Judge Lakshmi narayanan/53.In the light of the above discussion, the preliminary objection raised by Mr.T.Mohan stands rejected. I hold these writ petitions to be maintainable. 54.Registry is directed to number the challenges made to the orders of STAT as Writ Petitions by following the directions of the Constitution Bench and not as Civil Revision Petitions. 55.The Court records its appreciation for Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal, Additional Government Pleader, and Mr.R.Rajesh Vivekananthan, Deputy Solicitor General for their effective assistance. 03.11.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 03.11.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.LAKSHMINARAYANAN
W.P.Nos.9356, 9825, 9826 & 10327 of 2015 and
M.P.Nos.1, 2, 2, 2 of 2015 & W.M.P.Nos.11606 to 11609 of 2015
W.P.No.9356 of 2015:
A.Rukmini .. Petitioner
Vs.
1.Regional Transport Authority,
Erode Region, Erode & 2 others. .. Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr.M.Palani
For R1 : Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal Additional Government Pleader
For R3 : Mr.T.Mohan
Senior Counsel for Mr.A.Suresh Sakthi Murugan
Amicus curae : Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal
Additional Government Pleader
Mr.Rajesh Vivekanandan Deputy Solicitor General W.P.No.9825 of 2015:
M.Shanmugam,
Proprietor, RKM Transports,
6/113, Kalaingarayanpalayam,
Bhavani. .. Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Regional Transport Authority,
Erode,
Erode District & 46 others.
.. Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr.M.Palani
For R1
:
Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal
Additional Government Pleader
For RR 3 to 45 & 47
:
Given up
For R46
W.P.No.9826 of 2015:
N.Dhanasekaran (deceased)
Proprietor, RKM Transports,
:
Mr.T.Mohan
Standing Counsel for Mr.P.Kumaravel
6/113, Kalaingarayanpalayam, Bhavani.
2.D.Jayanthi,
Proprietor, R.K.M. Transports,
6/113, Kalaingaraynpalayam,
Bhavani.
.. Petitioners
(2nd petitioner substituted as LRS of deceased 1st petitioner as per order of this Court dated 26.11.2024 in W.M.P.No.1722 of 2023 in
W.P.No.9826 of 2015)
Vs.
1.The Regional Transport Authority,
Erode,
Erode District & 46 others. .. Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr.M.Palani
For R1
:
Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal
Additional Government Pleader
For RR 3 to 45 & 47
:
Given up
For R46
:
Mr.R.Mohan
Standing Counsel for Mr.P.Kumaravel
W.P.No.10327 of 2015:
P.Periyaswamy,
Proprietor, Lotus Bus Service,
Now at 37, Sathy Road,
Erode: 638 003.
Vs.
1.The State Transport Appellate Tribunal,
.. Petitioner
Chennai: 600 104 & 48 others.
.. Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr.M.Krishnappa Senior Counsel for Ms.R.Swarnalatha
For R2
For RR 3 to 45
:
Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal
Additional Government Pleader
& 47 to 49
:
Given up
C O M M O N O R D E R
These writ petitions challenge the orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as STAT) at Chennai.
2.The writ petitions were admitted and rule nisi had been issued. The matters were listed before me for final disposal.
3.When I took the writ petitions for hearing on 04.09.2025, Mr.T.Mohan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection. He relied upon the following orders:
(i)P.Venkatachalam v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, 2022 SCC Online Mad 8080;
(ii)Tvl.Coimbatore Sub Urban Carriers (P) Ltd., v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in W.P.No.124 of 2020 dated 06.01.2020 and
(iii)V.Selvi v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal in W.P.Nos.2058 & 2299 of 2021 dated 10.02.2021.
and urged that the writ petitions challenging orders of STAT are not maintainable and that the remedy for a person aggrieved by such an order is only by way of a revision, invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4.Replying to this preliminary objection, Mr.M.Palani appearing for the petitioners in a few cases responded that the view submitted by Mr.T.Mohan is not the correct position of law. He brought to my notice that the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in B.Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others, (1964) 7 SCR 1 and submitted that an order passed by STAT is amenable to writ jurisdiction. He also relied upon a judgment of the Kerala High Court in Valsaraj v. Rajan, 2019 SCC Online Ker 2657. In the said judgment, the Kerala High Court held that STAT is a “persona designata” and therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction. He also relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in P.Naveen Chakravarthy v. Punjab National Bank, 2021-1-Writ L.R. 289 to urge that a statutory body, which is not a “Court” in the sovereign system of Courts but a Tribunal is amenable to writ jurisdiction.
5.Prima facie finding that the view submitted by Mr.M.Palani is in line with the law, I requested Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal, Additional Government Pleader, who is representing the State of Tamil Nadu and Mr.R.Rajesh Vivekananthan, Deputy Solicitor General to place their submissions on this point.
