Dismissed HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.VINOD KUMAR W.P.Nos.8260, 8265, 8269 & 8273 of 2019 R.Venkatesan … Petitioner in W.P.No.8260/2019 G.Ramadoss … /Mr.Haja Nasirudeen Additional Advocate General Assisted by Mr.M.Geetha Thamarai Selvan Special Government

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 29.10.2025
Pronounced on : 31.10.2025
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.VINOD KUMAR
W.P.Nos.8260, 8265, 8269 & 8273 of 2019
R.Venkatesan … Petitioner in W.P.No.8260/2019
G.Ramadoss … Petitioner in W.P.No.8265/2019
R.Raju … Petitioner in W.P.No.8269/2019
A.Vadivelu … Petitioner in W.P.No.8273/2019
vs
1. State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Secretary
Finance (Cooperative Audit) Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai – 600 009.
2. The Director of Cooperative Audit
Integrated Finance Department
Office Complex, 2nd Floor,
No.571, Anna Salai,
Chennai – 600 035. … Respondents in all petitions
Common Prayer: Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records relating to the order passed by the second respondent in e/f/19276/rpjg[F/11 dated 19.01.2015 in respect of the fixation of
Notional emoluments to arrive terminal benefits leaving all the increments and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to implement
G.O.Ms.No.446 Finance (Co-operative Audit) Department, dated
30.12.2010 and letter in No.43253/Tj/2011 dated 18.06.2012 and that of the orders passed in W.P.Nos.27814 to 27817 of 2011 dated 07.04.2014 and pass orders.
For Petitioner in all petitions : Mr.A.R.Nixon
For Respondents
in all petitions : Mr.Haja Nasirudeen
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by
Mr.M.Geetha Thamarai Selvan
Special Government Pleader
C O M M O N O R D E R
Since the issue involved in all these four writ petitions is one and the same, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Special Government Pleader for the respondents and perused the records.
3. For reference, the facts as stated in W.P.No.8260 of 2019 are being referred to.
4. The case of the petitioner in brief is that he has been appointed as Junior Co-operative Inspector on 15.05.1969 on temporary basis through employment exchange and was transferred to a newly created Department namely Department of Co-operative Audit; that in all 351 persons who were earlier working in composite Co-operative Department were transferred to the new department i.e., Audit Wing of Co-operative Department and re designated as Junior Co-operative Auditors; that the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (for short TNPSC) conducted the special qualifying examination for the 351 temporary Junior Inspector of Co-operative Department; that out of the total number of 351 temporary Junior Cooperative Auditors, who have taken part in the Special Qualifying
Examination 330 candidates have qualified, while 18 candidates including the petitioner did not qualify and 3 candidates have been debarred from taking part in the examination.
5. It is the further case of the petitioner that 18 candidates who did not qualify in the special qualifying examination conducted by the TNPSC, approached the Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Application vide O.A.No.4590 of 1995 and similar other O.A’s seeking for regularisation of their services which were otherwise considered as temporary; and that the Tribunal by order dated 21.10.2003 directed the respondents to regularise the services of those who did not qualify the Special Qualifying Examination.
6. The petitioner further contended that aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the Government preferred Writ Petition to this Court which was dismissed; that on the Writ Petition filed by the Government being dismissed, the 21 candidates who did not qualify in the Special Qualifying Examination were allowed to continue and their services were regularised with effect from 16.10.1989 by issuing G.O.Ms.No.445 Finance (Co-operative) Audit Department dated 20.12.2005; that thereafter, the respondents issued another Government Order vide G.O.Ms.No.446 Finance (Co-operative) Audit Department dated 30.12.2010 protecting the wages and also granting various benefits like annual wage increase, leave, etc.,
7. It is the further case of the petitioner that when the respondents did not grant benefits in terms of G.O.Ms.No.446, he along with others who were not granted benefits had approached this Court by filing Writ Petition vide W.P.No.14800 of 2011 and batch, seeking a direction to the respondents to implement G.O.Ms.No.446 and to pay all pensionary benefits including the increment for 3 years, Earned Leave Salary, Deathcum-Retirement Gratuity (for short DCRG), Commutation Value Pension as claimed by them under letters dated 26.04.2011 and 02.05.2011; that the batch of Writ Petitions were disposed of by this Court by a common order dated 18.08.2011 whereby the petitioners were directed to file fresh representation to the second respondent therein and the second respondent was directed to pass orders on merits in accordance with law, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of fresh representation from the petitioners.
