in possession of the premises, mere acceptance of rent by the landlord could neither renew the tenancy nor create a new one. That is so because such subsequent occupation of premises was not in pursuance of any contract, express or implied between the parties”
– B.A. Khan, J.

c. Under Evidence Act:
Sections 18, 20 and 23 of the Evidence Act regarding admission in the context of this Article although Sec. 17 through 23 deals with admission. Section 18 days that admission by party to proceedings or his agent shall be admission. Section 20 reaffirms that any statement by parties to the suit is admission. Interestingly, Sec. 23 stipulates the circumstances under which admission in civil cases are relevant. When parties expressly agree that such statement made is cannot be given as evidence, such admission is irrelevant. In my opinion, admissions made, without prejudice, admissions made in the course of negotiations for compromise when expressly agreed between parties not be given as evidence, shall not be considered as admission.

Lord Mansfield has observed that all men must be permitted to buy their peace without prejudice to them should the offer not succeed, such offers being made to stop litigation, without regard to the question whether anything is due or not. If, therefore, the defendant, on being sued for £ 100, should offer the plaintiff £ 20, and at the same time state that such offer was “without prejudice” this is not admissible in evidence, for it is irrelevant to the issue. It neither admits nor ascertains any debt, and is no more than saying that he would give £ 20 to be rid of the action
Section 23 of Evidence Act —Admission in Civil case, when relevant -In civil cases no admission is relevant, if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.
In my opinion, by the limitation of Sec. 23, any evidence which prima facie was agreed not be made part of evidence cannot be relied upon as admission. However such agreement between parties needs to be express.

2.1.6. In Karam Kapahi and Others v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust (2010) 4 SCC 753, which in my opinion is a comprehensive precedent on Order XII Rule 6 CPC, The respondent trust, is the plaintiff in the suit for recovery of possession on the ground of termination of lease in favour of the South Delhi Club (Appellant is a member of the club) and for damages and mesne profit. After demand notice by the Trust, the Club filed a suit against the Trust seeking declaration that the Trust has no right, title or interest in suit premises and with a further prayer of restraining the trust from collecting rent. The suit of the Club was dismissed for default for non-prosecution. In the suit of the trust, the Club filed a written statement admitting existence of lease deed but disputed the title and right of the trust. Further club filed an I.A. for restraining the trust from collecting rent but the same was dismissed by relying on Sec. 116 of Evidence Act as the Club is estopped from disputing the title of Trust and was directed to remit the rental due. Subsequently the Club filed an application under Sec. 114 of Transfer of Property Act seeking relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent by agreeing to remit the rent to the Trust. The Trust filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC to consider the plea in the application of the Club under 114 of TP Act. Both applications were heard together and judgment on admission was passed as the application of the Club contains admission as to, (i) relationship of lessor and lessee, (ii) notice of termination of lease served on the Club, (iii) non-payment of rent by the Club. The Hon’ble SC hearing the SLP arising out of the litigation initiated by the members as well as the Club, together, held that the content of the application under Sec 114 of TP act can be considered under the term ‘otherwise’ in the Order XII Rule 6 CPC and in the application there is clear admission of relevant facts which entitles the Trust to succeed. The Hon’ble Court also specially referred to Scots Law term “approbate and reprobate” where by doctrine of election, the party cannot chose both to accept and reject the same instrument. The club in its suit challenged the title of the Trust and pleaded the contrary in its Sec. 114 Application. The judgment on admission by the Trial Court, upheld.
Extract:
“37.The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about ‘which there is no controversy’ [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the Master of Rolls, in Thorp v. Holdsworth in (1876) 3 CD 637 at 640].
38.In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus:
“6. Judgment on admissions. – Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admission he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.”
39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering judges to use it ‘ex debito justitial, a Latin term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment.
40. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by ‘pleading or otherwise in writing’ but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression ‘or otherwise’ is much wider in view of the words used therein namely: ‘admission of fact…either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing’.
41. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Court held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and Ors. v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and Anr. (2005) 11 SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8) ]. Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas’s commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177].
45. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code has been very lucidly discussed and succinctly interpreted in a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shikharchand and Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai and Ors. reported in AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 75. Justice G.P. Singh (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment explained the aforesaid rule, if we may say so, very authoritatively at page 79 of the report. His Lordship held:
…I will only add a few words of my own. Rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of civil Procedure corresponds to Rule 5 of Order 32 of the Supreme Court Rules (English), now Rule 3 of Order 27, and is almost identically worded (see Annual Practice 1965 edition Part I. p. 569). The Supreme Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen (1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was filed for ejectment, mesne profits and damages on the ground of breach of covenant against sub-letting. Lessee’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors in which fact of breach of covenant was admitted and a case was sought to be made out for relief against forfeiture. This letter was used as an admission under Rule 5 and as there was no substance in the plea of relief against forfeiture, the suit was decreed for ejectment under that rule. Sargant, J. rejected the argument that the rule is confined to admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 in the same order (same as ours) and said:
he rule applies wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed.
Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same construction as was put upon the corresponding English rule by Sargent, J. The words “either on the pleadings or otherwise” in Rule 6 enable us not only to see the admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 of the same order but also admissions made elsewhere during the trial.
(Emphasis added)
46. This Court expresses its approval of the aforesaid interpretation of Order 12 Rule 6 by Justice G.P. Singh (as His Lordship then was). Mulla in his commentary on the Code has also relied on ratio in Shikharchand (supra) for explaining these provisions.
47. Therefore, in the instant case even though statement made by the Club in its petition under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come within the definition of the word ‘pleading’ under Order 6 Rule 1 of the Code, but in Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, the word ‘pleading’ has been suffixed by the expression ‘or otherwise’. Therefore, a wider interpretation of the word ‘pleading’ is warranted in understanding the implication of this rule. Thus the stand of the Club in its petition under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act can be considered by the Court in pronouncing judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 in view of clear words ‘pleading or otherwise’ used therein especially when that petition was in the suit filed by the Trust.
57. Therefore, the common law doctrine of Election is a part of our jurisprudence and squarely applies in this case inasmuch as the Club has advanced inconsistent pleas as noted hereinabove.
58. In so far as non-payment of lease rent is concerned, the Club has admitted it in its written statement in paragraphs (8) and (10). The Club has also admitted it in its reply to the Trust’s petition under Order 12 Rule 6 referred to hereinabove. The Club has also admitted non-payment of rent in its petition under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act where it sought the equitable remedy of forfeiture and which has been denied to it by the High Court for valid reasons.
59. From the pleadings between the parties in this case the following things are admitted:
(a) the Club has admitted in its written statement that the Trust is its Lessor;
(b) the Club has also admitted that it has not paid the lease rent;
(c) the Club has also admitted that the lease rent is more than Rs. 3500/- per month in its reply to the Trust’s petition under Order 12 Rule 6;
(d) the Club has also admitted the receipt of notice of termination of lease issued by the Trust on the ground of non-payment of lease rent.”
– A.K.Ganguly, J

