(vi) The period already undergone shall be set off, and all sentences shall run concurrently. Fine Amount, if any, paid already shall also be taken into credit. (vii) The respondent police is directed to inform PW-2, and PW-2 shall be assisted in all respects with regard to making any further application before the District Legal Services Authority for additional compensation under the scheme, and if found eligible for any further amount, it shall be paid. 04.08.2025 Neutral Citation: Yes nsl D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J. nsl

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 04.08.2025
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY
Crl.A.No. 554 of 2022
Navarasan … Petitioner

Vs

State rep. by,
Inspector of Police,
All Women Police Station,
Udumalpet,
Tiruppur District.
(Crime No. 13/2020) … Respondent

Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to set aside the judgment dated 18.04.2022 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethimandram in Tiruppur Spl.S.C.No. 11 of 2021 convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 11(iv) read with Section 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 and undergo sentence of 3 years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment and for offence under Section 5(m) read with Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 and under 20 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment and for offences under Section 5(h) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and to undergo 20 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigourous Imrpisonment and for offence under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code to undergo 20 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment and for offence under Section 506(ii) of Indian Penal Code to undergo 7 years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to undergo 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment.
For Petitioner : Mr.S.Manoj Vasanth
For Respondent : Mr.J.R.Archana
Government Advocate (Crl.Side)

ORDER
A. The appeal :
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court (FAC), Tirupur, dated 18.04.2022, passed in Special S.C. No.11 of 2021. In the said case, the appellant was tried as the sole accused. In this judgment, he is referred to as Accused.

2. By the said judgment, the accused was convicted of the following offences:
Under Section Sentence

Section 11(iv) r/w Section 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012
Sentenced to undergo 3 years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment

Section 5(m) r/w Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012

Sentenced to undergo 20 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment.

Section 5(h) r/w Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
Sentenced to undergo 20 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigourous Imrpisonment

Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Sentenced to undergo 20 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment

Section 506(ii) of Indian Penal Code, 1860
Sentenced to undergo 7 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to undergo 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment.

Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

B. The Case of the Prosecution & The Trial:

3. On 12.10.2020, P.W.2 XXXXX came to the All Women Police Station, Udumalpet, and lodged a complaint stating that she is currently residing at XXXX and working as a daily wager. She has two daughters. Her elder daughter is 11½ years old and studying in the 7th standard. The accused was a married man residing near their house. About a month prior to the lodging of the complaint, he was standing in front of his uncle Balu’s house on the morning of 12.09.2020 (Saturday) at about 10:00 AM. From there, he called the de facto complainant’s daughter (the victim) on the pretext that his wife was calling her. The victim child informed him that she would inform her elders after they returned home and would then come to his house. To that, the accused replied that his wife was about to go out immediately and asked the child to come to his house at once. The child approached his house, stood in front of the doorway and called out for the accused’s wife. At that time, the appellant/accused pulled her inside the house by gagging her mouth with his hand and locked the door from inside. He then threatened the child at knifepoint and forced her to undress. Out of fear, the child did so. Thereafter, he took her to the bedroom and did things as if he were raping her.

4. The acts done by the accused were all mentioned in detail in the complaint, which included oral penetration and applying the mouth of the accused to the vagina of the child, etc. After that, the Child put on her dress and came home. From then on, she exhibited noticeable changes in behaviour, including poor sleep, sleep talking, frequent nocturnal awakenings, irregular eating habits, and a dull appearance. After noticing the child’s conduct, P.W.2 enquired from her, and after repeated prodding, the child finally cried and revealed the above. Therefore, she brought the child to the police station and lodged the complaint.

5. On this complaint, P.W.7 Thamilarasi registered the case as Crime No. 13 of 2020 for the alleged offences under Section 6 r/w 5(m) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and Section 6 r/w 5(h) of the same Act, under Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act. Thereafter, P.W.8 undertook the investigation, completed it, and filed the final report proposing the accused to be guilty of offences under Section 11(iv) r/w 12, Section 5(h) r/w 6, Section 5(m) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and Sections 376 AB and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code.