8. It is the further case of the petitioner that after the disposal of the writ petition filed by them seeking payment of pensionary benefits and other emoluments, the respondent passed order dated 07.10.2011 (3 other dates for 3 other petitioners stating that they have been wrongly sanctioned increment and decided to recover the same; that as the respondents passed the aforementioned order without application of mind and without following principles of natural justice, the petitioner and 3 others have filed separate writ petitions vide W.P.No.27814 of 2011 and batch; that this Court by order dated 07.04.2014 was pleased to set aside the order impugned therein which had stated that the respondents have wrongly sanctioned increment and thus, the excess payment made is to be recovered and for the said reason, pension proposal was not being sent; and that this Court while restraining the respondent from recovering the excess payment made, further directed the respondents to send the pension proposal with Earned Leave salary, to pay DCRG, Commutation Value Pension within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order.
9. The petitioner contended that despite this Court directing the respondents to forward the pension proposal of the petitioner including the various components of the salary, the respondents failed to forward the proposal based on the last drawn scale of pay and on the other hand, the respondents have fixed the scale of pay and the terminal benefits on imaginary notional pay basis without considering all the increments except one increment received by the petitioner and forwarded the same for fixation of pensionary benefits; that on account of wrong fixation of pay and terminal benefits, resulted in wrong fixation of pension.
10. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that since, G.O.Ms.No.446 gives protection in respect of age, educational qualification, pay fixation, annual increment and Earned Leave (without any break), the respondents by impugned order passed have caused pecuniary loss to the petitioner by considering only one increment and excluding three increments which have to be granted to the petitioner, by implementing the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.27814 to 27817 of 2011 dated 07.04.2014.
11. By contending as above, the petitioner seeks for quashing of the impugned order dated 19.01.2015 passed by the second respondent in respect of fixation of notional emoluments to arrive at terminal benefits, leaving all the increments as being contrary to the direction of this Court in W.P.No.27814 of 2011 and batch, whereby the respondents were directed to implement G.O.Ms.No.446 dated 30.12.2010.
12. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that in all 351 temporary Junior Cooperative Inspectors working earlier in Co-operative Department, on a new Department namely Co-operative Audit Department being carved out with effect from 17.06.1981 were re-designated as Junior Co-operative Auditor and new set of adhoc rules were framed exclusively for the staff belonging to Subordinate Services in the Co-operative Audit Department vide G.O.Ms.No.253, Finance (CA) Department, dated 13.03.1986.
13. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that initially the regular as well as temporary employees working including the petitioners herein in Audit Wing of Co-operative Department were posted in the Cooperative Audit Department; that thereafter options have been called for from the regular employees of the composite Co-operative Department as to whether they are willing to serve in the newly carved out and created Department i.e., Co-operative Audit Department or would continue in parent Department ie., Co-operative Department; that no such option was called for from temporary Junior Inspectors of Co-operative Department who are working in the Audit Wing of the Co-operative Societies including the petitioners since, their appointment was on temporary basis and liable for termination; that based on the option exercised by the regular employees working in both Co-operative Department and Co-operative Audit Department, the same was finalized by absorbing those who opted for Cooperative Audit Department; that the petitioner and other similarly placed temporary Junior Inspectors of Co-operative Department in all numbering 351 persons were considered as temporary Junior Co-operative Auditors and were allowed to continue in the Cooperative Audit Department since, they were working in the Audit Wing of the parent department before bifurcation.
14. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that on account of persistent demands from Service Association and temporary employees as that of the petitioner, seeking regularisation of service, the Government considering the request on humanitarian grounds took a policy decision to conduct a Special Qualifying Examination of Higher Secondary Standard for Group III service on 15.10.1989 to all the temporary Junior Inspectors of Co-operative Department/Junior Co-operative Auditors through TNPSC; that minimum qualifying mark was fixed as 60 out of 200 marks; that the examination was based only on General English and General Knowledge; that in all 351 temporary Junior Co-operative Auditors who were working in the newly created Co-operative Audit Department appeared in the aforesaid examination held on 15.10.1989; and that out of 351 candidates, 330 candidates have qualified in the examination conducted by TNPSC and 21 candidates including the petitioner were not successful in the examination.
15. It is further contended, that instead of terminating services of Temporary Junior Inspectors of Co-operative Department, the Government, by taking a lenient view directed the candidates to appear for examination to be conducted by the TNPSC, which itself concession given to the petitioner and other similarly placed temporary Junior Inspectors/Junior Co-operative Auditors; that the petitioner having failed to secure minimum mark of 60 out of 200 marks became ineligible for regularisation along with other 20 candidates.
16. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the candidates including the petitioner who failed to clear the Special Qualifying Examination held on 15.10.1989, apprehending that their services would be terminated, approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal and obtained order for their countenance in service. The respondents in compliance with the order of the Tribunal in O.A.No.3493 of 1990 dated 11.07.1991 allowed the petitioner and 20 other failed candidates to continue in service.