2.1.7. In Charanjit Lal Mehra and Others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan and Another (2005) 11 SCC 279 The 1st respondent is the plaintiff in the suit for eviction, arrear of rent and damages. The landlord-tenant relationship was not disputed. The 4 tenants disputed that the tenancy is not a composite one but is a separate on and hence separate action must have been initiated. It was held that from the plain reading of the lease deed, the 4 brothers form one party and the tenancy is a composite one and not a separate one. Hence the Hon’ble Court held that it amounts to admission and upheld the judgment of the court below allowing application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

2.2. IN PLEADING OR OTHERWISE:
2.2.1. Pleadings mean plaint and written statement . There is no doubt that the admission contained in pleading qualifies as valid under Order XII Rule 6.
2.2.2. The interpretation of ‘otherwise’ has been done in several case where the Courts have concluded that otherwise necessarily means any place. It has been adjudicated that admissions made in balance sheets , minutes of meetings , agreements , notices , letters , etc constitute valid admission.
2.2.3. The party seeking admission can either, call for the other party to make such admission under Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XII to admit the facts or the documents as in the case may be through Form 9 and Form 10 of CPC, or rely on the admission or confirmation of admission through pleadings.
2.2.4. This was clarified for the first time before Chancery Division in Ellis v. Allen (1914) 1 Ch 904. The Plaintiff and the 1st defendant had a subsisting lease where there is explicit condition that the 1st defendant shall not sub-let the premise to third parties without permission from the plaintiff. The 1st defendant sub-let the property to 2nd defendant. The plaintiff sent a notice to the defendants for vacation of the premise. The 1st defendant through its attorney replied to the notice admitting lease and sub-lease but raising other issues of development cost, furnishing, etc. In the suit, plaintiff filed an application for judgment on admission to treat the reply of the defendant as admission. Back then there were no specific precedents on this question. In fact in Landergar v. Feast the court held that the term otherwise can only be looked into to accommodate the admissions secured under Rule 1-4 of the same order. However in this case Sargant, J took a very wide approach to interpret ‘otherwise’ and held a beneficial provision like Rule 6 should not be confined to cryptic interpretation. His Lordship further held wherever there is clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed. Further the court also rejected the plea of the defendants that they would still have defence on the ground of mistake or inadvertence. The court held there is no mistake or inadvertence in the present case, as it is a plain statement of facts and allowed the application for judgment on admission.
Extract:
“The object of the rule was to enable a party to obtain speedy justice where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. I do not think R. 6 should be confined as suggested. In my judgment it applied wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the fact of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed.”
– Sargant, J.
2.2.5. The document relied on for a judgment on admission need not necessarily be made before the Court. In the event where a letter of acknowledgment of debt is made and the party, in its pleadings, fails to deny such letter or explain why such letter cannot be considered as conclusive proof of debt, it qualifies as valid admission.

