Court in WP.No.27924 of 2024. All these facts clearly indicate that the notification has been put in use, several permissions have been regularly obtained by the Committee, therefore, it cannot be said that the entire notification is a dead letter not come into force. Such view of the matter, this writ petition is nothing but clear abuse process of law. 17. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed. No costs. (N.S.K.,J.) (D.B.C.,J.) 12.09.2025 Index : Yes/N

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 08.08.2025
Pronounced on : 12.09.2025
CORAM
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N. SATHISH KUMAR
AND
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE D. BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY
W.P.No.27312 of 2016 and WMP.No.23510 of 2016
The Hospitality Association of Mudumalai
Rep by its President
Vikram Mathias, Bokkapuram
Masinagudi Post, Nilgiris – 643 233 … Petitioner Versus 1.The Union of India
Represented by its Secretary to Government
Department of Forest and Environment
Paryavaram Building, C.G.O.Complex
New Delhi
2.The State of Tamil Nadu
Represented by its Secretary to Government
Environment and Forest Department Chennai – 600 009
3.The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest
Panagal Building
Saidapet, Chennai – 600 015
4.The District Collector Nilgiris District, Ooty
5.The District Forest Officer
Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest
Nilgiris District … Respondents
Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, pleased to issue a Writ of Declaration, declaring that the notification dated 01.11.1991 issued under Section 1(2)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 and published in the District Gazette on 15.11.1991 on the file of the fourth respondent.
Petitioner : Mr. Salman Khurshid, Senior Counsel
Assisted By Mr. Zafar Khurshid Assisted By
Mr. P. Purushotham
Respondents : Mr. T. V. Krishnamachari, SPC For R1 Mr. J. Ravindran ,AAG Assisted By
Dr. T. Seenivasan SPL, GP For R2 To R6
Amicus Curiae : Mr.T.Mohan, Senior Counsel
ORDER
It is the case of the petitioner’s Association that they are a registered association consist of likeminded people with the objective of carrying on eco tourism in a sustainable manner. The petitioner association consists of 9 members, who had purchased their lands before the enactment of the notification issued under Section 1(2)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act (TNPPF Act), on 01.11.1991 which declared certain government and private lands to be private forests in certain revenue villages of Udhagamandalam Taluk, Sholur Village and Gudalur Taluk. The sole intent and purpose of this notifiation was to ban further setting up of industries within the radius of 5 mile in the Mudumalai Wildlife Sanctuary. Challenging the validity of the notification dated 01.11.1991, the present writ petition has been filed. Press notes on 22.11.1991 and letters of the District Collector dated 05.12.1991 stated that the notified lands would not be subject to any restriction in respect of their right to sell, transfer or lease. However, the District Collector vide letter dated 21.08.2009 issued directions to the District Registrar not to register any sale transactions of land notified by the TNPPF Act. It is their grievance that between 15.11.1991 and September 2009, thousands of land transfers/alienation pertaining to the lands covered by the notification were registered without insisting on prior permission from the Committee in terms of Section 3 of the Act and there were mutations also. Since, the notification was issued as early as on 15.11.1991, there was no occasion to challenge the same since the notification was never enforced and the Act is a dead letter. It is also their grievance that nowhere “forest” or “forest land” has been defined. The notification under TNPPF Act too does not have inclusive definition. The TNPPF Act is only
regulatory and adversely affects the fundamental rights of the petitioner. Further, the impugned notification is issued under Section 1(2) (ii) of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 ought to have seen that the power to notify the lands as forests under the said provisions is confined to forests situated in Estates as defined in the Tamil Nadu Estate Land Act, 1908 in the State of Tamil Nadu. Hence, the petitioner challenges the notification dated 15.11.1991 as arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the provisions of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300 (A) of the Constitution of India.
2. Mr.Salman Khurshid, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners inWP.No.27312 of 2016 submitted that the TNPPF Act governs regulatory regimes and aims at regulation and not restriction. The regulatory regime includes the TNPPF Act, Eco-sensitive zone notification,and the Forest Conservation Act altogether propose to shun felling of trees and not to obstruct peaceful living.The press note of the public information officer does not indicate obstruction of the standard living in the locality or to acquire the respective areas, but to regulate and avoid derogation, thereby adhering to the principles of eco-sensitivezone protection. Indulging in the definition of forest extracted from the case of Godavarman Thirumalpad, 1996 and Noida Bird Sanctuary case, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the challenged area does not come under forest land If there are no revenue entries from the said lands. The Chief Wildlife Warden notified on 15.02.1998 that the notified forests do not come under the Forest Conservation Act. The Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the principle of res judicata does not apply to this instant case, where he challenges the notification since the matter in question involvesa huge public interest and further delves into the concept of promissory estoppel in the light Motilal Padampad case and contends that there is a non application of mind in the said notification since the notified area was not declared as forest in the fore most notifications and there after brought in the doctrine of desuetude stating that the notification has fallen into disuse and is no longer enforceable. It was argued that the notification has not been actively implemented for over three decades, and permissions have been granted despite its existence, indicating prolonged administrative inaction.
