CORAM THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI Crl.O.P.(MD).No.23251 of 2025 and Crl.M.P.(MD)Nos.20158 and 20160 of 2025 Saravanaperumal … Petitioner/Accused Vs. 1. The State of Tamilnadu, Rep by the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Pudukkottai District. Crime No.25 of 2017 … Respondents / Complainants 2. Anandanayaki … Respondent / Defacto Complainant Prayer : Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, to call for the

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 27.02.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 30.04.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI
Crl.O.P.(MD).No.23251 of 2025 and
Crl.M.P.(MD)Nos.20158 and 20160 of 2025
Saravanaperumal
… Petitioner/Accused

Vs.
1. The State of Tamilnadu,
Rep by the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Pudukkottai District.
Crime No.25 of 2017
… Respondents / Complainants
2. Anandanayaki … Respondent /
Defacto Complainant
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, to call for the entire records pertaining to the proceedings in CC No.32/2019 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai and quash the same as far as the petitioner is concerned.
For Petitioners : Mr.R.L.Dhilipan Pandiyan
For R-1 : Mr.M.Sakthi Kumar, Government Advocate (Crl. side)
For R-2 : Mr.N.Kamesh
ORDER
Preface:
The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is undoubtedly a constitutional safety-valve preserved by statute to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. Yet, such power is not intended to conduct a mini-trial, sift disputed facts, weigh competing versions, or decide the ultimate innocence or guilt of an accused.
2. The present petition presents a familiar but legally delicate contention. The petitioner asserts that in one case he is the defacto complainant and victim, while in another case arising out of the same transaction he has been shown as an accused. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that though the two cases may have a factual connection, they are not legally identical transactions, and that the petitioner’s liability towards the persons from whom he directly collected money cannot be extinguished merely because he claims to have been cheated by another person further down the chain.
3. It is in this backdrop that this Court is called upon to decide whether the proceedings in C.C.No.32 of 2019 deserve to be
interdicted at the threshold.
Case of the prosecution:
4. The prosecution case, as borne out from the complaint,
investigation and final report, is that the son of the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant was seeking employment abroad. The petitioner is alleged to have represented that he could arrange foreign employment for the son of the defacto complainant. Believing such representation, the 2nd respondent is stated to have paid a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- to the petitioner. The specific allegation is that the said amount was directly paid/deposited to the petitioner, who, after receiving the money, failed to secure employment abroad and failed to return the amount. It is further alleged that the petitioner took the son of the defacto complainant to Delhi on the assurance of arranging employment abroad, left him there, returned to Tamil Nadu and thereafter failed to fulfil the promise.
5. On the basis of the complaint lodged by the 2nd respondent, the respondent police registered a case for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC. After completion of investigation, final report was filed for the said offences and the same was taken cognizance as C.C.No.32 of 2019 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai.
Grounds for quash:
6. The petitioner seeks quashment principally on the ground that the prosecution is mala fide and falls within the seventh category laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1. It is contended that prior to the registration of the present case, the petitioner himself lodged a complaint, which resulted in registration of Crime No.24 of 2017, wherein he was shown as the defacto complainant.

1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
7. In the said case, according to the petitioner, seven personswere originally arrayed as accused. However, after investigation, final report was filed only against one Balabhaskaran, who had allegedly received the money from the petitioner. It is further contended that Balabhaskaran had died on 12.10.2019, whereas the final report in that case was filed on 19.12.2019, and therefore the police had mechanically laid a charge sheet against a dead person.
8. The petitioner’s further grievance is that the other accused persons, particularly A5 to A7 in the earlier case, were deleted from the array of accused and shown as witnesses, though money was allegedly transferred to them.
9. According to the petitioner, the very same witnesses figure in the present case also. Therefore, both cases arise out of one continuous transaction and the petitioner ought to have been shown only as a witness in the present case also. It is also contended that the petitioner had only collected money from the victims and transferred it to Balabhaskaran and others, and therefore he cannot be fastened with criminal liability.
10. The petitioner also relies upon Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.2, to contend that in a proceeding for quash, the Court must look beyond the plain wording of the FIR and examine the surrounding circumstances. It is finally contended that the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot go together and that the continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process of law.
Submissions on either side:
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the case arising out of Crime No.24 of 2017, the petitioner is the defacto complainant, whereas in the present case arising out of the complaint of the 2nd respondent, he has been made an accused.
12. It was submitted that both cases relate to the very same money transaction concerning overseas employment. According to the petitioner, the money collected from various persons was transferred to Balabhaskaran and certain other persons, and
therefore the petitioner is also a victim of cheating.