2.2.6. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. V. United Bank of India (2000)7 SCC 120
The 1st respondent bank, plaintiff in the suit for recovery of money has filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The 1st respondent relied on the balance sheet of the appellant herein which reflects the debt owed to the 1st respondent and the minutes of meeting of the appellant’s board of directors acknowledging such debt. The trial and appellate courts allowed the application. It was contended that the admission made in board resolution and balance sheet cannot be relied to determine an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Hon’ble SC however, refused to accept the arguments of the appellants and upheld the order of the Courts below holding, there is no doubt that the admission made under the balance sheet and the minutes constitutes admission and furthermore, in the affidavit, no specific denial or explanation has been provided by the Appellant to necessitate doubt or question over the documents. Interestingly, the Apex Court held that admission in this case is made as part of the pleadings. Even otherwise, admissions made dehors of the pleadings can also be relied upon for the purpose of this Rule.
Extract:
“12. As to the object of the Order XII Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the Legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.” We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
13. The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial court has dealt with the same. When the trial judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter send as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable.
14. Before the trial judge, there was no pleading much less an explanation as to the circumstances in which the said admission was made, so as to take it out of the category of admissions which created a liability. On the other hand, what is stated in the course of the pleadings, in answer to the application filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the stand is clearly to the contrary. Statements had been made in the course of the minutes of the Board of Directors held on 30th May, 1990 to which we have already adverted to in detail. In the pleadings raised before the Court, there is a clear statement made by the respondent as to the undisputed part of the claim made by them. In regard to this aspect of communicating the resolution dated 30th May, 1990 in the letter dated 4th June, 1990 what is stated in the affidavit-in-opposition in application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is save, what are matters on record and save what would appear from the letter dated 30th May, 1990 all allegations to the contrary are disputed and denied. This averment would clearly mean that the petitioner does not deny a word of what was recorded therein and what is denied is the allegations to the contrary. The denial is evasive and the learned judge is perfectly justified in holding that there is an unequivocal admission of the contents of the documents and what is denied is extent of the admission but the increase in the liability is admitted.
15. Even without referring to the expression ‘otherwise’ in Rule 6 of Order XII CPC, we can draw an inference in the present case on the basis of the pleadings raised in the case in the shape of the applications under that Rule and the answering affidavit which clearly reiterates the admission. If that is so, interpretation of the expression ‘otherwise” becomes unnecessary.
16. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in Nagubai Ammal and Ors. v. B.Shama Rao and Ors. [1956]1SCR451 , as to when an admission becomes relevant. In Nagubai Ammal (supra) which is locus classicus on the subject states that merely because a written admission made in a different context, such admission may not become relevant if the party making it has a reasonable explanation of that. But that is not the position in the present case at all. Learned Counsel for the appellant further adverted to the decision in Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr. AIR1999SC3381 in which the Court was concerned with a case of the effect of not filing a written statement and whether a decree could be passed only on that basis. That was a suit for specific performance and it was held it could not be granted without even writing a detailed judgment and adverted to various provisions of CPC and reference was made to Order XII Rule 6 by way of analogy and referred to the dictum in Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum [1959]1SCR1111 , to state that Order XII Rule 6 should be read along with proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8 CPC. In that case, what was noticed was that in cases governed by Section 42 and Section 43 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, the Court is not bound to grant declaration prayed for on the mere admission of the claim by the defendant if the Court has reason to insist upon a clear proof apart from admission. The result of a declaratory decree confers status not only on the parties but for generations to come and so it cannot be granted on a rule of admissions and, therefore, insisted upon adducing evidence independent of the admission. That is not the position in the present case at all. We fail to see how this decision can be of any use to the petitioner. The decision in re Pandam Tea Co. Ltd. AIR1974Cal170 pertain to the manner in which the balance sheet should be read and has no bearing on the case. The decision in Shikharchand and Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai and Ors. 1974 MP. 75, is to the effect that the Rule is wide enough to afford relief not only in cases of admissions in pleadings but also in the case of admission de hors pleadings. State Bank of India v. Midland Industries and Ors. AIR1988Delhi153 . and Union of India v. Feroze & Co. AIR 1962 J & K 66 cannot have any relevance because the facts in arising cases and the present case are entirely different.
17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that admissions referred to in Order XII, Rule 6 CPC should be of the same nature as other admissions referred to in other Rule preceding this Rule. Admissions generally arise when a statement is made by a party in any of the modes provided under Sections 18 to 23 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Admissions are of many kinds : they may be considered as being on the record as actual if that is either in the pleadings or in answer to interrogatories or implied from the pleadings by non-traversal. Secondly as between parties by agreement or notice. Since we have considered that admission for passing the judgment is based on pleadings itself it is unnecessary to examine as to what kinds of admissions are covered by Order XII, Rule 6 CPC.”
-Rajendra Babu, J.

2.2.7. Similarly in Indian Bank v. S.N. Engineers and Suppliers and Another (2018) 4 SCC 606
The Appellant is the 2nd defendant in the suit and by a letter to the 1st respondent herein the Appellant has undertaken to honour the cheques for supply of T-3 material not exceeding INR 680000. The undertaking was unconditional and upon dishonour of the instrument, suit has been initiated. The trial Court passed a judgment on admission and imposed cost on the bank. The Calcutta HC upheld the judgment. On Appeal, the Supreme Court refused to alter the findings of the courts below and affirmed that the undertaking to clear cheques is unconditional, hence qualifies as admission.

2.2.8. In an nutshell, any document can be perused to gather admission if not specifically denied or explained by the admitting party.