3. Further, submitted that there is a material distinction in law and on facts between a pristine forest and a deemed forest. It was contended that the protection claimed by the respondents proceeds on the erroneous assumption that both categories stand on the same footing. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Notification in G.O. Ms. No. 125 of 1991 was not acted upon until the year 2009, and therefore, by operation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, transactions which took place prior to the year 1991 are not liable to be invalidated on the basis of the said Notification.
4. In response to the plea of promissory estoppel, the learned Additional Advocate General contended that no promise was ever extended by the Government so as to invoke the doctrine, and referred to N. Mangalchand Vaid and Others v. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, where it was held that a statutory notification does not, by itself, constitute a binding promise. Rather, it was submitted that the Government has acted in accordance with the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It was further submitted that the doctrine of desuetude is inapplicable in the present case, as multiple permissions have been granted under the Act from time to time, indicating continued recognition and enforcement of the statutory scheme.
5. The learned amicus curiae refuted the argument of desuetude, clarifying that mere non-enforcement or infrequent application of the statute does not render it obsolete or invalid. The Act remains in force and retains its enforceability, both in letter and in spirit. On the issue of landholding, the learned Amicus submitted that fragmentation of holdings is evident in the present matter, and as such, the question of absolute or exclusive ownership over the entire corridor area does not arise. He clarified that for land to be eligible for exemption from the applicability of the Act, a holding must constitute at least 2 hectares of private forest as defined under the Act. It is not sufficient if a person merely owns 2 hectares of land in total; the land must qualify as private forest within the meaning of the statute.
6. Heard both sides and perused the materials placed on record. The petitioner claiming to be the members of the Hospitality Association of Mudumalai challenges the notification issued by the District Collector dated 15.11.1991 under Section 1(2)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 declaring the entire area as a private forests. It is relevant to note that very affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is clearly deposed that some of the members of the Hospitality
Association of Mudumalai/petitioner association were also the members in the Masinagudi Farmers and Land Owners Association. The said association challenged the notification issued by the District Collector dated 01.11.1991, published in the District Gazette Extraordinary on 15.11.1991 under Section 1(2)(ii) of the Tamil
Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 and the subsequent circular dated Rc.A4 No.62857/08 dated 21.08.2009 before this Court under various writ petitions in W.P.No.24575 of 2009, 5825, 7612, 7613 & 7662 of 2010. The learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed all the writ petitions vide common order dated
12.07.2011. The appeals filed against them in Writ Appeals are also dismissed in W.A.Nos.35 and 405 of 2012 vide judgment dated 08.12.2017. Having suffered orders from this Court, wherein, this Court has upheld the notification dated 15.11.1991 issued by the District Collector, now, some of the members have formed new association in the name of the writ petitioner association namely the Hospitality Association of Mudumalai challenges the very same notification issued by the
District Collector under Section 1(2)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 dated 15.11.1991 on various ground which were already raised earlier in both the writ court as well as a Division Bench. The matter was directly and substantially in issue and decided on merits by this Court. Either the issue is decided after detailed consideration or the issue is such in nature that it should have already been raised in the earlier rounds. Useful reference in this regard, can be made paragraph 33 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of
India v. S. Narasimhulu Naidu, (2021) 20 SCC 321:
“33. The rule of res judicata is founded on considerations of public policy that the finality should be attached to the binding decisions pronounced by the courts of competent jurisdiction. This Court inDaryao v. State of U.P.[Daryaov.State of U.P., 1961 SCC OnLine SC
21 : AIR 1961 SC 1457] held as under : (AIR p. 1462, para 9)
“9. … Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32.”
7. Be that as it may, the main submissions of the Mr.Salman Khurshid, the learned senior counsel is that the notification was issued as early as on 15.11.1991 and published in District Gazette, however, the same has not been given effect, therefore, doctrine of desuetude comes into play, whereas, only in the year 2009, the District Collector by virtue of the circular in Rc.A4 No.62857/08 dated 21.08.2009 directed not to register the properties. According to the learned senior counsel, there were press releases issued by the Government taking note of the huge public protest stating that the notification will not affect the normal avocation and livelihood of the people nor purchase and sale of lands notified or construction of new building will be subject to any restriction. The Government after having issued the notification and the said notification became a dead letter, the same cannot be valid in the eye of law.