2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
13. The learned counsel submitted that though seven personswere named in the petitioner’s complaint, the police filed final report only against Balabhaskaran and deleted the other accused persons. Some of the deleted accused have been cited as witnesses. It was further submitted that Balabhaskaran had already died before the final report was filed, and therefore the investigation itself suffers from serious infirmity.
14. The learned counsel would contend that the petitioner cannot be treated as a complainant in one case and as an accused in another case when the substratum of both cases is the same. It was submitted that the prosecution has artificially split one transaction into two cases. If the petitioner had collected money and passed it on to Balabhaskaran and others, then he should be examined as a witness and not prosecuted as an accused.
15. The learned counsel further submitted that no proper notice was served upon the petitioner regarding deletion of the other accused persons in the earlier case. On these grounds, it was submitted that the continuation of the prosecution in C.C.No.32 of 2019 is oppressive, mala fide and liable to be quashed.
16. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) opposed the petition and submitted that two separate FIRs were registered on two different complaints. It was submitted that in Crime No.24 of 2017, the petitioner claimed that he had been cheated by Balabhaskaran and others. However, in the present case, the victims have directly alleged that they paid money to the
petitioner.
17. The learned Government Advocate submitted that the petitioner had received money from the defacto complainant and other witnesses on the promise of securing foreign employment. Therefore, he cannot escape criminal liability by stating that he subsequently transferred money to some other person. It was further submitted that the defacto complainant paid Rs.7,50,000/- to the petitioner and that documentary materials are available to show such payment.
18. The prosecution further contended that the petitioner hadcollected money from several persons and that the total amount involved is about Rs.23,99,000/-. It was submitted that the petitioner had accounted only for a part of the amount and that a substantial amount remained unpaid.
19. With respect to the final report filed against Balabhaskaran, it was submitted that the police came to know of his death only later, when summons were sought to be served after filing of the final report. Therefore, there was no deliberate act of filing a charge sheet against a dead person.
20. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that the other persons were deleted from the accused array only after investigation disclosed that they had no intentional role in the commission of the offence. It was submitted that the present proceedings disclose disputed questions of fact, including receipt of
money, inducement, entrustment, subsequent transfer,
misappropriation and intention, all of which can be decided only during trial.
21. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the defacto complainant had directly paid nearly Rs.7,50,000/- to the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner personally undertook to arrange foreign employment for the son of the defacto complainant.
22. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner took the defacto complainant’s son to Delhi, left him there, returned to Tamil Nadu and thereafter avoided responsibility. It was therefore submitted that the allegations disclose clear ingredients of cheating and criminal breach of trust and that the petitioner must face trial.
Point for consideration:
23. The point that arises for consideration is whether the proceedings in C.C.No.32 of 2019 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, deserve to be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 BNSS?
Analysis:
24. Section 528 BNSS preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
25. The principles governing the exercise of inherent power are well settled. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court catalogued illustrative categories where criminal proceedings may be quashed. Equally, the Court cautioned that such power must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection.
26. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that proceedings may be quashed where there is a legal bar, where the allegations do not constitute any offence, or where there is no legal evidence to support the charge.
27. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of quash, the Court must not