2.3. ORAL OR IN WRITING:
2.3.1. Admission as per Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be either Oral or in Writing.
2.3.2. Oral admission although seem improbable, can be relied if the admitting party does not deny such admission. However in the event of judgment on oral admission, satisfaction of proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 of CPC would be improbable.
2.3.3. When an application is filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, based on an oral admission of a party, if such admission is denied by the admitting party in pleadings, a judgment on admission cannot be passed. The truth about such disputed statement can only be ascertained through trial and not by inference.
2.3.4. It is important to note that this is added by the 1976 Amendment. The 54th Law Commission in its recommendation regarding this addition, says,
“12.4. The rule has been held to be wide enough to cover oral admissions. The use of the words “or otherwise” in R. 6, without the words “in writing” which are used in R. 1 of Or. 12, shows that a judgment may be given even on an oral admission. It is desirable to codify this interpretation.”
Hence it is deliberate legislative intent to bring Oral Admissions within the scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

2.4. COURT MAY:
2.4.1. The word ‘may’ has been represented in interpretation of several statutes as discretionary and not mandatory. The Rule specifically states that the Court ‘may’ pass such judgment on admission. This necessarily provides a discretionary power to the Courts to exercise such discretion based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
2.4.2. The relief under Order XII Rule 6 cannot be demanded as a rule and it is neither peremptory not mandatory but discretionary . However it does not mean that the Court can arbitrarily exercise such discretion but must exercise it judiciously with careful consideration of the facts of the case.
2.4.3. In my opinion the legislative intent behind such discretion is to make sure that no party is deprived of its right to defend a case. The court has exercised its discretion to accept or reject a statement as admission depending on the complexity of defence, independence of the admission, nature of the suit, etc.,
2.4.4. This discretionary power has to be read along the lines of proviso to Sec. 58 of Evidence Act and proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 CPC where it is provided;
“Provided that the court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.”
Hence even in the case of admission, the Court retains absolute discretion to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. The circumstances under which the Court may ask for such independent proof shall be dealt later in this article.
2.4.5. It is needless to state that such discretion must be exercised in consonance with the the object of the rule to provide speedy justice atleast to the extent of admission .

2.5. AT ANY STAGE OF THE SUIT:
2.5.1. It is clear beyond doubt that the Court has power to pass admission on judgment at any stage where the court is satisfied that a valid admission is made.
2.5.2. ‘At any stage of the suit’ mentioned in this rule necessarily is identical to Order I Rule 10 CPC where the court at any stage of the suit can direct addition or deletion of parties.

2.6. EITHER BY APPLICATION OF A PARTY OR BY ITS OWN MOTION
2.6.1. The original rule before CPC Amendment Act, 1976 provided for judgment on admission only by application of a party. However, as per the recommendation of 54th Law Commission, the provision was amended to give suo moto power to the Court to pass such judgment independent of any application.
2.6.2. In my opinion, the intent of the amendment is to widen the scope of the rule to enable Courts to pass judgment on admission on its own.

2.7. WITHOUT WAITING FOR DETERMINATION OF ANY OTHER QUESTION
2.7.1. The Court when satisfied that a valid admission is made by a party under this Rule shall proceed to judgment on admission and shall not wait for determination of any other question.
2.7.2. This however is subject to the caveat that the cause of action is divisible to the extent of admission. In a case where INR 1000 is claimed as consolidated debt from A to B and B admits INR 500, a judgment can be passed to the extent of admission and the question of residue INR 500 need not be determined.
2.7.3. This principle however has to be interpreted correctly because if the defence to admission goes to root of the issue or requires letting in of evidence, Order XII Rule 6 would not be feasible.
2.7.4. In Thorp v. Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch D 637 before the Chancery Division, an issue came where the plaintiff and defendant had entered into a lease deed which contains some stipulations. The defendant admits all but one of such stipulation. The plaintiff seeks judgment on admission and defendant objects to it on the ground that the admission should be considered as a whole. The Court while allowing the application for judgment on admission observed;
“If you have an agreement for lease containing fifty stipulations made by parol, and the Plaintiff and defendant both agreed that there was such an agreement, and , except as to one of the fifty stipulations, that it had been carried out and acted upon, what would be said of a Court of Justice if it allowed the Defendant simply to deny that there was any such agreement as alleged, so that the Plaintiff should be compelled to come to trial with witnesses to prove every one of the fifty stipulations of the agreement? Of course the defendant ought to admit that forty-nine were made, and deny the fiftieth, and then the cause would come to a trial upon the question whether the fiftieth stipulation alleged did or did not form part of the agreement. That is not hard upon a defendant: it is the proper mode of carrying on the administration of justice.”
2.7.5. To sum up, when an admission is made, clarifying the entitlement of a party to the extent of such admission a judgment shall be made to the extent of such admission. There is no doubt that multiple decrees can be made in a suit .

2.8. MAKE ORDER OR JUDGMENT AS IT MAY THINK FIT:
2.8.1. The court based on such valid admission, as it may think fit, shall make a judgment or order. The term order or judgment shall be judgment under Sec. 2(9) CPC and Sec. 2(14).
2.8.2. The term as it may think fit has been interpreted as an exercise of judicial discretion similar to Order VIII Rule 10 CPC . The court while passing such order or judgment shall provide reason for such judgment as per Order XX Rule 4(2) .

