THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE C . K U M A R A P P A N WP.Nos.8916, 10456, 21164 and 21848 of 2025 and WMP.Nos.10018, 11769, 11771, 23898, 24048, 24650, 24651 and 24653 of 2025 W. P ( M D ) N o . 8 9 1 6 o f 2 0 2 5 1. S.Siva 2. K.Bharathi Rajan 3. B.Varatharajan 4. V.Sureshkumar … PetitionersVs. 1.The State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by its Additional Chief

2025:MHC:2523
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 08.08.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 04.11.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE C . K U M A R A P P A N
WP.Nos.8916, 10456, 21164 and 21848 of 2025 and
WMP.Nos.10018, 11769, 11771, 23898, 24048, 24650, 24651 and 24653 of 2025

W. P ( M D ) N o . 8 9 1 6 o f 2 0 2 5
1. S.Siva
2. K.Bharathi Rajan
3. B.Varatharajan
4. V.Sureshkumar … PetitionersVs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Home (Prohibition & Excise) Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009.

2.The Director General of Police(Head of Police)
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004.

3. M.Venkatesan
4. G.Annadurai
5. M.Gunasekaran
6. M.Shanmugam
7. K.Pradeep
8.Dinakaran
9.G.Pravin Kumar
10.P.M.Thangavel
11. T.Saravanan
12. K.Annadurai
13.A.V.Elamurugam
14. A.Annadurai
15. H.Krishnamurthy
16. S.Selvakumar
17. S.Unnikrishnan … Respondents
(R3 to R17 are impleaded as per order dated 02.04.2025 in W.M.P.No.13539/25)
P r a y e r : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to fill up the post of Additional Superintendent of Police coming under Class-I Category (2) of Tamil
Nadu Police Service, by drawing regular panel through Departmental Promotion
Committee (DPC) in consideration of regular members of service in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police in accordance with apportionment of vacancies following Ratio Rule 1:2 between direct recruits and recruitment by transfer to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police in every recruitment year, by replacing the temporary promotion to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police with regular promotion and consequently direct the respondents to fill up the post of Superintendent of Police in accordance with Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Police Service, in consideration of representation submitted by the petitioners dated 10.01.2025 and 20.02.2025 with all consequential and other attendants benefits, within a time frame to be fixed by this Court.
For Petitioners : Mr.B.Vijay, for Mr.M.Mohamed Muzammil

For R1 & R2 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.G.Nanmaran, Spl.Govt. Pleader
For R3 to R6,
R8 to R10, R12&
R14 to R17 :Mr.MA.Gouthaman
For R11 & R13 : Mr.S.Silambannan, Senior Counsel for Mr.A.Ashwin Kumar
For R7 : Mr.K.Sampath Kumar

W. P. N o . 1 0 4 5 6 o f 2 0 2 5
1.G.Parthiban
2.Ameer Ahmed
3. K.Kiruthika
4. S.Rithu … Petitioners
Vs
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Home (Prohibition & Excise) Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009.
2.The Director General of Police(Head of Police)
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004.
3. P.Stephen
4. N.Kottieswaran
5. P.Jayakumar
6. R.Mathiazhagan
7.S.Unnikrishnan
(R7 impleaded vide order dated
27.06.2025 made in W.M.P.No.
19636 of 2025) … Respondents
P r a y e r : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records relating to the
Government Orders issued by the 1st respondent in G.O.Ms.No.263 dated
30.05.2022, G.O.Ms.No.143, dated 29.03.2023, G.O.Ms.No.214 dated 14.03.2024 and G.O.Ms.No.697 dated 17.12.2024 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st and 2nd respondent to promote the petitioners to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police by drawing a regular panel in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police by following the ratio 1:2 between direct recruits and recruitment by transfer on regular basis in the sanctioned vacancies and grant all attendant benefits to the petitioners from the date on which they became eligible for promotion to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police.
For Petitioners : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Senior Counsel for Mr.AR.Karthik Lakshmanan
For R1 & R2 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.G.Nanmaran, Spl.Govt. Pleader
For R3 :Mr.Balan Haridas
For R4 : Mr.K.Venkataramani, Senior Counsel
for Mr.M.Muthappan
For R5toR7 : Mr.MA.Gouthaman
W. P. N o . 2 1 1 6 4 o f 2 0 2 5
1.Kokila
2.S.Pugazhenthi Ganesh … Petitioners
Vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Home (Prohibition & Excise) Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009.

2.The Director General of Police(Head of Police)
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore,
Chennai-600 004.
3.The Director General of Police,
(Head of Police Force),
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore,
Chennai-600 004. … Respondents
P r a y e r : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the 1st respondent pertaining to G.O.Ms.No.263 dated 30.05.2022 along with the Police Note No.8 issued by the 2nd respondent dated 31.05.2022, G.O.Ms.No.143 dated 29.03.2023 along with the police Note No.4 issued by the 1st respondent dated 17.04.2023, Note No.9 issued by the 1st respondent dated 12.06.2023, G.O.Ms.214 dated
14.03.2024 along with the police Note No.5 issued by the 1st respondent dated
15.03.2024 and G.O.Ms.No.697 dated 17.12.2024 along with the police Note
No.13 issued by the 2nd respondent dated 27.12.2024 and quash the same.
For Petitioners : Mr.Richardson Wilson
For R1to R3 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.G.Nanmaran, Spl.Govt. Pleader
W. P. N o . 2 1 8 4 8 o f 2 0 2 5
1.Kokila
2.S.Pugazhenthi Ganesh … Petitioners
Vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Home (Prohibition & Excise) Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009.

