HIGH COURT RESERVED ON : 20.02.2026 PRONOUNCED ON : 30.04.2026 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE N.MALA S.A.(MD).Nos.382/2009 & 348/2014 and CMP.[MD].No.6262/2024 SA.[MD].No.382/2009:- 1.R.Sundaram 2.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chetty & Sons rep.by its Partner R.Sundaram S/o.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiar Door No.59, Amman Sannathi Street Madurai-1. … Appellants / Plaintiffs Vs 1.Karur Vysya Bank Limited rep.by its Branch Manager Door No.74, Amman Sannathi Street Madurai.

THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 20.02.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 30.04.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE N.MALA
S.A.(MD).Nos.382/2009 & 348/2014
and
CMP.[MD].No.6262/2024

SA.[MD].No.382/2009:-

1.R.Sundaram
2.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chetty & Sons
rep.by its Partner R.Sundaram
S/o.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiar
Door No.59, Amman Sannathi Street
Madurai-1. … Appellants / Plaintiffs

Vs

1.Karur Vysya Bank Limited
rep.by its Branch Manager
Door No.74, Amman Sannathi Street
Madurai.

2.Bhuvaneswari
3.S.Jayasree
4.A.Venkatasubramanian
5.G.Vijayasree … Respondents / Defendants 2 to 6
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the decree and judgment dated 06.08.2008, passed in AS.No.66/2008 on the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge [Fast Track Court No.1], Madurai, as confirming the judgment and decree dated 07.04.2005, passed in OS.No.241/1995, on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif, Madurai Town, insofar as it is against the appellants.

For Appellants : Mr.A.Sivasubramanian
For R1 : Mr.V.Sukumar
For R4 : Mr.K.Muraleedharan
For RR2, 3&5 : M/s.J.Anandavalli

SA.[MD].No.348/2014:-

1.Bhuvaneswari
2.S.Jayasree
3.A.Venkatasubramanian
4.G.Vijayasree … Appellants / Defendants 3 to 6
Versus

1.R.Sundaram
2.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chetty & Sons
rep.by its Partner R.Sundaram
S/o.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiar
Door No.59, Amman Sannathi Street
Madurai-1. … Respondents / Plaintiffs

PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the decree and judgment dated 06.08.2008, passed in AS.No.65/2008 on the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge [Fast Track Court No.1], Madurai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 07.04.2005, passed in OS.No.241/1995, on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif, Madurai Town, insofar as it is against the appellants.
For Appellants 1,2&4 : M/s.J.Anandavalli
For 3rd Appellant : Mr.K.Muraleedharan
For Respondents :Mr.A.Sivasubramanian

