Coopertive case full order THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MR.N.ANAND VENKATESH   W.P.Nos.21440, 21441, 21442/2015, 18263, 27535/2010, 14726, 15943, 15944, 15945, 34257, 34260, 34258, 34259/2012,—+++The benefit of regularization that is extended to the eligible Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be shall also be extended to all those employees who are similarly placed even though they have not knocked the doors of this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

 

ORDERS  RESERVED ON       :  15.02.2021

 

PRONOUNCING ORDERS ON : 19.02.2021

 

CORAM

 

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MR.N.ANAND VENKATESH

 

  1. W.P.Nos.21440, 21441, 21442/2015, 18263, 27535/2010, 14726, 15943, 15944, 15945, 34257, 34260, 34258, 34259/2012, 33595,33596,33597,33598,39950/2015, 6805,19111, 27319/2016, 7054,7057,7055,7056, 12596,27840,29238,32549,32550/2017,25419/2019, 5549, 9396, 9533/2020, 96,279,287,286,282,1585,1601,1602,1607,1591,1594,1597,1587,1608,1652,1666,1671,1655,1659,1678,1662,1685,1845,1857,1863,1865,1869,1885,1889,1890,1891,1893,1900,1903,1905,1909, 1911,1987,1989,1992,1994,1996,2349,2351,2352,2353,2356, 2360,2361/2021 and WP(MD).No.17039, 17040/2014, WP(MD).No.5216, 5217,11143,20398/2015, WP(MD)No.21949/2016, WP(MD).No.1670,1671,2453/2018 and WP(MD).No.12481 of 2019

and

WMP Nos.7692,7693,7694,7695,13405,13406,31493,31492, 35878, 35879/2017, 6498,6499,11486, 11637/2020,2725,142,140/2021,WMP(MD),8901,8902,8874,8873,16862,16861/2017, WMP(MD).Nos.1777,1778,1779,1780/2018

 

 

W.P.No.21440 of 2015

 

A.Svakumar                                                 ..Petitioner

in W.P.No.21440/2015

 

.Vs.

 

 

1.The Secretary to Government,

Food, Co-op. & Consumer Protection Dept.,

Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

 

2.The Registrar of Co-op. Societies,

N.V.N.Maligai, Kilpauk, Chennai-10.

 

3.The Addl. Registrar of Co-op. Societies,

(Marketing, Planning and Development),

N.V.N.Maligai, Kilpauk, Chennai-10.

 

4.The Management of AIWFC Women’s

Consumers Co-op. Stores Ltd.,

Rep. by its Special Officer,

No.7/2, Anna Samy Street,

Ellis Road, Chennai -2.                                     ..Respondents        in All WPs

 

 

 

PRAYER in W.P.No.21440/2015:    Writ  Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,  for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified  Mandamus,  to call for the records of the impugned order in Na.Ka.No.114175/2011/WP2 dated 25.05.2015 passed by the 3rd respondent herein and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents nos.1 to 4 to regularize the services of the petitioners post ration shop packer with all  monetary and attendant benefits.

 

 

 

For Petitioner

in W.P.Nos.21440,21441,

21442/2015                       : Mr.T.Sundaravadanam

 

 

For Respondents                 : Mr.P.H.Arvind Pandian

(in All WPs)                        Additional Advocate General

Asstd. by:

Mr.L.P.Shanmugasundaram

Special Government Pleader

(Co-operatives)

 

 

 

COMMON ORDER

1.The current batch of Writ Petitions are filed seeking for regularization of the services of the Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be.

 

  1. The Petitioners have all joined as salesmen or as packers in various Cooperative Societies, Marketing Societies and Cooperative Wholesale Stores (hereinafter collectively referred to as “cooperative societies” or “societies”)  before 12.03.2001. It is an admitted case that none of these Petitioners were sponsored from the employment exchange. They were all recruited by the respective societies based on the vacancies available and all of them have put in decades of service.

 

  1. It would be more appropriate to trace the brief history involved in the present batch of Writ Petitions.

 

  1. The State Government took into consideration the employment of a large number of salesmen and packers in various societies whose services was utilised continuously for years together and decided to regularize their services. A government order was issued in GO (MS) No. 86 dt. 12.03.2001, by the Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department (hereinafter referred to as “department”), through which the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was vested with the power to regularize the services of those employees who have been appointed after 08.07.1980, by way of an irregular appointment, by means other than through an employment exchange provided, they have completed 480 days of continuous service within a period of two calendar years (or 24 service months), as provided under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981. The Government Order provided that if any such irregular appointments are made subsequent to the said Order, action may be taken against such societies, as provided for under the Tamil Nadu Co-Operative Societies Act, 1983 and that the government shall not take responsibility for any such irregular appointments made thereof. The Registrar of Co-Operative Societies was directed to instruct/inform the concerned managements of various societies in this regard.

 

  1. The validity of the said Government Order in GO (MS) No. 86, dt. 12.03.2001, came to be challenged before the Division Bench of this Court in L. Justine &Anr. v. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies and 2 Ors. reported in 2002 (4) CTC 385 and this Court upheld the Government Order and directed that regularization of services of these employees appointed after 08.07.1980 and before 12.03.2001 be done based on and subject to the findings and directions given thereto.

 

  1. The above-mentioned judgement in L. Justine (cited supra) was taken on an appeal by way of a Special Leave Petition and it was heard along with other connected appeals in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies reported in (2004) 7 SCC 112, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the appeals, reversed some of the findings of this Court in L.Justine, with respect to the power of the State Government under Sections 170 and 182 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 and the Executive Power under Article 162 of The Constitution of India, 1950.