2.The Director General of Police(Head of Police)
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004.

3.The Director General of Police,
(Head of Police Force),
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore,
Chennai-600 004. … Respondents
P r a y e r : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents 1 and 2 to draw up an interse seniority list for the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police for the panel years 2012-13 and 2013-14 in accordance with law within a time frame to be fixed by this Court and further direct the respondents to draw up a panel for promotion of Deputy Superintendent of Police as Additional Superintendent of
Police and effect further promotions only on the basis of such panel.
For Petitioners : Mr.Richardson Wilson
For R1to R3 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.G.Nanmaran, Spl.Govt. Pleader
C O M M O N O R D E R
These writ petitions are yet another set of vexed issue of inter se seniority between the direct recruits DSPs’ and promotee DSPs’.

2.Since the fact and law involved in all the writ petitions are one and the same, all are taken together for consideration and for common orders.

3.For convenience sake, this Court deems it appropriate to refer the pleading mostly from W.P.No.10456 of 2025.
4.The writ petition in W.P.No.10456 of 2025 has been filed challenging four G.Os, qua G.O.Ms.No.263, dated 30.05.2022, G.O.Ms.No.143, dated
29.03.2023, G.O.Ms.No.214, dated 14.03.2024 and G.O.Ms.No.697 dated
17.12.2024, on the ground that the above GO’s offend Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Another writ petition in W.P.No.21164 of 2025 is also for the same relief.

5.Apart from the above two writ petitions, the third writ petition W.P.No.8916 of 2025 was filed for Mandamus directing the authority to fill up the Promotional post by drawing a regular panel through the departmental promotion committee.

6.Similarly, the prayer in the Fourth writ petition W.P.No.21848 of 2025 is also for a Writ of Mandamus to draw inter se seniority from the panel year 2012
– 2013 to 2013-2014, and for promotion based upon such panel.

7.The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of these writ petitions are as follows:
The petitioners are directly recruited Deputy Superintendent of Police. The first and second respondents are the Official respondents. The respondents 3 to 6 are the promotee Deputy Superintendents of Police, who have now been promoted to the cadre of Additional Superintendents of Police. The post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, comes within Class-II, Category-1 of Special Rules for
Tamil Nadu Police Service(herein after called ‘Special Rules’). According to the Special Rules, the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police has two mode of recruitment namely, direct recruitment and recruitment by transfer from the post of Inspector of police.
8.According to Class-II Category-1 of Special Rules, the proportion in which “substantive” vacancies of DSPs’ has to be filled up is in the ratio of 1 :2 between “Direct Recruitment” and the “Recruitment by Transfer”.
9.The main grievance of the petitioners are that the Official respondents have promoted the Inspectors of police from the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Service, by way of recruitment by transfer to the post of Deputy Superintendents of Police, not only in the substantive post, but also to the temporary post, over and above the permissible ratio of 1:2, thereby denied the legitimate seniority to them. It is their further submission that, by temporary promotion granted under Section 17(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Service(Conditions of Service)Act, 2016,[hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’], the direct recruit’s legitimate expectation for consideration for promotion is affected.

10.It is the further submission of the petitioners that the respondents 1 and 2 by invoking Section 47 of the Act, have given further promotions to the temporarily promoted DSPs to the post of Additional Superintendents of Police, ignoring the direct recruits who hold the substantive post. For this purpose, the Official respondents invoked Section 58 of the Act, and relaxed the condition stipulated in Section 41(1) of the Act. According to the petitioner, for the past 20 years, further promotions have been given based up on the temporary panel by relaxing the mandatory condition of declaration of probation.

11. In other words, the respondents and other similarly situated persons have been temporarily promoted to the post of Additional Deputy Superintendents of Police, again being considered for promotions to the post of Superintendents of Police, in the absence of an approved panel. It is in this background, the petitioner would contend that the act of the Government in concluding the panel who are fit for promotion to the post of Additional Superintendents of Police for the year 2021 – 2022, year 2022-2023, year 2023-2024 and for the panel year 2024 – 2025, through the impugned four G.Os’ are illegal and as a consequence prayed to quash the same.
12.Heard,Mr AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.AR.Karthick Lakshmanan, for the petitioners in W.P.No.10456 of 2025,Mr
B.Vijay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.8916 of 2025, Mr.Richardson Wilson, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.21164 and 21848 of 2025, Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr.G.Nanmaran, learned Special Government Pleader for R1 and R2 in all W.Ps, Mr.MA.Gouthaman, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.3 to 5, 8 to 10, 12, 14 to 17, Mr.K.Sampath Kumar, learned counsel appearing for R7, Mr.S.Silambannan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.A.Ashwin Kumar, for R11 and R13 in W.P.No.8916 of 2025, Mr.Balan Haridas, learned counsel appearing for R3, Mr.K.Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.M.Muthappan, for R4, and Mr.MA.Gouthaman, learned counsel appearing for R5 to R7 in W.P.No.10456 of 2025.