2.9. DECREE SHALL BE DRAWN UP:
2.9.1. Sub Rule (2) was inserted by CPC Amendment Act, 1976 and in my opinion, the intent is to provide enforceability to such judgments on admission passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

3. JUDGMENT ON ADMISSION – WHEN REFUSED
In my opinion there are many circumstances under which judgment on admission is refused than granted. Since the Court is provided with undisputed discretion while exercising this power, every case would carry a unique factual bundle for fresh consideration. However relying on the precedents thus far the following are the few circumstances under which judgment on admission is refused;
3.1. DECLARATORY SUITS:
3.1.1. It would be highly controversial and incorrect to state that admissions are not allowed in any declaratory suits. Declaratory reliefs under Sec. 34 and 35 of Specific Relief Act are discretionary by nature. Further in case of some declaratory suits, despite admission the case would require proof of the averment to merit such declaration.
3.1.2. In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others AIR 1958 SC 886
The Appellant is the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of her marital status as the legally wedded wife of Prince. The Prince files a written statement admitting that the appellant is his legally wedded wife. The 1st and 2nd respondent, the 1st wife and minor child of the Prince, file an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleading the in the suit. The Appellant as well as the Prince objected to the application averring that any judgment passed in the suit of the Appellant would not affect the impleading party as under Muslim Law he is legally permitted to marry four wives. However, the Prince admitted that the 1st and 2nd respondent are his wife and child respectively. The 1st and 2nd respondents insisted on impleading as they alleged collusion between parties. In this precedent the Court while determining the validity of Order 1 Rule 10 application also touched upon Order XII Rule 6 CPC concerning the admission of the Prince in the Written statement. The court held that in a declaratory suit filed under Sec. 42 and 43 of Specific Relief Act 1877 (Corresponding Provision Sec. 34 and 35 of Specific Relief Act, 1963) is prima facie a suit seeking a discretionary relief. The Court held that Order XII Rule 6 of CPC must be read along with proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 of CPC (Extracted below) where the court holds discretion to require proof of facts independent of the admission. The Court also observed that the proviso is identical to the proviso to Sec.58 of Evidence Act and held that there is no doubt that the Court has discretion to require proof of facts despite admission. The Court placed reliance on Anderson’s Action for Declaratory Judgments (Extracted below) and held in case of declaratory reliefs, which would affect known or unknown third parties, judgment on admission cannot be claimed as matter of right as it involves a complex matrix of facts which might need proving independent of the admission. The opinion of the bench was divided 2:1 but the dissenting opinion was on the scope of impleading respondents 1 and 2 and not on judgments on Admission.
Extract:
10.It is also clear on the words of the statute, quoted above, that the grant of a declaration such as is contemplated by Section 42, is entirely in the discretion of the court. At this stage, it is convenient to deal with the other contention raised on behalf of the appellant, namely, that in view of the unequivocal admission of the plaintiff’s claim by the Prince, in his written statement, and repeated as aforesaid in his counter to the application for intervention by the Respondents 1 and 2, no serious controversy now survives. It is suggested that the declarations sought in this case, would be granted as a matter of course. In this connection, our attention was called to the provisions of Rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lays down that, upon such admissions as have been made by the Prince in this case, the court would give judgment for the plaintiff. These provisions have got to be read along with Rule 5 of Order 8 of the Code, with particular reference to the proviso which is in these terms: —
“Provided that the court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.”
The proviso quoted above, is identical with the proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that facts admitted need not be proved. Reading all these provisions together, it is manifest that the court is not bound to grant the declarations prayed for, even though the facts alleged in the plaint, may have been admitted. In this connection, the following passage in Anderson’s Actions for Declaratory Judgments, Vol. 1, p. 340, under Article 177, is relevant:
“A claim of legal or equitable rights and denial thereof on behalf of an adverse interest or party constitutes a ripe cause for a proceeding, seeking declaratory relief. A declaration of rights is not proper where the defendant seeks to uphold the plaintiffs in such an action. The required element of adverse parties is absent.”
“In other words the controversy must be between the plaintiff and the respondent who asserts an interest adverse to the plaintiff. In the absence of such a situation there is no justiciable controversy and the case must be characterized as one asking for an advisory opinion, and as being academic rather than justiciable i.e. there must be an actual controversy of justiciable character between parties having adverse interest.”
Hence, if the court, in all the circumstances of a particular case, takes the view that it would insist upon the burden of the issue being fully discharged, and if the court, in pursuance of the terms of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, decides, in a given case, to insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts, the court could not be said to have exceeded its judicial powers.
Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha, J
3.1.3. From the above judgment it can be reasonably inferred that in cases seeking declaratory reliefs, the court might require evidence other than admission to appreciate the averments of the plaint.
3.1.4. It would be concrete to pass a judgment on admission in commercial cases, recovery of money, recovery of possession, etc., where no declaration of a right is required. However in my opinion, it cannot be a rule that admission on judgment cannot be made in declaratory suits. If such admission coupled with apparent averments and plaint documents necessitates a judgment, it can very well be made.

