Appeal dismissed MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN Crl.A.(MD).No.198 of 2016 1.Anbarrasu @ Stanley Jones Anbarasu @ Stanley David Anbarasu
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved On
:
24.01.2025
Pronounced On
:
15.05.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN
Crl.A.(MD).No.198 of 2016
1.Anbarrasu @ Stanley Jones Anbarasu
@ Stanley David Anbarasu
2.Asir David
3.Kasthuri
… Appellants
Vs.
State rep by
The Inspector of Police,
Vadasery Police Station,
Nagercoil,
Kanyakumari District.
(Crime No.204 of 2000)
… Respondent
PRAYER: Criminal Appeals has been filed under Section 374 (2) of
Criminal Procedure Code, to call for the records relating of the judgment dated 27.05.2016 made in S.C.No.194 of 2002 on the file of Mahila Fast Track Court, Nagercoil by which the appellants/A1 to A3 who were convicted and sentenced to undergo 3 years simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 498(A) of IPC and fine of Rs.5,000/- each in default to undergo 4 months of Rigorous Imprisonment and the first appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo 10 years of rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 304 (B) of IPC and fine of Rs.25,000/- in default to undergo 9 months of rigorous imprisonment and the appellant Nos.2 and 3/A2 & A3 were convicted under Section 304(B) r/w 114 of IPC and sentenced to undergo 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- each in default to undergo 9 months of rigorous imprisonment and the appellant Nos.1 to 3 were convicted and sentenced to undergo 2 years of Simple Imprisonment for the offence under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo 3 months of simple imprisonment. The sentences have been ordered to run
concurrently.
For appellant : Mr.M.Ajmal Khan Senior Counsel for M/s.Ajmal Associates
For respondent : Mr.M.Sakthi Kumar
Government Advocate (Crl.Side)
JUDGMENT
This criminal appeal is filed against the judgment dated
27.05.2016 passed by the learned Judge, Mahila Fast Track Court, Nagercoil, in S.C.No.194 of 2002, wherein the appellants were convicted as follows:
Sl.No.
Rank of the
accused
Offences Under Section
Punishment
1
A1 to A3
498(A) of IPC
To undergo three years of Simple Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/each in default to undergo 4 months of rigorous imprisonment.
2
A1
304(B) of IPC
To undergo ten years of Rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- each in default to undergo 9 months of rigorous
imprisonment
3
A2 and A3
304(B) r/w 114 of
IPC
To undergo ten years of Rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- each in default to undergo 9 months of rigorous
imprisonment
4
A1 to A3
4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act,
To undergo two years of Rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each in default to undergo 3 months of simple
imprisonment
During the pendency of the appeal, the second appellant had died.
2.The case of the prosecution runs thus:
The first appellant herein married P.W.1’s daughter, namely, Christilda Jane, the deceased, on 26.01.1994 in Kaliyankadu Church as per the Christian rituals. During their wedlock, a male child was born on 28.03.1995. On 13.05.1996 A1’s younger brother got married to a girl from a wealthy family and therefore the deceased was ill-treated and harassed by these appellants for not bringing more dowry. Therefore, the deceased preferred a complaint on 20.07.1999 to the All Women Police Station, Nagercoil. The said complaint was closed on an undertaking that A1 and the deceased would live in a separate house. Subsequently, A1 and the deceased along with the child stayed at the rental house of P.W.5. Even after that the harassment demanding dowry continued and she was unable to bear the torture, hence, the deceased self immolated herself with her child in the rental house. The neighbours and the owner of the house broke open the door and informed to the fire service and recovered the body. Thereafter, father of the deceased gave a complaint to the jurisdictional police, who registered a case, conducted the investigation and arrested the accused. They also obtained the report from the Revenue Divisional Officer, examined a number of witnesses and also recovered a letter written by the deceased to the family of P.W.1 relating to the harassment meted out to her in the matrimonial house. They also sent the letter for the Hand writing expert’s opinion and obtained the positive report.