6.Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal submitted that the Bench of B.Rajagopala Naidu’s case, consisting of 5 judges, having explicitly held that STAT is amenable to writ jurisdiction, this Court has to apply the said view. He pointed out that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the State of Tamil Nadu had inserted a provision under section 64-B, by virtue of Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1971, with effect from 18.06.1971. Prior to this amendment, orders of STAT were amenable only to writ jurisdiction and after the amendment, a revision under section 115 of CPC was being entertained against such orders. With the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and no similar provision being made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the deeming clause found under Section 64-B of the central legislation no longer exists. This is a powerful indicator that STAT cannot be considered as a “Court”. Referring to section 89, he urged that the Presiding Officer of STAT is appointed by the State Government and not by the High Court and hence it fits the classic definition of a “quasijudicial body”. Hence, a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a traditional and appropriate remedy. He relied upon the following judgments to that effect:
(i)Sandeep Kumar and others v. State of Uttarakhand and others, MANU/UC/0128/2019 and
(ii)Regional Transport Authority, Namakkal Region v.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others, AIR 1995 Mad 226.
7. He states similarity can be drawn between the Labour Court and STAT and this Court can reach a conclusion that although the STAT discharges certain judicial functions, it is not a “Court” in the technical sense of a word.
8.Mr.R.Rajesh Vivekananthan, referred to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the amendments made thereunder. He points out that the power that has been exercised by STAT was originally exercised by the Government. During that period, the orders so passed were amenable to writ jurisdiction, then issued invoking Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Thereafter, a Tribunal was constituted. Pursuant to the amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act by amendment 56 of 1969, with effect from 29.12.1969, he states that the power that had been exercised by the Government, commenced to be exercised by the STAT. In fact, the Tribunal also did not have the power to condone the delay, which it would have had, had it been a “court”. It was conferred on the STAT pursuant to the amendment made to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by the Amendment Act, 1978, by inserting section 64-A to the principal Act.
9. Relying on the following judgments, he points out that the Supreme Court and this Court have, on more than one occasion, have held that a writ petition is maintainable against order of the STAT.
(i)K.M.Shanmugam v. S.R.V.S.(P) Ltd & Others, 1963
SCC Online SC 25;
(ii)Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. C.Chandrasekaran
& others, 1963 SCC Online SC 140;
(iii)Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & others, (2003) 6
SCC 675;
(iv)State of Madhya Pradesh & others v. Visan Kumar
Shiv Charan Lal, (2008) 15 SCC 233;
(v)State of Chhattisgarh & others v. Shekhar Sahu, Civil
Appeal No.2751 of 2009;
(vi)Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra
Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329;
(vii)Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & others,
(2015) 5 SCC 423;
(viii)T.S.Rajasekar v. Kombiah Driver & another,
W.A.(MD).No.1359 and 1360 of 2023 and
(ix)Neeta Singh & others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & others, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl).No.13578 of 2024.
Hence he pleads that only a writ petition is maintainable and not a revision under article 227, as held in the cases relied upon by Mr.T.Mohan.
10.Considering the importance of the question, I decided to answer this issue first before going into the merits of the case. This is because in case I hold the writ petitions to be maintainable, the issue of going into the merits arises. If I were to come to the conclusion that the writ petitions are not maintainable, then I would have to direct the party to file appropriate applications to convert these writ petitions into civil revision petitions. Before dwelling into this topic, this Court would like to point out the difference between a “Court” and a “Tribunal”.
Distinction between a Court and a Tribunal
11.The classical political definition of power of the State, being divided into legislature, administrative and judiciary, is recognized by the Constitution of India. Prior to the Constitution, the Courts were created, organized and governed by the Statutes issued by the colonial legislature or by the Letters Patent issued by the Sovereign, on which basis subsequent legislations were enacted. To give an example, the Indian High Court Act, 1861.
12.The issue of distinction between “Courts” and “Tribunals” had come up before the Constitutional Courts on more than one occasion. I am not going to recollect all of them. I will refer to few which bring out the jurisprudential angle and elucidate the crucial difference between a Court and a Tribunal. Justice Shah in M/s.Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 referred to Justice Fazil Ali’s judgment in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S.
Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621 wherein the learned judge observed the following on when a decision becomes judicial:
“The word ‘decision’ in common parlance is more or less a neutral expression and it can be used with reference to purely executive acts as well as judicial orders. The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially?”
The following test by Scrutton LJ in King v London County Council,
(1931) 2 K.B. 215, 233. was also approvingly cited in Kusaldas S.
Advani’s case:
“It is not necessary that it should be a court in the sense in which this court is a court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari.”
13.Justice Mr.Mohammad Hidayatullah writing a separate judgment in Harinagar Sugar Mills’ case also opined on the distinction as below:
“All tribunals are not courts, though all courts are tribunals. The word “Courts” is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organized State for administration of Justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and punish the “wrongs”. Whenever there is an infringement of right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. The judicial power, according to Griffith, C.J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. Proprietary Ltd. v.
Moorehead, [1908] 8 CLR 357 means:- “The power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.”
When rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party can go and commence a querela before the ordinary Civil Courts. These Courts which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the judicial power of the State, and their authority is derived from the Constitution or some Act of legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their numbers may be increased or decreased, but they are almost always permanent and go under the compendious name of “Courts of Civil Judicature”. There can thus be no doubt that the Central Government does not come within this class. With the growth of civilisation and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of ‘Courts’ in Article 136, 227 or 228, or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Article 136 and Article 227. By “Courts” is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by “tribunals”, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws.”
14.The key distinction between Courts and tribunals is that Courts are a part of the traditional judicial system and they exercise the State’s inherent judicial powers. They owe their origin to the Constitution. In addition to the plenary jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters that Courts possess, additional work can be imposed on them by the
legislature. In stark distinction to the power of the Court, Tribunals are specialized quasi-judicial bodies. They are created by statutes to deal with specific issues. They resolve disputes, in particular, fields of specialization like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in taxation matters, Central Administrative Tribunal in service matters, National Green Tribunal in environmental matters, and the National Company Law Tribunal in corporate and insolvency matters. Such Tribunals by their very nature are circumscribed by the statutes which create them. Tribunals cannot venture outside the four corners of a statute. They cannot exercise powers over matters, which the statute does not confer them, the powers to take decisions. Unlike traditional Courts which enjoy broad jurisdiction, tribunals are created to adjudicate specific types of disputes (See Union of India v. R.Gandhi, (2010) 11 SCC 454).
15.Tribunals may have many trappings of a Court. Nonetheless, they are not “Courts” in the strict of exercising judicial power of the State. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to certain negative propositions
which were enumerated by Lord Sankey L.C. in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] A.C. 275, 296 and were endorsed by Hidayatullah J in Harinagar Sugar Mills’ case, cited supra. For the mere fact that Tribunals have been conferred with the powers of the Court of civil judicature like summoning witnesses, examining evidence, compelling production of documents, deciding the lis between disputing parties and rendering final decisions which affect the rights of the parties will not convert them into a Court of civil judicature.
16.It is also instructive to refer to the classic judgment in
Associated Cements Company Limited v. P.N.Sharma and others, AIR 1965 SC 1595. Alhough the issue was whether while exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, the State of Punjab was acting as a “Tribunal” within the meaning of Article 136, guidance given in this judgment would be of help to answer the issue before us too. The Court held that the main and basic test to determine whether the adjudicating body is a Court or a Tribunal is to examine whether the adjudicating power that the authority is bestowed upon, is by way of a statute, and can be described as a part of the State’s inherent power in discharging its judicial functions. (See also Indo China Steam Navigation Company v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140).
17.Another test that can be applied is the nature of appeals. While appeals from a lower Court to a higher Court is permissible as per judicial hierarchy, insofar as the Tribunals are concerned, it should be specifically conferred by a statute.
18.Conclusively, in a nutshell, the word “Court” is used to designate forums which are set up in an organized State to exercise the judicial powers of the State. They maintain and uphold rights, punish wrongs that are necessary for administration of the justice. The word “Court” would ordinarily denote “Ordinary Court of Civil Judicature”. The powers exercised by Courts are judicial powers; the functions they discharge are judicial functions; and the decisions they arrive at are judicial decisions. Due to several reasons such as reducing the burden of Courts, speedy disposal of cases, tribunals were created by the state. Before their creation, the disputes that arose were being settled by Courts of civil judicature. It was by divesting the power of such Courts to decide these matters, tribunals come to be vested with the power to decide specific specialized issues. While they help in reducing the burden of Courts, they must not and they cannot carry out the core judicial functions of the judiciary. To give an illustration, the civil Court’s jurisdiction is plenary. It deals with all matters unless they are specifically or impliedly barred (See Section 9, CPC). In case of a tribunal, it can and should deal with powers specifically conferred on it. I will repeat the classic sentence that “though all Courts are Tribunals, all
Tribunals are not Courts“.
Judicial remedies against orders of Courts and Tribunals
19.As discussed above, the distinguishing factors between Courts and Tribunal is that the Court is constituted by the State as a part of the normal hierarchy of the civil judicature maintained by the State under the Constitution exercising judicial powers except those which are excluded by law from the jurisdiction. Tribunals are constituted by a special enactment exercising special jurisdiction to determine certain controversy which arose under special law. It is the judgments which are rendered by Courts of civil judicature which are incapable of being interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. The remedy in such cases is to resort to the supervisory power under Article 227 or if not barred, to the revisional power available under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & others, (2015) 5 SCC 423). In case of Tribunals, which do not fall under the category of Courts of Civil judicature, the remedy under Article 226, Constitution of India is always open.
Scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, 1950
20.I deal with the scope of Articles 226 and 227 next. Article 226 confers upon High Courts the power to issue to any person or authority including any Government, orders or writs for enforcement of fundamental rights. Amongst the four types of writs issued- Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, and Quo Warranto, Certiorari is of particular relevance for the discussion at hand. A High Court exercising powers under Article 226 will grant writ of certiorari to correct jurisdictional errors i.e., when it is exercised in absence or excess or failed to be exercised or when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. It does not exercise appellate powers by either reviewing or reweighing the evidence.
