Full bench order We answer the questions of law referred to this Full Bench in the above terms. The Registry shall place the matters before the Regular Bench for disposal. (S.M.S.,J.)      (D.B.C.,J.)      (C.K.,J.)                                                                                            21-01-2026            AR/GD

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 21-01-2026

CORAM

THE HON’BLE  MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN

Arb Appln No. 374 of 2025:

B.M.Insulation Private Limited,
Represented by its Authorised Signatory,

Mr.T.L.Ramanathan,

Having its registered office at

No.5, Gurusamy Nagar Extension – II, Mugalivakkam, Porur, Chennai, Tamil Nadu

..Petitioner(s)

Vs

Vardeep Petro Chemical Private Limited
A Private Limited Company

Represented by its Authorised Signatory Having its registered office at Plot No.2685, Old No.AL84, New No.AL15, 11^th Main Road, 4^th Street,

Anna Nagar, Chennai 600 040.

..Respondent(s)

                    To direct the Respondent to deposit a sum of Rs.10,20,517/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Twenty Thousand Five Hundred and Seventeen only) along with compound interest with monthly rests, at three times the bank rate per annum till the date of deposit before this Court.

For Petitioner(s):

Mr.K.Sharath Chandran

and

Ms.Anukriti Anand

For Respondent(s):

Mr.Thomas T Jacob

Arb Appln No. 628 of 2025:

M/s.Saffe Systems,

Represented by its Authorised Signatory,

Mr.Mujesh CKP,

XV/80E, Nochima,

NAD PO, Aluva 683 563

Kerala.

..Petitioner (s)

Vs

BGR Energy Systems Limited,
Having its registered office at

Plot No.A5, Pannamgadu Industrial Estate, Ramapuram (Post) Sullurpet (T)

Nellore 524 401,

Andhra Pradesh.

..Respondent(s)

                    To pass an order of attachment of the Bank account of the Respondent namely Account NO.00000036609800681 maintained with State Bank of India, IFB Branch for an amount of Rs.21,07,523.69/- along with pendent lite interest.

 

For Petitioner(s):

Mr.Pranava Charan MG

For Respondent(s):

Mr.C.P.Prasath Gopal

 

COMMON ORDER

(Order of the Court was made by S.M.Subramaniam J.)

          The Full Bench of this Court is called upon to clarify the scope of the word ‘enforced’ used in Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

          2. Differing views emerged on the interpretation of the word ‘enforced’ under Section 9. The Division Bench of this Court in Gopuram Enterprises Limited Vs. M/s.Integrated Finance Company Limited[1] read the word ‘enforced’ as ‘enforceable’ thereby giving a restricted meaning to the scope of Section 9 and limiting the time frame provided under sub-section (3) of Section 34.  On the other hand, a learned Single Judge of this Court had relied on the Bombay High Court judgment in Dirk India Private Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Company Limited[2], which in turn was taken note of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hindustan Construction Corporation Limited Vs. Union of India[3] and interpreted the meaning of the word ‘enforced’ to mean ‘until the complete satisfaction of the award’. The order of the learned Single Judge was interfered by the Division Bench in OSA (CAD) No.94 of 2023, only on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not deal the matter on merits and hence the matter was remanded back to the learned Single Judge to deal with it on merits. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge to the effect that an application under Section 9 of the Act can be maintained Post-Award but before it is ‘enforced’ and its scope in Section 9 has been upheld by the Division Bench. Therefore, it is contended that divergent views are expressed by two Division Benches of this Court.

          3. Consequently, the matter was referred to the Full Bench of this Court to seek clarity on the scope of the word ‘enforced’ used in Section 9 of the Act by formulating the following questions:

          (a) When Section 9 of the Act provides for interim measures before the Court even post arbitral award, but before it is enforced, whether the word ‘enforced‘ can be read down as ‘enforceable‘ and thereby limit the scope of Section 9 of the Act?

          (b) Whether an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be maintained even after the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act?

          4. The interim measures as contemplated under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act comprises of three stages,

          a) before arbitration

          b) during arbitration or

          c) at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36.

          5. The reference questions are focussed on the third stage, which is interim measures sought post-award but before it is enforced. The Division Bench of this Court in Gopuram Enterprises’s case cited supra had interpreted the words ‘before it is enforced’ in Section 9 as to mean ‘enforceable’. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

“2 ….The very wording of section 9 of the Act permits a post-award petition for interim measures to be relevant till such time that the award becomes enforceable. Though the relevant words used in the provision are “but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36”, such expression read in the context of section 36 of the Act that provides for enforcement implies that a party may apply to a Court for interim measures only till such time that the arbitral award becomes enforceable.”

