Madras High Court has dismissed a petition filed by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) challenging the order of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, refusing to commit the pending disproportionate assets case against former Minister Mr. Anitha Radhakrishnan in
[04/08, 16:39] sekarreporter1: http://youtube.com/post/UgkxGkkn4lE7zifDL3nrSNPc1fsJGE0Tma21?si=KLLD0ZaUxfLS28f8
[04/08, 16:39] sekarreporter1: Madras High Court Rejects ED Plea to Transfer Anitha Radhakrishnan Disproportionate Assets Case to PMLA Court
The Madras High Court has dismissed a petition filed by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) challenging the order of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, refusing to commit the pending disproportionate assets case against former Minister Mr. Anitha Radhakrishnan in
Spl.C.No.3 of 2019 to the Special Court at Madurai under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). A Division Bench comprising Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. Arul Murugan held that the application under Section 44(1)(c) was premature since the Special Court at Madurai had not taken cognizance of the money laundering complaint. The Court consequently dismissed the petition, vacated the interim stay and directed the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, to proceed with the disproportionate assets trial with due expedition.
Appearing for the ED, Mr. P. Sidharthan, Special Public Prosecutor for ED Cases, submitted that the scheme of Sections 43 and 44 of the PMLA reflected the legislative intent that both the scheduled offence and the offence of money laundering should be tried by the same Special Court. Referring to Sections 43(2) and 44(1)(a), it was contended that Section 44(1)(c) provided the statutory mechanism for committing a scheduled offence pending before another court to the Special Court, which would thereafter proceed with the case from the stage at which it was received. Reliance was placed on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement, Ranjit Singh Kothari v. State of West Bengal and Deputy Director v. Deputy Superintendent of Police. It was further submitted that Section 44(1)(c) did not require cognizance by the Special Court as a precondition and that no prejudice would be caused since the Special Court would continue the proceedings from the stage at which the case was committed.
Senior Advocate Mr. Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam, appearing for Mr. Anitha Radhakrishnan (Respondent No.2), and Mr. A. Nagarajan, appearing for Respondent Nos.3 to 9, submitted that Section 44(1)(c), by its express language, applies only where the Special Court has “taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering”. They submitted that, by the petitioner’s own admission, the Special Court at Madurai had not taken cognizance and had only issued a pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Relying on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Enforcement Directorate and Seeman v. Varun Kumar, it was submitted that cognizance in complaints instituted after 1 July 2024 could not be taken until the accused had been given an opportunity of hearing under Section 223 BNSS. It was further submitted that prosecution sanction had not been produced despite the Special Court having sought the same, that the disproportionate assets case and the money laundering complaint were pending before courts situated in different Sessions Divisions, and that the trial had substantially concluded with evidence on both sides having closed.
Framing the issue as whether the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, was justified in refusing to commit the scheduled offence under Section 44(1)(c), the Division Bench held that a bare reading of the provision made it “clear as day” that it contemplates two courts, each of which has already taken cognizance—one of the scheduled offence and the other of the money laundering complaint. The Court observed that Section 44(1)(c) expressly requires that the Special Court “has taken cognizance” and does not contemplate transfer in anticipation of cognizance.
The Court held that Rana Ayyub and Vijay Madanlal Choudhary did not support the ED’s contention since both decisions proceeded on the basis that cognizance had already been taken by the Special Court. Referring to Kushal Kumar Agarwal and Seeman, the Bench observed that compliance with Section 223 BNSS was mandatory before cognizance could be taken and that, on the admitted facts, the Special Court at Madurai had only issued notice under Section 223 BNSS. The Court also noted that prosecution sanction sought by the Special Court had not been produced, making the application premature. It further observed that Section 44(1)(c) was intended to save time and avoid conflicting findings, and was never meant to reopen a trial that had, for all practical purposes, already been fought and finished. Distinguishing the authorities relied upon by the ED and applying the principle laid down in Pankajini Sahu v. Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate, the Bench held that the statutory preconditions for committal had not been satisfied. The petition was accordingly dismissed, the interim stay vacated and the trial court directed to proceed with the disproportionate assets case at the earliest.
Case Title: The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement v. The Additional Superintendent of Police & Ors.
Case No.: Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3792 of 2026
Coram: Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. Arul Murugan
Appearance: Mr. P. Sidharthan, Special Public Prosecutor for ED Cases, for the Petitioner; Mr. Arun Anbumani, Additional Public Prosecutor, assisted by Mr. M. Dinesh, Government Advocate (Crl. Side), for R1; Senior Advocate Mr. Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam for Mr. K.R. Ramesh Kumar, for R2; Mr. A. Nagarajan for Mr. K.R. Ramesh Kumar, for R3 to R9.