Judge dandabani/Before parting with the case, this Court hastens to add that this is a classic case of abuse of the benevolent provisions of the SC/ST Act by the member of the said community, which Act was enacted with the aim of safeguarding the interests of the SC/ST community people from the clutches of the other members of the citizenry, but definitely not to be used as a tool against the very same citizenry by the members of the SC/ST community. It has now come to the notice of the Courts and has also been lamented by the Apex Court that the provisions of the SC/ST Act are more misused rather than being used for legitimate and genuine instance

2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this Writ Petition are as follows:
It is the case of the petitioners that, the 1st respondent herein alleged a property dispute with one Kannan and others and claimed that when he lodged a complaint as against those persons on 05.02.2024, the petitioners threatened and humiliated him by calling him by his caste name. He further alleged that these acts of the petitioners were intended only to pressure him to refrain him from pursuing registration of FIR against certain police officers in connection with the proceedings before the State Human rights Commission (SHRC). In the said complaint, he also referred to the registration of Crime No.26 of 2024 registered against him and his driver namely Madhavan for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 451, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(2) of IPC and Section 4 of TNPHW Act, 2022 on the basis of a complaint made by one Karuppayee aged about 97 years and claimed that the actions amounted to caste-based atrocities, as he belongs to Scheduled
Caste, leading him to file a petition before the Tamil Nadu State SC/ST Commission. Aggrieved by the said petition, which has been taken cognizance of, the petitioners have come up with the present Writ Petition.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that, admittedly, there is no previous enmity between the petitioners and the 1st respondent and that earlier, there was a civil dispute between the 1st respondent and one Kannan and one Kavitha in respect of which, the said Kannan filed a Civil Suit in O.S.No.118 of 2019 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Thuraiyur which came to be dismissed on 01.12.2023. It is further submitted that, there was also a dispute between the 1st respondent and said Kannan with regard to measurement of the suit property pursuant to which, the 1st respondent lodged a complaint before the 3rd petitioner, who refused to receive the same. Thereafter, the 1st respondent made a complaint before the 2nd petitioner, which was also refused. Aggrieved by the nonregistration of the complaint by the 2nd and 3rd petitioners, the 1st respondent approached the 1st petitioner alleging that petitioners 2 & 3 had humiliated him by using his caste name. Based on the said allegations, on 13.03.2024, 1st respondent made a complaint before the State Human Rights Commission and thereafter, lodged a complaint before the 2nd respondent, the Tamil Nadu SC/ST Commission seeking action against the petitioners under Section 8 of the Act.
4. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that, even a bare perusal of the complaint lodged by the 1st respondent against petitioners before the State Human Rights Commission and the 2nd respondent reveals that the said complaint is a motivated one as the complaint lodged before the State Human Rights Commission does not contain any allegation relating to caste based-abuse as alleged by the 1st respondent. However, such an allegation has been subsequently introduced in the complaint filed before the 2nd respondent. Therefore the impugned complaint lodged by the 1st respondent is wholly arbitrary and illegal.
5. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that, for entertaining the complaint, the 2nd respondent must necessarily be satisfied that the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and
3 (1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are made out. The said provisions clearly mandate that the alleged caste based insult or abuse should be by a non SC/ST person, which must have occurred within public view so as to attract the penal provision. In
the present case, the allegations against the petitioners is that the 1st respondent was called by his caste name when he met the petitioners inside the office which being an enclosed room bounded by four walls, cannot be construed as a place within public view and therefore the essential statutory requirement is not satisfied. Hence, the 2nd respondent Commission lacks jurisdiction and has no authority to entertain the complaint. Further, as the ingredients of the provisions under the SC/ST Act are not satisfied, the petition cannot be maintained and the same ought to have been rejected.
6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted that the issue involved in this Writ Petition was already decided by the Apex Court in case of Karuppudayar Vs State Rep.by the Deputy Superintendent to Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors (Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) Nos.8778-8779 of 2024 – SCC INSC 132) wherein it was held that, a complaint can be entertained for registration of the case, only if the essential statutory ingredients are made out however, in the absence of any such ingredients thereof, such complaint is not maintainable, and therefore, the averment relating to caste-based abuse is wholly unsustainable as there is no such allegation in the petition filed before the State level commission.
7. Per Contra, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent submitted that the 1st respondent is a reputed person. He is a member of the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association and the Tamil Nadu State Bar
Council and that he also served as a former member of the Right to Information Commission. Admittedly, the 1st respondent has no personal animosity towards the petitioners. Earlier, the 1st respondent had lodged a complaint against certain police officials pursuant to which, the State Human Rights Commission imposed a cost of Rs.5,00,000/- and issued directions for disciplinary action and the said order was also was confirmed by this Court. Aggrieved by the action taken by the 1st respondent, the 1st and 2nd petitioner allegedly foisted a false criminal case against the 1st respondent in Crime No.26 of 2024 dated 04.02.2024 for the offences under Section under
Sections 147, 148, 451, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(2) of IPC and Section 4 of TNPHW Act, 2022.