 

7.On 02.11.2006, the department issued Government Letter No. 22322/CG1/2005-7, CF & CP delegating the powers vested in the Registrar of Cooperative Societies through GO (MS) No. 86 dt. 12.03.2001, to the Regional Joint Registrars. By the said letter, the Regional Joint Registrars were directed to regularize the service of all employees appointed after 08.07.1980 and on or before 11.03.2001. This was done since the number of appointments that were to be regularized based on GO (MS) No. 86 dt. 12.03.2001 accounted to more than 35,000. It also emphasized that such regularization was to be done subject to:

  1. Amendments made through GOMS No.212
  2. 04.07.1995; and

 

  1. Rule 149(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-Operative

Societies Rules, 1998.

 

8.Meanwhile, pursuant to the Judgement in L. Justine’scase (cited supra), around 26,000 employees were regularized. There was some administrative delay in some of the cases and the regularization did not reach its logical end for the Petitioners and other similarly placed persons. While so, show cause notices were issued to some of the employees calling upon them to explain as to why their appointment is not irregular and/or illegal and as to why their services must not be terminated. These show cause notices came to be challenged before this Court. When the matter was taken up by a Division Bench, it was referred to the Full Bench after taking into consideration the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Umarani’s case (cited supra). In R. Rathakrishnan v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Dindugul Circle, Dindugulreported in 2007 (5) CTC 269,  the Full Bench of this Court held that:

 

  1. The observations, findings and directions given in L. Justine at paragraph 19(i), last portion of paragraph 19(v) and the finding with regard to regularization of service of employees recruited prior to 12.03.2001, stand overruled;

 

 

  1. The State Government cannot direct regularization of employees of co-operative societies of the State of Tamil Nadu, those who have been appointed without following the procedure and against constitutional mandate and in view of the clear dicta in A. Umarani; and that

 

  1. Though it was brought to the notice of the Court that 26,000 employees of Co-Operative Societies were regularized in service after the judgement in L. Justine, the Court is not expressing any opinion with regard to the same since the question of their legality and propriety was not challenged in the said case.

 

9.Pursuant to the judgment inR.Rathakrishnan and A. Umarani(cited supra), and based on the opinion of the learned Advocate General, the department, through GO (MS) No. 301 dt. 17.10.2007, withdrew its instructions given in Government Letter No. 22322/CG1/2005-7 dt. 02.11.2006.

 

  1. Subsequently, in their letter Re. No. 92088/2008/SF3 dt. 21.08.2008, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, after considering the reports of the Regional Joint Registrars that, of the employees of cooperative societies who have not been regularized, majority are already getting their pay based on time scale and only a section of employees are either on consolidated pay or daily wages, and that some of the employees who have been appointed between 08.07.1980 and 12.03.2001 may be given pay on time scale as on par with the majority of other irregular employees receiving pay on time scale, directed that the same could be done subject to certain conditions and that the management of the concerned Cooperative Societies must take an undertaking from the employees before fixing the time scale that they shall strictly abide by the conditions stipulated therein.

 

  1. The circumstances under which the present case arises is that, based on the issuance of GO (MS) No. 86, dt. 12.03.2001, regularization of service was sought for those employees of societies appointed without satiating the conditions of service provided for under The Tami Nadu Cooperative Society Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules”). The specific case of the Petitioners is that, by virtue of being similarly placed with the 26,000 other employees who were regularized, the same benefit must be extended to the Petitioners also. It is the further case of the Petitioners that they cannot be put to suffer the consequences of exorbitant administrative delay on part of the authorities, resulting in change in circumstances owing to subsequent development in law. The Petitioners further submitted that their appointments are in no stretch illegal and utmost, it could be termed as one which is irregular only, owing to the fact that they were not appointed through employment exchange.

 

12.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that all the Petitioners had the requisite qualification at the time when they were appointed and their appointment was within the cadre strength of the concerned societies in a sanctioned post, and all of them are receiving time scale of pay. In short, the services of all the Petitioners is on par with the regular employees. It was further submitted that the only deficiency that is put against the Petitioners is that they were not sponsored by the employment exchange. It was further submitted that the substantial qualifications provided under Rule 149(1) of the Rules has been satisfied and the procedural requirement provided under Rule 149(2) of the Rules which is not satisfied in the present case at the best can only make the appointments irregular and not illegal.

 

13.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners placed heavy reliance upon Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors. reported in (2006)4SCC 1,and particularly upon paragraph 53 of the judgement and contended that the Petitioners satisfy the requirements stipulated by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and are hence entitled to be regularized in service. The learned counsel for the Petitioners further brought to the notice of this Court the later judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which explained the correct position of law after Umadevi judgement (cited supra) and submitted that the Petitioners are satisfying all the parameters as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the subsequent judgements. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners in unison made it very clear that the Petitioners are not seeking any monetary benefits and at the best, the regularization of their services will only entitle them for subsequent promotions, if there is any period of service left for them, and in all the other cases, they can claim for the retirement benefits.