13.The learned Senior Counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, would vehemently contend that Section 17(3) of the Act enables the Government for temporary appointment only in emergency circumstances, and even in such temporary appointment, the appointees will be replaced by an approved candidate as soon as possible. It is his further argument that, according to Section 47(1) of the Act, those who got the temporary promotional post over and above the substantive vacancy cannot claim seniority or precedence over the direct recruits, who are appointed in their substantive vacancy. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the appointment in the temporary post prior in point of time will not be a ground to seek preferential seniority against the direct recruits who are officiating in the substantive post. Hence, he prays to interfere with the impugned G.Os.
14. Apart from adopting the aforesaid contention, Mr B.Vijay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.8916 of 2025, would contend that the official respondents have promoted the promotee candidates without the concurrence of the Public Service Commission and the Departmental Promotion Committee. Accordingly, those promotions are illegal and that, if such illegal promotion are not interfered with, the same would affect the morale of the direct recruits. It is his further submission that any regularisation of temporary promotion over and above the number of substantive vacancies are contrary to the Act.
15. In addition to the above submission, Mr.Richardson Wilson, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.21164 of 2025 would submit that if such illegal promotions are not interfered with, the concept of bringing fresh blood into the system through direct recruits would be defeated. Accordingly, he prayed for mandamus to draw the inter Seniority. Thus, all the petitioners’ counsels pray to allow all the writ petitions. In support of their contention they relied the following judgment:
(i).In N.K.Chauhan & Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 308.
(ii).In A.P.M. Mayankutty & Others vs. The Secretary & Anr., reported in
(1977) 2 SCC 715.
(iii).In Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 715
(iv).In Keshav Chandra Joshi vs. Union of India, reported in (1992)
Supp(1) SCC 272.
(v).In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., Vs. V.E.Paripooranam & Others, reported in (1992) Supp(1) SCC 420.
(vi).In Madan Gopal Garg vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, reported in
(1995) Supp(3) SCC 366.
(vii)In K.Mathalaimuthu & Ors., vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in (2006)6 SCC 558.
(viii)In Vinod Giri Goswai & Ors., vs, State of Uttarakhand and Others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 161.
(ix)In R.Ranjith Singh & Others vs. The State of Tamil Nadu & Others, reported in (2025) INSC 612.

15(a).Per contra, Mr P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents, in his usual dexterity, would contend that there is a huge delay in filing the present writ petition. The learned Advocate General would submit that having joined service during 2015 – 2016, they cannot challenge the seniority after a lapse of 10 years. Therefore, their claim is hit by delay and latches, more specifically under Section 40(6) of the Act. It is his further submission that according to Explanation-II of Section 7 of the Act, when qualified candidate is included in the temporary list, they cannot be overlooked later on, in preference to a person who was not included in the said temporary list.

15(b).It is the further submission of the learned Advocate General that having the seniority converged at the level of Deputy Superintendent of Police at the ratio of 1 : 2 between the direct recruit and the promotee, the question of expecting same ratio even at the promotional post is contrary to the Service Jurisprudence. He would also contend that according to Section 40(2) of the Act, the seniority of a person is the date on which he is first appointed to that service, class, category or grade. In the case in hand, having the promotee Deputy Superintendents of Police, were appointed to the cadre even prior in point of time before the petitioners borne into the cadre, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the seniority of the promotee Deputy Superintendents of Police.

15(c).The learned Advocate General would further submit that the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Ranjith Singh and Others case(cited supra) will have no application to the respondents, as these respondents were recruited as Sub-Inspector of Police in the year 1994, whereas the R a njith Sin g h c ase relates to the recruitment which happened thereafter. The learned Advocate General would also submit that the precedent relied by the petitioners are not applicable to the present facts of the case, as those precedents did not emanate under Tamil Nadu Act. Therefore, he would submit that the present writ petitions are devoid of merits and prays to dismiss the writ petitions.
16.The other learned counsels, who represents the private respondents, though have adopted the argument of the learned Advocate General, also submitted the following further arguments.

16(a).Mr.Balan Haridas, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent in W.P.No.10456 of 2025 would contend that, since the petitioners did not challenge the original G.O.Ms.No.726, dated 13.12.2015, the question of challenging the consequential order is illegal. Furthermore, he contends that the petitioner did not submit relevant records so as to demonstrate that these respondents were not appointed in a sanctioned post. He would further submit that apart from delay and latches, the present writ petition is also hit by the principles of res ju dic ata in view of the earlier order passed in W.P(MD)No.5595 of 2023 dated 22.06.2023.

16(b).Similarly, Mr.Gowthaman, learned counsel appearing for R3 to R6, R8 to R10, R12 & R14 to R17 in W.P.No.8916 of 2025 would contend that by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.213 dated 28.05.2020, and G.O.Ms.No.165, dated
29.02.2024, the seniority between the direct recruit and promotee has got merged. The learned counsel Mr.Sampath Kumar, appearing for the seventh respondent in W.P.No.8965 of 2025 would contend that the petitioners are legally and morally have no locus standi to file these writ petitions, as their very recruitment is under scanner.

16(c).The learned Senior Counsel Mr.Venkataramani, who is appearing for the fourth respondent in W.P.No.10456 of 2025, would contend that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties, as the petitioners failed to implead all the affected persons. Apart from that, the learned Senior Counsel would invite the attention of this Court to the G.O.Ms.No.976 dated 28.12.2015 and would contend that, in view of no
challenge to the above G.O., the seniority of the promotee reached it’s finality. It is his further submission that, even if there was any administrative lapse, the same does not dislodge the benefits accrued upon the individuals. 16(d).Mr.Silampannan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos11 and 13 in W.P.No.8916 of 2025 would contend that the prayer of the writ petition cannot be granted as there was no violation to the service rules. Hence, all the respective counsels prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.

17. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of either side.

18. In all the cases, the fundamental question that arises for our consideration would be, whether the practice adopted by the Government in considering the temporarily appointed Deputy Superintendents of Police for further promotion, by relaxing the mandatory conditions provided in the Special Rules of Tamil Nadu Police Service routinely, without there being any special reason, is legal. If so, how the inter-se seniority to be reckoned?
19. Before answering the above point, I deem it appropriate to deal with the judgment relied on by either party.

20(a). Let me start with the judgments relied on by the Petitioner. In APM Mayankutty vs. Secretary, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 360. While referring to Rule
10(a)(i)(1) of the Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the period of temporary service was purely a stop-gap or emergency arrangement, and that such tenure does not count for seniority even if the candidate qualifies to hold such a post.

20(b). The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association case(cited supra), ultimately held that, the ad hoc appointment, which was made as a stopgap arrangement, will not count for seniority. For ready reference, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the relevant para No.47 of the said judgment :
“47. To sum up, we hold that:
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.
(C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.
(D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down.
(E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date.
(F) Where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule.
(G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject.
(H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative.
(I) The posts held by the permanent Deputy Engineers as well as the officiating Deputy Engineers under the State of Maharashtra belonged to the single cadre of Deputy Engineers.
(J) The decision dealing with important questions concerning a particular service given after careful consideration should be respected rather than scrutinised for finding out any possible error. It is not in the interest of Service to unsettle a settled position. With respect to Writ Petition No. 1327 of 1982, we further hold:
(K) That a dispute raised by an application under article 32 of the Constitution must be held to be barred by principles of res judicata including the rule of constructive res judicata if the same has been earlier decided by a competent court by a judgment which became final.
In view of the above and the other findings recorded earlier, we do not find any merit in any of the civil appeals, writ petitions and special leave petitions which are accordingly dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs.” (emphasise supplied)
20.(c).In Keshav Chandra Joshi’s case(cited supra), the three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association case(cited supra), has held in para No.19 that the appointment made in substantive capacity alone will count for seniority, and that such appointment must have been made in accordance with the Rules. Similarly, in Para No.24 of the same judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that any promotion outside the quota would not be reckoned for seniority.
20(d). The three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.Paripoornam case(cited supra), after referring A.P.M. Mayankutty & Others, case has held that temporary service before regular appointment cannot be counted for seniority, and that the regularisation should be counted only for the limited purpose of earning increment and commencement of probation.
20(e). In Madan Gopal Garg v. State of Punjab and Haryana case(cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to N.K.Chauhan’s case(cited supra) has held in para No.12, that once it is held that the appointment of the appellant is in excess of the quota fixed, then the said appointment has to be treated as an invalid appointment until a substantive vacancy arises in the respective quota. For ready reference, the relevant para is extracted hereunder:
12. Once it is held that the appointment of the appellant was in excess of the quota fixed for promotees and officers appointed by transfer, the said appointment has to be treated as an invalid appointment, and it can be treated as a regular appointment only when a vacancy is available against the promotion quota against which the said appointment can be regularised. In other words, any such appointment in excess of the quota has to be pushed down to a later year when it can be regularised as per the quota and such an appointment prior to regularisation cannot confer any right as against a person who is directly appointed within the quota prescribed for direct recruits
[See : N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat]”
(emphasis supplied)
20(f).In MD.Israils and Others case(cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that even if the Public Service Commission approved the ad hoc appointment at a later stage, their service until such approval will not count for their seniority.
21. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WP.No.8916 of
2025 is very much relying upon the judgment in K.Madalaimuthu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu,reported in 2006(6) SCC 558. They would contend that the present writ petition will not be hit by the principles of res ju dic ata, as the earlier
judgment of the learned single Judges in W.P(MD)No.5595 of 2023 and W.P(MD)NO.4249 of 2023 had not considered the above Supreme Court
judgment on this subject. According to their submission, M a d al ai M u t h u’s c ase was not at all considered by the learned Single Judges; therefore, the present writ petitions are not hit by the doctrine of res ju dic ata.
22. The M a t h alai m uth u’s c ase( cited su pr a) also arose between the direct recruit and promotee and dealt the Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules, which is equivalent to the present Section 17 of the Act 2016. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after elaborate reasoning, has ultimately held that the inter se seniority in a cadre has to be determined only in respect of the substantive post and not against a temporary post. For ready reference, it is appropriate to extract Para Nos.. 24 and 26 hereunder:
“24. On a consideration on the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the decisions cited on their behalf, the consistent view appears to be the one canvassed on behalf of the appellants, the decisions cited by Mr. Rao have been rendered in the context of Rule 10 (a) (i) (1) and the other relevant rules which are also applicable to the facts of the instant case. Apart from the above, the law is well settled that initial appointment to a post without recourse to the rules of recruitment, is not an appointment to a service as contemplated under Rule 2 (1) of the General Rules, notwithstanding the fact that such appointee is called upon to perform duties of a post borne on the cadre of such service. In fact, Rule 39 (c) of the General Rules indicate that a person temporarily promoted in terms of Rule 39 (a) is required to be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service who is entitled to the promotion under the Rules. It stands to reason that a person who is appointed temporarily to discharge the functions in a particular post without recourse to the recruitment rules, cannot be said to be in service till such time as his appointment is regularized. It, therefore, follows that it is only from the date on which his services are regularized that such appointee can count his seniority in the cadres.
25……….
26.We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High court and direct the respondents concerned to re-determine seniority of the appellants in relation to the promotees after reckoning the starting point of seniority of such promotees from the date on which their services were regularized and not from the date of their initial appointment under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the General Rules.”
(emphasise supplied)