8. It is relevant to note that the public notices issued by the Government intimating the public that the notification will not affect the normal avocation and livelihood of the people nor purchase and sale of lands notified or construction of new building will be subject to any restriction is issued not in respect of the notification under the TNPPF Act. In fact, the Government has issued a Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.2837, Agriculture Department dated 17.09.1969 directing that no industries should be set up and situated within 5 kilometer radius of Mudumalai sanctuary. Taking note of the said restrictions, there were some agitations made by the people, only in respect of the said notification, a clarification was issued by way of press release that their rights will not be affected. The impugned notification was issued under the TNPPF Act was in the year 1991, wherein, the District Collector had published the notification declaring the areas including the petitioners’ lands as private forests. Therefore, the contention that the Government is estopped from taking contrary view cannot be countenanced. It is also to be noted that the same ground is also raised before the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.24575 of 2009, 5825, 7612, 7613 & 7662 of 2010. It is to be seen that firstly the doctrine of

desuetude cannot be applied at all as it cannot be contended that TNPPF Act, 1949 was in disuse or a dead letter. Secondly, the projection with reference to the notification issued is also erreneous, since the contrary practice that is sought to be projected is not with reference to notification under the act and there was nothin relating to issue of notification under the act.
9. Similarly, the learned senior counsel has contended that the impugned notification published on 15.11.1991 was never laid before the Legislative Assembly despite the mandate under Section 12-A (2) of the Tamilnadu Preservation of Private Forests Act and thus, the said notification is not valid in the eye of law. It is relevant to note that the very same ground was also raised in the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.24575 of 2009, 5825, 7612, 7613 & 7662 of 2010, wherein, the learned Single Judge vide order dated 12.07.2011 has considered the following judgments and held as follows:
” 22.Starting the main ground of attack, Mr.Vijay Narayan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that inasmuch as Section 12-A was not complied with, the notification was a still born child and cannot be acted upon. For that purpose, the learned Senior counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Quarry Owners’ Association v. State of Bihar reported in (2000) 8 SCC 655 and relied upon the following passages found in paragraphs 44 to 48 which reads as follows:
“44.This takes us to the next submission, whether the introduction of sub-section (3) of Section 28 by Parliament in any way strengthens the guidelines and puts a check on the exercise of power by the State Government. Sub-section (1) of Section 28 refers to the placement of every rule and every notification made by the Central Government before each House of Parliament for a period of 30 days when the same becomes effective, subject to its modification, if any. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 directs placement of every rule or notification made by the State Government before each House of the State Legislature. The submission is, there is no provision in sub-section (3) as in sub-section (1), of such rule being subject to scrutiny for its approval or modification by the State Legislature. The submission is, sub-section (3) in no way places any check on the State Government, as the State Legislature is not entrusted with power to approve or modify. In other words, introduction of sub-section (3) is merely for the sake of information and nothing more. Further it is submitted, when language of two different sub-sections in the same section is different it has to be differently interpreted, which cannot be construed to connote same meaning and same effect. It is also submitted, even if sub-section (3) was brought on the statute-book, it was not sufficient for the State, as it has to show that in fact both the impugned notifications were so laid before both Houses of the Legislature. The submission is, actually they were not so laid. Further reliance is placed on the case of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana (SCC p. 196, para 30) where this Court held that a mere laying procedure is directory not mandatory. On the other hand, submission on behalf of the State is that this laying procedure before the legislature cannot be a mere show, but it is for a purpose, the effect of which it has to be given. In our considered opinion, the incorporation of this by Parliament cannot be said to be in futility. In fact, this was brought in, in view of the observation made by this Court in the case of D.K. Trivedi.
45.It is true that the language of both sub-section (1) and sub-section
(3) of Section 28 is different. They are reproduced below:
“28. Rules and notifications to be laid before Parliament and certain rules to be approved by Parliament.-(1) Every rule and every notification made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or notification or both Houses agree that the rule or notification should not be made, the rule or notification shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or notification.
* * *
(3) Every rule and every notification made by the State Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature where it consists of two Houses, or where such legislature consists of one House, before that House.”
There is no difficulty for us to uphold their submissions that in view of difference in the language of sub-section (3), the same meaning to it as that of sub-section (1) cannot be given. This difference has been carved out for a purpose to give different projection to the said two provisions. In the case of major minerals which play important role in the national growth and wealth and where the delegatee is the Central Government, Parliament retained its full control but for the minor minerals, Parliament felt for the minor minerals as the subject is of local use and the State Government being well versed in dealing with it in the historical background, mere placement of rules, notifications framed by it before the State Legislature would be a sufficient check on the exercise of its powers. Thus, this difference of language gives two different thrusts as intended by Parliament. Any act of Parliament, far less when it introduces any new provision through amendment, it could be said for it to be in futility. The purpose has to be found. What could be the purpose for such an amendment? One of the reasons is that this was brought in, in view of the observation made by this Court in D.K.