6. After considering the final report, on 04.09.2021, five charges for the aforesaid offences under Section 376AB, 506(ii) of IPC, 11(iv) r/w 12 of the POCSO Act, 5(h) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act, and 5(m) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act were framed against the accused, pointing out the sexual acts of the accused which were extracted above while summarising the complaint. The accused denied the charges and stood trial. The victim child was examined as P.W.1. The child stated that the accused had called her in the guise of his wife calling her. Believing the accused, she went and stood in front of his door and called the wife of the accused. At that point, she was gagged and whisked inside by the accused. After locking the door, the accused threatened the child by brandishing a knife. The child had also deposed that by using a white colour touch phone, the accused had photographed her without her dress and also insisted that the child should pose in a smiling manner. Terrified by the threat, the child did all the sexual acts that the accused asked her to do. The child explained about the oral penetration and the accused applying his mouth to her vagina, and also making her do so. The child explained the other acts in detail. The child was cross-examined. It was suggested that no such incident had occurred. She denied the suggestion. She admitted that she did not mention the orange colour of the handle of the knife in her 164 statement. The child again denied the suggestion that she withheld information about the incident because it did not happen. It was also suggested to the child that she was falsely deposing due to previous enmity, which she denied.

7. The de facto complainant/victim’s mother was examined as P.W.2. She described what the child had told her about the incident on 12.09.2020. After repeated encouragement when the child disclosed about the crime, she went to the police station on 12.10.2020 and lodged a complaint, which was marked as Ex.P2. The child’s birth certificate was also marked as Ex.P1, showing the date of birth as 21.02.2009. In cross-examination, two suggestions were made. The first point was that the entire area is crowded, to which P.W.2 replied that she was unaware of. The second suggestion was that she lodged the complaint due to previous enmity, which she denied. She further stated that there was no enmity between them and the accused.

8. The assistant surgeon, Dr. Manoj, who examined the accused and confirmed that he did not suffer from any sexual disability or impotency, testified as PW-3. The certificate issued by him was marked as Ex.P3. A teacher of the victim child, was examined as P.W.4 who was also the witness to the confession had deposed that the accused voluntarily confessed before the investigating officer, and the admissible portion of the confession was marked as Ex.P4. Since she was also a witness to the recovery Mahazar, it was marked as Ex.P5. The recovered mobile phone was marked as M.O.1, and the knife as M.O.2. It should be noted that P.W.4 was not cross-examined on behalf of the accused. Dr. Jothimani, who examined the victim child and prepared the medical report, was examined as P.W.5. The accident register copy was marked as Ex. P6, her medical examination report as Ex. P7, and her final opinion as Ex.P8. This witness was also not cross-examined by the accused. The witness to the observation Mahazar, and preparation of the rough sketch, was examined as P.W.6. The observation Mahazar was marked as Ex.P9.

9. Head Constable Thamilarasi, who registered the First Information Report, was examined as P.W.7. The First Information Report was marked as Ex.P10. She was also not cross-examined on behalf of the accused. The Investigating Officer was examined as P.W.8 and spoke about the detailed investigation conducted by her. The rough sketch prepared by her was marked as Ex.P11. The Form 91 for the production of the material object, the mobile phone, was marked as Ex.P12. The Form 91 for the other material object, the knife, was marked as Ex.P13. The 164 statement of the child, recorded on 16.10.2020, was marked as Ex.P14. The birth certificate of the victim child was again marked as Ex.P15. The forensic examination report analyzing the recovered mobile phone was marked as Ex.P16. The alteration report for changing the offences mentioned in the First Information Report into the charges for which the case was laid was marked as Ex.P17.

10. Even the Investigating Officer was not cross-examined on behalf of the accused. Subsequently, when the accused was questioned about the incriminating evidence on record, he denied it as false. No further evidence was presented on behalf of the defence. The trial Court then considered the arguments of the learned Special Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and found that, based on the clear evidence of the victim child P.W.1 and her mother P.W.2, along with the complaint Ex.P2 and other documentary evidence, all charges against the accused were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. After this, the sentence mentioned above was imposed on the accused. Aggrieved by this, the present appeal has been filed.