21.The High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 can be traced to Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 which conferred supervisory power to the High Court over all Courts which are subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 expanded the same to include administrative and judicial supervision. However, Section 224(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 limited the supervisory powers exercised by the High Court by stipulating that such power cannot be exercised in terms of judgments of inferior courts, which are not otherwise subject to appeal or revision.
22.When the Constitution of India, 1950 came into force, the supervisory jurisdiction contemplated under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and those found in Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 stood restored. A mere statutory power was given a constitutional status. In addition, power of superintendence was granted to the High Court over decisions of tribunals throughout the territories in respect of which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The purpose behind supervisory powers is to keep sub-ordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of law and to ensure they exercise their duty in accordance with law (See Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd v. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 193).
23.The distinction between the scope of power exercisable by the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 has been considered by the
Supreme Court on more than one occasion. Notably, in Hari Vishnu
Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, (1954) 2 SCC 881, the
Supreme Court observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 in a certiorari, the High Court can only annul the decision of a Tribunal but under Article 227, it can go beyond annulment by issuing further directions in the matter. In that case, the Court ruled that there was an error manifest on the record in the decision of the Election Tribunal which, albeit holding that the 301 ballot papers found in the box of the first respondent bearing the wrong mark should not have been counted, upheld the election results by observing that the results had not been materially affected because of such erroneous reception of the votes. Accordingly, the Court noted that the proper order of the High Court should have been to quash the decision of the Election Tribunal by way of certiorari under Article 226 and to set aside the election of the first respondent in exercise of powers conferred under Article 227. Thus, under Article 226, the High Court is confined only to examining the decision-making process whereas under Article 227, it travels beyond and this Court can issue further directions as a corollary of such examination. Additionally, Article 227 clothes the High Court with administrative powers.
Persona Designata
24.The question that comes up for consideration in this batch of writ petitions is that whether the STAT formed under the Motor Vehicles Act can be treated as a Court of civil judicature. At this juncture, it is profitable to refer to the judgment in Kokku Parthasahadhi Naidu Garu Vs. Chintlachervu Koteswara Rao Garu and Anr, 1923 SCC OnLine
Mad 255 wherein this Court grappled with the question of whether a
District Judge or Subordinate Judge deciding election petitions under the
Local Boards Act, 1920 acts as a “Court” or “persona designata”. The Court did not define the term “persona designata” but concluded that the judge acting under the said enactment acts as a “Court” and not in his personal capacity because the judge has the power to direct subordinate court to conduct an inquiry, and such power cannot be conferred on the judge in his personal capacity.
25.Thereafter, in Central Talkies Ltd v Dwarka Prasad, (1961) 3 SCR 495, the Court, referring to Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, characterized “persona designata” as a person appointed as an individual and not ascertained as a member of a class or filling a particular character. In other words, a “persona designata” is a person operating in their personal capacity and not in the capacity of a judge.
Appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act
26.Before deciding whether the STAT is a court or a “persona designata”, it is informative to look into the genesis of STAT in the dispute resolution mechanism as provided for by the Motor Vehicles regime. At its inception, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, under Section 64 provided for appeals against the orders of the provincial or regional transport authorities to be filed before the “prescribed authority”. The “prescribed authority” was the Central Road Traffic Board. For a detailed discussion on the history, see Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 694.
27.Section 33 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1969 substituted the term “prescribed authority” with the phrase “State Transport Appellate Tribunal” in Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 and introduced sub-section (2) therein which provides for the State Government to constitute a State Transport Appellate Tribunal consisting a whole-time judicial member not below the rank of a District Judge. Section 25 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1978 omitted the phrase “whole-time” in the principal Act of 1939. Section 89(2) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which is in pari materia with the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 also provides for the State Government to constitute Transport Appellate Tribunals consisting of a judicial officer who is not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court.
Whether the STAT is a “Court” or “persona designata”
28.While deciding the issue of whether the STAT is a “court” or
“persona designata”, it should not be lost sight that the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained code for the establishment of STAT for
determination of specified disputes.
29.Let us now look up three judgments relied upon by Mr.T.Mohan to urge that the writ petitions are not maintainable. In P.Venkatachalam’s case, Hon’ble Mr.Justice P.D.Audikesavalu held that as STAT consists of a Judicial Officer in the rank of a District Judge, as per Section 89(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Nandhini
J.Shah, (2018) 15 SCC 356 applies and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. The same view was expressed by him in Tvl.Coimbatore Sub Urban Carriers (P) Ltd., Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in W.P.No.124 of 2020 dated 06.01.2020.