Trivedi. This Court records: (SCC p. 62, para 51)
“It was, therefore, for Parliament to decide whether rules and notifications made by the State Governments under Section 15(1) should be laid before Parliament or the legislature of the State or not. It, however, thought it fit to do so with respect to minerals other than minor minerals since these minerals are of vital importance to the country’s industry and economy, but did not think it fit to do so in the case of minor minerals because it did not consider them to be of equal importance.”
Parliament through its wisdom, apart from the above brought this amendment also to keep a check on the exercise of power by the State Government as delegatee. The question is whether mere laying of rules and notifications before the legislature, as in the present case, can be construed as a check on the State Government’s power. Laying before the Houses of Parliament is done in three different ways. Laying of any rule may be subject to any negative resolution within a specified period or may be subject to its confirmation. This is spoken of as negative and positive resolution respectively. Third may be mere laying before the House. In the present case, we are not concerned with either the affirmative or negative procedure but consequence of mere laying before the legislature.
46.Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade & Forsyth (7th Edn., p. 898) records with reference to mere laying:
“Laying before Parliament
An Act of Parliament will normally require that rules or regulations made under the Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Parliament can then keep its eye upon them and provide opportunities for criticism. Rules or regulations laid before Parliament may be attacked on any ground. The object of the system is to keep them under general political control, so that criticism in Parliament is frequently on grounds of policy. The legislation concerning ‘laying’ has already been explained.
Laying before Parliament is done in a number of different ways. The regulations may merely have to be laid; or they may be subject to negative resolution within forty days; or they may expire unless confirmed by affirmative resolution;’
47.Constitutional and Administrative Law by Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, 7th Edn., records:
“… If the instrument has merely to be laid, or laid in draft, before Parliament, it will be delivered to the Votes and Proceedings Office of the House of Commons. No opportunity is provided by parliamentary procedure for the instrument to be discussed, but its existence will at least be brought to the notice of Members and the Minister is more likely to be questioned about it than if it is not laid before Parliament at all.”
48.In a democratic set-up, every State Government is responsible to its State Legislature. When any statute requires mere laying of any notification or rule before the legislature its executive, viz., the State Government comes under the scrutiny of the legislature concerned. Every function and every exercise of power, by the State Government is under one or the other Ministry which in turn is accountable to the legislature concerned. Where any document, rule or notification requires placement before any House or when placed, the said House inherently gets the jurisdiction over the same, each member of the House, subject to its procedure gets the right to discuss the same, they may put questions to the Ministry concerned. Irrespective of the fact that such rules or notifications may not be under the purview of its modification, such Members may seek explanation from such Ministry of their inaction, arbitrariness, transgressing limits of their statutory orbit on any such other matter. Short of modification power, it has a right even to condemn the Ministry. No doubt in the case where the House is entrusted with power to annul, modify or approve any rule, it plays a positive role and has full control over it, but even where the matter is merely placed before any House, its positive control over the executive makes even mere laying to play a very vital and forceful role which keeps a check over the State Government concerned. Even if submission for the appellants is accepted that mere placement before a House is only for information, even then such information, inherently in it makes the legislature to play an important role as aforesaid for keeping a check on the activity of the State Government. Such placement cannot be construed to be non est. No act of Parliament should be construed to be of having no purpose. As we have said, mere discussion and questioning the Ministry concerned or authority in the House in respect of such laying would keep such authority on guard to act with circumspection which is a check on such authority, specially when such authority is even otherwise answerable to such legislature. Further examining the scheme of the Act, with its historical background, we find there is clear demarcation in dealing between the major minerals and the minor minerals. For minor minerals all its activity before this Act has been delegated to the State Government as it having all conceivable knowledge over it, as it being of local use and not being of much national importance. For this difference also stricter control is made for the major minerals through Section 28(1) than for the minor minerals. Thus, this mere check on the State Government, as aforesaid, may have been found to be sufficient by Parliament, with reference to the minor minerals. Thus, the language of both sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) though different, is only for two different purposes. Thus when Parliament introduced sub-section (3) through amendment, it was to further strengthen the control over the State Government’s power. Any other submission, the one made by the appellants, makes such an Act of Parliament meaningless, which cannot be attributed to Parliament.
23.For the very same proposition, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd., reported in (2001) 6 SCC 307. In that case, the procedure for laying notification before the house of Parliament was not followed. Therefore, the Supreme Court had held that when resolution not having been moved in terms of the Act, it cannot be held that there was any valid amendment to Schedule 1 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977.