 

14.Mr. P.H. Aravindh Pandian, learned Additional Advocate General (hereinafter referred to as “AAG”) appearing on behalf of the Government and the Cooperative Societies submitted that if the appointments does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 149 of the Rules, it automatically becomes illegal and therefore there is no scope for any regularization of the employees. The learned AAG further contended that the judgement of the Full Bench of this Court in R. Rathakrishnan (cited supra) was rendered after the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umadevi’s case (cited supra), and that it was held that the State Government cannot regularize the services of the employees of the Cooperative Societies appointed without following the procedure stipulated under the relevant Rule, and in view of such a specific finding given by the Full Bench, there is no scope for the Petitioners to claim for regularization of their services. The learned AAG further submitted that the services of the Petitioners have not been disturbed and they have been allowed to continue in service taking into consideration the extended service put in by them and that by itself does not give any right to the Petitioners to claim for regularization. The learned AAG in order to substantiate his submissions relied upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Devendra Sharmareported in 2020 I LLJ 1. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in R. Ezhilarasan and Ors. v. Anna University in W.P. No. 3175 of 2016 (Batch)dt. 09.11.2020.

 

15.This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record.

 

16.This is an unfortunate case where luck has played its part. The Government took a decision to regularize the services of nearly 35,000 employees working in various Societies by drawing a cut-off date as 12.03.2001 and out of the same, the lucky 26,000 employees got their services regularized. The rest of the employees were facing the wrath of their destiny. They were eagerly expecting their services to be regularized like that of the similarly placed employees but bad luck came in their way. The process of regularization was undertaken even for the Petitioners and due to various administrative delays, it did not reach its logical end. By then, there was a huge shift in law with regard to illegal and irregular appointments . This started from Umarani’s case (cited supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court came down very heavily on irregular appointments through back door entry which was putting a heavy financial burden on the Cooperative Societies. This judgement virtually stopped any further processing for regularization of the left out employees. It came to a grinding halt after the judgement of the Full Bench in R. Rathakrishnan (cited supra).

17.The only ray of hope for the Petitioners is pitched upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umadevi’s case (cited supra). It will therefore be relevant to take note of the important portions of this judgement which are extracted hereinunder:

47.When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.

 

  1. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.

 

49.It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and Courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the Court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the Court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution.

 

  1. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of Art.21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Arts.14, 16 and 309 so as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under Art.21 of the Constitution of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by Art.21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of Art.21 of the Constitution. The argument that Art.23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality.

 

51.The argument that the right to life protected by Art.21 of the Constitution of India would include the right to employment cannot also be accepted at this juncture. The law is dynamic and our Constitution is a living document. May be at some future point of time, the right to employment can also be brought in under the concept of right to life or even included as a fundamental right. The new statute is perhaps a beginning. As things now stand, the acceptance of such a plea at the instance of the employees before us would lead to the consequence of depriving a large number of other aspirants of an opportunity to compete for the post or employment. Their right to employment, if it is a part of right to life, would stand denuded by the preferring of those who have got in casually or those who have come through the back door. The obligation cast on the State under Art.39(a) of the Constitution of India is to ensure that all citizens equally have the right to adequate means of livelihood. It will be more consistent with that policy if the Courts recognize that an appointment to a post in Government service or in the service of its instrumentalities, can only be by way of a proper selection in the manner recognized by the relevant legislation in the context of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. In the name of individualizing justice, it is also not possible to shut our eyes to the constitutional scheme and the right of the numerous as against the few who are before the Court. The Directive Principles of State Policy have also to be reconciled with the rights available to the citizen under Part III of the Constitution and the obligation of the State to one and all and not to a particular group of citizens. We, therefore, overrule the argument based on Art.21 of the Constitution.

 

  1. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the Court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in  Dr.RaiShivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College Dr.RaiShivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College Dr.RaiShivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 144: A.I.R. 1962 S.C.1210. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent.

 

  1. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa (1967)1 S.C.R. 128: A.I.R. 1967 S.C.1071,  R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah and another R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah and another R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah and another (1972)1 S.C.C.409: (1972)2 S.C.R.799, and  B.N.Nagarajan and others v. State of Karnataka and others B.N.Nagarajan and others v. State of Karnataka and others B.N.Nagarajan and others v. State of Karnataka and others (1979)4 S.C.C. 507: 1980 S.C.C.(L. & S.) 4: (1979)3 S.C.R.937, and referred to in para.15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of Courts or of Tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of Courts or of Tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub-judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. [Italics for emphasis]”

 

18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above judgement, has consciously differentiated between an illegal appointment and an irregular appointment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has made an attempt to come to the aide of employees who have been irregularly appointed and have put in more than ten years of service.

 

  1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on various occasions had taken note of the judgement in Umadevi’s case (cited supra) and explained the correct position of law in this regard. It will therefore, be more relevant to take note of these judgments:
  2. State of Karnataka v. ML Kesari reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247. The relevant portions are extracted hereinunder:

7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against “regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1], if the following conditions are fulfilled:

 (i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years.

 

 (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular.” (emphasis supplied)

 

b.Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa reported in (2014) 4 SCC 583. The relevant portions are extracted hereinunder:

42.The decision in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , as noticed earlier, permitted regularisation of regular appointments and not illegal appointments. Question, however, is whether the appointments in the instant case could be described as illegal and if they were not, whether the State could be directed to regularise the services of the degree-holder Junior Engineers who have worked as ad hoc Assistant Engineers for such a long period, not only on the analogy of the legislative enactment for regularisation but also on the principle underlying para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] .