30.Insofar as V.Selvi Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal in W.P.Nos.2058 & 2299 of 2021 dated 10.02.2021 is concerned, the learned Judge did not go into the issue at all. The counsel for the petitioner had pleaded reliance upon the LIC’s case that a writ is not maintainable and immediately the counsel for the petitioner sought for conversion of the writ petition into a revision. As my brother Justice PD Audikesavulu has referred to LIC’s verdict, I shall refer to the judgment.
31.The issue that was presented in LIC’s case was whether an appeal is maintainable from the order of a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench when the learned Single Judge had disposed of the petition challenging an order passed by a District Judge under The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 9 of 1971).
32.In LIC’s case, the subject matter of interpretation was Section 9 of the Central Act, 9 of 1971. An order of eviction had been passed by the Estate Officer. It had been challenged before the District Judge under
Section 9 of the Act. The District Judge agreed with the findings of the Estate Officer and dismissed the appeal. Challenging the same, a writ petition had been presented to the High Court. The petition was purportedly filed under Article 226 read with 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. Challenging the same, an appeal had been presented before the Division Bench.
33.A preliminary objection had been raised before the Division
Bench stating that though the petition had been filed under Article 226 &
227, in effect it was a revision under Article 227 and therefore, no Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) lies from the said order. A Division Bench disagreed with this view and held that since Article 226 had been exercised, an appeal is maintainable and proceeded to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. When the matter went before the Supreme Court at the instance of LIC, LIC urged that since the appeal before the
Bench itself was not maintainable, the order passed by the Division
Bench was one without jurisdiction. Hence, the Supreme Court answered whether an LPA is maintainable or not.
34.It referred to Section 9 of the Central Act, 9 of 1971 and held that the appeal to the District Judge under Section 9 was not as a “persona designata”, but as a Court exercising regular civil jurisdiction. Consequently, applying the judgment in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & others, (2015) 5 SCC 423, the Court held that no writ petition is maintainable against an order of a Civil Court and therefore, the power exercised by the learned Single Judge is only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and hence, no LPA is maintainable.
35.Hence, we have to see whether the constitution of STAT is similar to that of an appellate authority under Central Act, 9 of 1971.
Section 9 of Central Act, 9 of
1971
Section 89 of Motor Vehicles Act,
1988
9. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under 3 [section 5 or section 5B] 4 [or section 5C] or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf.
89. Appeals.—
[(2) The State Government shall constitute such number of Transport Appellate Tribunals as it thinks fit and each such Tribunal shall consist of a judicial officer who is not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court and it shall exercise jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by that
Government.]
Section 9 of Central Act, 9 of
1971
Section 89 of Motor Vehicles Act,
1988
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2), every appeal pending at the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be proceeded with and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.
36.A perusal of these two Sections shows that while an appeal from the order of an Estate Officer lies to the District Judge, it is not to an authority specified by the State Government. This is to say, if on the date of presentation of the appeal, the appellate authority is a District Judge, by virtue of Section 9, either the learned District Judge must hear the appeal or he can transfer the same to any other Judicial Officer in that District, who has a standing as a District Judge for more than 10 years.
However, in the case of STAT, the appeal has to be dealt with only by the
Tribunal, to which an officer is appointed, by a notification in the Gazette.
37.In the case of Central Act, 9 of 1971, an appellate provision is in addition to the regular powers that are exercised by a District Judge. By virtue of Section 9, he is conferred with additional powers to deal with matters which comes before him. He does not stop being a Judge as understood in classical division of Sovereign powers as legislative, executive and judiciary. However, in the case of STAT, the officer who is appointed would have to get a Gazette notified in his or her name, prior to assuming charge and discharging the duties connected with that office. He does not automatically assume the office of STAT by virtue of being a District Judge.
38.At this juncture, it is beneficial to refer to Mukri Gopalan v
Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5. The Supreme Court, after examining the notification by which the appellate authority under Section 18 of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 comes to be appointed, concluded that the authority is constituted by designation as “the District Judge of the district” having jurisdiction over the area over which the Act has been extended. Even when the District Judge concerned ceases to hold office, his successor will pick up the thread of the proceedings from the stage where it was left and hence the appellate authority constitutes a “Court” and not a “persona designata”.
39.I called upon the Registry to circulate the notification on the
basis on which a Judicial Officer in the Tamil Nadu Judicial Services assumes office as a Chairman of STAT. The Registry circulated a latest notification issued by the State of Tamil Nadu on 10.05.2022. A comparative chart juxtaposing the notifications which appoint the appellate authorities under Section 89(2) Motor Vehicles Act and Section 18 of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 is provided below:
Notification under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Notification under the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central act 59 of 1988) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby appoints Dr. XXXXX, Additional District Judge & Presiding Officer, Principal Special Court under E.C.Act, Chennai on transfer and posting as Chairman, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Chennai in the existing vacancy.
(BY ORDER OF THE
GOVERNOR)
BUILDINGS (LEASE & RENT CONTROL) ACT, 1965-NOTN.
UNDER Section 18(1) CONFERRING ON DISTRICT JUDGES POWERS OF APPELLATE AUTHORITIES.