COMMON JUDGMENT
1. The above second appeals arise out of the common judgment and decree in A.S.Nos.66 and 65 of 2008, dated 06.08.2008. on the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Madurai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 07.04.2005, made in OS.No.241/1995, by the learned Principal District Munsif, Madurai.
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to, as per their ranking before the Trial Court.
3. Brief facts giving arise to the above Second Appeals, are as follows:-
4. The 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant, Anantha Subramanian, are brothers and they, with their father, A.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar, entered into a Partnership and conducted business in the name and style of ‘’P.S.A.Ramasamy Chetty & Sons’’. The said Firm was registered with the Registrar of Firms as Firm No.293/1971. The aforesaid partners of the Firm opened both current and savings bank accounts in the 2nd defendant/Bank. The Partnership Firm had two current accounts with the 2nd defendant and savings bank accounts in the name of the individual partners. According to the plaintiffs, the SB A/c.No.2113 in the name of the 1st defendant with the 2nd defendant/Bank, related to the Partnership Firm even though it stood in the name of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs therefore claimed that the 1st defendant had no independent right to the amounts in the said savings account and also no right to operate the same exclusively. The plaintiffs stated that after the death of their father, P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar, on 24.10.1994, misunderstandings arose between the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant. According to the 1st plaintiff, the 1st defendant threatened to withdraw the amounts from his savings bank account [SB A/c.No.2113] to the detriment of the Firm. The 1st plaintiff therefore caused a legal notice to the 2nd defendant/Bank and thereafter, sent a reminder notice on 30.12.1994. The 1st plaintiff stated that there was no reply to the legal notice. The 1st plaintiff further stated that despite knowing that the savings account 2113, related to the Firm, the 2nd defendant permitted the 1st defendant to withdraw the amounts and operate the said savings bank account and therefore, the 1st plaintiff issued a legal notice on 20.01.1995, to the 2nd defendant, calling upon the 2nd defendant/Bank to restore the aforesaid account to its original position as on 16.11.1994. The 2nd defendant/Bank, on 04.02.1995, sent a reply stating that unless a Court order was obtained, the Bank had no authority to refuse operation of the account by the account holder/1st defendant. The plaintiffs, left with no other option, filed the aforesaid suit for a declaration that the Savings Bank Account No.2113, standing in the name of the 1st defendant with the 2nd defendant, related to the Firm, the 2nd plaintiff herein, restraining the 1st defendant from operating the said account individually, and an injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from allowing the 1st defendant to operate the said savings account and for a mandatory injunction directing the 2nd defendant/Bank to restore the account to its original position as on 16.11.1994.
5. The 1st defendant in his written statement, contended that the savings bank accounts standing in the name of the individual partners, were the individual accounts of the partners. The 1st defendant contended that both the 1st plaintiff and he were holding separate savings accounts in the 2nd defendant’s Bank and that the savings bank account of the individual partners were not treated as the Firm’s accounts. The 1st defendant denied the plaintiffs’ contention that the individual partner in whose name the account stood, had no exclusive ownership of the account or right to operate the same. The 1st defendant further contended that for certain acts of forgery committed by the 1st plaintiff, in transferring shares standing in the name of their father, in favour of his sons, a criminal case in Crime No.118/1995 and CC.No.282/1999 was filed against the 1st plaintiff and the same was pending. The 1st defendant reiterated that the savings bank account was a personal account and the money therein belonged exclusively to him and the contrary claim of the 1st plaintiff, that it belonged to the Partnership Firm, was untenable and meritless. The 1st defendant contended that assuming that the account related to the Partnership Firm, the plaintiffs’ remedy if any, was to seek winding up of the Firm/2nd plaintiff and for adjustment of the accounts. However, the 1st defendant contended that even the winding up proceedings were barred by limitation since M/s.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar and Sons was deemed to have dissolved on 24.10.1994, when their father died. The 1st defendant also contended that the provisions of the Benami Prohibition Act, applied to the facts of the case and that the suit was a vexatious suit and liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
6. The 2nd defendant/Bank filed a written statement contending that as a Banker, the 2nd defendant was operating the accounts as per the Banking Regulations, Acts and Rules. The 2nd defendant contended that the savings account standing in the name of the 1st defendant was treated as his individual account and that he was dealing with the same in his own right. The 2nd defendant contended that the 1st plaintiff was also holding a savings Bank account and that it had no authority either to retain or refuse to honour the operation of the savings bank account of the account holders, i.e., the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant herein. The 2nd defendant/Bank contended that it was an unnecessary party to the litigation and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