C. The Arguments:
11. Mr. S. Manoj Vasanth, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the present case arises from an incident dated 12.09.2020, while the complaint was lodged only on 12.10.2020, nearly a month later. There is no explanation provided for this delay. Additionally, he argued that the accused was residing nearby as usual, and the prosecution’s case is that the child confided in her mother on 12.10.2020. After consulting their family members, they immediately went to the police station. It is reasonable to expect that a prudent person would confront the accused, who lived in the neighborhood, right away; however, this was not done. Further, the evidence shows that the accused had no knowledge that P.W.2 was planning to lodge a complaint until the police arrived and arrested him. Consequently, there was no reason to believe the accused would intentionally delete any evidence from his mobile phone. When the mobile phone was examined, the Ex.P16 report clearly indicated that no such image, as claimed by the child, was present. The mobile phone M.O.1 was seized immediately at the time of arrest, following the complaint, and after examination, it was found that the child’s version was incorrect. This casts doubt on the entire version provided by the child. In fact, the child, P.W.1, and her mother were cross-examined on behalf of the accused, and it was suggested that the complaint was lodged due to previous enmity. In this context, the only corroboration presented by the prosecution was the recovery of the mobile phone, which did not contain any pictures of the victim child. Therefore, the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused.

12. The learned counsel further states that the neighborhood where the appellant/accused and the victim child resided is a crowded area, and the relevant period was during a lockdown when everyone was at home. In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that no one saw the child coming to the appellant’s house or witnessed the appellant forcibly taking the child inside. If the appellant had dragged the child by the hand into the house, the child’s immediate reaction would have been to raise an alarm, which also did not happen here. Therefore, the offence alleged against the appellant is serious, with a minimum punishment of 20 years. The more serious the offence, the stronger the evidence required by the prosecution. The prosecution did not produce any corroborating material except the statement of P.W.1, the victim child. P.W.2’s testimony is hearsay regarding the incident and only explains the delay. Furthermore, cross-examination casts serious doubts on the prosecution’s case regarding the delay. It is also submitted that the accused has already been in custody for approximately five years.

13. The learned counsel, also drawing the Court’s attention to the medical report, would argue that no injury was observed and the expert found no signs of sexual assault. This further casts doubt on the child’s version. Regarding the details of the acts committed by the accused—whether they constitute ordinary sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or fall within the definition of rape under Section 375—such a determination cannot be based solely on the victim child’s solitary evidence.

14. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the respondent would submit that P.W.1, the victim child, has vividly explained the details and spoken about the incident. Her evidence establishes an offence under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, as well as other offences under the POCSO Act and Section 506(ii) of the IPC. Her testimony is corroborated by the natural evidence of her mother, who explained the manner in which the child behaved after the incident and how, only after repeated inquiries and coaxing by the mother, the child broke down and revealed the incident. Therefore, no doubt arises regarding the versions of the victim child as well as the mother. In cases of this nature, the testimony of the victim child alone is sufficient to convict. When there is no doubt whatsoever regarding the child’s account, no further corroborative evidence is necessary. It is also noted that during the lockdown, the victim child and her mother resided at the said address along with the child’s grandfather.

15. Further, regarding the mobile phone, it is noted that the complaint was filed only on 12.10.2020, while the incident occurred on 12.09.2020. During this one-month gap, the accused could have deleted several data files. The forensic report also indicates that many deleted data files were recovered. Additionally, with the available tools, deleted data can only be recovered to a limited extent. According to expert evidence, some data may be non-retrievable due to the limitations of laboratory facilities at that time. Therefore, the mere inability to retrieve any photograph from M.O.1 does not undermine the prosecution’s case. Apart from this, the offense remains proven. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) submits that the trial Court imposed only the minimum sentence, and thus, no interference is necessary.

16. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side), by pointing out the nature of the allegations, would submit that, considering the Rape/aggravated sexual assault was committed, it was in a manner that there would be no injuries. Especially considering that the child was medically examined after a month, it is expected that the experts would not detect any symptoms of sexual assault on the child’s body. Therefore, the absence of injuries is immaterial.
D. The Discussion & Findings:
17. I have considered the rival submissions made and perused the material records of this case.
18. Even though the First Information Report was initially registered only under Section 5(m) r/w Section 6 of the POCSO Act, during the investigation, since the child was found to be less than 12 years old, a subsequent alteration report was filed and marked as Ex.P17, thereby including Section 376 AB as part of the offences. However, the contents of the offence under Section 376 AB and under Section 5(m) r/w Section 6 are essentially the same. In light of this, the prosecution was free to charge under the provision that carries the harsher punishment. Therefore, once the charge under Section 376 AB was framed, the fifth charge under Section 5(m) r/w Section 6 was redundant and should not have been framed. Consequently, charge No. 5 and the related conviction are liable to be set aside.

19. Regarding the other charges, the principal charge is under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code. The birth certificate of the victim child is marked as Ex.P1 and Ex.P15. Ex.P1 is the birth extract maintained by the Udumalpet Municipality, which includes the victim child’s name, her father’s and mother’s names, and explicitly states the date of birth as 21.02.2009. Ex.P15 is also an extract obtained by the Investigating Officer from the municipality, containing the same details along with the registration number and the date. The defence has not challenged these documents.

20. The incident occurred on 12.09.2020, on which date the child was 11 years, 6 months and 23 days old, therefore less than 12 years of age. The child has spoken about the fact that the accused had put his penis into the mouth of the victim child. She also spoke further about the fact that he applied his mouth to the vagina of the child. Even if a stronger scrutiny with reference to penetration is applied, and it is held that there is no clear evidence with reference to penetration, as per the amended definition of rape contained under Section 375(d) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the act of the appellant accused amounts to rape. Section 375(d) is extracted hereunder for ready reference:-
“ 375 (d) – applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person”

21. Absolutely nothing was raised on behalf of the accused to disbelieve the victim child’s account. Only one question was asked to the victim child, P.W.1, and her mother, P.W.2, indicating that the complaint was based on previous enmity. However, the defense did not even attempt to explain what that enmity was. Conversely, P.W.2 is a single mother who has been raising her daughters and, during the lockdown, moved to the residence of her father. Therefore, there could be no enmity in this regard. This also explains why they did not confront the accused/appellant and instead went directly to the police station, as they were migrants residing at that address during the lockdown. It was natural for them to go straight to the police rather than confront the accused. Additionally, considering that P.W.2 was a daily wage earner not living with her husband, these factors lend credibility to the version of the prosecution as to the manner in which the occurrence took place. When the appellant called the child, and she came to his house and stood at the main door calling his wife (“akka…akka” – sister), the child states that the appellant suddenly approached, grabbed her, even while gagging her mouth with his hand and whisked her inside the house. This happened within seconds, so the argument that someone should have seen the incident cannot be accepted.

22. Secondly, with reference to the behaviour of the victim, the argument of the defence cannot be accepted and is rejected in toto. Every victim will behave in their own way; it is not necessary that every child victim should physically resist, attack the accused, raise an alarm or immediately run from the scene crying and telling everyone. In this case, the child, upon being frightened by the conduct of the appellant, cooperated with all the acts and was made to swallow, suppress and undergo the dastardly act. In that state of mind, she put her dress on and returned home, weeping in silence. The evidence of P.W.2 regarding the child’s condition that she was half asleep, half awake, sleep talking, blabbering, down, depressed and completely energy-less, and unwilling to go out, all clearly explains the trauma undergone by P.W.1, the victim child. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting the argument of the defence that the victim child should have reacted differently. Each child will react in their own way, and that is exactly why these offences are considered very serious. The trauma that was endured and tried to be swallowed by the child itself highlights the predatory/perverse behaviour of the appellant.