8. It was further submitted that the 1st respondent was not arrested by the Law Enforcing Agency at the relevant point of time and that the petitioners insulted the 1st respondent by calling his caste name. It is the
further submission of the learned counsel that the abuse meted out to the 1st respondent by calling him by his caste name and whether the occurrence took place in public view of within the confined walls in a private place is a matter to be enquired into by the 2nd respondent and that such disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent while denying the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition submitted that the 2nd respondent was not aware of the fact that a similar complaint had already been preferred by the 1st respondent before the State Human Rights Commission as the 1st respondent did not choose to disclose the same in the complaint made before the 2nd respondent. It is further submitted that the 2nd respondent is not precluded by any provision of law from entertaining a complaint alleging violation of civil rights under the provisions of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
10. He further submitted that the only statutory bar on the 2nd respondent from entertaining such a complaint arises when the matter is already seized of by the National Commission for Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes, as contemplated under Section 8 of the State Commission for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, 2021. Therefore, the 2nd respondent commission is well within its jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of such nature as made by the 1st respondent with regard to the alleged caste based abuse said to have been committed by the petitioners. Hence, the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, in as much as the petitioners’ contention regarding the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent commission and accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
11. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused thematerials available on record.
12. In the present lis before this court, it transpires from the materials on record that the 1st respondent belongs to the “Pallar Community” which is
a Scheduled Caste. Admittedly, there was a civil dispute between the 1st respondent and one Kannan and others pursuant to which it is alleged that the said persons trespassed into the property of the 1st respondent and damaged the boundaries thereof. Aggrieved by the same, the 1st respondent is alleged to have lodged a complaint before the petitioners herein. It is the alleged that the petitioners refused to entertain the said complaint and insulted the 1st respondent by using derogatory language and castigating him by using his caste name.
13. It is the admitted case of the 1st respondent that already a complaint in this regard has been made by the 1st respondent before the State Human Rights Commission. Parallely, the 1st respondent has also mooted out a complaint before the 2nd respondent herein on the very same set of allegations. According to the petitioners, filing of simultaneous complaints on identical facts with an improved version before the 2nd respondent is not proper. It is the specific case of the petitioners that there is a conspicuous absence of caste base flavour in the complaint lodged before the State Human Rights Commission, whereas in the parallel complaint lodged before the 2nd respondent, there is a high flavour of caste based abuse alleged to have been meted out to the 1st respondent by the petitioners.
14. It is the specific case of the 1st respondent that there is no statutory bar for taking up a parallel proceeding before the 2nd respondent when a similar complaint has been lodged before the State Human Rights Commission. However, the petitioners contend to the contra submitting that on the very same set of allegations, except inclusion of caste based allegations in the complaint before the 2nd respondent, filing of parallel
complaints before the State Human Rights Commission as also the 2nd respondent is not barred and the same is legally sustainable. The specific
contention of the petitioners in this regard relate to the act of the 1st respondent in including the caste based flavour in the complaint before the 2nd respondent, which, according to the petitioners, is only to crucify the petitioners by disabling them from having their grievance redressed at the earliest point of time.
15. Before adverting to the aforesaid issues and whether there is contradiction/extrapolation in the complaints given before State Human Rights Commission and the 2nd respondent herein, thereby, taking up parallel proceedings before two authorities at the same time and its permissibility, it is just and necessary for this Court to find out as to the circumstances under which the provisions under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act would stand attracted.
16. It is beyond cavil of doubt that only if the ingredients under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act stood satisfied, then the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent would come into play, as the said provisions involves penal consequences and, therefore, the 2nd respondent is bound to be cautious while entertaining a complaint by finding out whether the allegations disclose the commission of offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act.
17. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the expression“public place” and “public view” in Swaran Singh case (supra), wherein the Apex Court held as under :-
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.
29. Our Constitution provides for equality which includes special help and care for the oppressed and weaker sections of society who have been historically downtrodden. The SC/ST communities in our opinion are also equal citizens of the country, and are entitled to a life of dignity in view of Article 21 of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. In the age of democracy no people and no community should be treated as being inferior. However, the truth is that in many parts of our country persons belonging to SC/ST are oppressed, humiliated and insulted. This is a disgrace to our country.