23. In yet another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Giri Goswami and Others case(cited supra), has held that continuous long working in an ad hoc post does not confer any benefit for seniority. Apart from the above cases, on a similar proposition, the petitioner relied on certain other judgments,but the reference to those judgments will only be a multiplication of decision. Therefore, I refrained to refer those judgments to avoid verbosity.
24. In K.Meghachandra Singh and Others vs. Ningam Siro and Others, reported in (2020) 5 SCC 689, the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no backdated notional seniority will be given to the direct recruit based on the year in which the recruitment process was undertaken.
25(a). On behalf of the respondent, to counter the line of decision submitted by the petitioners, they relied upon the judgment in Amith Singh vs. Ravindra Nath Pandey and Others, reported in(2022) SCC online SC1559, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that a direct recruit cannot claim seniority from the date when a vacancy arises in the cadre.
25(b). The learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and Others, reported in (2003)5 SCC 604, which deals with the merit-based seniority, and also held that seniority is not a fundamental right. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in the above judgment that the merit-based seniority has no role to play in the matter of the determination of inter se seniority.
26. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also relied the judgment of the learned single Judge in the writ petition in W.P.No.4249 of 2023(Sathishkumar vs. State of Tamil Nadu), wherein a writ of Mandamus was sought to draw the inter se seniority between directly recruited Deputy Superintendents of Police, and the promotee Deputy Superintendents of
Police,but the same was dismissed relying the order passed by the another Learned Judge of this court in W.P(MD)No.5595 of 2023(M.Ramachandran vs.
The State of Tamil Nadu). InM.Ramachandran’s case, where the learned single
Judge, by referring to Section 3(b) of the Act 2016 has held that the word “appointed to service” has to be understood as referred to in the Section qua, when the person actually first discharges his duty.
27. Now, let us discuss the factual position in the backdrop of the above precedents. It is well-settled principle of law that the right of promotion is not a fundamental right; at the same time, the right of eligible employees to be considered for promotion is virtually a part of their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The fair consideration in the matter of promotion flows from Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Here, the main thrust of the argument of the petitioner is that their fundamental right of consideration for promotion is being affected by the illegal procedures followed by the official respondents in a routine manner without giving due regard to the special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Police Service.
28. At this juncture, it is relevant to discuss the argument of the respondents regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition. According to the respondents, in view of the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.5595 of 2023 and
W.P.No.4249 of 2013, the present writ petition is hit by the doctrine of res judic ata. The said argument was strongly objected by the petitioners. The above writ petitions were filed to fix the seniority and the learned single Judge by referring to Section 40 of the Act 2016, reiterated the rule position that the seniority should be reckoned from the date when they were first appointed to service, this Court is absolutely in full agreement with the above findings. But the distinguishing factor urged in the present writ petition is whether such reckonment of seniority should only be in respect of the permanent cadre, or may apply to the temporary cadre too.
29.In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mathalaimuthu’s case(cited supra), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 24 and 26 has categorically held that the temporary appointment will not count for seniority. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mathalaimuthu’s case(cited supra) was not referred to before the learned single Judge. Therefore, in the earlier writ petition, this Court had no occasion to go into the question whether the seniority referred to under Section 40 of the Act is in reference to the permanent cadre or not. In view of Mathalaimuthu’s case(cited supra), the position became very clear that the seniority referred to in Section 40 of the Act should only refer to the permanent cadre post. Further in Para 18 and 19 of the judgment held that, until the temporary appointee, appointed in substantive post, they cannot be considered as a member of service. For ready reference, para 18 and 19 are extracted hereunder:
“18. In su p p o rt of su c h pr o p o sition, relian c e w a s pla c e d o n the d e cisi o n of this C o u rt in V. Sre e nivas a R e d d y v. G o vt. of A . P. [ 1 9 9 5 S u p p ( 1) S C C 5 7 2 : 1 9 9 5 S C C ( L & S ) 5 7 9 : ( 1 9 9 5 ) 2 9 A T C 4 9 5 ] w h erein this C o u rt w a s c alled u p o n to c o n side r the disp ute inv olvin g inter se se ni o rity b et we e n p e rs o n s te m p o r arily a p p ointe d as A s sistant E x e c utive E n g in e ers d e h o rs the R u le s, to fill e m erg e nt va c a n cies as a g ainst dire ct re cruits. It w a s h eld that sin c e the a p p oint m e nts of the a p p ellants c o n c e r n e d w ere u n d er R u le 1 0 ( a)(i)( 1), they w ere n ot m a d e o n the b asis of sele ctio n by the P u blic S e rvic e C o m m issi o n a n d, theref ore, their a p p oint me nts w er e m a d e oth er wise than in a c c ord a n c e with the S p e cial R u l es. T h ey c o uld n ot, theref ore, be members of the service till they were appointed to the service in accordance with the Special Rules. It was also held that a direct recruitee takes his seniority from the date on which he starts discharging the duty of the post borne on the cadre while a temporary appointee appointed dehors the Rules or on ad hoc basis or to a fortuitous vacancy gets seniority from the date of regular appointment. C o n sid erin g further the effe ct of R u les 4, 2 3 ( a) a n d 3 3 ( a) of the R u les a n d R u l e 5 of the su b- rules, this C o u rt w e nt o n to h old that a P u blic S e rvice C o m m issi o n c a n did ate g ets his seni o rity fro m the d ate o n w hic h h e starts disc h argin g his d uties o n the p o st b o r n e o n the c a dre a n d his se ni ority sh all b e d eter min e d with effe ct fro m that d ate w hile in respe ct of te m p o r ary a p p ointees u n d e r R u l e 1 0 ( a)(i)( 1), w h o are su bse q u e ntly a p p ointed in a c c ord a n c e with the R u l es, the te m p o r a ry se rvice ren dere d pri o r to their a p p oint m e nt w o ul d n ot b e c o u nte d to w ards their se nio rity.
19. Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in State of T.N. v. E. Paripoornam [1992 Supp (1) SCC 420 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 4 1 5 : ( 1 9 9 2 ) 1 9 A T C 6 5 3 ] w h erein als o the pr ovisi o ns of R u le 1 0 ( a)(i)( 1) of the Ta mil N a d u State a n d S u b ordin ate S e rvices R u le s w ere u n d er c o n sid er atio n in respe ct of junio r pr ofess o rs w h o w ere later a p p ointe d o n a re g ular b asis o n the b asis of a n a p pr o ve d list pre p are d by the P u blic S e rvice C o m m issi o n. E v e n th o u g h the services of su c h te m p o r ary a p p ointees w er e inten d e d to b e re g ularise d with effe ct fro m the d ates of their o rigin al a p p oint m e nts o n a te m p o r ary b asis, this C o u rt h eld that they would not be entitled to count their
temporary service for the purpose of seniority and that the services rendered by the appointees under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) could not be considered for the purpose of seniority as such appointment was a stop-gap arrangement, emergency or fortuitous arrangement.
(emphasise supplied)
30.To vindicate the above finding, I deem it appropriate to refer the Section
7(1) of the Act, which deals with the approved candidate. The proviso to Section 7(1) of the Act deals with the preparation of the approved candidate where different types of posts, namely, permanent posts, temporary posts, anticipated posts and leave vacancy posts, etc., were dealt with. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner is that, the word “appointment to post” mentioned in Section 40(1) of the Act, deals with the inter se seniority between the two modes of recruitment, viz., direct recruitment, and recruitment by transfer, in the substantive permanent cadre. Here, admittedly, the private respondents were appointed to a temporary post and not to the substantive post. On the other hand, these petitioners were admittedly appointed in a substantive post and their service are eligible to be reckoned for seniority from the date of their first appointment.
31. This position is further vindicated through section 9 of the Act, where it specifically state that when the recruitment is under two modes, the vacancy has to be calculated for the permanent cadre. In this regard, it is appropriate to extract section 9(a) of the Act.
“9(a)the proportion or order in which the special rules concerned may require vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment and by recruitment by transfer shall be applicable only to vacancies in the permanent cadre:”
Therefore, the finding rendered by the learned single Judge reiterating the rule position that the seniority should be the date of first discharging service, should only be taken to the substantive post and not to the temporary post. Now, as per the judgment cited above, it is a well-settled principle of law that any amount of service in a non-substantive post will not count for seniority.