 

  1. As to what would constitute an irregular appointment is no longer res integra. The decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari [(2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] , has examined that question and explained the principle regarding regularisation as enunciated in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . The decision in that case summed up the following three essentials for regularisation: (1) the employees have worked for ten years or more, (2) that they have so worked in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal, and (3) they should have possessed the minimum qualification stipulated for the appointment. Subject to these three requirements being satisfied, even if the appointment process did not involve open competitive selection, the appointment would be treated irregular and not illegal and thereby qualify for regularisation. Para 7 in this regard is apposite and may be extracted at this stage: (M.L. Kesari case [(2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] , SCC p. 250)

7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against ‘regularisation’ enunciated in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , if the following conditions are fulfilled:

   (i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years.

  (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular.”

  1. Union of India and Ors. v. Central Administrative Tribunal and Ors. reported in (2019) 4 SCC 290. The relevant portions are extracted hereinunder: 19.The directions issued in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] have been considered by subsequent Benches of this Court. In State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari [State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the “one-time measure” prescribed in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] must be considered as concluded only when all employees who were entitled for regularisation under Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , had been considered. R.V. Raveendran, J., who wrote the opinion of the Court, held: (M.L. Kesari case [State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] , SCC pp. 250-51, paras 9-11)

9. The term “one-time measure” has to be understood in its proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , each department or each instrumentality should undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite qualification for the post and if so, regularise their services.

  1. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees were still pending before courts. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , will not lose their right to be considered for regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or because the six-month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] has expired. The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the one-time exercise in terms of para 53 ofUmadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para 53 ofUmadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , the employer concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-time exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 ofUmadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , are so considered.
  2. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was rendered, are considered for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] ] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision inUmadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above directions inUmadevi (3)[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] as a one-time measure.”                                                               (emphasis supplied)
  3. The judgment of this Court in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] does not preclude the claims of employees who seek regularisation after the exercise has been undertaken with respect to some employees, provided that the said employees have completed the years of service as mandated by Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . The ruling casts an obligation on the State and its instrumentalities to grant a fair opportunity of regularisation to all such employees which are entitled according to the mandate under Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] and ensure that the benefit is not conferred on a limited few. The subsequent regularisation of employees who have completed the requisite period of service is to be considered as a continuation of the one-time exercise.
  4. The decisions of this Court in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] and M.L. Kesari [State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] were considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand [Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 472] . Madan Lokur, J., construed the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] in the following terms: [Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , SCC p. 241, para 7]

7. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was therefore twofold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those irregularly appointed in the past.”

  1. The Court noted in the above judgment that if a strict and literal interpretation was given to the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , no employee from the State of Jharkhand appointed on an irregular basis could ever be regularised as the State was formed on 15-11-2000 and the cut-off date had been fixed as 10-4-2006. The intent of the Court was to grant similarly-placed employees who had put the requisite years of service as mandated by Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , the benefit of regularisation. The Court thus held that the Jharkhand Sarkar keAdhinasthAniyamit Rup se NiyuktEwamKaryaratKarmiyokiSewaNiyamitikaranNiyamawali, 2015 (“the Regularsation Rules”) must be interpreted in a pragmatic manner and employees of the State who had completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the rules, ought to be regularised. In doing so, the Court ensured that employees in the State of Jharkhand who had completed the same years of service as employees from other States, are granted parity in terms of regularisation. The spirit of non-discrimination and equity runs through the decisions in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , M.L. Kesari [State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826] and Narendra Kumar Tiwari [Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 472] .

 

  1. SheoNarain Nagar and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 13 SCC 432. The relevant portions are extracted hereinunder:

7. When we consider the prevailing scenario, it is painful to note that the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] has not been properly understood and rather wrongly applied by various State Governments. We have called for the data in the instant case to ensure as to how many employees were working on contract basis or ad hoc basis or daily-wage basis in different State departments. We can take judicial notice that widely aforesaid practice is being continued. Though this Court has emphasised that incumbents should be appointed on regular basis as per rules but new devise of making appointment on contract basis has been adopted, employment is offered on daily-wage basis, etc. in exploitative forms. This situation was not envisaged by Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . The prime intendment of the decision was that the employment process should be by fair means and not by back door entry and in the available pay scale. That spirit of the Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] has been ignored and conveniently overlooked by various State Governments/authorities. We regretfully make the observation that Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] has not been implemented in its true spirit and has not been followed in its pith and substance. It is being used only as a tool for not regularising the services of incumbents. They are being continued in service without payment of due salary for which they are entitled on the basis of Articles 14, 16 read with Article 34(1)(d) of the Constitution of India as if they have no constitutional protection as envisaged in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145 : AIR 1983 SC 130] , from cradle to grave. In heydays of life they are serving on exploitative terms with no guarantee of livelihood to be continued and in old age they are going to be destituted, there being no provision for pension, retiral benefits, etc. There is clear contravention of constitutional provisions and aspiration of downtrodden class. They do have equal rights and to make them equals they require protection and cannot be dealt with arbitrarily. The kind of treatment meted out is not only bad but equally unconstitutional and is denial of rights. We have to strike a balance to really implement the ideology of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . Thus, the time has come to stop the situation where Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] can be permitted to be flouted, whereas, this Court has interdicted such employment way back in the year 2006. The employment cannot be on exploitative terms, whereas Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] laid down that there should not be back door entry and every post should be filled by regular employment, but a new device has been adopted for making appointment on payment of paltry system on contract/ad hoc basis or otherwise. This kind of action is not permissible when we consider the pith and substance of true spirit in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] .

 

 

 

  1. It is clear from the above judgements that paragraph 53 of the judgement in Umadevi’s case (cited supra) has given rise to a glimmer of hope for all those employees whose appointments are irregular but who have voluntarily and continuously worked for ten years or more in a duly sanctioned post with prescribed minimum qualifications. In no uncertain terms, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that those category of employees who fulfil this criteria as on 10.04.2006 will be entitled to be considered for regularization.