7. The 1st plaintiff filed a reply statement stating that the suit subject savings Bank account No.2113, standing in the name of the 1st defendant and savings bank account No.1399 standing in his name, were treated as accounts of the Firm, the 2nd plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff further submitted that the 1st defendant was very well aware that both the accounts were operated by all the other partners of the Firm even though they stood in the names of the individual partners. The 1st plaintiff, with regard to the criminal case referred to in the 1st defendant’s written statement, submitted that the same was filed as a counter-blast to the suit filed by him on 01.03.1995. The 1st plaintiff denied the contention of the 1st defendant that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation and also that the Partnership Firm was dissolved on the death of their father P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar. The 1st plaintiff submitted that the Partnership Firm was Partnership at Will and further, the Benami Prohibition Act, did not apply to the facts of the case. The 1st plaintiff further submitted that there was a criminal case pending against the 1st defendant in Crime No.23/1996 before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Madurai. The plaintiffs therefore prayed that the suit be decreed as prayed for.
8. Before the Trial Court, the plaintiffs examined the 1st plaintiff as PW1 and the Auditor of the Firm as PW2. The Plaintiffs marked 60 documents on their side. On the side of the defendants, the Branch Manager of the Bank was examined as DW1 and the 5th defendant was examined as DW2. The defendants marked 9 documents.
9. The Trial Court framed necessary issues and after considering the entire evidence on record, decreed the suit with respect to the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction ; but dismissed the suit with respect to the relief of mandatory injunction. The plaintiffs, aggrieved by the rejection of the relief of mandatory injunction, filed AS.No.66/2008 and the 1st defendant, aggrieved by the rest of the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs, filed AS.No.65/2008.
10. The Lower Appellate Court, by a common judgment and decree dated 06.08.2008, dismissed both the appeals, confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 07.04.2005. Aggrieved by the dismissal of appeal preferred by the plaintiffs in AS.No.66/2008, the plaintiffs filed SA.No.382/2009 and the unsuccessful defendants in the appeal in AS.No.65/2008, who are the legal heirs of the deceased 1st defendant, filed SA.No.348/2014.
11. This Court, at the time of admission of SA.No.382/2009, framed the following substantial question of law:-
‘’Whether the Courts below are correct in rejecting the relief of mandatory injunction though the relief of declaration and permanent injunction have been granted?
12. This Court, at the time of admission of SA.No.348/2014, framed the following substantial question of law:-
[1]Whether both the Courts below have erred in holding that the relief of declaration that the Savings Bank Account of individual belongs to Partnership Account and whether such finding is perverse in nature?
[2]Whether the Courts below have failed to see that this subject matter of suit, is barred by limitation?
13. The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the findings of the Courts below in support of the decree for the relief of declaration, were perverse. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2005 [2] MLJ 10 [SC] [M/s.Dale and Carrington Investment [P] Limited and Another Vs. P.K.Prathapan and Others] in support of his submission. The learned counsel submitted that the Courts below failed to note that mere production of the Account books was of no avail, unless the entries therein were proved to the satisfaction of the Court by examining the persons who made the entries. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel relied on the judgment reported in 1992 [11] MLJ 481 [Deluxe Road Lines rep.by its Partner, Kushalchand B.Shah Vs. P.K.Palani Chetty]. The learned counsel, referring to the judgment reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1787 [Iqbal Ahmed [Dead] by LRs and Another Vs. Abdul Shukoor], submitted that additional evidence sought to be raised, should not be permitted.
14. The learned counsel further submitted that the relief of declaration and injunction sought for by the plaintiffs was in fact, a claim for partnership asset and therefore, the true remedy of the plaintiffs lay in seeking for dissolution of the Partnership Firm and for accounts. The learned counsel therefore, submitted that the suit for declaration was not maintainable and that, the plaintiffs ought to have prayed for dissolution of the partnership Firm and for rendition of accounts. On such submissions, the learned counsel prayed to allow SA.No.348/2014 and dismiss SA.No.382/2009.
15. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs on the other hand, submitted that the suit was very much maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, which provided for grant of declaration regarding the status or a right. The learned counsel further submitted that unless and until a declaration was granted declaring the savings bank account as belonging to the Partnership Firm, the plaintiffs could not seek for rendition of accounts. The learned counsel submitted that the findings of the Courts below are reasoned and cogent and therefore, interference by this Court in the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below, is not warranted.
