Dismissed THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY Crl.O.P.No.29257 of 2025 and Crl.M.P.Nos.19884 of 2025 and 12046 of 2026 1. Subhash Chand Jain 2. Ameet Kumar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Orders reserved on : 27.07.2026
Orders pronounced on : 05.08.2026
CORAM :
THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY
Crl.O.P.No.29257 of 2025
and Crl.M.P.Nos.19884 of 2025 and 12046 of 2026
1. Subhash Chand Jain
2. Ameet Kumar
3. Maina Devi
4. Nemi Chand Jain .. Petitioners

Versus
1. State Represented by
Inspector of Police Central Crime Branch, CKV & FPP Wing, Alpha-IV, Vepery, Chennai – 119.
2. Asif Iqbal .. Respondents
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, to call for records pertaining to Crime No.72 of 2025, pending on the file of the 1st respondent and quash the same.
For Petitioners : Mr.N.R.Elango, Senior Counsel, for M/s.S.Kushi
For Respondents : Mr.M.Mohamed Riyaz,
Government Advocate (Criminal Side), for R1
: Mr.Abudukumar Rajarathinam,
Senior Counsel, for Mr.M.Vimal Bobby Crimson, for R2
ORDER
A. The Petition:
The Criminal Original Petition is to call for the records pertaining to the First Information Report in Crime No.72 of 2025, pending on the file of the first respondent and to quash the same.
B. The F.I.R & the allegations:
2. A perusal of the First Information Report shows that it was
registered for offences under Sections 318(4) and 61(2) of the B.N.S, and
Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003.
2.1. The gist of the allegations, as per the complaint, is that the
de facto complainant is the owner of the lands admeasuring Acres 8.20 cents in S.Nos.14 and 15 of Kayar village, Thiruporur taluk, Chengalpattu district. While so, in February 2024, he was in need of money and approached the accused Nos.1 and 2, who were financiers, through a land broker named Nazeer. The accused, taking advantage of the position, unduly influenced the de facto complainant and made a condition that the de facto complainant should execute sale deeds in favour of the accused in respect of the aforesaid land and also repay the amount with interest at the rate of 2% per month, and if there is a default by one day, the interest will be 3% per month, and for a default of one week, it will be 4% per month. The de facto complainant executed three sale deeds, i.e., one on
23.03.2024 and two on 23.04.2024, in favour of the accused persons. Though the sale deeds were executed, the de facto complainant continued his possession and enjoyment of the land. The original purpose was to convey the land into plots and to sell them.
2.2. On 18.10.2024, the de facto complainant paid Rs.9,33,409/-
to the DTCP for approval to divide the land into 156 plots, and further obtained panchayat approval by paying the requisite amount of Rs.15,96,442/-. When the de facto complainant attempted to sell plots by entering into an MOU, the accused interfered and pressurised the de facto complainant to sell the land for a lesser consideration. Further, they requested the de facto complainant to repay the loan amount to the tune of
Rs.2,50,00,000/-, as they were in need of money. The de facto complainant, accordingly, transferred a sum of Rs.2,07,18,500/- from his wife’s account to the accounts of the accused Nos.2 and 3 and prayed that the said amount be deducted from the total loan amount repayable.
Another sum of Rs.57,24,000/-, in cash, was paid to the accused from March 2024 to November 2024 towards interest. When the de facto complainant finally made the balance sum of Rs.2,15,00,000/- ready and requested the accused to re-convey the lands, the accused did not comply and demanded a huge sum of Rs.11,00,00,000/- to re-convey the lands.
Hence, the complaint.
C. The Arguments:
3. Mr.N.R.Elango, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners,
would submit that this is a sale transaction, pure and simple. Accordingly, the lands were purchased for a total sale consideration of Rs.3,99,63,750/-. The payment thereafter made by the de facto complainant to the accused is not repayment of loan but in reference to the development of yet another property being a farmhouse at Akkarai village belonging to the first accused. As far as the lands in question relating to the sale transaction are concerned, even the applications for development, etc., have been made only in the name of the accused who were the owners of the property. The de facto complainant is included only as a Power Agent, as he was very much involved in the development of the property. Thus, no offence whatsoever has been committed by the accused. In any event, this is a pure and simple sale transaction. Whether the alleged sale is a sale or a mortgage is a question that is civil in nature and can be determined only by Civil Courts. He would further submit that, even in the present case, while
deciding the bail application, an observation was made in
Crl.O.P.No.13769 of 2025 that the transaction, prima facie, appears to be civil in nature.
3.1. The learned Senior Counsel would rely on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A.M.Mohan Vs. State1 to contend that an allegation of dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction is a sine qua non for attracting the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. In this case, there is not even such an allegation.
The learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon the judgment of this Court in R.P.Ganeshan Vs. State and Anr.2, to contend that, with reference to the offence under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003, unless the complainant deposits the balance

1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339
2 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6323
amount due before the competent forum and thereafter lodges a complaint, the allegation cannot be considered. The learned Senior Counsel would finally submit that this is a case which squarely falls within the canons of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.3 and therefore, he would submit that this Court should interfere by quashing the First Information Report.
3.2. Per contra, Mr.M.Mohamed Riyaz, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the first respondent, would submit that this is a case where it is alleged that after entering into a transaction involving the advance of money and repayment, the accused had taken sale deeds in their name and, thereafter, when they were accepting the repayment money, they failed to accept the final payment. Hence, the case is registered, and the matter is under investigation.
3.3. Mr.Abudukumar Rajarathinam, learned Senior Counsel for
the second respondent, would submit that the subsequent transactions, namely, the joining of the de facto complainant as a witness while executing gift deeds towards the local body while forming the layout,

3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
including the de facto complainant as a co-applicant in all the proceedings relating to the approval from DTCP, and in the subsequent proceedings by itself, would reveal that the property was given only as security for the loan transaction. Further, the version of the accused that the de facto complainant advanced money to the accused, who are financiers, for the development of the other property, is absolutely a figment of imagination and cannot be believed by any person. The learned Senior Counsel would finally rely upon the additional set of papers filed by him to point out the bank statements from which the payments were made.
3.4. By pointing out the road pattern approval granted by the
Town and Country Planning Department on 09.06.2024, the learned Counsel would submit that the approval stands in the name of the de facto complainant. In the communication of the Assistant Director, Town and Country Planning Department, dated 24.09.2024, the de facto complainant’s name is also mentioned. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that the payment receipt also reflects the de facto complainant’s name. Thus, by referring to all the other documents relating to the layout application and final approval order, etc., the learned Senior Counsel would submit that all the transactions reflect the de facto complainant’s name. The learned Senior Counsel would rely upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Accamma Sam Jacob Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr.4. He would submit that the case also arose out of similar circumstances, whereunder the High Court of Karnataka quashed the F.I.R by holding that whether a particular transaction is a mortgage or sale is to be determined by the Civil Court, and unless the title deed is set aside by obtaining a relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, the criminal complaint is not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, however, reversed the said judgment by considering the facts and circumstances of the case and held that if there appears to be a criminal offence that is committed, the interference should not be made. Reliance was placed on paragraph No.56 of the said judgment.
3.5. By way of reply and rejoinder arguments, both sides learned Senior Counsels would rely on certain WhatsApp conversations between the parties and the screenshots with reference to approval of land etc., to bring home their respective submissions.

4 2026 SCC OnLine SC 585
D. The Questions:
4. I have considered the rival submissions made on either sideand perused the material records of the case. The question to be determined is whether the allegations made in the instant case are purely or predominantly civil in nature so as to interfere with the First Information Report, or do they point towards ingredients of commission of any cognisable offence? Whether the offence under the Exorbitant Interest Act should not be proceeded with in the absence of deposit of the balance amount?
E. The Answer:
5. It is evident that the de facto complainant has conveyed the
property to the accused by three sale deeds. In this case, there is no clause in any of the sale deeds that directly or indirectly indicates that the transaction is only a mortgage or that the property is to be redeemed on payment of the loan. In view of the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no scope to contend that it is only a mortgage. The issue was settled long ago by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Pandit Chunchun Jha Vs. Sheikh Ebadat Ali and Anr. and Shri Bhaskar Wamman Joshi (deceased) Vs. Shri Narayan Rambilas Agarwal (deceased) . However, in Shri Bhaskar Wamman Joshi’s case (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in paragraph No.6, held as follows:
“6. ……. The question in each case is one of
determination of the real character of the transaction to be ascertained from the provisions of the deed viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. If the words are plain and unambiguous, they must in the light of the evidence of surrounding circumstances be given their true legal effect. It there is ambiguity in the language employed, the intention may be ascertained from the contents of the deed with such extrinsic evidence as may by law be permitted to be adduced to show in what manner the language of the deed was related to existing facts. Oral evidence of intention is not admissible in interpreting the covenants of the deed but evidence to explain or even to contradict the recitals as distinguished from the terms of the documents may of course be given. Evidence of contemporaneous conduct is always admissible as a surrounding circumstance; but evidence as to subsequent conduct of the parties is inadmissible.”