32.As already referred, in Section 7(1) of the Act 2016 deals with the permanent post and temporary post, etc., while drawing the regular panel. Therefore, the mere reference to the post, unless it is identified whether it is temporary or permanent, the question of seniority from the first discharging service cannot be determined. Therefore, the word appointed to service, though mentioned as the date first discharging service, must only be construed such discharge should be in the permanent cadre.

33.Here admittedly, the Government did not come up with any clear records as to the number of permanent post, and the temporary post etc. They have submitted the following Tabular column, which only contains the sanctioned strength and actual strength in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. When Section 7(1) of the Act, clearly distinguishes between the permanent post, and temporary post, and when the proviso to Section 9 of the Act, 2016, deals about conversion of temporary post into the permanent post after a period of five years, the conduct of the official respondent in not providing such material detail to the Court would only exhibit the malafides on the part of the authorities which cannot be appreciated. The details given by the authorities are extracted below for ready reference. The same demonstrate the suppression of material particulars by the authorities.

34. But, the learned Advocate General would rely upon the Explanation II of Section 7 of the Act 2016 and would contend that, once a qualified candidate is included in the temporary panel, his rights of temporary appointment will be protected and he should not be overlooked in preference with a persons who were not included in the temporary panel. But in the case in hand, the fulcrum of the issue is, whether a person included in the temporary panel, that too in respect of a nonsubstantive post can march over the direct recruit, who was admittedly appointed later, but in a sanctioned substantive post. As we have already discussed, the abovecited judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently held that the temporary appointment in a non-substantive post will not count for seniority.
35.Therefore, the submission that the direct recruit who has not borne to the cadre has no locus standi to challenge the promotee Deputy Superintendents of Police, as they have already been promoted before the appointment of the direct recruit, is not a good argument, unless the state proves that the rank promotees DSPs were appointed in a sanctioned substantive post. Therefore, reliance on explanation II of Section 7 by the Government has no application to the present fact, as it only deals with temporary appointments, which could be valid till the regular list is approved. Here we are concerned with a regular list qua substantive post.
36. In the case in hand, it is not in serious dispute that all the petitioners are direct recruits and were appointed in a substantive post. At this juncture, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would invite the attention of this Court to the impugned G.O.Ms No.214 dated 14.03.2024, wherein the Government, though it approved the proposal of the 2nd respondent, has heavily come down against them for continuing to maintain the temporary panel. While approving the proposal, the Government took cognisance of the true spirit of Section 47(5) of the Act 2016 and specifically mentioned that the promottees cannot have any preferential claim in any future promotion. Furthermore, in the impugned GO, by exercising the power under Section 58 of the Act 2016, an exemption has been granted by dispensing with a compulsory 4 years service as Deputy Superintendent of Police.