3.2. SUITS REQUIRING PROOF DESPITE ADMISSION:
3.2.1. Almost on the same line of the preceding heading, in the event where any suit requires independent proof despite admission, a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC cannot be passed.
3.2.2. In Balraj Taneja and Another v. Sunil Madhan and another (1999) 8 SCC 396
Suit for specific performance of agreement to sale by the respondent 1. The Appellant failed to file Written statement. A judgment under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC was made and directed the respondent to deposit remaining sale consideration and directed execution of sale deed. The validity of the judgment passed under Order VIII Rule 10 is under challenge. The plaint says that the sale consideration is INR 700000/- and an advance of INR 400000/- has been made and INR 225000/- would be made after receipt of permission for sale from the Income Tax Department and INR 75000/- would be made upon execution of sale deed. The facts in the pleadings by themselves might require proving even without written statement. The Hon’ble Court placed reliance on Razia Begum Case and held as per provisio to Order VIII Rule 5 CPC and Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, the court may still require the pleadings of the plaint to be proved. In the present case, there necessarily is a necessity for permission from the Income Tax department. Under such circumstances, whether the respondent secured the permission is a fact that needs proving without which the suit for specific performance by itself might not be maintainable. Glaringly in this case, no such permission was secured from the Income Tax Department. The court interpreted the phrase “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” and held that the Court must satisfy itself before making an order under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC or Rule 5 or under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The court went on to reiterate that under Sec. 2(9) of CPC and Order 20 Rule 4(2) of CPC, the judgment must bear reason for decree and while giving such reason, the court must satisfy itself with reasonable proof of the plaint averments, it the circumstances of the case mandates. Judgment set aside and remanded for fresh consideration.
3.2.3. Hence even while taking admission under Order XII or Order VIII into consideration, necessity for proof despite the admission need to be analysed by Courts. The legislative intent behind provisio to Order VIII Rule 5 and Order XII 2-A is that the court mandates such proof independent of admission depending on the facts of the case.
3.3. IRRELEVANT STATEMENT:
3.3.1. The statement made irrelevant to the context of the suit shall not constitute admission. Further a statement made by inference of circumstances shall also not be admission unless such statement is acted upon detriment to the interest of the maker constituting estoppel.
3.3.2. Further an admission based on circumstances cannot be treated as truth if that can be disproved. Simply put if a person admits that the sky is green, it need not necessarily be the truth and court may not rely on the judgment considering the fact of the case.
3.3.3. In Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Shama Rao & others 1956 SCR 451
This precedent hailed as locus classicus on Order XII Rule 6 CPC carries severely complex set of facts as the primary litigation lasted for over 40 years. The suit properties belonged to one Munusami who left behind his third wife, three sons though his predeceased wives and three minor daughters. The three sons entered into usufructuary mortgage with one Mr. Abdul Haq. Three years was fixed as period for redemption and the property was leased back to the mortgagors. The brothers partitioned the property between them and the partition deed carried condition to pay INR 8 to the widow and to maintain the daughters. Due to breach, the widow and three daughters instituted suit in forma pauperis claiming maintenance. Suit was allowed with direction to pay INR 6 per month and to pay INR 1500 towards marriage expenses of the daughters. The brothers were adjudicated insolvents and upon execution of the decree, the property was sold and bought by one of the sisters, Devanamma. The mortgagee, Abdul Haq sued for foreclosure and arrayed the brothers and sisters as defendants alleging collusion in the maintenance suit. The mortgage suit was decreed and by court auction, the property was sold to one Mr. Chapman and from him to Krishna Road, the respondent. The possession was hindered two rival claimants, 1. Garudachar, claiming though sale deed executed by the husband of one of the sisters 2. Nagubai, claiming through sale deed from one of the mortgagors. Krishna Rao instituted a suit for declaration against Garudachar and emerged successful. The present appeal is from the suit instituted against Nagubai.

The suit was for declaration of Chapman’s title perfected through court auction and to declare the claim of defendant bad. Nagubai contested on the gound of non-impleadment in the mortgage suit and also claimed adverse possession. The trial court held that the title of Nagubai is hit by lis pendens and further that she has failed to prove possession.

The Appeal carried several grounds and those that relating to Admission on Judgment are as follows;

The mortgagee Abdul Haq in his petition before the insolvency court alleged collusion between the insolvents and the possessors of the property in the execution proceedings. The ground of attach of the sale deed was that it was fraudulent. In an nutshell the suit itself was not attacked as collusive but the execution proceedings were impeached as fraudulent. The appellant in a futile attempt to hold the above statement as admission, claimed that, in the present suit, the appellant has gone back on his stand and has alleged that the maintenance suit by itself is collusive. The Appellants alleged that if the earlier suit is collusive as claimed by Abdul Haq, their title is perfect. The Apex Court refused to heed to such plea and held;

“16. An admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matters stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel. In the present case, there is no question of estoppel, as the title of Dr Nanjunda Rao arose under a purchase which was long prior to the admissions made in 1932 and in the subsequent years. It is argued for the appellants that these admissions at the least shifted the burden on to the plaintiff of proving that the proceedings were not collusive, and that as he gave no evidence worth the name that these statements were made under a mistake or for a purpose and were, in fact, not true, full effect must be given to them. Reliance was placed on the well-known observations of Baron Parke in Slatterie v. Pooley3 that “what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so”, and on the decision in Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Chaudhri Narpat Singh: Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Rajah Makund Singh4 where this statement of the law was adopted. No exception can be taken to this proposition. But before it can be invoked, it must be shown that there is a clear and unambiguous statement by the opponent, such as will be conclusive unless explained. It has been already pointed out that the tenor of the statements made by Abdul Huq, his legal representatives and the plaintiff was to suggest that the proceedings in 0. S. No. 100 of 1919-20 were fraudulent and not collusive in character. Those statements would not, in our opinion, be sufficient, without more, to sustain a finding that the proceedings were collusive.”
– T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar, J.