3.The first investigating officer, namely, P.W.27 conducted the
investigation by altering the offence under Section 302 to 304 B of IPC and the same was continued by P.W.28 another Investigating Officer, a DSP and he filed the final report. The final report was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Nagercoil, for the offence under Section 304(B) of IPC and the same was taken on file in P.R.C.No.10 of 2002. After furnishing copies of records to the appellants under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Judicial Magistrate,No.II,
Nagercoil, committed the case to the Court of Sessions under Section
209(A) of Cr.P.C. The same was taken on file in C.C.No.194 of 2002 by the Mahila Sessions Fast Track Court, Nagercoil. The learned Judge framed necessary charges, questioned the appellant under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C.
The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
4.The Prosecution examined 28 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.28 and
marked Exhibits P.1 to P.39. The accused/appellants were questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and they simply denied the incriminating portions. They neither examined any witness nor marked any document on their side.
5. The learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Fast Track Court, Nagercoil, after analysing the oral and documentary evidence adduced on both sides, held that the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellants as stated supra. Challenging the same, present appeal is filed by the appellants.
6.The learned Senior counsel for the appellants would submit that
the entire case rests on the interested testimony of the relatives of the deceased, namely, P.W.1 to P.W.5 and previous complaint Ex.P12. To disprove the charge under Section 304(b) of the IPC, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2005 SC 2081, 2008 16 SCC 512, 2008 1 SCC 202, 2006 1 SCC 463, and 2004 7 SCC 724. He would submit that 5 elements are to be established by the prosecution to sustain the conviction under Section 304 of IPC., and they are as follows:
(i)The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance
(ii)Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage
(iii)She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv)Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry and
(v)Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
6. 1.According to the learned Senior counsel, except the first two
conditions, the remaining material ingredients were not established by the prosecution in this case. The Revenue Divisional Officer specifically found that there was no dowry harassment and the same was not properly considered by the learned trial Judge. Ex.P12 the alleged material document does not form part of the final report, and the same was produced much later on 08.05.2002, ie., after the filing of the final report, and hence, it lacks genuineness. The document is a concocted one, and hence, the same is liable to be rejected. P.W.1 to P.W.5 are the family members and relatives of the deceased. They have not furnished any explanation as to why they have not disclosed the demand of dowry during the inquiry of the Revenue Divisional Officer. Hence, their evidence is liable to be rejected. Apart from that, the house owner of the deceased specifically deposed that both were living peacefully in the house. Therefore, the demand of dowry proximate to time of the death to prove a live link as required under Section 304(b) of the IPC is not established. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that after the alleged complaint dated 20.07.1999, the first appellant and the deceased had resided in the rental house as tenants. A3 was not residing with them. Therefore, the allegation that she also harassed the deceased is not correct. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel seeks acquittal of A3.
6.2. He further submitted that the material letter produced by the
prosecution did not whisper about dowry harassment. The letter disclosed only the harassment made by husband/A1, and there was no dowry
harassment. Except Ex.P12, no other documents are available to prove the dowry harassment immediately before the death. Hence, he seeks to set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge and acquit the appellant from the charged offences.
7.The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side), on
instructions, upon perusal of the records, would submit that the submission of the learned senior counsel that Ex.P12 does not form part of the final report is factually not correct. The learned Government Advocate produced the CD file, and he specifically stated that in the CD file and the served copies under Section 207 of Cr.P.C, the exhibit was shown as Document No.
12. The copy was marked along with the complaint of the deceased’s withdrawal letter and the docket of closing entry of the police officers. To prove the above complaint, the corresponding police official was also examined.
7.1.Therefore, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side)
submitted that Ex.P12 is genuine, and the same is not fabricated as argued by the learned senior counsel. In the said document, deceased has clearly stated about the demand of dowry made by the appellants herein.
7.2.The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) would also
submit that in the case of dowry death, the relative is the competent witness, and the non-examination of the independent witness is not material in the case of bride burning. For which he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2014 4 SCC 129. Therefore, he seeks confirmation of the conviction and sentence, and also reiterated the reasoning of the learned trial Judge.
7.3. The learned Government Advocate also requested this Court
to consider the detailed written submission filed before the Court below.