17. On behalf of the respondents, it is further contended that 330 candidates who have qualified in the Special Exam conducted by the TNPSC were allotted to Co-operative Audit Department as Junior Cooperative Auditors and their services were regularised with effect from 15.10.1989 and also inter se seniority was fixed for them as per the list sent by the TNPSC.
18. The respondents by counter further contended that in respect of
330 unsuccessful candidates who had qualified in the Special Qualifying Exam, the Government by relaxing the adhoc Rules for commencement of declaration of their probation in the category of Junior Co-operative Auditors and for their further promotion as senior Co-operative Auditors had issued various G.Os vide G.O.Ms.No.115, G.O.Ms.No.626 and G.O.Ms.No.597 dated 17.05.1995, 28.07.1995 and 27.11.1997 respectively; and that no such exemption was given in respect of 21 candidates who had failed in the Special Qualifying Exam.
19. It is also the contention of the respondents that based on the orders passed by the Tribunal in Original Application and this Court in Writ Petition, the temporary services of 21 Junior Inspectors who have failed in Special Qualifying Examination including the petitioner herein were regularised retrospectively with effect from 16.10.1989 under G.O.Ms.No.445 dated 20.12.2005; and that by virtue of the above G.O, the failed candidates numbering to 21 are considered as directly recruited as Junior Co-operative Auditors and thus are governed by adhoc rules which were notified vide G.O.Ms.No.253 dated 31.03.1986.
20. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that as per the adhoc rules which are applicable to the directly recruited Junior Co-operative Auditors like the petitioner(s), are to be placed on probation for a total period of 2 years on duty within a continuous period of three years and have to fulfil the conditions prescribed in the adhoc rules within a period of probation namely –
1.Candidate must undergo the course of instruction in Co-operation,
Auditing, Banking and Book Keeping for a period of nine months and a course of practical training for a period of three months at a Co-operative Training Institute in Tamil Nadu.
2. Candidate must pass the examination in Co-operation, Auditing,
Banking and Book Keeping conducted by the Central Co-operative
Institute, Madras or the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.
3.Must pass the Account Test for Subordinate Officers
4.Must pass the District Office Manual Test.
21. It is further contended by the respondents that the petitioner herein did not fulfil one or more conditions of the adhoc rules mentioned herein above, during the period of his service, either while being in the Cooperative Department as Inspector or on being regularised as Junior Cooperative Auditor in terms of the order of the Tribunal/Court, till he has retired from the service.
22. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that since, the petitioner who is a temporary Junior Audit Inspector initially, is redesignated as Junior Co-operative Auditor pursuant to orders in Original Application and Writ Petition, cannot claim himself as equal to the 330 Junior Co-operative Auditors who had succeeded in the Special qualifying exam conducted by the TNPSC.
23. It is further contended by the respondents that since, the petitioner’s services have been regularised in terms of G.O.Ms.No.445 and are granted benefits in terms of G.O.Ms.No.446, the petitioner is required to comply with Rule 23-A of Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Service Rules (for short TNSSS Rules) which mandates that a probationer in order to be eligible for sanction of increment on normal dates, is required to pass prescribed test within a period of probation failing which no increments can be granted; and that though the petitioner(s) service has been regularised in terms of G.O.Ms.No.445 with effect from 06.10.1989, the petitioner did not pass all the prescribed tests as mentioned in the Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules and as such, his probation was never confirmed till he attained the age of superannuation and retiring from services of the respondents.
24. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that in respect of 330 candidates on being declared successful in the Special Qualifying Examination conducted by TNPSC were treated as appointed as Junior Cooperative Auditors on 15.10.1989, while the 21 candidates who had failed to clear the Special qualifying exam including the petitioner(s) whose services have been regularised pursuant to the orders of the Court with effect from 16.10.1989 ie., the following day and thus, the petitioner(s) cannot claim that he being entitled to all the monetary benefits as were granted to the candidates who had succeeded in the Special qualifying exam or for being treated on par with the said 330 candidates.
25. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that the impugned order was passed on 19th January, 2015, whereby, the respondents have fixed the pensionary benefits of the petitioner in terms of Order passed by this Court in W.P.No.27814 of 2011 dated 07.04.2014 and also having made the payment in terms of aforesaid proceedings, which has been accepted by the petitioner(s) without any demure or protest, the petitioner(s) cannot be allowed to call in question the said proceedings after lapse of 4 years.
26. By contending as above, the respondents seek for dismissal of the
Writ Petition.