24.The learned Senior Counsel submitted that before notification, principles of natural justice required that the owners of lands should be given notices to show cause against the said notification. He also placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Sirumalai Kanakasabapathy Poonjolai Company Limited by its Managing
Director K.M.J.Joseph Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its
Secretary to Government, Forest and Fisheries Department, Fort St.George, Madras-9 and another reported in 1980 (1) MLJ 202 and reliance was placed upon the following passage found in paragraph 5 which reads as follows:
“5.If in this case, it had been shown that the land-holder while admitting the ryot to the land reserved for forest, had shown an intention not to confer upon the person so admitted, a permanent right of occupancy, then the land would have retained its character as forest land. Therefore the mere existence of shrubs, and jungle or wild and natural growth by itself, may not make the land as forest. Even the meaning given in the Random House Dictionary for the word forest is to the effect that a forest is an extensive area preserving some or all of its primitive wildness and usually having game or wild animals in it. But the Estates Land Act and the Abolition Act did not treat the lands as non-cultivable lands and therefore they are to be treated as ryoti lands. When once they are treated as ryoti lands and ryotwari patta has been issued, the petitioner is entitled to hold the lands as not forest lands and the Preservation of Private Forest Act could not be applied to such a land. The impugned notification is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the District Collector.”
Since no notice was given, the same was invalid.
25.The learned Senior counsel further submitted that the power to regulate the forest cannot be stretched beyond the grant of permission as the power of regulation take within its sweep in an appropriate case to revoke or cancel the permission itself. Therefore, if the power is exercised, it should be exercised consistent with the principles of natural justice. In this context, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 and referred to the following passage found in paragraph 55 which reads as follows:
55.It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority’s discretion that is exercised, but someone else’s. If an authority #hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires”. Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority. De Smith sums up the position thus:
“The relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive.”
26.The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that if the authority is to exercise his power, he has to exercise according to his own discretion and he should not be under the dictate of some one else. In this context, he placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat reported in (1995) 5 SCC 302 and relied on the following passage found in paragraph 11 of the said judgment which reads as follows:
“11……. If a statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority’s instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. In other words, the discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20-A(1) was not exercised by the DSP at all.”
27.The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that inasmuch as 1991 notification had never been acted upon for the last 20 years, it should be taken as a dead letter and that doctrine of desuetude will apply in such circumstances. For this purpose, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation for City of Pune v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd., reported in (1995) 3 SCC 434 and referred the following passage found in paragraph 34 which reads as follows:
“34.Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does not appear to have been used so far to hold that any statute has stood repealed because of this process, we find no objection in principle to apply this doctrine to our statutes as well. This is for the reason that a citizen should know whether, despite a statute having been in disuse for long duration and instead a contrary practice being in use, he is still required to act as per the “dead letter”. We would think it would advance the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of desuetude in our country also. Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed, there is need for its implantation, because persons residing in free India, who have assured fundamental rights including what has been stated in Article 21, must be protected from their being, say, prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which has become “dead letter. A new path is, therefore, required to be laid and trodden.”
28.Per contra, Mr.P.S.Raman, the learned Advocate General contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches in moving this court. Except in W.P.No.5825 of 2010, in other writ petitions, it is the subsequent purchasers who are before this court. Hence the writ petitions are not maintainable at the instance of the subsequent purchasers. The writ petitions have been filed under misconception of law and that whenever an application is made for alienation of land, permission has been granted.
29.The learned Advocate General submitted that the constitutional validity of Section 1 (2) (iii) of the TNPPF Act was gone into by P.Sathasivam, J. (as he then was) in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.7275 of 1985 and batch cases, dated 05.04.2002 in
Kanyakumari District Planters Association, Ramavaramapuram, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District represented by its Secretary and others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and others. The learned Advocate General submitted that the issues raised in these writ petitions regarding plantation being covered under the TNPPF Act and that the forest land will include even the other lands not strictly construed by the dictionary meaning and when declaration by the Collector or the Committee declaring certain lands as forest lands is valid and also the provisions are not violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution and that there are no arbitrary power vested on the committee granting prior permission have all been considered in the said judgment. He referred to the following passages found in paragraphs 25, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 36, which read as follows:
“25……. To preserve the trees from indiscriminate cutting by private individuals, the preservation of private forest has to be undertaken by the State and therefore, it was necessary to enact the separate Act called the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949. As stated earlier, it is clear from Explanation to Section 1 (2) (iii) of the Act that the lands which are cultivable will not cease to be forests. Therefore, the rubber plantations even if they are cultivated partly or wholly is to be considered as forest for the purpose of declaration by the District Collector as forest by notification in the District Gazette. Though the word forest as generally understood means a large uncultivated tract of land covered by trees and underwood, it is clear from the information furnished by the first respondent that the plantation area referred to in the writ petitions not only contain rubber trees, but also contain other miscellaneous trees like rosewood, teak, aini, maruthu and themba trees and shrubs of undergrowth; hence it cannot be said as merely plantations. In the light of the information furnished and in view of the Explanation referred to above, it is clear that a private forest which is a forest shall not cease to be such by reason of the fact that a portion thereof lands are cultivated….