 

21.It therefore, becomes imperative to understand the scope and ambit of the term “regularization” and the distinction between the terms “irregularity” and “illegality”, in service law jurisprudence.

 

  1. The word “regularization” is not meant to connote any benefit of tenure of appointments. What it seeks to provide is that in case of defects, if any, during appointments, are cured by regularizing such appointments. In other words, the purpose of regularization is to set right procedural irregularities. What is procedural or substantial and what is curable or not depends on the facts and circumstances of every case.

 

  1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umadevi’s case (cited supra) has gone into this specific aspect by taking note of the earlier judgements and the relevant portions are extracted hereinunder:

15.  Even at the threshold, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between regularization and conferment of permanence in service jurisprudence. In  State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa (1967)1 S.C.R. 128: this Court stated that it was a mis-conception to consider that regularization meant permanence. In  R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah and another (1972)1 S.C.C.409, this Court dealt with an argument that regularization would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment. This Court stated:

Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularization would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment, whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularization did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularization of the rules under Art.309. Both the contentions are fallacious. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, illegality cannot be regularized. Ratification or regularization is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority, but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularization cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.”

 

  1. In  B.N.Nagarajan and others v. State of Karnataka and others (1979)4 S.C.C.507: this Court clearly held that the words “regular” or “regularization” do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments. This Court emphasized that when rules framed under Art.309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularization is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Art.162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. These decisions and the principles recognized therein have not been dissented to by this Court and on principle, we see no reason not to accept the proposition as enunciated in the above decisions. We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularized and that it alone can be regularized and granting permanence of employment is a totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularization.”

 

  1. Useful reference can be made to the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1979) 4 SCC 507. The relevant portion of the judgement is extracted hereunder:

23.[…] It was argued that the regularization of the promotion gave it the color of permanence and the appointments of the promotes as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from November 1, 1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly, the words “regular” or “regularization” do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. In this connection reference may with advantage be made to State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa [AIR 1967 SC 1071 : (1967) 1 SCR 128, 132] and R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] .

 

  1. The question of distinction between “irregular appointment” and “illegal appointment” arose in Municipal Corporation of Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey reported in (2007) 1 SCC 373 and the Court held as follows:

11. The question which, thus, arises for consideration, would be: Is there any distinction between “irregular appointment” and “illegal appointment”? The distinction between the two terms is apparent. In the event the appointment is made in total disregard of the constitutional scheme as also the recruitment rules framed by the employer, which is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment would be an illegal one; whereas there may be cases where, although, substantial compliance with the constitutional scheme as also the rules has been made, the appointment may be irregular in the sense that some provisions of the rules might not have been strictly adhered to.”

 

 

26.Further reference can be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Desh Raj reported in (2007) 1 SCC 257, which after considering the judgements in:

  1. State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1071 ; and

b.B.N. Nagarajan (cited supra) held that:

10.The observations made in the said paragraph must be read in the light of the observations made in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment. The Constitution Bench referred to the decisions of this Court in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa [State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071 : (1967) 1 SCR 128] , R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah [R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409] and B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka [B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4] . B.N. Nagarajan [B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4] is a decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in which it has clearly been held that the regularisation does not mean permanence. A distinction has clearly been made in those decisions between “irregularity” and “illegality”. An appointment which was made throwing all constitutional obligations and statutory rules to the winds would render the same illegal whereas irregularity presupposes substantial compliance with the rules.

  1. Distinction between irregularity and illegality is explicit. It has been so pointed out in National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh [(2006) 5 SCC 493: 2006 SCC (L&S) 1152] in the following terms: (SCC pp. 500-01, paras 23-25)

23. The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the appointments were irregular and not illegal, cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They were appointed only on the basis of their applications. The Recruitment Rules were not followed. Even the Selection Committee had not been properly constituted. In view of the ban on employment, no recruitment was permissible in law. The reservation policy adopted by the appellant had not been maintained. Even cases of minorities had not been given due consideration.

  1. The Constitution Bench thought of directing regularisation of the services only of those employees whose appointments were irregular as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa [State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071 : (1967) 1 SCR 128] , R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah [R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409] and B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka [B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4] wherein this Court observed: [Umadevi (3) case [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , SCC p. 24, para 16]

16. In B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka [B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4] this Court clearly held that the words ‘regular’ or ‘regularisation’ do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments.’

  1. Judged by the standards laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decisions, the appointments of the respondents are illegal. They do not, thus, have any legal right to continue in service.”

(See also State of M.P. v. Yogesh Chandra Dubey [(2006) 8 SCC 67 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1797] .)

 

27.It is also pertinent to take note of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, reported in(1972) 1 SCC 409. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:

26. The contention on behalf of the State that a rule under Article 309 for regularisation of the appointment of a person would be a form of recruitment read with reference to power under Article 162 is unsound and unacceptable. The executive has the power to appoint. That power may have its source in Article 162. In the present case the rule which regularised the appointment of the respondent with effect from February 15, 1958, notwithstanding any rules cannot be said to be in exercise of power under Article 162. First, Article 162 does not speak of rules whereas Article 309 speaks of rules. Therefore, the present case touches the power of the State to make rules under Article 309 of the nature impeached here. Secondly when the Government acted under Article 309 the Government cannot be said to have acted also under Article 162 in the same breath. The two articles operate in different areas. Regularisation cannot be said to be a form of appointment. Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.