* * * * * * * *
33. We have already stated above that in today’s context even calling a person “chamar” ordinarily amounts to intentionally insulting that person with intent to humiliate him. It is evident from a perusal of the FIR that Appellant 1 Swaran Singh joined his wife and daughter in insulting Vinod Nagar, and he also used the word “chamar” in a derogatory sense. However, a perusal of the FIR shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the FIR to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against Appellant 1.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
18. The decision in Swaran Singh case (supra) has been quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Karuppudayar – Vs – State rep. by the Deputy Superintendent to Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors. (SLP (Criminal)
Nos.8778-8779 of 2024 – SCC INSC 132) and the relevant portion of the decision is quoted hereunder:-
“8. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer to the provisions of Sections 3 (1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, which read thus:
“3 Punishments for offences of atrocities.___(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, —
(a)……………………………………………….
(b)………………………………………………
XXX XXX XXX
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe in any place within public view:-
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”
9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Similarly, for constitution an offence under Section 3(1)(s) or the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuse any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and ohers v. State through Standing Counsel and another. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v.State of Uttarakhand and another referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:
……………….
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “Place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the Judgment reported as Swaran Singh v.State [Swaran Singh v.State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view,. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic[Ed.: what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p.736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:”Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held as under :
(SCC p.443-4, para 28)
28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “Chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (nor merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gram sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.
……………………………………….
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to be a place within public view, the offence would not come under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)
(s) of the SC-ST Act.”
19. From the above ratio laid down by the Apex Court, it is manifestthat it is not the place which has significance in the term “in any place within public view” and what is more material therein is “within public view”, which literally means that in the said place, excluding relatives or friends, there should be presence of other persons, who are independent of the occasion and who could be termed to be public who could witness the happenings in the said place and in which place the dignity and prestige of the person belonging to SC/ST community is besmirched by castigating the said person with caste name. Therefore, the intention of the Parliament is writ large in the inclusion of the words “within public view” as what fell important was that the act, which is being complained of, should have been visible and audible to public view, whereby the victims’ stature in the eyes of the public would stand diminished/tarnished.
20. In yet another case, a learned single Judge of the Aurangabad
Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Balu B.Galande – Vs – State of Maharashtra & Ors. (MANU/MH/1421/2006), after considering the various decisions on the issue, which is of similar nature relating to the meaning of the term “within public view” held as under :-
“18. Considering the judicial pronouncements on the subject, the expression within public view must be construed to mean that the insult or humiliation must take place in the presence of or in the proximity of at least one independent person. The test of audibility and visibility can be taken to have been satisfied if an independent person is actually present or is at a place where the utterances are clearly audible and reaches the scene of occurrence while the incident is still in progress. Turning to the present case, it can be seen that the first incident took place at the vasti of the complainant. Recitals of the complaint, however, do not refer to the presence of any member of the public. Considering the recitals of F.I.R. that the petitioner and his brother Haribhau were insulting the complainant by loudly shouting from their vasti, it can be seen that the element requiring presence of members of public is not disclosed by the allegations. As the condition, that the offence should have been committed within public view, is not satisfied, contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of SC and ST Act could not have been registered, will have to be sustained. In this view of the matter, the petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (B) with no order as to cost.”
21. From the dissection made by the Courts in the above judgments, it is implicitly clear that the expression “within public view” should be construed to mean that the insult or humiliation must take place in the presence of or in the proximity of atleast one independent person and only then the test of audibility and visibility can be taken to have been satisfied as the utterances should be clearly audible and it reaches the ears of the independent person. Further as held in Swaran Singh case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the place of utterance is immaterial, be it outside the building or inside the building, but it is the presence of members of the public alone, which is material to bring home the offence u/s 3 (1) (r) and (s) of the SC/ST Act.
22. On the touchstone of the above principles laid down, this Court has to find out whether the alleged offence u/s 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act stands attracted to the present case on hand.
23. Two complaints have been given by the 1st respondent, viz., the earliest complaint before the State Human Rights Commission and the second complaint before the 2nd respondent. Both the complaints are almost identical barring the allegation of caste based flavor in the complaint before the 2nd respondent. Further, one other important aspect of the issue is that the latter complaint before the 2nd respondent does not spell out about the former complaint filed before the State Human Rights Commission. This
would clearly show that the 1st respondent has not gone before the 2nd respondent with clean hands by placing all the facts, including the factum of giving the former complaint before the State Human Rights Commission.
24. Be that as it may. In the present case, as stated above, to attract the ingredients codified in Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the act should have been perpetrated in public view as laid down in Swaran Singh case (supra). A perusal of the complaint before the 2nd respondent reveals that the incident is alleged to have taken place behind the four walls of the office of the petitioners. It is not the case of the 1st respondent that in the office of the petitioners, there were any public or independent persons available before whom the 1st respondent was castigated by the petitioners
by using his caste name. In fact, the whole of the complaint before the 2nd respondent is silent as to the presence of independent persons in the place where the 1st respondent is alleged to have been castigated or besmirched using his caste name. Therefore, it could safely be concluded that it is the word of the petitioners against the word of the 1st respondent as regards what happened and there is no independent witness who could vouch for the allegation alleged against the petitioners. That being the scenario that emerges, this Court is at a loss to understand as to how the 2nd respondent would conduct an investigation on the complaint of the 1st respondent to find out whether such an incident had really taken place in which the petitioners castigated the 1st respondent using his caste name.