31…In the light of the observation of the Supreme Court in the decision in State of Kerala v. Pullangode Rubber and Produce Co., Ltd.,(cited supra) and of the fact that the question forest as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act and forest produce was referred to a larger Bench, I am of the view that the learned Advocate General is right in pointing out that the term forest land occurring in Section 2, will not only include forest as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership.
32…… It is also contended that neither the Collector nor the committee has jurisdiction to declare the land as forest under Section 1 (2) (iii) without there being a notification by the State
Government declaring such classes of lands as Forest under Section 2 (aa) of the Act. As rightly stated in the counter affidavit of the first respondent, the land declared by the State Government to be a forest by notification in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette comes under reserved forest, whereas the Collector/ Committee is the competent authority under section 1 (2) (iii) of the said Act to declare an area exceeding 2 hectares to be forest for the purpose of the said Act by notification in the District Gazette. To put it clear, only for the purpose of declaring lands as forests to bring them under reserved forest, notification by the Government is necessary, but in the instant case, the lands declared as forest by the Collector is a private forest and for such declaration, Collector/ Committee is the competent authority and the Government notification is not required as claimed.
33…. It is further explained that to keep the ecological balance the tree cover should be 33 per cent of the total extent of the land in a country or State. Tamil Nadu has an area of forests equivalent to 26 per cent. Before enactment of the Act, there were indiscriminate destruction of private forest in this State. In order to protect such private forest from destruction, this Act was found necessary. The first respondent has also explained that whenever there are number of private forests available in the State, notification has been issued by the respective District Collector/ Committee. It is also stated that the plantation such as tea, coffee and cardamom are mostly grown in hill areas and they are governed by Tamil Nadu Hill Areas Preservation of Trees Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of
1955) and prior permission is also required for felling under section 3(1) of the said Act by the District Committee which is similar to that of the impugned order. It is further stated that in Kanyakumari District, the reserved forest as well as private forests are in high percentage when compared with other districts. I have already referred to the fact that as far as Kanyakumari District is concerned, there are numerous pockets of private forests in the midst of the reserved forest. In such circumstances, the contention with reference to article 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the
Constitution of India is liable to be rejected.”
34….., I am of the view that the petitioners claim that the impugned notifications are in violative of principles of natural justice cannot be accepted. For the same reasons, the exercise of the power by the District Collector/Committee and other officers cannot be construed as unreasonable or discriminatory in nature. As rightly contended by the respondents, the Rubber Board will give advice in technical matters like selection of high-yielding variety of nursery stock plants, fertiliser application and pesticide application and collection of latex etc., and not about felling trees or clearing the area. It is not mandatory to obtain clearance of the Rubber Board for cutting down the rubber trees and the present Act is intended to prevent indiscriminate destruction of forest.
36.Though it is stated that Section 1 (2) (iii) and Section 2 (aa) of the Act are unconstitutional and that the District Collector or Committee are given arbitrary and un-guided powers, in the light of the fact that there is a provision in the Act for constitution of committee, which consists of the District Collector as its Chairman and other Officers as members and considering its nature of duties, as seen from the Government Orders referred to in the counter affidavit, I am of the view that the said contention is liable to be rejected. Likewise, the contention that sections 3 and 6 infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India is also liable to be rejected. First of all, Section 6 is not in the statute book and Section
3 imposes only certain restrictions…. ”
30.The learned Advocate General also referred to a judgment of a division bench of this court in N.Mangalchand Vaid and others Vs. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai-9 and others reported in (2008) 1 MLJ 476 for contending that it is not necessary to have the committee for the issuance of notification as the District Collector is also the Chairman of the committee both under the TNPPF Act, 1949 as well as the Tamil Nadu Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act, 1955 and referred to the following passages found in paragraphs 22 to 25 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “22.The other argument advanced on the part of the appellants is that as per the Amended Act 68 of 1979, the power to issue a notification vests only with the Committee constituted under Section 2-A of the Private Forests Act and therefore, the notification issued by the District Collector is bad in law.
23.At this juncture, it is to be mentioned that the District Collector is the Chairman of the Committees constituted both under the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forests Act and the Tamil Nadu Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act. Therefore, even if the notification is issued by the District Collector, but not by the Committee headed by him, it could only be treated as an irregularity and definitely not an illegality. It is now a well established principle of law that such irregularities will not vitiate the entire proceedings, since no prejudice has been caused to the land owners.