(Published in Kerala Gazette No. 38 dated 26th September, 1989: SRO: 1631/89) NOTIFICATION S.R.O. No. 1631/89 – In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 18(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) and in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject, the Government of Kerala hereby confer on the District judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the said Act have been extended, the powers of the Appellate Authorities for the purposes of the said Act, in the said areas.
40.This shows the Judicial Officer exercising the power as a Chairman, STAT has to be specifically appointed by name by His Excellency, the Governor of Tamil Nadu under a Notification. Whereas, the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, assumes office by virtue of being a judicial officer in the relevant jurisdiction. It is a Court of civil judicature being burdened with additional powers and functions. If not for the notification under the Motor Vehicles Act, a Judicial Officer cannot assume office of the said Tribunal. The powers exercisable by the officer are also within the four corners of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder. By virtue of merely being an officer in the judicial service, the concerned officer who assumes charge cannot be said to possess the characteristics of a regular Court of civil judicature. The appellate authority, who is appointed by name, acts only in his or her personal capacity and discharges the functions qua STAT, and not as a judicial officer forming part of the regular judicial hierarchy in Courts of Civil judicature. Thus, he does not exercise the sovereign judicial powers of the State and can be characterized only as a “persona designata”.
41.It is also germane to refer to the Tamil Nadu State Transport
Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1989, which, read with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, govern the functioning of the STAT. These rules specifically lay down procedures in respect of appeal or revision petitions before the STAT, time limit for preferring an appeal, hearing and adjournment, condonation of delay, leading evidence and aspects relating thereto. This evinces that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with the relevant rules is a self-contained code. There is no reference to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which governs the procedure in relation to the administration and functioning of Courts of Civil judicature.
42.To give another example, I would also refer to the judgment of the Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282. The Supreme Court was called upon to answer the issue of whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to a petition / application filed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. It was also to decide whether the petition under Section 16(3) of that Act, claiming enhanced compensation would have to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by Article 137. The Supreme Court in paragraph No.20 observed that as there is nothing in the Indian Telegraph Act to suggest that the “District Judge” referred to therein is not identified to refer to a District Court and held that the District Judge under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, acts as a Court of civil judicature while dealing with an application under Section 16. The relevant test laid down in the judgment is as follows:
“whereby statutes, matters are referred for determination by a Court on record with no further provision, the necessary implication is that the Court will determine the matters as a Court.”
43.It relied upon the judgment in National Telephone Company Limited v. Post Masters General, 1913 Appeal Cases 546. It is this principle which has been accepted in LIC’s case. As seen from Section 9 extracted above, an appeal lies to a District Court which is covered by Section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. By that Act governing interpretation of central statutes, Section 3(17) holds reference to the word ‘District Judge’, in any act of Central Legislature means a Judge of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in context. It was in these circumstances, in LIC’s case, the Supreme Court came to a conclusion that the District Judge who exercises power as an Appellate Authority under the Central Act 9 of 1971, exercises the power of Courts of Civil Judicature. There is an ocean of difference between an appeal lying to a District Court and an appeal lying to a Tribunal headed by a Judicial Officer, appointed to that post by a Special Notification issued by the Government.
44.I can also usefully refer to the judgment in Shyam Sunder
Aggarwal Vs. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1321. In the State of
Meghalaya, the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong and the Deputy Commissioner are clothed with the powers of a Court of civil judicature. This was by virtue of Rule 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Janitia Hills, 1937.
In the case before the Supreme Court, the Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner had passed an order. An appeal was filed before the Deputy Commissioner. Against the order of a Deputy Commissioner, a revision was preferred to the High Court under Rule 36A of the 1937 Rules. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a revision is tenable before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that since the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner have been clothed with the powers of a Court of civil judicature including the power to decide civil disputes in general within their territorial limits, the orders passed by them have to be treated as those passed by the Court of civil judicature and hence, a revision is maintainable. A revision to the High Court, as will be seen later from an order of STAT was
maintainable till the New Act of 1988 came into force. It was by virtue of the deeming provision under Section 64-B of the 1939 Act.
45.I am pointing out this judgment to show that unless and until there is a specific direction in the statutes which create a Tribunal that holds or deems it to be a Court of civil judicature, the Tribunals cannot be held as having a status on par with a Court of civil judicature. When the STAT does not exercise the power of a Court of civil judicature, as understood in the hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature, their orders cannot be excluded from the fold of Article 226.
46.It is this position which had been amplified by a Division Bench of this Court in P.Naveen Chakravarthy v. Punjab National Bank, 2021-1-Writ L.R. 289. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted hereunder:-
“It is too late in the day to suggest that a writ petition against a quasi-judicial authority will not lie under Article 226 of the Constitution and the grievance has to be carried only by way of a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution. It is the quality of the grievance
that may decide whether a party invokes Article 226 of the Constitution or Article 227 thereof against a quasi-judicial body. A quasi-judicial body, particularly a statutory body which is not a Court in the sovereign system of Courts but may be a tribunal, will be amenable to the writ jurisdiction.”