8. This Court considered the rival submissions made by the
learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the respondent and perused the materials available on record and the precedents relied upon by them.
9.Now the question in this case is whether the conviction and
sentence passed against the appellants by the Court below, is in accordance with law?
10. Before going to the merit of the case, this court culled section 304(B) of IPC and Section 113 of Evidence Act and corresponding principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court relating to the dowry death.
“304-B.Dowry death.
113-B.Presumption as to dowry death.
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860.”
11. The Narrow interpretation given to the meaning of “dowry” in
Hon’ble Two Judges Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of “Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 9 SCC 721 and in the case of Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., reported in (2013) 3 SCC 684 were overruled in the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in
(2015) 6 SCC 477 and the relevant paragraphs are as follows:
Appasaheb v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721
Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684
Rajinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477
1. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India.
A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure.
In our view, both the trial court and the High Court failed to appreciate that the demand, if at all made by the appellant on the deceased for purchasing a computer to start a business six months after the marriage, was not in connection with the marriage and was not really a “dowry demand” within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment
in Appasaheb
case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC
721(2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007)
3 SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in
Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.
12. The interpretation to the word “Soon before her death” given by
the Hon’ble Two Judges of Supreme Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 12 SCC 532 that “It can be said that the term “soon before” is synonymous with the term “immediately before” is overruled by the Hon’ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 477 and the same was reaffirmed by the latest three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2021) 6 SCC 108 and the relevant paragraphs are as follows:
Dinesh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 12 SCC
532
15.It can be said that the term “soon before” is synonymous with the term “immediately before”
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6
SCC 477
Dinesh v. State of Haryana [(2014) 12 SCC 532, in which the law was stated thus : (SCC p. 537, para 15)
“. It can be said that the term ‘soon before’ is synonymous with the term ‘immediately before’.
We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. “Soon before” is not synonymous with “immediately before”.
Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6
SCC 108
11. “soon before” cannot be interpreted to mean “immediately before”, rather the prosecution has to show that there existed a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207
15. . “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any other intervening circumstance showing the nonexistence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.
Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the woman.
12.1. The Hon’ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the
case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 477 has also elaborately considered the dowry prohibition Act and 304(B) of IPC and gave the meaning of the word “dowry” and necessary ingredients to consitute the offence under section 304(B) of IPC which reads as follows:
8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts:
9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be:
(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security— the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.
(2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.
(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.
(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.
(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised.
(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.
(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry.
13. According to the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the Appellant as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decision to sustain the conviction under Section 304(B) of IPC, the following essential elements are to be established:
(i)The death of a woman should be caused by burns
or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance
(ii)Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage
(iii)She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv)Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry and
(v)Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
13.1. In this case, according to the learned Senior Counsel the
requirements iii, iv, v were not established and no material adduced. The considered opinion of this court is that the said argument of learned Senior Counsel is misconceived. P.W.1 to P.W.4 clearly deposed about the dowry harrasment and prosecution also marked number of documents to prove the dowry demand.
14. P.W.1 is the mother of the deceased, P.W.2 is sister of the
deceased, P.W.3 is close relative of deceased. P.W.4 is an independent person aged about 76 years. P.W.1 to P.W.3 testified to some incidents of demand of dowry within their knowledge. They specifically deposed that before marriage there was a dowry demand i.e. 25 sovereigns of gold jewels and Rs.50,000/- cash. At the time of the engagement, 50,000/- and 1 sovereign of gold jewels were given and remaining jewels were given on the date of the marriage on 26.01.1994 and male child was born on 28.03.1996. On 13.05.1996, A1’s brother’s marriage was performed. In the said marriage A1’s brother was given huge dowry in the form of jewels and land. Thereafter the deceased was subjected to harrasment to obtain same amount of jewels and land, by A1 to A3. They had also severely beaten the deceased and hence she left the matrimonial home with the child and returned to the matrimonial home at the intervention of the Bishop. They also demanded six sovereigns of gold jewels and 12,000/- for the child as a dowry. They also provided the same. Since deceased’s father was an evangelist, he was unable to meet out the dowry demand. On 04.10.1998, information had been received about the serious health condition of the deceased, that the deceased was admitted in the hospital and deceased informed about the forcible pouring of kerosine in the mouth of the deceased and hence she became unconscious and admitted in the hospital and took treatment. Police complaint was given and closed with the advice to resume the matrimonial life peacefully. Again the deceased was harrassed continuously and hence the deceased made the complaint on 20.07.1999 with serious allegation of dowry demand and the said complaint was marked as Ex.P.12 and in the said complaint all the above events have been narrated by the deceased herself seeking to take action against the appellants and for better appreciation, the contents of Ex.P.12 is extracted hereunder:



14.1. The evidence of the family members about the demand of
dowry and the harrasment meted out to the deceased in furtherance of the demand of dowry are cogent, clear and without any infirmities and hence this court has no reason to disbelieve their testimony. They are the best persons to speak about the harrasment caused to the deceased. Apart from that, in Ex.P12 deceased herself clearly narrated what all happened to her. Therefore this court finds no reason to discard the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.