24.It is to be mentioned that the provisions of both the Acts are only regulatory and preventive in nature to prevent the indiscriminate destruction of the forests and the procedure contemplated is also very lucid and in case there is any rhyme or reason for the land owners to remove the shade trees which are fully grown and which get silviculturally matured, they could very well approach the Committees constituted for permission and no case of any arbitrariness or discrimination adopted on the part of the said Committees has been brought to our notice.
25.A social responsibility is cast on every individual to prevent deforestation. The laudable and lucid laws enacted to preserve Mother Nature intact for the welfare of the Society and future generations, like the Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, should be strictly adhered to, lest, the repercussions would be very serious affecting the ecological balance, leading to destruction and chaos.”
31.The learned Advocate General submitted that the earliest case where the requirement to place the statutory notification before the house of legislature came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana reported in (1979) 2 SCC 196 and referred to the following passages found in paragraphs 23 and 24, which reads as follows:
“23.In Starey v. Graham (1899) 1 QB 406 where it was contended that the Register of Patent Agents Rules, 1889 which had been repealed by Rules of 1890 could not be re-enacted by mere reference without complying with the provisions of Section 101, sub-section (4) of 46 and 47 Vict. c. 57 according to which, a copy of the Rules of 1889 should also have been laid before both Houses of Parliament in order to make them valid, Channell, J., said:
“I somewhat doubt whether the provisions of Section 101 are more than directory and whether it is necessary in any particular case where reliance is placed on such rules to prove that in fact its provisions had been complied with.”
24.In Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban v. State of Gujarat (1966) 1 SCR 505 : AIR 1966 SC 385 where it was urged by the petitioner that the rules framed by the Provincial Government in 1941 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 26(1) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act (22 of 1939) had no legal validity as they were not laid before each of the Houses of the Provincial Legislature at the session thereof next following as provided by sub-section (5) of Section 26 of the Act, this Court rejected the contention and upheld the validity of the said rules. The following observations made in that case by Shah, J. (as he then was) on behalf of the Constitution Bench are opposite:
“The rules under Act 22 of 1939 were framed by the Provincial
Government of Bombay in 1941. At that time there was no Legislature in session, the Legislature having been suspended during the emergency arising out of World War II. The session of the Bombay Legislative Assembly was convened for the first time after
1941 on May 20, 1946 and that session was prorogued on May 24, 1946. The second session of the Bombay Legislative Assembly was convened on July 15, 1946 and that of the Bombay Legislative Council on September 3, 1946 and the rules were placed on the Assembly Table in the second session before the Legislative Assembly on September 2, 1946 and before the Legislative Council on September 13, 1946. Section 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the roles acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under Section 26(1).
It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature.Granting that the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that subsection (5) of Section 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory. (Emphasis supplied.) The rules have been in operation since the year 1941 and by virtue of Section 64 of Gujarat Act 20 of
1964 they continue to remain in operation.””
The learned Advocate General submitted that the same view in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd.’s case came to be followed and that decision was held good even today.
32.The learned Advocate General submitted that the judgment cited by the petitioners in Quarry Owners’ Association’s case (cited supra) and the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd.’s case (cited supra) were considered subsequently by the Supreme Court in Veneet Agrawal v. Union of India, reported in (2007) 13 SCC 116 and in paragraph 17, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:
“17.It was observed that provision was merely directory and not mandatory and even if the rules were not laid before the House at all even then the non-compliance with the laying down of the rules before Parliament could not be a ground to declare the
rules/regulations framed under the statute as ultra vires.”
33.The learned Advocate General also referred to the subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ram Deen Maurya v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2009) 6 SCC 735 for contending that if the consequence of non compliance was not provided, then the provision is only directory and placed reliance upon the following passage found in paragraph 52, which reads as follows:
“52.While considering the non-compliance with procedural requirement, it has to be kept in view that such a requirement is designed to facilitate justice and furthers its ends and, therefore, if the consequence of non-compliance is not provided, the requirement may be held to be directory.”
10. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 34 has clearly held that the Actdoes not deal with any consequence upon the non observation of the procedure. The procedure contemplated under Section 12-A(2) will have to be held directory in nature and also held that only on the ground that it was not placed before the legislative assembly, the impugned notification does not suffer from any irregularity or illegality. As cited above, these writ petitions have also been filed by some of the members in the Masinagudi Famers and Land Owners Association. The order of the learned Single Judge is upheld in a Division Bench.
11. Similarly, the contention of power of the District Collector in issuance of notification instead of the Committee was also the subject matter of challenge in the case of Mangalchand vaid and others vs. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu reported in 2008 1 MLJ 476. The Division Bench of this Court has held that the District Collector is the Chairman of the Committees constituted both under the TNPPF Act as well as the Tamil Nadu Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act. The said proposition was also followed by two Division Benches of this Court in the cases of Fr.George Padinjarayil and others vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, Environment and Forest Department (FR-5) and others made in W.A.No.35 of 2012 dated 08.12.2017 and Masinagudi Farmers and Land Owners Association vs. The
State of Tamil Nadu, Department of Forest made in 405 of 2012 dated 30.01.2018.