23. The next argument from the defence that nothing was found during the medical examination is again illogical because the child has clearly explained the nature of the acts. The accused only threatened the child by wielding a knife; otherwise, the sexual acts were carried out in a manner that did not cause injuries or marks on the child. In such circumstances, it is natural that no injuries or physical signs of sexual assault would be present on the child’s body. Therefore, these arguments made on behalf of the defence must be rejected.

24. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the orange colour was not mentioned in the original 164 statement needs to be considered. From Ex.P2 (the complaint), the 164 statement of the victim child, and also in the evidence of the victim child, the fact that the petitioner brandished a knife has been consistently stated. Even during cross-examination, the child maintained her stance. What might seem like an embellishment is only the alignment with M.O.2, which was recovered by mentioning the colour of the knife handle as orange. Even if that part is ignored, the child has clearly spoken about the accused wielding the knife when she narrated the incident to P.W.2, her mother, and PW-2 when she lodged the complaint in Ex.P2, and when the child’s 164 statement was recorded and in the evidence, and cross-examination. Therefore, that argument is rejected.

25. This leaves us with the last but important argument made on behalf of the defence. It is true, from a review of the entire record, that the accused had no knowledge whatsoever that P.W.2 was going to the police station to lodge a complaint. The investigation team confronted the accused suddenly after the complaint, and he was immediately arrested, with his mobile phone also recovered. The prosecution, during the course of the investigation, took steps to examine the mobile phone forensically. The report, though marked, the author was not examined. However, since something is in favour of the accused, it was not objected to by the defence and even before this Court, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the accused on the document. even though the expert was not examined, is marked as Ex.P16. The analytical findings are reproduced below for easy reference.

“ ANALYTICAL FINDINGS

Mobile phone-Redmi**

a. 5506 Contacts, 52 Call logs, 9 Installed Applications, 228 chats (active/deleted), 10271 Image files (active/deleted), 317 Video files (active/deleted), 31 Audio files, 781 texts and 2 user account found stored were extracted.

b. On perusing user accounts, the mobile phone was found configured with social media applications viz: “WhatsApp” (No:?+919787740293?), Face book messenger (ID:100013646858358) and found made through 154 (active/deleted) chats, 74 chats respectively.

c. On perusing image files, all were of movie based and personal Images. No obscene contents were found stored.”

26. The report speaks for itself. It can be seen that all the 5506 contacts, 52 call logs, 99 installed applications, 228 chats (both active and deleted), 10,271 image files (both active and deleted), 317 video files (both active and deleted), 31 audio files, 781 texts, and 2 user accounts were all extracted. Upon perusing those files, the offending image of the child was not found. As a matter of fact, two other obscene videos were found. Therefore, it is clear that there was no such picture of the child contained in the phone of the appellant accused. The prosecution ought to have examined the said D.Velmurugan, who was the forensic expert. Before this Court, the Government Advocate (Crl.Side) argued that in the 161 statement given by the said witness D.Velmurugan, he also stated that there may be some other files which could not have been retrieved with the available tool. Firstly, such statements cannot be looked into by this Court when the witness has not been examined. Secondly, such statements run counter to the document (ExP-16) marked on behalf of the prosecution. Therefore, as a question of fact, I find that the prosecution has not proved that the accused had used M.O.1 to photograph the victim child in a nude manner.

27. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant is right in contending that when the offence under section 376 AB is a serious offence with a minimum punishment of 20 years, the quality of evidence presented should also be stellar in nature. In this regard, if the image had been retrieved and proved by properly examining the witness, that would have been of stellar quality. Therefore, in the absence of the same, this Court takes the said fact as not proved. Now, with the said finding of fact, the further argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the entire version of the victim child itself should be doubted. It is in this regard that the exact nature of the testimony given by the victim child becomes relevant, and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“vjphp xapl; fyh; lr; nghid itj;J ehd; ou!; ,y;yhky; ,Ug;gij nghl;nlh vLj;jhh;/ mjw;F rphpr;r khjphp ngh!; bfhLf;fDk; vd;W brhd;dhh;/”