4 and the same gains support from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Jagdish v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2015) 2
SCC 252
9. It must be remembered that cruelty and harassment on a married woman and demand of dowry are generally committed within the four walls of residential houses and in secrecy, thereby making it difficult to get direct evidence. That is why the legislature by introducing Section 113-B in the Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution case by enabling the court to raise the presumption if certain basic facts are established and that death has taken place within seven years of marriage. Considering the scope of Section 304-B IPC and presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, due weightage is to be given to the evidence of the father, brother, sister and other relatives of the deceased with regard to the case put forth relating to demand of dowry.
14.2. From Ex.P.12 it is clear that the deceased tolerated all the
torments to a certain level and the appellants continuously demanded dowry. Therefore, Ex.P12 and the evidence of the family members of the deceased clearly show the live link between the harrassment and her death and also show the proximity of harassment to death. Proximate time between the facts of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry and death would depend upon the circumstance of each case as held by the Hon’ble Supreme in the following cases:
In the case of Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab,
reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633
It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept “soon before her death”.
In the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588
“Soon before” is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstance of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period “soon before the occurrence”. There must be in existence a proximate live link between the facts of cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry and the death. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.
In the case of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 108
11. The next important ingredient which needs to be established is the existence of dowry demand “soon before her death”. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that, “soon before” cannot be interpreted to mean “immediately before”, rather the prosecution has to show that there existed a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.
14.3. Matrimonial tolerance on the part of the deceased to
maintain the matrimonial peace for the welfare of the child and to maintain the good relationship cannot be taken in the negative terms so as to say that there was no live link between the cruelty and consequential death of victim which had been emphasized by the Hon’ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207:
“Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the woman.”
14.4. In the complaint dated 20.07.1999 marked as Ex.P.12 there
is categorical narration of harrasment meted out to the deceased in connection with the dowry demand and also the evidence of the family members of the deceased, are sufficient to hold that deceased was subjected to the harassment in connection with dowry demand and hence the presumption under section 113 B of the Evidence Act would operate against the appellants as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sher
Singh v. State of Haryana reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 724:
“… We are aware that the word ‘soon’ finds place in Section 304B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants is established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt.”
15. In this case, no evidence was adduced on the side of the
appellant to rebut the said statutory presumption and also no circumstance was either established by the appellant or brought out by the appellant from the evidence of the prosecution, to rebut the said presumption.
16. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant raises
suspicion relating to the genuineness of the complaint dated 20.07.1999. This Court perused Ex.P.12. Ex.P.12 is entire CD file, containing complaint dated 20.07.1999, receipt given by the police officer in CSR No. 163/99, and closure report. The author of the said Ex.P.12 was examined as P.W.10. P.W.10 clearly deposed about the receipt of the complaint dated 20.07.1999 and enquiry conducted on the basis of the said complaint by registering the said complaint in CSR No. 163/99 and closure of the said complaint. She marked the said entire original file. The Investigating Agency also collected the said document and produced before the Court. The same forms part of the final report. Original also was marked. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the same was concocted and hence this court is not inclined to accept the argument of the Senior Counsel that the contents of the Ex.P.12 are to be looked with suspicion. Initially, accused disputed the genuineness of the complaint dated 20.07.1999 and inland letters sent by the deceased. All were sent to the lab. The expert opinion confirmed the signature of the deceased.