Applicability of LIC’s case
47.This shows that even in case of a Tribunal which is headed by a Judicial Officer, which forms outside the Sovereign System of Courts, should not be treated as a Court of civil jurisdiction. If the orders passed by such Tribunal do not constitute orders of such Court, then the judgment in LIC’s case is not applicable. A comparative chart extracted above shows that STAT, though a statutory Tribunal, cannot be treated as a Court within the Sovereign System of Courts. It is no doubt headed by an Officer belonging to the Judicial service. Yet, the Officer does not assume office by virtue of that position. It is only on the basis of a Notification that has been issued by the Government, the Officer gets the jurisdiction to assume position of a Chairman of STAT. Therefore, merely because a person is a Judicial Officer does not mean an order passed by the said officer as the Chairman of STAT becomes one passed by a Court of civil judicature. In such a scenario, LIC’s case is inapplicable in this context.
48.As rightly contended Mr.M.Palani, which is ably echoed by Mr.R.Rajesh Vivekananthan and Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal, the position of law has been settled by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in B.Rajagopala Naidu‘s case. The Supreme Court dealt with the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, which is in pari materia with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. After a survey of the entire Act, P.B.Gajendragadkar CJ, speaking for the Bench came to the following conclusion:-
“12.This scheme shows that the hierarchy of transport authorities contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act is clothed both with administrative and quasi-judicial functions and powers. It is well settled that Sections 47, 48, 57, 60, 64 and 64A deal with quasi-judicial powers and functions. In other words, when applications are made for permits under the relevant provisions of the Act and they are considered on the merits, particularly in the light of the evaluation of the claims of the respective parties, the transport authorities are exercising quasi-judicial powers and are discharging quasi-judicial functions, and so, orders passed by them in exercise of those powers and in discharging those functions are quasi-judicial orders which are subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226, vide New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd. and M/s. Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and others and R. Abdulla Rowther v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras and others, so that when we examine the question about the validity of the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the impugned order is concerned with matters which fall to be determined by the appropriate transport authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial powers and in discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.”
49.Section 64(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for the State Government to constitute the STAT which shall consist of a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge to hear appeals against orders of the Regional Transport Authority under Section 64(1). The Motor Vehicles (Tamil Nadu Second Amendment) Act, 1971 inserted Section 64-B to the principal Act. Section 64-B is a deeming provision which states that the STAT shall be deemed to be a court sub-ordinate to the High Court for the purposes of Section 115 of the CPC and its orders shall be liable to revision by the High Court. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 repealed the 1939 Act and a similar deeming provision is conspicuous by its absence in the 1988 Act. A comparative table below containing Section 64(2) of the 1939 Act and Section 89(2) of the 1988
Act shows that the latter is in pari materia with the former:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
64. Appeals.-
(2) The State Government shall constitute for the State a State Transport Appellate Tribunal which shall consist of a *** judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge :
Provided that in relation to a Union territory the Tribunal may consist of the Administrator of that territory or any officer who has judicial experience.
89. Appeals.—
(2) The State Government shall constitute such number of
Transport Appellate Tribunals as it thinks fit and each such Tribunal shall consist of a judicial officer who is not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court and it shall exercise jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by that Government.
50.Similarly, corresponding provisions which are in pari materia with Sections 47, 48, 57, 60, 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that provide for procedures for Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit, power to grant and impose conditions on stage carriage permits, applying for and granting permits, cancellation and suspension of permits, power of revision exercised by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against orders of State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, respectively, find place in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (See Sections 71, 72, 80, 86, and 90, respectively). However, in the absence of a similar deeming provision in the 1988 Act, the status quo before the 1971 Amendment, is restored. Consequently, the STAT cannot be said to constitute a “Court” and therefore is amenable to writ jurisdiction as held in B.Rajagopala Naidu’s case.
51.Under normal circumstances, I should have referred the issue to a Bench, in case a disagreement on a point of law arises. However, when the law has been so clearly declared by the Supreme Court in B.Rajagopala Naidu‘s case and when the law had not been taken note of into in the judgments relied upon by Mr.T.Mohan, I only have to follow the Constitution Bench and not the view taken by in the cases relied upon by him. When a judgment of a High Court does not take note of a judgment of the Constitution Bench which has directly answered the issue, then the former judgment cannot be relied upon as a precedent.
52.Since I have concluded that the order passed by the Tribunal as in the case of STAT headed by a Judicial Officer is not an order passed by a Court within the Sovereign System of Courts, the judgment in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabif Nath & others, (2015) 5 SCC 423 will not apply. Hence, a writ petition would certainly be maintainable challenging its order.
53.In the light of the above discussion, the preliminary objection raised by Mr.T.Mohan stands rejected. I hold these writ petitions to be maintainable.