37. At this juncture, I deem it appropriate to extract Special Rule 4(E), and
5(a) of the Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Police Service.
“4(E).No Deputy Superintendent of Police, category (1) of class II
shall, except in very special circumstances, be eligible for promotion as Additional Superintendent of Police unless he has completed four years of service as a Deputy Superintendent of Police Category(1) irrespective of the post held by him at the time of selection.
Rule 5.Probation:
(a)Every person appointed to a category in Class-II shall, from the date on which he joins duty be on probation for a total of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years.”
Reading of the above Rule clearly mandates that before a person is promoted to the next level of post qua ADSP, he has to complete four years as DSP, and he/she must also be completed their probation.

38. At this juncture, it is relevant to deal with Section 58 of the Act 2016. The power of exemption under Section 58 is not meant for a routine exercise, and it must be invoked by the Government only in deserving cases and during emergency. But, in the present relaxation, though G.O.Ms.. No.214 dated 14.03.2024 referred to a certain emergency, namely the general election, has also captured the reality of what had happened in the past 10 years. It is an admitted fact that for more than 10 years, the respondents followed the practice of relying temporary panel for consideration of further promotion. Similarly,in the other impugned G.O.Ms No.263 dated
30.05.2022, and G.O.Ms.No.143 dated 29.03.2023, the Government has relaxed certain conditions by invoking Section 58 of the Act. The Section 58 of the Act, is the power to the Government to deal with certain cases only with just and equitable reasons. For ready reference, Section 58 is extracted herein below:
“Section 58 of the Tamil Nadu Government
Service(Conditions of Service) Act, 2016, deals with the “Power to deal with certain cases”. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the special rules, the Governor shall have power to deal with the case of any person or class of persons serving in a civil capacity under the Government or of any person who has or of any class of persons who have served as aforesaid or any candidate or class of candidates for appointment to a service in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable:
Provided that, where any provision of this Act or the special rules is applicable to the case of any person or class of persons, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him or them than that provided by that rule.”

39.The reading of section 58 of the Act makes it clear that the Government has the power to relax certain conditions as may appear to them to be just and equitable. The word “may appear to him to be just and equitable” has got greater connotation, as we have already stated this has to be tested in the backdrop of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as consideration for promotion is a fundamental right which cannot be thwarted or denied by routinely, relaxing, mandatory conditions provided under the Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Police Service with out any just and eqitable reason.

40.At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that the interpreting provisions for relaxation even if generally included in the service rule, the same could only be invoked either for the purpose of mitigating hardship or to meet a special deserving situation. It needs a justification while invoking relaxation. Any artbitrary exercise of such power must be guarded against and the rule of relaxation must get pragmatic and purposeful construction so as to achieve effective implementation of good policy. In this regard, it is appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Prakash Gupta and Others vs. State of J&K and Others, reported in (2000)7 SCC 561.
“32.On facts, the reasons given in the Cabinet note for granting relaxation are hopelessly insufficient. In fact, the letter of the Commission date 25.11.97, shows that the Commission was prepared to give its opinion in regard to regularisation of each promotee but the Government backed out when the Commission called for the records relevant for considering suitabil-ity for regular promotion, in our view, there can be no hardship for a person seeking appointment or promotion to go by the procedure prescribed therefor. The relevant recruitment rule for promotion cannot itself be treated as one producing hardship. Narender Chadda’ case must be treated as an exception and not as a rule. In fact, if such relaxation is permitted in favour of promotees then the same yardstick may have to be applied for direct recruits. In fact the J.K. Government has already started to do so and this has not been accepted by this Court in Narender Mohan’s case and Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal’s case referred to above. If it is to be held that direct recruitment can also be permitted without consulting the Service Commission (in cases it is required to be consulted) there will, in our opinion, be total chaos in the recruitment process and it will lead to backdoor recruitment at the whims and fancy of Government.”
41. While reading and re-reading the impugned G.Os, viz., G.O.Ms No.263 dated 30.05.2022 and G.O.Ms No.143 dated 29.03.2023, absolutely, there is no reason to infer the just and equitable reason for relaxation. The above G.Os, covertly and overtly, did not disclose the reason why they relaxed the rules or what the pressing need to do so. In the above G.Os., apart from relaxing the conditions stipulated under section 41(1) of the Act, which deals with the non-consideration for promotion before declaration of probation, the Government has also relaxed the conditions stipulated in explanation III of Section 7 of the Act.