3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
4 AIR 1960 SC 866 5 (2012) 9 SCC 460
appreciate evidence as though conducting a trial, and if the allegations disclose the ingredients of an offence, the proceedings ordinarily must continue.
28. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of allegations at the threshold. Therefore, the question is not whether the petitioner will ultimately be convicted. The question is whether, accepting the prosecution materials at their face value, the alleged offences are prima facie disclosed.
29. Section 420 IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.
The essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC are:
i. deception of a person; ii. fraudulent or dishonest inducement; iii. delivery of property pursuant to such inducement;
and
iv. dishonest intention at the time of inducement.
30. In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar , , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the distinction between mere breach of contract and cheating depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement.
31. In Vesa Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala , it was held that every breach of promise does not amount to cheating, but where dishonest intention exists from inception, criminal prosecution is maintainable.
32. In the present case, the specific allegation is that the petitioner represented that he could secure foreign employment for the son of the defacto complainant, received Rs.7,50,000/-, took the candidate to Delhi, left him there and failed to secure employment or refund the money. These allegations, at this stage, cannot be brushed aside as a mere civil dispute or failed employment arrangement.
33. The allegation of collecting money on the promise ofoverseas employment, taking the victim to Delhi and abandoning him there, if ultimately proved, would prima facie indicate inducement and dishonest intention.
34. Whether the petitioner genuinely believed that Balabhaskaran would secure employment, whether he honestly transferred the amount, whether he retained part of the amount, and whether he himself was deceived are all matters of evidence.
35. At the stage of quash, this Court cannot accept the petitioner’s explanation as conclusive and terminate the prosecution. Therefore, the offence under Section 420 IPC is prima facie made out for the purpose of allowing the trial to proceed.
36. Section 406 IPC punishes criminal breach of trust. The foundational ingredients are:
i. entrustment of property or dominion over property; ii. dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal of that property; and
iii. violation of any legal direction or contract concerning such entrustment.
37. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that entrustment and dishonest
misappropriation are essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust.
38. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that criminal prosecution should not be used for settling civil disputes, but where the allegations disclose the ingredients of a criminal offence, the prosecution cannot be quashed merely because civil remedies may also exist.
39. In the present case, the allegation is not merely that the petitioner failed to repay money. The allegation is that money was entrusted to him for a specific purpose, namely, securing foreign employment. The prosecution further alleges that the petitioner did not utilise the amount for the stated purpose, did not secure employment and did not return the amount.
40. The petitioner admits receipt of money, but states that he transferred it to Balabhaskaran and others. This explanation may be a defence. It may also be relevant during trial. But it cannot by itself destroy the prosecution case at the threshold.
41. If the money was entrusted for a specific purpose and the petitioner dishonestly dealt with it in breach of that purpose, Section 406 IPC may be attracted. Therefore, the charge under Section 406 IPC cannot be quashed at this preliminary stage.
42. The petitioner contends that Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot go together. This submission, stated as an absolute proposition, cannot be accepted.
43. It is true that cheating and criminal breach of trust are distinct offences. Cheating requires dishonest intention at the inception, whereas criminal breach of trust postulates entrustment and subsequent dishonest misappropriation. However, at the stage of framing charge or taking cognizance, if the allegations disclose elements of both inducement and entrustment, the prosecution cannot be quashed merely because both provisions are invoked.
44. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar , the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised the distinction between the two offences, but did not lay down any absolute bar against simultaneous prosecution where facts justify such invocation.
45. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a complaint need not reproduce the ingredients of an offence in exact statutory language, and if the factual foundation exists, the proceedings ought not to be quashed.
46. In the present case, the allegation is that the petitioner induced the defacto complainant to part with money and also received the money for a specific purpose. Whether the facts ultimately prove cheating alone, breach of trust alone, both, or neither, is a matter for trial. Therefore, the mere invocation of Sections 406 and 420 IPC together is not a ground to quash the proceedings.
47. The principal plank of the petitioner’s argument is that he is the defacto complainant in Crime No.24 of 2017 and therefore cannot be an accused in the present case. This Court is unable to accept such a broad proposition. A person may be deceived by one person and still be answerable to another person whom he has independently induced to part with money.
48. The petitioner’s complaint against Balabhaskaran may show that the petitioner claims to have been cheated in the subsequent chain of events. But that does not automatically erase the allegation that the defacto complainant paid money directly to the petitioner on the petitioner’s assurance.
49. The prosecution has specifically contended that the victims knew only the petitioner and that they paid money to him. The defacto complainant also asserts direct payment to the petitioner. If the petitioner had collected money from the defacto complainant and had undertaken responsibility for securing employment, his liability towards the defacto complainant is a matter to be tested on evidence. The petitioner’s status as complainant in another FIR may be a defence circumstance. It may be used during cross-examination. It may even assist the petitioner at trial. But it does not render the present prosecution inherently illegal. The Court cannot, at this stage, hold that both cases are one and the same transaction merely on the petitioner’s assertion.
50. The prosecution case is that the first FIR concerns the petitioner’s complaint against Balabhaskaran, whereas the present FIR concerns the complaint of victims who paid money to the petitioner. The distinction is not illusory on the face of the record. Therefore, the petitioner’s double status as complainant in one case and accused in another case is not, by itself, a ground for quashment.
51. The petitioner has strongly contended that certain persons originally arrayed as accused in Crime No.24 of 2017 were deleted and later cited as witnesses. Whether the deletion was proper, whether protest remedy was available, whether further investigation ought to have been sought, and whether the deleted persons should have been prosecuted are issues pertaining to the connected case.
52. The legality of deletion of accused in Crime No.24 of 2017 cannot be decided collaterally in this petition, which challenges C.C.No.32 of 2019 arising out of the complaint of the 2nd respondent. Further, the mere fact that a person is cited as witness in one case does not automatically prohibit the prosecution from proceeding against another person in a connected case.
53. The evidentiary worth of such witnesses, their role, their credibility and the propriety of their deletion from the accused array are all matters that can be tested during trial. At this stage, the Court cannot quash the proceedings merely because some persons whom the petitioner considers to be real culprits have been cited as witnesses.
54. The petitioner has submitted that final report in Crime No.24 of 2017 was filed against Balabhaskaran after his death. This circumstance may raise questions regarding the manner in which Crime No.24 of 2017 was investigated or proceeded with. However, it does not automatically invalidate the present proceedings in C.C.No.
32 of 2019.
55. The present case rests upon the allegation of the defacto complainant that money was paid directly to the petitioner. The death of Balabhaskaran may have evidentiary consequences. It may affect the petitioner’s ability to establish his defence. It may also be a circumstance to be considered by the trial Court in appreciating the prosecution case. But it cannot result in quashing of the case against the petitioner at the threshold.
56. The prosecution has also explained that the death of Balabhaskaran came to the knowledge of the police only later. Whether such explanation is acceptable is not the determinative issue in the present quash petition.
57. The petitioner relies upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal13 and Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.14 to contend that the proceedings are mala fide. In Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.15, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where proceedings appear manifestly frivolous or vexatious, the Court may look into the surrounding circumstances and need not confine itself mechanically to the FIR.
58. However, the said principle cannot be understood to mean that every defence version must be accepted at the threshold. In the present case, the materials do not show that the prosecution is manifestly absurd, inherently improbable or wholly malicious. On the contrary, the record indicates that the defacto complainant alleges direct payment to the petitioner; the petitioner admits receipt of money but offers an explanation that he transferred the amount to another person.
59. Once receipt of money is not seriously disputed and the dispute concerns the purpose, transfer, intention and liability, the