3.4. ROOT OF THE MATTER:
3.4.1. When the defence or the inference of admission goes to the root of the matter which requires wholistic adjudication, judgment cannot be passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
3.4.2. In State Bank of India v. M/s. Midland Industries & Others 1987 SCC Online Del 325
The Appellant, plaintiff in the suit for recovery of money filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC relying on the balance sheet of the respondent. The balance sheet showed provisional balance of INR 598000 as on 31.03.1985. The defendants disputed the admission by stating that it neither contains the signature nor is written by all defendants. Further the defendants raised preliminary issue on maintainability of suit. The Trial Court rejected the application for judgment on admission and on appeal it was contended that the contents of balance sheet constitutes admission. The court held that the application was rightly rejected as the issue in suit goes into the root of the lis. Furthermore, where the defendants have raised preliminary objection, which in the event of being allowed would non-suit the appellant, it is necessary to try the suit on merit and not under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

Extract:
“6……There is no doubt that Rule 6 of Order 12 has been couched in a very wide language. However, before a court can act under Rule 6, admission must be clear, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal. Furthermore a judgment on admission by the defendant under Order 12 rule 6 Civil Procedure Code is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court, no doubt such discretion has to be judicially exercised. If a case involves questions which cannot be conveniently disposed of or a motion under this rule the court is free to refuse exercising discretion in favor of the party invoking it. It is not in each case where Order 12 rule 6 Civil Procedure Code is invoked that the court 528 would be obliged to pass a decree which case would depend upon its own peculiar facts. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the very root of the case, it would not be proper to exercise this discretion and pass a decree in favor of the plaintiff. The purpose of Order 12 rule 6 Civil Procedure Code is to avoid waiting by the plaintiff for part of the decree when there is a clear, unequivocal, unambiguous and unconditional admission of the defendant in respect of the claim of the defendant. The rule only secures that if there is no dispute between the parties, and if there is on the pleadings or otherwise such an admission as to make it plain that the plaintiff is entitled to a particular order or judgment he should be able to obtain it at once to the extent of admission. But the rule is not intended to apply where there are serious questions of law to be asked and determined. Likewise where specific issues have been raised in spite of admission on the part of the defendants the plaintiff would be bound to lead evidence on those issues and prove the same before he becomes entitled to decree and the plaintiff in that event cannot have a decree by virtue of provision of Order 12 rule 6 Civil Procedure Code without proving those issues.
8.In the case in hand not only admission is not unequivocal but further also the defendants have raised certain preliminary pleas which must be decided before the plaintiff can be held to be entitled to a decree. The preliminary objections raised by the defendants in this case go to the very root of the suit and are likely to non-suit the plaintiff if these were found against the plaintiff. Keeping in view of all these facts, I do not think that a case has been made out under Order 12 rule 6 Civil Procedure Code . for passing a decree in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 5,98,000.00 and as such I find no merit in this application and this application is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed.”
– Mahesh Chandra, J.

3.5. INDELIBERATE AND INDEFINITE STATEMENT:
3.5.1. Any statement made which is not deliberate or unambiguous and definite cannot be treated as valid admission. It is a well settled principle of law.
3.5.2. In Raj Kumar Chawla v. Lucas Indian Services 2006 (89) DRJ 560 (DB)
The respondent, the plaintiff in the suit for recovery of INR 3,61,186.74/-. An application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was filed relying on a letter from the appellant herein. Despite objections, the trial court allowed the application. The letter from the appellants contained admission of due of INR 36000 and return of goods worth INR 154949 and the trial court passed a judgment on admission for INR 190949/-. On Appeal before the Delhi HC, the ingredients of valid admission were reiterated. The Court while confirming the validity of multiple decrees in a suit, refused to treat the letter of the Appellant as admission as it is not a concise and deliberate act. In this case the respondent has written a letter to the appellant referring to the meeting held and sought payment and agreed to take return of goods. The appellant in reply in the course of several allegations against the respondent, made a remark on the outstanding amount. Since this letter was referred out of context and no unambiguous and clear admission was made, the judgment of the trial court was set aside.
Extract:
“6. The powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code has to be exercised judicially on the facts and circumstances of each case. The admission on the basis of which the Court wishes to pass a decree has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional. There is no doubt that in a suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages and each decree being separate and independent is enforceable in accordance with law, was the principle stated by [1971]2SCR171 Chanchal v. Jalaluddin. Admission understood in its common parlance still must be a specific admission. There is very fine distinction between unambiguous and specific admission on the one hand and vague averments of facts which, if proved, could even tantamount to an admission on the part of a party to the suit. The Court has to consider the need for passing a decree on admission under these provisions only in the cases of first category and normally should decline in the cases of the later category.
9. …..The outstanding amount which was Rs. 3.97 lac prior to the meeting with the plaintiff had on its own come down to Rs. 0.36 lacs when the defendant had not paid anything to the plaintiff. This was stated by way of an example by the defendants to show as to how properly the accounts were being managed. Thereafter, reference was made to the possibilities of settlement in due course. The decree based on admission of the Trial Court is founded on these two letters. One letter is written by the plaintiff to the defendant while the other letter is written by the defendant to the plaintiff. The letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant could in no way, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an admission of the defendant of his liability to pay to the plaintiff the amount referred in that letter. The letter dated 23.9.2000 written by the defendant to the plaintiff was a grievance raised to indicate that the plaintiff was not even maintaining the accounts regularly and as such it would not only be unfair but even unjust to treat that letter as an admission of law. This, in fact, cannot even construe on interpretation as an admission much less a direct and unequivocal admission of the defendant of any liability towards the plaintiff. In fact, prior to these letters vide letter dated 12th July, 1999 (Ex P8) the defendant had written to the plaintiff that some money was blocked. The letter dated 12th July, 1999 again is a letter which refers to various aspects of business including that the defendant has to pay some amount to the company. In that very letter it was stated that credit notes had not been issued, returned goods values had not been adjusted and the defendant had claimed a sum of Rs. 40,000/- payable to him from the plaintiff.
10. The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that there is no unambiguous, specific and clear admission by the defendant of his liability towards the plaintiff much less of any definite claim as stated in the plaint. In the written statement large factual and legal controversies have been raised which require determination by the Court of competent jurisdiction before any decree could be passed. Viewed from any angle, the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot justify passing of a decree on admission, on facts and in law.”