16. The learned counsel further submitted that the accounts, as borne out by the ledgers, were not disputed by the 1st defendant and therefore, there was no question of independently proving the same. The learned counsel submitted that in the absence of a dispute on the genuineness of the entries made in the ledgers the objection that it ought to be proved by independent evidence, cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that both the Courts below failed to note that the prayer for mandatory injunction was a consequential prayer and therefore, when the main prayer was allowed, the consequential prayer should follow. The learned counsel therefore submitted that there were no merits in SA.[MD].No.348/2014, and hence, the same be dismissed. The learned counsel prayed that SA.[MD].No.382/2009, be allowed.
17. Heard both sides and perused the materials placed on record.
18. Firstly, the substantial questions of law framed in SA.[MD].No.348/2014, are taken up for consideration.
Substantial Question of Law No.1:-Whether both the Courts below have erred in holding that the relief of declaration that the Savings Bank Account of individual belongs to Partnership Account and whether such finding is perverse in nature?
19. The principal objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendants pertains to the maintainability of the suit. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiffs ought to have filed the suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts since the plaintiffs claimed that Savings Bank Account No.2113 was a partnership asset. The learned counsel contended that a partner has no specific right in any particular asset of the Firm and has a right only to a share in the surplus upon taking the accounts. The learned counsel submitted that no partner can deal with a portion of the Partnership property as his own and that, his interest may be a right to obtain his share upon settlement of accounts. The learned counsel therefore submitted that without seeking dissolution of the Firm and rendition of accounts, a suit seeking declaration, in respect of a particular asset is not maintainable.
20. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submitted that the suit was very much maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, which provides for grant of declaration regarding status or right. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, only if the declaration is granted, declaring the status of Savings Bank A/c.No.2113 as a partnership asset, the question of dissolution of Firm and rendition of accounts would arise.
21. The relief sought for in the suit is one for declaration that the Savings Bank Account No.2113, though standing in the name of the 1st defendant, in fact is relatable to the Partnership Firm. In this context, it is apposite to note that under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court is vested with discretion to declare the status or right of a party in respect of any property. The declaration sought for by the plaintiffs is essentially to establish the said account forms part of the assets of the Partnership Firm and consequently, to assert their rights over the accounts therein. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that the suit ought to have been one for dissolution of Firm and rendition of accounts, cannot be countenanced in the facts of the present case. There is no dispute as to the legal proposition that a partner has no exclusive right over any specific asset of the Firm. In Addanki Narayanappa & Anr. vs. Bhaskara Krishtappa and 13 Ors, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1300, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“…From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing, to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in clause (a) and sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause(b) of Section 48.”
However, the said principle applies to cases where the dispute relates relates to working out a share of the partner in admitted partnership assets. In the present case, the controversy is of a different nature. The dispute is not with regard to the quantification of share in a partnership asset but concerns the anterior issue as to whether the savings bank account standing in the name of the 1st defendant is at all a partnership asset or his individual property. Unless this foundational issue is adjudicated, the question of seeking dissolution of the Partnership Firm and rendition of accounts does not arise. Since the very character of the bank account is in dispute, in the view of this Court, the suit for declaration is very much maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, unless the character/statue of the account as one belonging to the Partnership Firm is established, the plaintiffs would not be in a position to seek rendition of accounts. Since the plaintiffs have filed the suit for a declaration declaring the character of the savings bank account No.2113, as a partnership account or belonging to the partnership, the relief for declaration is not only maintainable but is also a necessary precursor to any further relief. In the considered view of this Court, when the dispute relates to status or character of an asset as belonging to the Firm, a declaratory suit is very much maintainable and cannot be rejected, since based on such determination of the status only any subsequent relief of dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts can be claimed.