17. In Ex.P3, the deceased narrated the harrasment she had
undergone in the matrimonial home. In Ex.P2, the deceased specifically requested her parents to inform to the police officers and the material contents are as follows:
“mk;kh fle;j 23-12-k; Njjpad;W jpBnud;W vd;Dila Chain NghLtjw;F NjLk; NghJ mijf; fhztpy;iy. mJ vq;F Nghapw;nwd;W njhpatpy;iy. Vw;fdNt ehd; mq;F tUk; NghJ ePq;fs; ,th;fSf;F (Mr.Anbu) tpw;F Nghl;l Chain ,y;iy. ehd; Kd;Ng nrhd;Ndd;. vd;id xd;Wk; ,y;yhky; Mf;FNtd; vd;W Mr.Anbutpw;F vq;fs; khkh> khkpahUk; $Wfpwhh;fs; vd;W. ,g;gb xd;W xd;wha; tUtJ ey;yJ my;y. NkYk; Employment ehd; ,q;F tUk; NghJ ,Ue;jJ. ,g;NghJ fhztpy;iy. ehd; Nfl;ljw;F gjpy; xd;Wk; $wtpy;iy. jpUk;gf; Nfl;lhy; mbg;gJ Nghy; tUfpwhh;fs. Nfhgk; mjpfk;. vdNt> ePq;fs; policeaplk; tpraj;ijf; $wp nkJthf Rk;kh rounds tUtJ Nghy; te;J tpraj;ij mwpe;J Nfl;fl;Lk;. Chain vy;yhtw;iwAk; locker y; itf;f itg;Nghk;. ePq;fs; mk;kh> mg;gh cq;fs; nghWg;gpy; ,Uf;fl;Lk;. ehd;F fhg;Gk; xU Chain k; $l ehd; fOj;jpNyNa vg;NghJk; Nghl;Lf; nfhs;fpNwd;. police aplk; vf;fhuzk; nfhz;Lk; ehd; letter vOjpajhf ,q;F te;J $wf;$lhJ vdW; $wTk;
ghh;j;J tu $wpdhh;fs; vd;W $wl;Lk;.”
18. From the above contents of the letter it is clear that there was a
continuing harrasment relating to the dowry. P.W.1 deposed about the dowry of Rs.50,000/- and gold chain and ring at the time of the betrothal and at the time of the marriage 40 sovereigns. Further, after some demand of dowry they gave further six sovereigns of gold jewel and Rs.12,000/-. They also demanded immovable property, as the second daughter-in-law of the second appellant had brought from her house. P.W.1 also deposed about the earlier occurrence of attempt to murder on the account of the demand of dowry. Finally, the complaint of dowry harassment was preferred on
20.07.1999, and the death happened on 04.02.2000. The said evidence of P.W.1, mother of the deceased corroborated with the evidence of P.W.2 sister of the deceased and P.W.3 nephew of the deceased. They clearly reaffirmed their stand in the cross examination relating to the demand of dowry also. P.W.4/Independent person of the village clearly deposed about the demand of dowry made by the appellants and also about the attempt to murder the deceased earlier to the complaint made on 20.07.1999. Their evidence are clear, concrete and cogent about the demand of dowry and this Court finds no reason to disbelieve their version and doubt over their trustworthiness.
19. That apart in the complaint dated 20.07.1999 the above all
incidents have been disclosed by the deceased and finally she has helplessly pleaded that her family was not in a position to meet out the demand of dowry in the following words:
“vjphpfs; Nfl;Fk; mstpw;F nrhj;Njh gzNkh eifNah nfhLf;Fk; msT trjpAk; vq;fs; tPl;lhhplk; ,y;iy.
vdNt fdk; khpahijf;Fhpa Ma;thsh; mth;fs; ,Jfwpj;J tprhhpj;J rl;lg;gb eltbf;if vLf;f nkj;j gzptd;Gld; Ntz;LfpNwd;.”