Therefore, when already a challenge was made to the notification raising various grounds before the Writ Court as well as the Division Bench, wherein, both the Writ Court as well as the Division Bench has upheld the notification, now, under the pretext of a new association by some of the members who are already parties to the above writ petitions cannot agitate the very same ground earlier raised in the subsequent writ petition, viz., the present writ petition.
12. It is also relevant to be noted that the present writ petition challenging the very same notification is not only barred by principle of res judicata but also by laches. Principle of res judicata is rested on public policy and repeatedly relitigating the same issue runs counter to the same. The notification was issued in the year 1991 and the challenge to the notification was dismissed both by the Writ Court as well as the Division Benches of this Court (W.A.Nos.35 of 2012 and 405 of 2012), the present writ petition is filed in the year 2016 after much water has been flown.
13. It is also relevant to note that the entire area in respect of which the notification is issued and most of the areas where the writ petition claim right over of the properties are already declared as a elephant corridor vide Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.125 dated 31.08.2010. That Government Order is also put to challenge before this Court and the Division Bench has also upheld the Government Order, on appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal.Nos.3438 to 3439 of 2020 dated 14.10.2020 has upheld the Government Order. While upholding the Government Order, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also held that corridorrs are narrow and linear patches of forest which establish and facilitate connectivity across habitats. When the entire area has been notified as a elephant corridor, Government Order is upheld, wherein, the petitioner association is also party before the Hon’ble Apex Court, now, they are estopped from claiming that their lands do not fall within the ambit of TNPPF Act.
14. It is also to be noted that while upholding the Government Order, the Hon’ble Apex Court has constituted three members committee only to look into certain grievance of the petitioners with regard to their so-called building license and constructions etc., The committee was headed by a retired judge of this Court, viz., Hon’ble Mr.Venkatraman (Retd) with two others experts in field. The finding of the
Committee is also put to challenge before this Court in batch of writ petitions in WP.Nos.26182 of 2023 etc., cases. This Court heard the writ petitions and we have passed a detailed order with regard to the importance of the elephant corridor. Therefore, after the notification, the entire lands which have been declared as elephant corridor, it is too late for the petitioner to challenge the notification issued under the TNPPF Act.
15. Much emphasis has been made by the learned senior counsel to theminutes of the meeting of the TNPPF Committee on 31.10.2022 making recommendations to the High Level Committee for denotifying the area from the purview of the TNPPF Act. It is relevant to note that recommendation alone cannot be taken advantage by the petitioners. Though recommendation has been made mainly taking note of the fact that several villages which is situated in the upper hills namely Upper Nilgiris is also notified under the TNPPF Act which were used by the villagers for agricultural activites. Only in that context, the recommendation has been made. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage on the basis of the resolution for the simple reason that entire area where the association claims right over the property is a foothills of the Nilgris mountain where the elephants have a migratory path and the entire area has been declared as elephant corridor. Therefore, we are of the view that merely because the committee has made certain recommendation taking note of the actual agriculturists who are residing in the upper hills that cannot be a ground to apply the same yardstick to the petitioner association members’ land predominantly situated within corridor.
16. With regard to the contention that the notification is a mere dead letter and doctrine of desuetude applies, as already stated, the press release has been issued consequent upon the agitations shown by the people when the earlier G.O.Ms.No.2837, Agriculture Department dated 17.09.1969 prohibiting the industrial area within 5 kilometers radius. Further, it is also brought to the notice of this Court that many permissions have been accorded for sale of the property under the TNPPF Act, in fact, certain members also sought ratifications and the dismissal order is also challenged in a writ petition filed before this Court in WP.No.27924 of 2024. All these facts clearly indicate that the notification has been put in use, several permissions have been regularly obtained by the Committee, therefore, it cannot be said that the entire notification is a dead letter not come into force. Such view of the matter, this writ petition is nothing but clear abuse process of law.
17. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.
(N.S.K.,J.) (D.B.C.,J.)
12.09.2025
Index : Yes/No Neutral Citation : Yes/No dhk
To:
1.The Secretary to Government
The Union of India
Department of Forest and Environment
Paryavaram Building, C.G.O.Complex New Delhi
2.The Secretary to Government
The State of Tamil Nadu
Environment and Forest Department
Chennai – 600 009
3.The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest
Panagal Building
Saidapet, Chennai – 600 015
4.The District Collector Nilgiris District, Ooty
5.The District Forest Officer
Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forest
Nilgiris District
N. SATHISH KUMAR, J.
AND D. BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J.
dhk

W.P.Nos.27312 of 2016
12.09.2025 (2/2)