(Emphasis supplied)
5.1. Though the above judgments relate to characterising the
document as an ostensible sale/mortgage or conditional sale or whether sale with an option to repurchase, as far as outright sale deeds which contain no clause with reference to redemption or repayment, it is very clear that not even the Civil Court can interpret the document as a mortgage by conditional sale/ostensible sale. The only remedy with reference to the title is that the party has to approach the Civil Court and pray for a declaration that the sale is sham and nominal by pleading undue influence, fraud etc., and unless a declaration is granted in terms of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
5.2. The legal position that title once conveyed can be regained
only by re-conveyance or by an appropriate decree or declaration of the Civil Court, cannot be disputed. A useful reference in this regard is the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Sasikala Vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-Sub Collector, Devakottai, Sivagangai District and Anr. . Thus, from the above, there can be no doubt that the matter with reference to the question of title to the lands is civil in nature, or that the nature of the transaction is civil in nature.
5.3. Even in a civil dispute between the parties, if there are also
allegations that the parties had committed criminal offences, there is no bar to prosecution. In the instant case, the de facto complainant primarily alleges that he has been repaying the loan. Thus, even if the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners/accused is taken on face value, that the entire transaction is a sale, pure and simple, then, in that case, there was no question of the de facto complainant repaying the amount.
5.4. As per the version of the de facto complainant, the accused
lured the de facto complainant into the transaction, representing that the entire transaction would be treated as a loan, advanced the money, subsequently took repayment of part of the amount, and finally, when the de facto complainant wanted to settle the amount, the accused did not accept the same. Then, when the property was also vested with the accused, claiming to be a sale, and part of the amount was repaid by the de facto complainant, it would certainly be a wrongful gain. When the transactions for repayment were proceeded with, and finally the accused said ‘no’ to the settlement of the final tranche of the loan amount and reconveyance of the property, it can very well be gauged that the dishonest intention to keep all the cards close to the chest, that is, to keep every option open and to take prevaricating stands, was kept as an option by the accused from the very inception of the transactions, and it cannot be said that the averments made in the complaint do not constitute the ingredients of an offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
5.5. A factual explanation is sought to be given that it belongs to
some other land transaction. Firstly, that explanation is factual in nature and cannot be taken at face value to quash the F.I.R. Further, in case of an outright purchase, no purchaser would include the vendor at every stage of the subsequent development of the property. It can be seen that the vendor has stood as a witness in the document while executing gift deeds in respect of the road portion while developing the property. The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent would point out that the monies towards the payment of the fee to the DTCP authority and the panchayat all went from the account of the de facto complainant. In all the documents, the de facto complainant’s name is mentioned as an applicant. Though a feeble reply was sought to be given that the de facto complainant was acting as the Power of Attorney Agent of the accused, prima facie, no Power of Attorney is produced, and again, the entire arguments are factual in nature. When the averments in the complaint point out towards the ingredients of commission of a cognisable offence, despite the transaction also being civil in nature, the prosecution certainly would lie. When clear offences are alleged and sought to be investigated, it cannot be said to be an exaggeration or dressing up a civil cause as criminal in nature. Under these circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in a somewhat similar factual scenario, permitted continuation of the criminal prosecution, and the dictum in Accamma Sam Jacob’s case (cited supra) would apply with full force to the present case.
5.6. The contentions of the learned Counsel on either side, with
reference to several WhatsApp conversations between the parties, are again factual in nature and can be looked into only by the Investigating Officer during the course of the investigation. If a detailed analysis of those conversations is undertaken by this Court, it would amount to the Court assuming the role of the investigator. Further, when the amounts are said to have been transferred by the de facto complainant by way of repayment, this Court directed the respondent Police to obtain instructions as to what was filled in the column relating to remarks whenever the de facto complainant repaid money through an RTGS transaction. In all those transactions, it is clearly mentioned as Naziya Banu’s land and not with reference to the Akkarai property. The said entries were made in the year 2024 during the course of the transactions. The same is also borne in mind.
5.7. The second question relates to the registration of the case
under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003. If the parties are admitting the loan transaction, and the question is only with reference to the rate of interest or the balance outstanding, the party can be directed to deposit the alleged balance outstanding. In the instant case, the accused is pleading outright sale, and the payment is for a different purpose of developing property. Therefore, the plea that the de facto complainant is not depositing the balance cannot be pressed into service in the context of the instant case.
F. The Result:
6. In view of the same, finding no merits, this Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous
petitions are closed.
05.08.2026 Neutral Citation : yes grs
To
1. The Inspector of Police Central Crime Branch, CKV & FPP Wing, Alpha-IV, Vepery, Chennai – 119.
2. The Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Madras.
D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J.
grs
Crl.O.P.No.29257 of 2025
and Crl.M.P.Nos.19884 of 2025 and 12046 of 2026
05.08.2026