25. It is to be pointed out that it is the duty of the 2nd respondent to separate wheat from the chaff before embarking upon investigating a complaint as such acts would put the alleged offenders in peril, when the act
is visited with penal consequences. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the 2nd respondent to have analysed the issues in proper perspective, more especially on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Courts with regard to the acts and whether such acts have happened within the public view. When there is no semblance of material, which would show that the act was perpetrated in public view and it is a bald allegation made against the petitioners by the 1st respondent, prudent warrants the 2nd respondent to have ditched the complaint filed by the 1st respondent even at the first instance. Merely because the 1st respondent is a practising advocate, that cannot be the basis to proceed with the complaint, moreso, when there are already pending litigations of civil and criminal nature against the 1st respondent and other persons relating to certain civil disputes. The 2nd respondent ought to have handled the issue with more caution and circumspection rather than coming before this Court and claiming that it not only has jurisdiction but also it involves disputed questions of fact, when such facts cannot even be verified by the 2nd respondent by conducting any investigation, as there is no independent witness to speak about the happenings behind the closed door between the petitioners and the 1st respondent.
26. Therefore, on the discussion made above, it is explicitly clear that the complaint lodged before the 2nd respondent cannot be proceeded with as it does not satisfy the essential ingredients to constitute the offences under
Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and further there is no material evidencing that such an act has taken place, as alleged by the 1st respondent in the absence of any independent witness/not happening in public view and also on account of the fact that already a complaint was filed by the 1st respondent before the State Human Rights Commission, which has not been spelt out in the present complaint filed before the 2nd respondent.
27. In the absence of any material to show that the alleged caste-basedabuse was made in a place within public view, the impugned complaint cannot be proceeded with any further, particularly when even according to the 1st respondent, the alleged incident is stated to have taken place inside the office of the petitioners. Therefore, the impugned complaint made before the 2nd respondent is not maintainable and the same deserves to be set aside.
28. In such of view of the matter, this Court finds that permitting the 2nd respondent to proceed further with the impugned complaint, as against the petitioners, lodged by the 1st respondent, would amount to an abuse of
process of law and, therefore, the impugned complaint made before the 1st respondent requires interference at the hands of this Court.
29. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the complaint lodged by the 1st respondent in Petition No.169 of 2024 dated 14.02.2024 before the 2nd respondent is hereby quashed. However, it is made clear that this order shall not preclude the 1st respondent from working out his other remedies in the manner known to law. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
30. Before parting with the case, this Court hastens to add that this is a classic case of abuse of the benevolent provisions of the SC/ST Act by the member of the said community, which Act was enacted with the aim of safeguarding the interests of the SC/ST community people from the clutches of the other members of the citizenry, but definitely not to be used as a tool against the very same citizenry by the members of the SC/ST community. It has now come to the notice of the Courts and has also been lamented by the Apex Court that the provisions of the SC/ST Act are more misused rather than being used for legitimate and genuine instances. Therefore, it is high time that the 2nd respondent before entertaining such complaints, be abreast of the law propounded by the Courts so that the innocent common man is not unnecessarily dragged to go through the rigours of the penal consequences attached with the said provision.
25.11.2025
Index : Yes / No
Nhs/GLN
To
The Hon’ble SC/ST Commission, L.L.A.Bulding, 2nd Floor, Mount Road, Chennai-600 002.
M.DHANDAPANI, J.
Nhs/GLN
W.P.No.30536 of 2025

25.11.2025

W.P.No.30536 of 2025
M.DHANDAPANI, J
This Petition has been listed under the Caption “For being mentioned” at the instance of Registry.
2. It is brought to the notice of this Court that in order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court, the name of the 3rd petitioner has been inadvertently mentioned as P.Thamizhselvan in the cause title instead of V.Kavitha and therefore, it is prayed that necessary corrections may be made in the said order and fresh order copies may be issued.
3. In view of the above, in order dated 25.11.2025, the name of the 3rd petitioner shall stand replaced as V.Kavitha.
4. Registry is directed to carry out the aforesaid correction in the order dated 25.11.2025 and issue fresh order copies to the parties.
20.02.2026
Nhs
Note to Office : Issue Order Copy on 24.02.2026
27/28
M.DHANDAPANI, J.
Nhs

W.P.No.30536 of 2025
20.02.2026
28/28