42.The explanation III of Section 7 deals with the temporary list, where the consultation of the Public Service Commission is not required. In the case in hand, it is not in serious dispute that the consultation of the Public Service Commission is relevant. Therefore, the relaxation of Explanation III to Section 7 of the Act would, according to this Court, clearly demonstrate the non-application of mind by the authorities concerned. It is pertinent to mention here that, though the persons dealt under the above G.Os. were considered for promotion temporarily, the said G.Os. conspicuously absent to refer to Section 47(5) of the Act, viz., denying preferential right in further promotion. This would also exemplify the irregular procedure followed by the official respondent, and such an act tends to impinge upon the petitioner’s fundamental right to consideration for promotion.
43.Similarly, in another impugned G.O.Ms.No.214 dated 14.03.2024, and
G.O.Ms.No.697 dated 17.12.2024, the Government has relaxed the condition stipulated under section 41(1) of the Act. While doing so, the Government has referred to certain exigencies to justify its just and equitable reasons. But, G.O.Ms No.214 reference about the past 10 years procedure would make the reasons are self serving. It is an admitted position that the second respondent had only the temporary panel in the past, also. As already stated, whenever there are justifiable reasons, the Government has the right to relax conditions. But they can’t use such power, capriciously, arbitrarily, and to defeat the constitutional right of a petitioner in such a way to deny their consideration for promotion at an appropriate eligible time.
44.The very consideration of a temporary panel for promotion in the past, even to the non-satisfaction of the first respondent Government, would militate against the impugned G.Os.. Apart from the above reason, the other G.O.Ms.. No.697 does not provide any ground for such relaxation. All the above discussions would only converge at a point that the impugned G.Os do not contain any reason so as to bring with in just and equitable reasons to relax the condition. Which makes. such G.Os. are liable for quashing.
45.We are of conscious of the position that the rank promotees are reaching this position after putting in their hard work and unblemished service for more than a decade. Their service absolutely requires appreciation, and they have to be considered for promotion in accordance with the rule immediately. But the conduct of the Government, not following the Rules to its letter and spirit, knowingly or unknowingly, divides the two lines of recruits. The strict adherence to law may have some impact on one set of people, but it does not give right to the Government to invoke Section 58 of the Act, to indiscriminately relax the rule,without having any just and equitable reasons. It is appropriate to refer legal maxim “Dura Lex Sed Lex”, which means law is hard, but it is the law.
46.If the Government wants to alleviate the heartburn of any of the employees,it is for them to have a relook at the service Rule, and not that relax the same indiscriminately. This Court would also like to emphasise that the employee should not be allowed to be at the mercy of any authority,except the law. It is relevant to note that once the person is part of the system, they must be dealt with in accordance with the Rule, in an unbiased manner. Since the Rule was prejudicial at the relevant point of time cannot be a ground to relax the condition to nullify the Rules.
47. But the respondent argues that any promotion to the Additional Superintendent of Police is only based upon merit cum seniority, and there is no ratio in such promotion. It is well-settled principles of law that promotion is not a matter of right, but consideration for promotion is a matter of right. In the case at hand, the petitioners’ consideration for promotion is under threat due to the selective procedure followed by the official respondent. Unless the government comes up with a clear and transparent mechanism to publish the details of substantive and temporary posts, these issues cannot be sorted out. From the above detailed discussion, the past contact of the government directly impinges upon the petitioners’ right provided under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and their consideration of the promotion. Therefore, this court finds every reason to interfere with the impugned
GOs.

48. Before closing curtain of this case, I would like to deal with the submission regarding non joinder of necessary parties. A faint attempt was made to argue that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of non joinder of necessary parties. But it is pertinent to note, the present matter is not the person’s specific, but rather deals with the irregular procedure followed by the respondent, which has violated the Rights of the petitioner protected under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in such view of the position, the non-inclusion of the alleged affected persons will make no difference. Accordingly, the present writ petitions are maintainable.

49. In view of the above detailed discussions, this Court is of the view that,
(i).The petitioners in W.P.No,10456 of 2025, and W.P.No.21164 of 2025 are entitled to have an order in their favour and in the result, the impugned
G.O.Ms.No.263 dated 30.05.2022, G.O.Ms.No.143, dated 29.03.2023, G.O.Ms.No.214 dated 14.03.2024 and G.O.Ms.No.697 dated 17.12.2024, are quashed,
(ii).The respondents 1 and 2 are directed to draw inter se seniority in the substantive post, between direct recruits and promotees in the cadre of DSP, as per the observation made herein above, and consider them for promotion in accordance with their eligibility within a period of eight(8) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iii).In view of the above direction, the other two Writ petitions qua W.P.Nos.
8916 of 2025 and 21848 of 2025, are disposed.
(iv). However, it is made clear that the respondents’ State shall not revert any officer who has been given further promotion based on the above impugned G.Os.,.But the respondent State shall not issue any further promotion till the inter se seniority list is drawn by the Government for the substantive post in accordance with the observation made by this Court.
(v).In any case, if the direct recruits/rank promotees are found fit for promotion to the next higher substantive post will be entitled to notional promotion, fixation of seniority and all other consequential benefits, except back wages on the grant of promotion to the next higher post.
50.With the aforesaid, the Writ Petitions stand disposed of. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
04.11.2025
Index : Yes
Neutral Citation : Yes
Ns
To
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Home (Prohibition & Excise) Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat,
Chennai-600 009.
2.The Director General of Police(Head of Police)
Tamil Nadu Police,
Kamarajar Salai, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004. 
C.KUMARAPPAN, J.
Ns
WP.Nos.8916, 10456, 21164 and 21848 of 2025 and
WMP.Nos.10018, 11769, 11771, 23898, 24048, 24650, 24651 and 24653 of 2025
04.11.2025