20. Therefore, the prosecution has shown circumstances and
evidence to presume the continuous dowry demand made by the appellants which has driven the deceased to self immolate herself along with her child. The deceased not only suffered a lot at the hands of the appellants and also undergone untold pain and committed suicide by setting herself on fire using kerosene.
21. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the said
harassment continued to no end and it is not reasonable on the part of this Court to expect the prosecution to provide material evidence to prove the demand of dowry till the date of the death of the deceased. When the complaint dated 20.09.1999 clearly disclosed the demand of dowry, the ingredients under Section 304(b) of IPC were clearly proven. P.W.1 to P.W.5 also clearly deposed about the demand of dowry. It is true that the landlord of the deceased deposed that they were living peacefully in their house. He could not have had knowledge about the harassment meted out by the deceased within the four walls. To maintain good relationship with the landlord, the deceased would not have disclosed about the harassment meted out to her by the accused inside the four walls. It is true that the Revenue Divisional Officer gave a finding that there was no dowry demand, but before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the complaint/Ex.P12, and other documents were not placed. Apart from that, he categorically admitted in the cross-examination that he did not make any inquiry about the demand for dowry.
22. The submission of the learned Senior counsel is that in the
report of the Revenue Divisional Officer there was no mention of demand of dowry. The said plea can not be accepted. Revenue Divisional Officer’s inquiry is a piece of material, like an inquest. It is a settled principle that the averment in the inquest report is not a material circumstance to disbelieve the evidence of the witnesses. Likewise in this case also RDO’s report will not affect the credibility of witnesses. When the Ex.P12 is proved in accordance with law, the demand of dowry is clearly established.
23. Appellants are Christians and A1 married the daughter of an
evangelist. “Tolerance is the life line of every religion”. Christianity preaches the following:
And the LORD GOD said, “It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him a helper comparable to him.”
An excellent wife is the crown of her husband.
He who finds a wife finds a good thing, And obtains favor from the LORD.
Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church and gave Himself up for it, That He might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word. That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish. So husbands ought to love their own wives as their own bodies; he who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, just as the Lord does the church. For we are members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones. For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife and the two shall become one flesh. This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church. Nevertheless, let each one of you in particular so love his own wife as himself and let the wife see that she respects her husband.
Likewise you husbands, dwell with them with understanding, giving honor to the wife, as to the weaker vessel, and as being heirs together of the grace of life, that your prayers may not be hindered.
24. According to the above version of the Bible, Jesus created
wife since man cannot live alone and obligates certain duties upon the husbands to protect the welfare of the wife and blessed to join with her and made the two bodies become one soul. But the appellant caused intolerable harassment to his better half and has driven her to death along with his innocent child. Therefore, he can not get mercy even from the creator. This court finds no reason to differ from the judgement of the trial court and hence confirms the conviction and sentence without reduction.
25. This Court finds no merit in the contention of the learned
Senior counsel and hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
26. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal stands dismissed on the
following terms:
26.1.The conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judge, Mahila Fast Track Court, Nagercoil vide judgment dated 27.05.2016 in S.C.No.194 of 2002 is hereby confirmed.
26.2.During the pendency of this Criminal Appeal, the second
appellant died. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed as abated in respect of the second appellant .
26.3.Bail bond executed by the appellants shall stand cancelled.
26. 4.The learned trial Judge is hereby directed to take steps to
secure the appellant Nos.1 and 3 and confine them in prison to serve their remaining period of imprisonment.
27. List this case on 15.07.2025 for “reporting compliance”.
15.05.2025
NCC :Yes/No
Index :Yes/No
Internet :Yes/No sbn
To
1.The Fast Track Mahila Court, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari.
2.The Inspector of Police,
Vadasery Police Station,
Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District.
3.The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
4.The Section Officer,
Criminal Section (Records) Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN.J,
sbn
Crl.A.(MD).No.198 of 2016
15.05.2025