27. In reply on behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that the secondrespondent by his communication dated 13.03.2019, addressed to the first respondent recommended for considering the case of the petitioner favourably, thus the respondents cannot claim; that the petitioner is not entitled for grant of any monetary benefits with regard to fixation of his pay and increments.
28. I have taken note of the aforesaid contentions.
29. At the outset, it is to be noted that the petitioner cannot seek parity with the 330 candidates who had succeeded in the Special qualifying Examination conducted by the TNPSC and appointed as Junior Co-
operative Auditors on 15.10.1989. Admittedly, the petitioner herein did not succeed in the Special qualifying Examination, for him to be treated on par with the candidates who had put in effort in getting through the aforesaid examination. Thus, there are two classes of Junior Co-operative Auditors ie., one consisting of 330 candidates who have qualified in the Special examination conducted by TNPSC, and the second is of 21 Junior Cooperative Auditors including petitioner(s) who did not qualify the examination, but whose services were regularised by the Government as a special case under G.O.Ms.No.445 dated 20.12.2005 with effect from 16.10.1989 ie., day following the regularisation of the 330 successful candidates.
30. This would be evident from a reading of G.O.Ms.No.445, wherein it has been mentioned that the services of 21 persons who did not pass the special examination conducted by TNPSC, though they become eligible for dismissal, but having approached the Administrative Tribunal claiming that they should not be dismissed and that their services should be regularised. It is in compliance with the order of the Tribunal, their services were regularised from 16.10.1989 ie., the following day after regularising the services of the 330 candidates who qualified in the Special Qualifying Examination held. Since, the petitioner(s) who are part of the 21 candidates and were not successful in the special examination, form a separate class by themselves and cannot claim of their wages being protected and also being entitled to the benefits on a par with the 330 qualified candidates.
31. Further, though it is contended by the petitioner(s) that their wages/salary was protected in terms of G.O.Ms.No.446 dated 30.12.2010. Firstly, it is to be noted that the aforesaid G.O came to be issued 5 years after the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.445, whereby the petitioner’s services were regularised. Secondly, reading of Clause 3 (2) of the G.O dealing with fixation of remuneration clearly states that while the services of 21 persons including petitioner who were regularised with effect from 16.10.1989 would continue to receive the remuneration they were “getting before regularisation”.
32. By virtue of aforesaid protection granted under G.O.Ms.No.446, the petitioners on being regularised in the post of Junior Co-operative Auditors with effect from 16.10.1989 is entitled to receive the remuneration which they were getting upto 15.10.1989. However, since the services of 21 candidates including the petitioner who did not qualify the Special qualification examination were regularised by way of GO, the exemption granted in respect of 330 candidates who had qualified in the Special qualifying examination from appearing and Qualifying in various tests, would not be available and applicable to the petitioner(s) as the said G.Os issued are specific in relation to those candidates, who had qualified in the exam conducted by the TNPSC on 15.10.1989.
33. Since, the petitioner(s) who form a separate class is not entitled toclaim the benefit of the specific G.Os which are applicable only in relation to the candidates who had passed the Special Qualifying Examination, and cannot be allowed to claim that they are not required to comply Rule 10/Rule 11 or Rule 23-A of the Subordinate Service Rules, for them to claim parity, or for being treated on a par with selected candidates in the exam held on 15.10.1989.
34. If the contention urged by the petitioner(s) is accepted by treating them on par with the other class of Junior Co-operative Auditors, who were successful in the Special Qualifying Examination and their pay being protected, the same would result in incentivising the otherwise ineligible candidates at the cost of the successful candidates, which cannot be allowed.
35. Further, since, the 21 unsuccessful candidates including the petitioner(s) since form a separate class, they cannot claim themselves to be equal to 330 candidates who have passed the Special Qualifying
Examination or to claim violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, if the 21 unsuccessful candidates including the petitioner who are not equally placed as 330 candidates if treated as equals, the same would amount to unequals being treated as equal thereby violating Article 14 of Constitution of India.
36. The Apex Court in the case of Dev Gupta v. PEC University of
Technology and others, (2023) 20 SCC 166, held as under:
“14. It is now entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence, that the doctrine of equality has varied—and layered dimensions, one of which is that under Article 14 : (Manish Kumar v. Union of India [Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1 :
(2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 50] , SCC p. 96, para 152)
“152. … Equals must be treated equally. Unequals must not be treated equally. What constitutes reasonable classification must depend upon the facts of each case, the context provided by the statute, the existence of intelligible differentia which has led to the grouping of the persons or things as a class and the leaving out of those who do not share the intelligible differentia. No doubt it must bear rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved.”