 

  1. It will also be relevant to take note of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Kamala Prasad, in Civil Appeal No. 4809 of 2014 (Batch).

16. The aforesaid submissions made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants were rebutted by the learned senior counsel, Mr. J.P. Cama appearing on behalf of the respondent-employees justifying the reasons recorded in the impugned judgment contending that the respondent- employees were appointed as Junior Engineers in the year 1981 in the Rural Department of the State of Bihar and in the year 1985 when regular appointments were to be made to the Posts of Assistant Engineers in pursuant to an advertisement made in the year 1985 itself, the respondents applied for the same but did not succeed and therefore, they were put in the waiting list. However, their services were not terminated even after regular appointments were made to the posts in the year 1985 as contended by the appellants. Their services were not dispensed with because their work was good and they were appointed as Assistant Engineers by order of the Bihar State Government dated 27.6.1987 and thereafter they continued in service without break in their service till the orders of termination dated 24.8.2011 passed against them. It is further contended that even after bifurcation of the appellant-State of Jharkhand from State of Bihar on 15.11.2002, the respondent-employees continued in employment without any break. It is contended that the existence of vacancies of Assistant Engineers in the Rural Development Department in the erstwhile State of Bihar is not in dispute. The existence of vacancies in the said posts is not denied by the appellant-State as there were 207 vacancies as on 2010. Therefore, they continued in service though they were appointed by order of the State Government on 27.6.1987 on ad hoc basis but continued as such till the termination orders were passed against them. They were being paid regular salary and other service benefits were given to them thereby treating them as permanent employees by the appellants. He further contended that the Division Bench in its judgment has held that the State Public Service Commission merely examined suitability of eligible candidates for the posts and recommended the names of such suitable candidates for appointment to the posts. In the case on hand, it is not the position of the State Government that these employees holding the posts of Assistant Engineers and rendering their services are not suitable persons to hold the posts. It is further contended that interim stay was granted by the High Court in the cases of the respondent-employees for the first time on 9.9.2010. Therefore, it is not correct to state that they continued in the service with the intervention of interim orders of the High Courts as urged by the appellants’ senior counsel and therefore, they are not entitled to the benefit of the decision of Umadevi’s case (supra). Further, the learned senior counsel contends the core questions involved in the case in hand are:-

   (1) Whether the services of the respondent-employees should have been considered for regularization by the State Government even though in the first instance they did not obtain selection through the Public Service Commission and on the 2nd occasion they did not participate in the selection process?

   (2) Whether, they were entitled to claim regularization based only on the fact they had worked for more than 10 years of service continuously with the appellants?

He further submits that the High Court, considering the law declared in Umadevi’s case (supra) at para 53 and also keeping in view the justice and good conscious, has granted the relief to the respondent-employees. The same cannot be termed either as erroneous or error in law. Further, it is contended that the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand has rightly rejected the contentions urged by the Advocate General to the effect that the persons who are appointed on ad hoc/temporary basis had an opportunity to get another appointment in regular selection and they failed to participate in the selection process, therefore the same would not be a ground for the appellants to refuse regularization of service of the respondent-employees, even after they have not availed such opportunity. The employer State Government did not choose to dispense with their services though there is no restraint order from the court. In the cases in hand, both the Government of State of Bihar and Jharkhand have continued the service of all the respondent-employees for 10 or more years even after they failed to get appointed to the posts on a regular basis. Therefore, the principle laid down in Umadevi’s case (supra) would squarely apply in the case in hand in support of the respondent-employees. The submission made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants that the regularization of the respondent-employees in their service would deprive the other eligible persons from employment is wholly untenable in law as the same would constitute not only discrimination but also deprivation of their livelihood, which is not legally permissible in law. The question is whether the appellants can terminate the services of the present employees who have served for more than 10 to 30 years, thereby rendering injustice to the eligible people. Therefore, in any event, it is doubtful whether the employer, more particularly the State can raise such a plea to deny employment to the employees and whether the law can be interpreted in a manner so as to give all benefits to the wrongdoers. The appointments were given to a large number of engineers by the State Government of Bihar consciously and there is no allegation of unfairness in their appointment which can be said to be tainted or as a result of any nepotism. The error of the State Government of either Bihar or Jharkhand would not justify to throw away the respondent-employees by making them unemployed who have been well-settled in their life since the same would amount to a clear case of discrimination and deprivation of their livelihood. Further, the Division Bench of High Court has rightly held that there is duty cast upon the State Government of Jharkhand to consider the claim of the respondent-employees as one-time regularization of ad-hoc/ temporary employees in their posts. Further, it is contended by the learned senior counsel that similarly situated employees are continuing in service in the State Government of Bihar. Therefore, the relief sought by the respondent-employees’ continuation in service, clearly takes care of all the hurdles coming in their way. The Division Bench of the High Court is of the considered opinion that the employees services should have been regularized, but on the other hand, the appellant-State Government, during pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals, has terminated their services. The same cannot be an hurdle for it and it would not come in the way of the appellant-State Government for grant of relief in favour of the respondent- employees. Lastly, it is submitted that there is material distinction between filling up a vacant post by direct recruitment on the one hand and “regularization” of existing employees in their posts by applying the decision of Umadevi’s case (supra) who have served for more than 10 years in the posts with the appellants without the interventions of any interim orders granted by any court. Further, he urges that the principle which flows from the mandate of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India is supported at paragraph 53 of Umadevi’s case (supra). It is further contended that it is not a case of “appointment” as mentioned hereinbefore but it is a case of “regularization”. The only qualification for the latter is continuous service of the employees without intervention of the court order for a period of 10 years. Once this takes place, the citizen’s right to livelihood as guaranteed under Article 21 as also his/her right to fair treatment and against arbitrary action of the appellants is protected by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of the impugned judgment of Division Bench of the High Court. The conclusion and the finding and reasons recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment is squarely covered by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Olga Tellis&Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation &Ors.[7] The relevant para’s of the same will be extracted in the reasoning portion of the judgment. Therefore, the learned senior counsel has prayed for dismissal of the appeals.