          6. However, the Division Bench of this Court in Eros International Media Limited Vs. 14 Reels Entertainment Private Limited and Another[4] had expressed a differing view from Gopuram enterprises’ case. The Division Bench instead relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Dirk India Private Limited case cited supra and held as follows:

“24. The language of Section 9(1) enunciates a distinct timeline specifically leaving no space for any further interpretation. The three specific scenarios enlisted includes, before, during or at any time after passing arbitral award, but before execution. Here, the time gap specified in the third prong is crystal clear. When the words employed are pristine, no further meddling is required and meaning as plainly given shall be taken.”Enforced” is the word used, which implies execution of the award. The words cannot be dissected and used to suit each party in arbitration proceedings. The phrases “any time after making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced” illuminates complete meaning within itself. Further, dissection of this third prong is unnecessary and fogs the rationale of section 9(1). The rationale being is to facilitate the final award and to prevent it from becoming meaningless.”

          7. In Dirk India Private Limited’s case cited supra, the Bombay High Court clearly stated that Post-Award interim Measure under Section 9 is a step in aid of enforcement. This position of law has also been cited and approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hindustan Construction Company Limited and Another Vs. Union of India and Others[5]. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

“36. Interpreting Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dirk (India) (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd.’ held that: (SCC OnLine Bom para 13)

“13. … The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement.”

37. This being the legislative intent, the observation in NALCO [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540] that once a Section 34 application is filed, “there is no discretion left with the Court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award..” flies in the face of the opening words of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, extracted above.

38. Thus, the reasoning of the judgments in NALCO National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540], and Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. [Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. v. AMCI (India) (P) Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 796 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 637] being per incuriam in not noticing Sections 9, 35 and the second part of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, do not commend themselves to us and do not state the law correctly. [In NALCO, (2004) 1 SCC 540, this Court was concerned with two questions—the second question being whether the appropriate court, for the purpose of challenging or seeking modification of an award,was theSupreme Court, or the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This Court held, distinguishing State of M.P. v. Saith & Skeleton (P) Ltd., (1972) 1 SCC 702 and Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh & Sons, (1981) 4 SCC 634, that the court which had jurisdiction to modify and/or set aside the award was not the Supreme Court. On thispoint, NALCO, (2004) 1 SCC 540 has subsequently been followed by a number of judgments and continues to be good law. Also, the ratio of the judgment in Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 796 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 637 on the construction of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 relating to the framing of issues and pleadings and proof required in Section 34 proceedings remains untouched by the present judgment.] The fact that NALCO [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540] has been followed in National Buildings Construction Corpn. Ltd. v. Lloyds Insulation (India) Ltd. [National Buildings Construction Corpn. Ltd. v. Lloyds Insulation (India) Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 367] does not take us any further, as National Buildings Construction Corpn. Ltd. [National Buildings Construction Corpn. Ltd. v. Lloyds Insulation (India) Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 367] in following NALCO [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540], a per incuriam judgment, also does not state the law correctly. Thus, it is clear that the automatic stay of an award, as laid down by these decisions, is incorrect. The resultant position is that Section 36—even as originally enacted -is not meant to do away with Article 36(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, but is really meant to do away with the two bites at the cherry doctrine in the context of awards made in India, and the fact that enforcement of a final award, when read with Section 35, is to be under the CPC, treating the award as if it were a decree of the Court.”

          8. On analysis of Section 9, it is clear that the term used is ‘enforced’ and not ‘enforceable’. Though the Court in Gopuram Enterprises’s case cited supra while reading the words ‘but before its is enforced’ read in the context of Section 36 have listed out four possibilities, it is an unnecessary interpretation. When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain and literal meaning ought to be taken. Instead venturing upon possibilities and giving contextual meaning would defeat the object of the statute. As held in the case of Dirk India Private Limited’s case cited supra, the interim measures of protection as contemplated under clause (ii) of Section 9 are intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. In essence, an interim measure of protection when sought before or during an arbitral proceeding is considered as a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings, When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the Award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement.

          9. When Section 9 contemplates a Post-Award protection, the purpose of such interim protection being to secure the property or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award, no further interpretation can be made which will cripple such interim protection intended to be given to the award holder by the statute.

          10. It is also pertinent to quote the latin maxim Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget which literally means ‘An absolute judgment or sentence needs no expositor’. In legal terms, it can be construed that when language of law is in clear terms, no interpretation is required. Applying the maxim to Section 9, in plain terms, the word “enforced” which is a past participle of the verb “enforce” cannot be equated with “enforceable”. The term has been consciously used by the legislature to emanate a particular meaning and usage to the said word. This cannot be deformed through unwarranted interpretation, which will in turn defeat the object of the legislature.

          11. The Post-Award and Pre-Enforcement stage interim measure as given under Section 9 is unique and primarily serves to prevent frustration of the arbitral award during the 90 day challenge period under Section 34. This object will be defeated when the word ‘enforced’ is read down as ‘enforceable’.