54.Registry is directed to number the challenges made to the orders of STAT as Writ Petitions by following the directions of the Constitution Bench and not as Civil Revision Petitions.
55.The Court records its appreciation for Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal,
Additional Government Pleader, and Mr.R.Rajesh Vivekananthan,
Deputy Solicitor General for their effective assistance.
03.11.2025 
krk
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes / No
Neutral Citation : Yes / No
To
1.The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Chennai: 600 104.
2.The Regional Transport Authority,
Erode, Erode District.
3.The Superintendent of Police, Erode.
4.The Deputy Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Erode Town.
5.The Chairman, Erode Municipality, Erode.
6.The Commissioner, Erode Municipality, Erode.
7.The Divisional Engineer, (H.W. & R.W.) Erode.
8.The Inspector of Police, Erode.
9.The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Gobi.
10.The Secretary,
Regional Transport Authority, Tiruchengode.
11.K.A.Sivagami,
Prop. K.A.S. Bus Service,
Mettupalani Andavar Koil Street,
K.R.Palayam, Bhavani.
12.Tvl.D.C.B.S. Ltd., 205/d, East, Kongalamman Koil Street, Erode.
13.Muthupillai,
Pushparaj Bus Service,
Lakshmi Nagar, Vasagi College Post, Erode.
14.C.Pongodi
15.S.Pandurangan,
K.A.S. Bus Service,
K.A.S. Nagar, Marapalam Road, Karungalpalayam, Erode.
16.Tvl.K.A.S. Transports,
K.A.S. Nagar,
Marapalam Road,
Karungalpalayam, Erode 3.
17.Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited (Division 2), Coimbatore.
18.S.S.Murugesan,
P.S.G. Bus Service,
60, Thangaperumal Street, Erode 2.
19.R.Duraisamy, Arun Bus Service,
Thennanthoppu Thottam, Perumalmalai, R.N.Pudur, Erode 5.
20.P.K.N.Murthy,
P.K.N. Bus Service,
Kavinmanju Illam, Dheeran Chinnamalai Street, Moolapalayam, Erode.
21. R.Palanisamy, Gowri Bus Service, 223, Brough Road, Erode.
22. R.Chandrasekaran, Gowri Motor Service, 39, Prakasam Street, Erode.
23. N.Periasamy, Thirumalai Deivam Transports, 43, Kovai Main Road, Perundurai.
24.Tvl.Tholilar Transport Service, 161-B, Mettur Road, Erode 11.
25.P.Vijayalakshmi, Nanthakumar Bus Service, 46, K.K.Nagar, Erode-9.
26.S.Velumani,
Velumani Transport,
3/1 Balasubbrayalu Street, Erode.
27.T.S.Kumar,
T.S.P. Bus Service, 47, Nehru Veethi, Erode.
28.S.Subramaniam
29.P.Vivekanandan
30.Tvl.Sri Ramajayam Transport, 123, Agilmedu Street, Salt Colony, Erode 1.
31.Tvl.Raja Transports, 498, Perundurai Road, Erode.
32.P.Selvasundaram,
R.P.B.S. Bus Service,
No.2, Railway Station Road,
Erode 2.
33.D.Padmavathy
34.K.Dhanabalan
35.P.Sathasivam,
Palani Murugan Transport,
6/10, 12th Main Road, Kalingarayanpalayam, Bhavani.
36.P.Thangamani,
Thangam Transports, Thangamani Illam,
Lakshmi Nagar,
Vasavi College Post, Erode Taluk.
37.E.N.Manokaran
38.Tvl.Nataraja Transports, 143-A, Perundurai Road, Erode 11.
39.Tvl.Jai Balaji Transports, 99, Sathy Road, Erode 3.
40.K.S.Senthilnathan,
K.S.R. Bus Service, H-95, Periyar Nagar, Erode 1.
41.K.Mohanasundaram,
R.P.K. Transports, No.2, Ramamoorthy Street, Erode.
42.S.Jayalakshmi
43.P.Selvaraj,
Selvakumar Bus Service,
172, Rice Mill Road,
Moolapalayam, Erode 2.
44.M.Mariappan,
Karthikeyan Transport, 53/3 Balasubbarayalu Street, Erode.
45.A.M.V.Jayaraman,
Karthikeyan Transport, 16/23, K.N.K. Road, Karungalpalayam, Erode 3.
46.S.M.Govindasamy,
Secretary,
Makkal Nalam Membattu Maiyam,
Sottaiyamalayam, 22 East Street, R.N.Pudur, Erode 5.
47.M.Shanmugam,
No.6/1034, R.K.M. Transport, Kalingarayanpalayam, Bhavani.
48.N.Dhanasekaran,
R.K.M. Roadways, No.6/1033, Kalingarayanpalayam, Bhavani.
49.The President, District Bus Owners Association, Bus Mahal, Erode.
V.LAKSHMINARAYANAN, J.
krk
W.P.Nos.9356, 9825, 9826 & 10327 of 2015
03.11.2025