  1. With reference to the above said rival legal contentions, urged on behalf of the parties the following points would arise for consideration in these Civil Appeals :-

   1) Whether the impugned judgment is correct in holding that the respondents-employees are entitled for the benefit of Umadevi’s case (supra) as they rendered more than 10 years of service in the State Government of Jharkhand without intervention of the court?

   2) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of High Court is vitiated on account of erroneous finding or suffers from error in law?

   3) Whether the impugned judgment warrants interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India on the grounds urged in these appeals?

   4) What orders?

  1. We have heard the factual and legal contentions urged by the learned senior counsel for both the parties and carefully examined the findings and reasons recorded in the impugned judgment with reference to the evidence produced on behalf of the respondent-employees. The evidence on record produced by the respondent-employees would clearly go to show that they have been rendering services in the posts as ad-hoc Engineers since 1987 and have been discharging their services as permanent employees with the appellants. Additional 200 posts were created thereafter by the State Government of Bihar. However, the respondents continued in their services as ad hoc employees without any disciplinary proceedings against them which prove that they have been discharging services to their employers to their satisfaction.

The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants have failed to show as to how the interim orders upon which he placed strong reliance are extended to the respondents which is not forthcoming except placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Amrit Lal Berry (supra), without producing any record on behalf of both the State Governments of Bihar and Jharkhand to substantiate the contention that the interim orders obtained by the similarly placed employees in the writ petitions referred to supra were extended to the respondent-employees to maintain parity though they have not obtained such interim orders from the High Court. Therefore, the learned senior counsel has failed to prove that the respondents have failed to render continuous services to the appellants at least for ten years without intervention of orders of the court, the findings of fact recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court is based on record, hence the same cannot be termed as erroneous in law. In view of the categorical finding of fact on the relevant contentious issue that the respondent-employees have continued in their service for more than 10 years continuously therefore, the legal principle laid down by this Court in Uma Devi’s case (supra) at paragraph 53 squarely applies to the present cases. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly held that the respondent- employees are entitled for the relief, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court.

 

  1. From a perusal of the judgments in above mentioned cases, it is clear that the following constitutes illegality and irregularity, respectively:
  2. Total disregard of the Constitutional Scheme and the recruitment rules or infraction of rules.

 

  1. Substantial compliance of the rules exists despite some rules and provisions not strictly adhered to, or irregularity presupposes substantial compliance and most importantly, where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular.

 

  1. In other words, the line between irregularity and illegality is to be drawn where there exist certain mandatory substantial and procedural requirements. A deviation from the latter must be curable and an appointment shall not be illegal, solely due to non-compliance of the same.

 

31.In the present case, Rule 149 of the Rules prescribes conditions of service of paid officers and servants of societies and the same is extracted hereinunder:

149. Conditions of service of paid officers and servants of societies. __ (1) Every society shall, taking into account its nature of business, volume of transaction and financial position, adopt, with the prior approval of the Registrar a special by-law covering the service conditions of its employees. The special by-law shall, inter- alia prescribe the following:- (i) Cadre strength and classification of various categories of posts and the qualifications required thereof for each such post. (ii) The method of recruitment for each such post. (iii) The scale of pay and allowances for each such post.(iv) Conditions of probation for each such post. (v) Duties and responsibilities for each such post. (vi) Leave of various kinds admissible and, the conditions thereto for each such post. (vii) The penalties that may be imposed upon, the procedure for taking disciplinary action and inflicting various kinds of punishments on an employee holding each such post and the authority competent to entertain and dispose of appeal made against an order of punishment imposed by the competent authority on a disciplinary proceedings . (viii) Conditions relating to acquisition and disposal of movable and immovable property: Provided that in the case of the post, other than the post of manager, superintendent and above a minimum period of three years satisfactory service shall be prescribed for eligibility for promotion from one category to the immediate next higher category of post:

Provided further that no person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of manager, superintendent and above by promotion, unless he has completed atleast one year of satisfactory service in the category of post in which he is working and not less than six years of satisfactory service in the category of posts in which he is working and the feeder category of post to which he is working combined together: Provided also that the co-operative training at the appropriate level may be prescribed as a necessary qualification for specific categories of non-technical posts. (2) No appointment by direct recruitment to any post shall be made except by calling for a list of eligible candidates from the Employment Exchange and also giving due publicity by means of announcement in the notice board of the society and also of the affiliated societies, inviting application from the eligible employees of such societies. Where the Employment Exchange issues a non-availability certificate, the society shall invite applications by giving advertisement in more than one daily newspapers in which one should be in regional language having wide circulation throughout the State: Provided that the above stipulation shall not apply-

(i) to the appointment made on compassionate grounds; (ii) for the absorption of surplus employee of other Co-operative Societies; (iii) to the posts for which a Recruitment Bureau has been constituted under section 74 of the Act or in respect of which a common cadre of service has been constituted under section 75 of the Act.