– Swatanter Kumar J
3.6. INCONCLUSIVE STATEMENT:
3.6.1. In the event where a statement accorded as admission is made and does not conclude such admission, it cannot be treated as valid admission.
3.6.2. It is imminent that the admission so made is conclusive, clear and unequivocal.
3.6.3. In Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited (2011) 15 SCC 273
The respondent filed a suit for recovery of INR 2,02,72505/- from the Appellant. The respondent filed an Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC for judgment on admission based on the minutes of meeting held on 09.12.2000 between the representatives. The Appellant suffered adverse order in both trial and appellate court as the application was allowed. On Appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirms that admission contained in minutes of a meeting can be construed as valid admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. However, the minutes of meeting ends with a observation, “final figure will be arrived at the meeting accordingly” which is not unequivocal admission of a liability. The court refused to place reliance on the minutes to satisfy the requisites of Order XII Rule 6 CPC and held that admission must be categorical, conscious and deliberate and the party making such admission must show intention to be bound by it. It was also reiterated that Order XII Rule 6 is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. Appeal was allowed setting aside the judgment on admission.

Extract:
“9.Thereafter, in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, there is a reference to both parties agreeing to provide particulars, agreeing to hold further discussions on 26.12.2000 and Respondent agreeing to check up its records to find out the correctness of certain entries. Thereafter the minutes conclude that the “final figure will be arrived at the meeting accordingly”. When the minutes merely notes certain figures and states that they are tentative and both parties will verify the same and says that the final figure will be arrived at the next meeting, after discussions, we fail to understand how the same could be termed as an “admission” for the purpose of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.
10. Another aspect regarding the minutes dated 9.12.2000 requires to be noticed. The Minutes do not refer to any admission by HIMANI (Appellant) to pay any amount to TISCO (Respondent). If a buyer states on 9.12.2000 that his account as on 31.3.1999 shows a balance of amount ‘X’ to the credit of the supplier, it can not be treated as an admission that the said amount ‘X’ was due to the supplier on 9.12.2000. In a continuing account, it may be possible that between 31.3.1999 and 9.12.2000, there may be debits to the account, or ‘reveral of credits’ or ‘settlement of the account’. We therefore hold that there was No. admission on 9.12.2000 which could result in a judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.
11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the Defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a Defendant to contest the claim.”
-R.V.Raveendran, J.
3.7. ADMISSION DEPENDENT ON DETERMINATION OF ANOTHER QUESTION:
3.7.1. In cases where a statement although by definition qualifies as admission cannot be accepted where determination of another issue or right is imminent to crystalize the right acquired through admission, it can be refused.
3.7.2. In S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj (2015) 9 SCC 287
The respondent is the plaintiff in suit for recovery of possession upon termination of lease. The respondent sought judgment on admission as the Appellant accepted the landlord tenant relationship. The appellant resisted the suit by claiming that he has made advances towards the property a sum of INR 82.50 lakhs in furtherance to a Sale Agreement. The Appellant also filed a suit for specific performance of the Sale Agreement. The trial court allowed the application for Judgment on Admission. The Apex Court held that, since the Appellant has managed to set up defence to maintain possession based on an sale agreement and also cash receipts, the question needs to be decided alongside the specific performance suit. The admission of landlord-tenant relationship by itself will not confer right to possession on the respondent. Hence judgment set aside and remanded for fresh hearing.

Extract:
“8. The words in Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure “may” and “make such order…” show that the power Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where the Defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s claim.
9.In the suit for eviction filed by the Respondent-landlord, Appellant-tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted Respondent-Plaintiffs claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an advance of Rs. 82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the Respondent-landlord. The Appellant-Defendant also filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is contested by the Respondent-landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure.
10. Having regard to the stand taken by the parties, in our view, an opportunity has to be afforded to the Appellant to put forth his defence and contest the suit and therefore, the matter is to be remitted to the trial court for a fresh hearing, however, subject to the condition that the Appellant should pay the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 44,000/- per month within a period of eight weeks.”
– R. Banumathi, J.

4. CONCLUSION
From the above precedents, reports and discussions, it is clear that Order XII Rule 6 is a provision for the benefit of speedy remedy. However, interpretation of what amounts to admission holds the key in effective implementation of this Rule. In my opinion, this rule creates more questions than it answers. Since, what amounts to admission will be a question depending on facts and circumstances of each case, the presiding officer is provided with vast discretion to apply this provision. By judicial exercise of such discretion, no doubt, would make this rule indispensable. This provision is theoretically sound but practically overlooked due to existing trend. At present, Courts favours disposal of a suit by trial and is not inclined to exercise its discretion. As easy as it sounds, to exercise such delicate power, both the bar and the bench must familiarize itself with sound principles of law concerning admission of judgment. With sound judicial activism, Order XII Rule 6 CPC would be a formidable weapon against frivolous suits.