15. This Court in Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan [Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 465] explained how the reasonable classification is to be applied
: (SCC pp. 42-43, para 6)
“6. The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute equality amongst all, which may be a physical impossibility. All that Article 14 guarantees is the similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The protection of equal laws does not mean that all laws must be uniform. Equality before the law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality before the law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as though they were the same. It is true that Article 14 enjoins that the people similarly situated should be treated similarly but what amount of dissimilarity would make the people disentitled to be treated equally, is rather a vexed question. A legislature, which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power of making special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not “per se” amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. The State has always the power to make classification on a basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with.”
37. Insofar as reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision of this Court dated 07.04.2014 in W.P.Nos.27814 and 27817 of 2011, it is to be noted that the operative portion of the order in the said Writ Petitions is in two parts. First part dealing with recovery sought to be made by the respondents from the petitioner(s). Second part of the order states that the petitioner(s) is entitled to the benefits of which they are otherwise eligible in terms of the Judgment. A reading of the Judgment would show that the respondents having contended that the petitioner(s) was required to pass the departmental test under Rule 23-A of the Service Rules in order to be eligible for being granted increments and the petitioner herein not having passed departmental test on account of which, the excess payment made to him during the service period was sought to be recovered, this Court held that the excess payment made is not on account of any misrepresentation by the petitioner(s), and accordingly held that the recovery cannot be undertaken.
38. Further, this Court having held that excess payment made to the petitioner during his service with the respondents cannot be recovered, and noting that the respondent on the said ground have sought to deny sanction of pension, directed the respondents to send the pension proposal by taking into consideration the various emoluments to which the petitioner (s) are ‘otherwise eligible’ including the Earned Leave salary, DCRG, Commutation value pension. Thus, the said direction cannot be construed in a manner as if the Court having directed the respondents to consider increments which have been wrongly paid to the petitioner, while in service for granting pensionary benefits. The use of word “otherwise eligible” in the Judgment makes the aforesaid position clear. (Underlining supplied by Court)
39. It is a settled position of law that the pension fixed wrongly, can be revised, it such wrong fixation has occurred due to any clerical error or calculation error. (See: Union of India and others Vs. Bhanwar Lal
Mundan ((2013) 12 SCC 433).
40. In the facts of the present case, since, the petitioner (s) did not complete probation by qualifying in the Departmental tests, they are not entitled for any increments during their service, though paid wrongly, for such increments to be taken into consideration for fixing pensionary benefits resulting in loss to state exchequer which is public money.
41. Further, the petitioner having accepted the pension as fixed by the respondents by taking into consideration, the last drawn pay with one increment upto the date of attaining superannuation and retiring from service of the respondents more than a decade back cannot be allowed to agitate the respondents not fixing his pension by considering all the emoluments which he is not eligible and in fact, paid wrongly.
42. The Apex Court in the case of (i)Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC
108, held that –
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
(ii). The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Prabhakar vs. Joint
Director, Sericulture Department and another” (2015) 15 SCC 1, held that
38. “It is now a well-recognised principle of
jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities”. (iii).The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed as under in the case of “State of Uttaranchal and another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and others” (2013) 12 SCC 179, held that-
29. ………. But equality has to be claimed at the right juncture and not after expiry of two decades. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.
43. Further, this Court had an occasion to consider a similar challenge in relation to the same Department in W.A.No.1589 of 2021 wherein Division Bench of this Court had held that the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.626 dated 26.07.1995 is available only to those candidates who have passed in Special qualifying examination and is not applicable to those who failed in examination conducted by TNPSC and whose services are regularised based on the Court order. Since, the petitioner(s) stand on the same footing, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court would apply on all force to the fact of the petitioner’s cases.
44. Thus, considered from any angle, a conspectus of the above legal position when applied to the facts of the case, it would be evident that petitioner(s) neither can be considered as equal to the 330 candidates who qualified in the examination conducted by TNPSC nor can be declared as eligible for being granted increments without complying with the adhoc Rules and Rule 23-A of the TNSSS Rules, this Court is of the view that the impugned order as passed by the respondents does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court.
45. Accordingly, the writ petitions are devoid of merits and are dismissed. No order as to costs.
31.10.2025
Speaking order / Non-speaking order
Index : Yes / No
Neutral Citation : Yes / No dh
To
1. State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Secretary
Finance (Cooperative Audit) Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai – 600 009.
2. The Director of Cooperative Audit
Integrated Finance Department
Office Complex, 2nd Floor, No.571, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 035. 
T. VINOD KUMAR, J.
dh
Pre-delivery order made in
W.P.Nos.8260, 8265, 8269 & 8273 of 2019
31.10.2025