 

  1. Rule 149(1)(i) provides adoption of by-law which must take into account the nature of business and prescribe the cadre strength, classification of various categories of post and qualifications required thereof for each such posts at the time of recruitment. Further, Rule 149 (2) provides that appointments shall take place only by calling for a list from the Employment Exchange and giving due publicity. Thus, in an appointment, two-fold conditions are to be satiated. The first one is the educational qualifications, cadre strength and the second being drawing of eligibility list from employment exchange.

 

  1. Sub-clause (1) of Rule 149 is a mandatory substantial rule which prescribes minimum qualification criteria and cadre strength for appointments. As far as sub-clause (2) of Rule 149 is concerned, the same is a procedural requirement that is to be followed in making appointments to the societies.

 

  1. In the case in hand, the Petitioners satisfied the first criteria, i.e., with respect to the educational qualification and cadre strength. The case of the Petitioners lies with respect to non-compliance of procedure as laid by sub-clause (2) of Rule 149. Taking cue from the judgment in Kesari’s case (cited supra), when the employees satisfy the mandatory qualifications and cadre strength as prescribed by the authorities and had been in continuous service, but had been selected without being sponsored by the employment exchange, the appointment is only irregular and by no stretch illegal. As stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.N. Nanjundappa (cited supra),only that non-compliance that goes to the root of the appointments made can be termed as illegal. In the present case, the appointment of the Petitioners herein cannot be deemed to be illegal merely on the basis that their appointments were not made through employment exchange.

 

  1. In the view of this Court, the root of appointment herein is the necessary qualifications and sanctioned strength alone that substantially governs the appointments. Once that has been observed, the procedural infirmities can always be cured, the same owing to only an irregularity. The word illegality carries with it a high threshold so as to view something on the face of it as blatant violation or non-observance of which could render the whole process null and void.

 

  1. In fact, the same criteria was applied in the case of 26,000 employees who were earlier regularized by taking into consideration the cut-off date as 12.03.2001. All the Petitioners who satisfy the requirements of paragraph 53 of the judgement in Umadevi’s case (cited supra) will be entitled to get their services regularized. Considering the length of service put in by the Petitioners for decades together, if they are to be sent out unceremoniously without being regularized in service, that would tantamount to depriving their right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The Petitioners are not going to receive any extra monetary benefits since they are already being paid the time scale of pay on par with the regular employees. Therefore, there will be no additional financial burden on the Respondents. At the best, the employees who are left with some more years of service will be entitled for promotion and the employees who are at the verge of retirement will be entitled for getting retirement benefits. In short, they will leave the employment with a happy note as regular employees of the Cooperative Societies.

 

  1. In view of the above discussion, all the Writ Petitions are disposed of with the following directions:

 

  1. All those Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be who have at the time of their appointment, fulfilled their educational qualification, who have been appointed in a sanctioned post within the cadre strength, and are in regular scale of pay, are declared to have satisfied the substantial/mandatory qualification prescribed under Rule 149(1) of the Rules;

 

  1. The appointments not being sponsored by the employment exchange, as prescribed under Rule 149(2) of the Rules, will only make the appointments irregular and not illegal;

 

  1. All those Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be who have fulfilled the criteria stipulated in Clause (a), shall be regularised by the Respondents by issuing appropriate proceedings within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order by taking the cut-off date as 12.03.2001;

 

  1. The regularization of service of the Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be will not entail them with any additional monetary benefits except the consequential benefits which flows from such regularization; and

 

  1. The benefit of regularization that is extended to the eligible Petitioners/Respondent Employee, as the case may be shall also be extended to all those employees who are similarly placed even though they have not knocked the doors of this Court.

 

Accordingly, the batch of writ petitions are disposed of. No costs.  Consequently, all the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

 

19.02.2021

Index    :  Yes

Internet  : Yes

Speaking Order/Non Speaking Order

KP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To

 

1.The Secretary to Government,

Food, Co-op. & Consumer Protection Dept.,

Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

 

2.The Registrar of Co-op. Societies,

N.V.N.Maligai, Kilpauk, Chennai-10.

 

3.The Addl. Registrar of Co-op. Societies,

(Marketing, Planning and Development),

N.V.N.Maligai, Kilpauk, Chennai-10.

 

4.The Management of AIWFC Women’s

Consumers Co-op. Stores Ltd.,

Rep. by its Special Officer,

No.7/2, Anna Samy Street,

Ellis Road, Chennai -2.

 

 

 

 

 

N.ANAND VENKATESH, J.

 

KP

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pre Delivery Common Order in

W.P.Nos.21440, 21441, 21442/2015, 18263, 27535/2010, 14726, 15943, 15944, 15945, 34257, 34260, 34258, 34259/2012, 33595,33596,33597,33598,39950/2015, 6805,19111, 27319/2016, 7054,7057,7055,7056, 12596,27840,29238,32549,32550/2017,25419/2019, 5549, 9396, 9533/2020, 96,279,287,286,282,1585,1601,1602,1607,1591,1594,1597,1587,1608,1652,1666,1671,1655,1659,1678,1662,1685,1845,1857,1863,1865,1869,1885,1889,1890,1891,1893,1900,1903,1905,1909, 1911,1987,1989,1992,1994,1996,2349,2351,2352,2353,2356, 2360,2361/2021 and WP(MD).No.17039, 17040/2014, WP(MD).No.5216, 5217,11143,20398/2015, WP(MD)No.21949/2016, WP(MD).No.1670,1671,2453/2018 and WP(MD).No.12481 of 2019

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19.02.2021

 

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