22. This Court is of the further view that the rule that a partner must be sued only for dissolution and rendition of account, cannot be applied as inflexible or rigid proposition as to defeat the claim where the very character of the asset as a partnership asset is in dispute. In the considered view of this Court, a partner must seek dissolution and rendition of accounts, where the asset undoubtedly belongs to the partnership, but where the dispute relates to the very character or status of the property as a partnership asset, a suit for declaration is maintainable. The present suit, being one seeking to establish the character or status of the bank account standing in the name of the 1st defendant is a partnership asset, is therefore perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, the objection raised by the defendants as to the maintainability of the suit stands rejected. With regard to the plea of dissolution, the Courts below found that under Ex.A22, the partnership was one at Will. The admissibility of Ex.A22 was questioned. However, the same was rejected on the grounds that the defendants despite being in possession of the original partition deed, failed to produce the same and that they did not dispute its genuineness thereby rendering Ex.A22 admissible in evidence. The materials on record do not establish that the Firm stood dissolved upon the death of Thiru.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar. The facts, in fact indicate that the business continued thereafter.
23. The next objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendants is the alleged perversity in the findings of the Courts below. On the aspect of perversity, in the findings of the Courts below, this Court has carefully perused the entire evidence on record. The Courts below upon appreciation of Ex.A4 to Ex.A7 and the testimony of DW1, the Branch Manager of the 2nd defendant Bank, concurrently held that the savings bank account No.2113 is connected with the Partnership Firm. Further, documentary evidence marked as Exs.A8 to A21 and A23 to A55, were not disputed by the 1st defendant or his legal heirs. The Courts below relying on Exs.B4 to B7, and the evidence of PW2, the Auditor of the Firm, found that the practice of authorising the partners or their family members to operate the accounts was not alien to the business of the Firm. It is pertinent to note here that the defendants failed to produce the Bank pass-book for the subject account No.2113, which would have constituted the best evidence to establish their case.
24. A further analysis of Exs.B4, B6 and B7 reveals that the savings bank account No.2113, though stood in the name of the 1st defendant, was in fact treated as an account of the Partnership Firm. The authorisations granted to the 1st plaintiff and his father to operate the account under Exs.B6 and B7, is wholly inconsistent with the claim that the account was the exclusive property of the 1st defendant. Significantly, DW2 admitted the execution of Ex.B6 and the continuation of authorisation which was never revoked. Insofar as the evidentiary value of the ledgers, viz., Exs.A5 to A21 and A23 to A55 is concerned, this Court finds that the objection raised by the defendants is misconceived. Though Section 34 of the Evidence Act provides that the entries in Book of Accounts alone shall not be sufficient to charge any person with liability, in the present case, such entries were not disputed by the defendants. In the absence of any challenge to the correctness of the entries, the plaintiffs were not required to adduce independent corroborative evidence. Hence, reliance placed on such entries by the Courts below, cannot be faulted. Under the circumstances, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the defendants reported in 2005 [2] Mad LJ 10 [SC] [M/s.Dale and Carrington Investment [Pvt] Ltd and Another Vs. P.K.Prathapan and Others] and 1999 [2] MLJ 481 [Deluxe Road Lines rep.by its Partner, Kushalchand B.Shah Vs. P.K.Palani Chetty], are distinguishable on facts and do not support the case of the defendants. Hence, the substantial question of law No.1, is answered against the defendants/appellants.
Substantial Question of Law No.2:-Whether the Courts below have failed to see that this subject matter of suit, is barred by limitation:-
25. Though this Court has framed the substantial question of law on limitation, before this Court and in the written arguments, no submissions were made on limitation. This Court has therefore independently examined the issue.
26. The suit has been filed for declaration along with the consequential reliefs for permanent and mandatory injunctions. The records reveal that the suit was instituted immediately after the death of one of the partners, namely, P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar, and in the backdrop of the 1st defendant acting against the interest of the Partnership Firm. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the suit is not barred by limitation. Hence, the substantial question of law is answered against the defendants.
Substantial Question of Law in SA.[MD].No.382/2009:-Whether the Courts below are correct in rejecting the relief of mandatory injunction though the relief of declaration and permanent injunction have been granted?
27. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that once the principal relief of declaration had been granted by the Courts below, the consequential relief of mandatory injunction ought to have followed as a matter of course. This Court is unable to accept the said contention. As rightly held by the Courts below, unless the plaintiffs established the exact amount lying in SB.A/c.No.2113 as on 16.11.1994, the grant of mandatory injunction would be futile and inexecutable. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the mandatory injunction cannot be granted as a mere formality and therefore, the Courts below were right in rejecting the said relief. Accordingly, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the findings of the Courts below. Hence, the substantial question of law is answered against the plaintiffs.