28. Even in the 164 statement, the child has deposed as follows:
“mg;gwk; vd;id ou!;n! ,y;yhky; mtUila lr; nghdpy; nghl;nlhbty;yhk; vLj;jhy;/ nghl;nlht[f;F rphpr;r khjphp ngh!; FLf;fqk;D brhd;dhh;/ ngh!; FLf;fhl;o Fj;jpUntd; vd;W kpul;odhh;/

29. Thus, it is not the case that the child has spoken that the accused showed her the photographs and threatened her. It is not the child’s statement that she saw the picture even at the time of the incident. Had such a statement been made, the child’s version could have been doubted. Whether the accused actually took the photograph or not is within the knowledge of the accused, and therefore the mere fact that the prosecution was not able to retrieve any image from the cell phone, which was naturally recovered even before the accused had any knowledge of the complaint, would only lead to the finding of this Court that, the allegation to the extent that the accused also photographed the child is not proven. But even holding that the said allegations are not proved, I am of the view that the evidence of the victim child as well as the mother is stellar in quality so as to hold the offences under charges 1 to 4 against the accused as proved. Accordingly, I have no hesitation is upholding the conviction of the accused in respect of the said charges.

E. The Sentence & Compensation:
30. Now, regarding the question of sentencing, the learned counsel for the appellant makes an attempt to point out that even if the heinous acts of the accused are proven, the trial court has imposed a punishment of 20 years. He also points out that substantial fines have been levied on the accused, along with further default sentences. The appellant, being poor, has not paid the fine amount to date. The counsel’s argument is understandable. However, the punishment imposed is only the minimum mandatory sentence under Section 376 AB, and therefore, neither the trial court nor this court is authorised to impose a sentence shorter than 20 years in terms of imprisonment. As such, there can be no reduction in the sentence. Regarding the fine, Section 376 AB states that it should be sufficient to cover medical expenses and the child’s rehabilitation.

31. In the instant case, it is pleaded on behalf of the appellant/accused that he is economically poor person, unable to pay even the Rs. 10,000/- which is already imposed on him. Upon perusal of the records, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) would confirm that from the victim fund, a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- has already been paid as compensation to the child. If any further amount is payable under the scheme, the same shall also be paid upon P.W.2 making an application before the Legal Services Authority in that regard. There were no major medical expenses in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, considering the nature of the case, I am of the view that the fine as imposed by the trial Court is also appropriate. However, the default sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment for non-payment of fine is on the higher side, especially considering the fact that already a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment is imposed on the accused. Therefore, for the default of payment of the fine, the accused shall undergo one month of simple imprisonment. Similarly, with reference to the other offences also, for default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo one month’s simple imprisonment. To the said extent, the sentence that is imposed by the trial Court is interfered with by this Court.

F. The Result:
32. In the result, this criminal appeal is partly allowed on the following terms:
(i) The conviction and sentence imposed on the accused in respect of the charge punishable under Section 6 r/w Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act, 2012 shall stand set aside;
(ii) The accused is convicted of an offence punishable under Section 11(iv) r/w Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and he is sentenced to undergo 3 years of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month;
(iii) The accused is found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 5(h) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and is sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In case of failure to pay the fine, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month;
(iv) The accused is found guilty of the offence under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and is sentenced to undergo 20 years of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In default of payment of fine, to undergo one month of simple imprisonment;
(v) The accused is convicted of an offence under Section 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, he must undergo one month of simple imprisonment.
(vi) The period already undergone shall be set off, and all sentences shall run concurrently. Fine Amount, if any, paid already shall also be taken into credit.
(vii) The respondent police is directed to inform PW-2, and PW-2 shall be assisted in all respects with regard to making any further application before the District Legal Services Authority for additional compensation under the scheme, and if found eligible for any further amount, it shall be paid.

04.08.2025
Neutral Citation: Yes
nsl

D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J.
nsl
To

1. The Sessions Judge,
Magalir Neethimandram, Tiruppur.

2. Inspector of Police,
All Women Police Station,
Udumalpet, Tiruppur District.

3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.
Crl.A.No. 554 of 2022

04.08.2025