          12. Mere filing of Execution Petition cannot deny the Post-Award stage interim measure under Section 9. The words ‘before it is enforced’ means ‘until the complete satisfaction of the award’. The language is clear in its terms that interim measures given to the parties under Section 9 extend until the complete satisfaction of the Award. Therefore, the words ‘before it is enforced’ cannot be treated as ‘enforceable’, thereby narrowing down or constricting the scope of interim relief granted by the legislature under Section 9.

          13. It is to be noted that the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited Vs. Reliance Infrastructure Limited[6], while discussing about the outer limit provided in the third stage under section 9 observed as follows:

“82. Secondly, even if one were to assume that the outer limit prescribed by Section 9 of the Arbitration Act were to apply even to proceedings seeking enforcement of foreign awards, the outer limit cannot be read as “before filing an application seeking enforcement”. The expression used is “before it is enforced”. This would clearly imply till the award is fully satisfied. The word “enforced” is past tense of the word “enforce” which would implythat the enforcement has already happened and is complete.

83. If one were to give a restricted meaning as proposed by the Respondents, it would frustrate the very purpose of the foreign award. For the reason that the holder of the foreign award has to first approach the court for a recording of satisfaction that the award is enforceable and then the award would be enforced and if during this period there was no power of the court to grant interim measures, the party against whom the award is sought to be invoked, could deal with the assets to defeat the award.

84. Thus it is held that the outer limit for seeking interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act would not become applicable on mere filing of the Application seeking enforcement. There is thus no merit in the said argument raised on behalf of the Respondent, the same is accordingly rejected.”

          14. Also in Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation Vs. Power Mech Projects Ltd[7], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India recognised the power of the Court under Section 9 to direct the judgement debtor to deposit the sum under the award. The relevant portion is extracted below:

“34. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide power on the Court to pass orders securing the amount in dispute in arbitration, whether before the commencement of the Arbitral proceedings, during the Arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral award, but before its enforcement in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. All that the Court is required to see is, whether the applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief as prayed for being granted and whether the applicant has approached the court with reasonable expedition.”

          15. A plain reading of Section 9 can reveal that the Post-Award Pre -Enforcement interim measure is a unique protection guaranteed by the legislature as a step in aid to enforcement. But by reading the word enforced as enforceable, the scope of Section 9 has been restricted thereby narrowing down the time frame intended to be given by the legislature. Enforced can in no angle be interpreted as enforceable. In simple language ‘enforced’ is the past tense of ‘enforce’ and denotes a completed action. Therefore, the words ‘before it is enforced’ in the light of Section 9 can only mean ‘until the complete satisfaction of the award’. On the other hand, enforceable does not denote a completed action. So when there is clear difference in the meaning carried by these two words, the legislative usage of one of these words itself clarifies the legislative intent. Hence, in the absence of ambiguity, no further interpretation is required.

          16. Further, if the word ‘enforced’ is taken as ‘enforceable’ then the outer  time limit for seeking interim measures stand restricted, which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. Where filing of Execution proceedings or pendency of execution proceedings, if taken into consideration for rejecting Section 9 application, then the very purpose and object of Section 9 would be defeated. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hindustan Construction Company’s case cited supra has already approved the stance taken by the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Private Limited’s case cited supra.

          17. In view of the discussion above, we arrive at the following conclusions:

          A)          The word ‘enforced’ under Section 9 cannot be read down as ‘enforceable’.

          B)          The word ‘enforced’ denotes a completed act. Hence, the phrase ‘before it is enforced’  signifies ‘until the complete satisfaction of the award’.

          C)          The correct position of law has been already laid down in Dirk India Private Limited’s case cited supra, which has also been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hindustan Construction Company’s case cited supra. In the light of the same the stance taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Gopuram Enterprises Limited’s case cited supra by reading down the word ‘enforced’ as ‘enforceable’ is held to be bad in law.

          18. We answer the questions of law referred to this Full Bench in the above terms. The Registry shall place the matters before the Regular Bench for disposal.

(S.M.S.,J.)      (D.B.C.,J.)      (C.K.,J.)

                                                                                      21-01-2026

AR/GD

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J.

AND

D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J.

AND

C.KUMARAPPAN, J.

AR/GD

Arb Appln No. 374 of 2025

&

Arb Appln No. 628 of 2025

21-01-2026

[1]   2021 SCC OnLine Mad 16559

[2]   2013 SCC Online Com 481

[3]   (2020) 17 SCC 324

[4]   2025:MHC:2771

[5]    2020 17 SCC 324

[6]    2024 SCC Online Del 1606

[7]    2022 SCC Online SC 1243