28. The plaintiffs filed CMP.No.6262/2024 in SA.[MD].No.382/2009, for receipt of additional evidence. The plaintiffs sought to produce the xerox copies of the ledger relating to SB A/c.No.2113 as additional evidence. It is contended by the plaintiffs that the original ledger is in the custody of the Bank and that only Xerox copy could be obtained during the pendency of the second appeal.
29. This Court is not inclined to accept the additional evidence in view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not satisfactorily explained the belated production of the document. Further, when the Bank itself does not possess the original ledger it incumbent on the plaintiff to explain how he obtained it. Since the defendants have also disputed the genuineness of the documents sought to be furnished as additional evidence, such evidence cannot be admitted without proof and that too at second appellate stage.
30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case reported in 2025 SCCOnline [SC] 1787 [Iqbal Ahmed [died] by LRs and Another Vs. Abdul Shukoor], held that apart from laying a foundation in the pleadings for receiving additional evidence, the other provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the code have to be satisfied.
31. In the pleadings of the plaintiff, there is no whisper about the ledgers, and further there is absolutely no explanation as how the plaintiffs obtained the copies when the 2nd defendant himself did not possess it. Further, absolutely no reasons are assigned for the delay of 20 years in getting the documents. Hence, CMP.No.6262/2024 is dismissed. The plaintiffs are at liberty to place the document subject to admissibility, at the time of settlement of accounts.
32. In view of the foregoing discussions, the Second Appeals are found to be meritless.
Moulding the Relief in the suit:-
33. Before parting with the matter, considering that the suit was filed in the year 1995, this Court is of the view that the relief in the suit deserves to be moulded since a mere declaration, at this stage, would not give a quietus to the litigation. The defendant’s in their written statement specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs remedy was only to seek for winding up proceedings. Even in the written submission of the learned counsel for the defendant’s the plea raised is that the plaintiffs ought to have asked for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts. Therefore this Court finds that no prejudice would be caused to the defendant if the relief is moulded as stated herein after. Useful reference with regard to the power of the Court to mould relief can be made to the following judgments; Srinivas Ram Kumar Firm Vs. Mahabir Prasad and others, reported in (1951) SCC 136, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para ’12’ held as follows:
“12. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant’s own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.”
So also, in the case of Kedar Lal Seal and another vs. Hari Lal Seal, reported in AIR 1952 SC 47, at para ’40’ it is held as follows:
“40. I would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded. In any event, it is always open to a court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for in costs.”
34. On appreciation of pleadings and evidence, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs, apart from seeking the relief of declaration and injunctions, ought to have sought the relief of rendition of accounts.
35. The Courts below had concurrently found that the Partnership Firm was a Partnership at Will and that, the Firm was not dissolved in accordance with law. Since the Courts below have rendered a finding of fact on the basis of the evidence on record, this Court, in the absence of any perversity in such findings, finds that the Partnership Firm has not been dissolved in accordance with law. However, this Court finds that the relationship between the partners has become irretrievably strained. The conduct of the parties including initiation of civil and criminal proceedings against each other clearly establishes a break down of mutual trust and confidence.
36. It is trite that in the absence of mutual confidence, continuation of partnership business, which is founded on trust, is neither feasible nor legally desirable. Useful reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.H.Patel & Company and others vs. Hirubhai Himabhai Patel and others, reported in 2000(4) SCC 368. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“11….. Dissolution will arise where it appears that the state of feelings and conduct of the partners have been such that business cannot be continued with advantage to either party.”
37. Therefore, this Court invoking its power under Order 7 Rule 7 of CPC, construing the prayer for declaration as including a prayer for dissolution of the Partnership firm, passes the following preliminary decree:-
a. declaring that the Partnership Firm, namely, P.S.A.Ramasamy Chetty and Sons, stands dissolved with effect from 28.10.1994, being the date of death of Thiru.P.S.A.Ramasamy Chettiyar ; and
b. declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to half share in the assets of the Partnership Firm and directing that the accounts of the Partnership Firm be taken for the purpose of final settlement.
No costs.
30.04.2026
AP
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes / No
NCC : Yes / No
Speaking Order/Non Speaking Order

To

1.The Additional District and Sessions Judge
FTC-1, Madurai.

2.The Principal District Munsif,
Madurai.

3.The Section Officer,
VR Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Madurai.
N.MALA, J.

AP

Common Judgment in
SA.[MD].Nos.382/2009 & 348/2014

30.04.2026