GLIMPSE OF A LATEST VERDICT* *CRL.A. 522/2021, 523/2021* Nathu Singh Vs. St. of UP; Ompal Singh Vs. St. of Up Dated 28.05.2021 *Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, N.V. Ramana*, allowed the Appeal and set aside the Orders of the Hon’ble High Court to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the respondents-accused in the matter relating to *“Grant of Relief from coercive action subsequent to rejection of Anticipatory Bail”* and held the following:

*GLIMPSE OF A LATEST VERDICT*

*CRL.A. 522/2021, 523/2021*
Nathu Singh Vs. St. of UP; Ompal Singh Vs. St. of Up
Dated 28.05.2021

*Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, N.V. Ramana*, allowed the Appeal and set aside the Orders of the Hon’ble High Court to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the respondents-accused in the matter relating to *“Grant of Relief from coercive action subsequent to rejection of Anticipatory Bail”* and held the following:

i) A Court in certain special circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited period of time. In such a circumstance, the Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which would be assailable before a superior Court.
ii) Any interpretation of the provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. has to take into consideration the fact that the grant or rejection of an application has a direct genesis from Article 21 of the Constitution, as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an individual. The provision therefore needs to be read liberally, and considering its beneficial nature, the Courts must not read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly provided for. Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in favour of the applicant seeking relief. This is based on the decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. St. of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565. The Provision cannot be read as constituting a bar on the power of the Court.
iii) Section 482, Cr.P.C explicitly recognizes the High Court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice.
iv) The discretionary powers of the Court cannot be exercised in an untrammeled manner. The impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out above for two reasons, namely, (a) the High Court granted the impugned relief without assigning any reasons, (b) the Court had neither considered the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant nor the proviso to Section 438(1) Cr.P.C.
v) A relief period of 90 days/3 months cannot be considered as a reasonable amount of time.