13 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
14 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 15 Supra
matter enters the realm of trial. Therefore, this Court is unable to hold that the case falls under the seventh category of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal16.
60. The following issues require evidence:
i. whether the defacto complainant paid Rs.7,50,000/- directly to the petitioner; ii. whether the petitioner induced such payment by promising foreign employment; iii. whether the petitioner had dishonest intention at the inception; iv. whether the petitioner actually transferred the money to Balabhaskaran or others;
v. whether such transfer, if true, was bona fide or a device to escape liability; vi. whether the petitioner retained any portion of the amount; vii. whether the petitioner abandoned the defacto complainant’s son at Delhi; and

16 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
viii. whether the petitioner’s role was that of an innocent intermediary or a culpable participant.
61. These are not issues which can be decided in a petition under Section 528 BNSS. The trial Court alone can appreciate oral and documentary evidence, test the witnesses in cross-examination and decide whether the prosecution has proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt.
Epilogue:
62. Criminal law does not proceed on labels but on legally provable roles. A person may describe himself as an intermediary, victim, agent, facilitator or conduit. But when the allegation is that he directly received money from a complainant on a promise to secure employment abroad, the Court cannot, at the threshold, close the prosecution merely because he asserts that he was cheated by another person in the chain.
63. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court is meant to protect the innocent from baseless prosecution. It is not meant to shortcircuit a prosecution where disputed facts, admitted receipt of money, competing explanations and allegations of dishonest inducement require adjudication by evidence.
64. The petitioner may have a defence. He may rely upon his complaint in Crime No.24 of 2017. He may confront the prosecution witnesses with the alleged transfer of money. He may contend before the trial Court that Balabhaskaran was the real offender. But such defence cannot be converted into a ground for quashing the prosecution at its inception. This Court therefore finds no ground to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.
65. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. It is made clear that the observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding this petition under Section 528 BNSS. The learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, shall proceed with C.C.No.32 of 2019 independently, uninfluenced by any observation made in this order.
66. The petitioner is at liberty to raise all permissible legal and factual defences before the trial Court in the manner known to law.
30.04.2026
NCC : Yes / No
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes/ No
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To
1.The Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai,
2.The Inspector of Police,
District Crime Branch, Pudukkottai District.
3. The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J.

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CRL OP(MD)No.23251 of 2025
30.04.2026