the Criminal Revision Petitions stand dismissed and the impugned order passed by the learned II Additional District Judge (CBI Cases), Madurai, in Crl.MP.No.252 of 2025 and Crl.MP.No.2 of 2026 in C.C.No.7 of 2025 dated 23.03.2026, is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. [N.A.V.,J.] & [K.K.R.K.,J.]

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved on : 15.06.2026
Pronounced on : 24.06.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.ANAND VENKATESH and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN
Crl.RC.(MD).Nos.736 & 737 of 2026 and
C.M.P.(MD).Nos.8790 & 8791 of 2026
P.Arunraja … Petitioner / Accused No.3 (In Crl.RC.(MD).No.736 of 2026)
P.Krishnamoorthy … Petitioner / Accused No.2
(In Crl.RC.(MD).No.737 of 2026) Vs.
The Assistant Director,
Directorate of Enforcement,
Chennai Zone-II, 3rd Floor, Tower-II, BSNL Administrative Building,
Greams Road, Chennai-600 006.
… 4th Respondent / 1st Respondent
(In both Petitions)
COMMON PRAYER:- Criminal Revision Cases are filed under Section 438 r/w 442 of BNSS, 2023, to call for the records relating to the proceedings in Crl.MP.No.252 of 2025 and Crl.MP.No.2 of 2026 in C.C.No.7 of 2025 dated 23.03.2026 on the file of he learned II Additional District Judge (CBI Cases), Madurai, set aside the impugned order.
(In both Petitions)
For Petitioner : Mr.Vaibhav R.Venkatesh
for M/s.Sri Law Associates
For Respondent : Mr.P.Siddharthan
Special Public Prosecutor
COMMON ORDER
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN.J,)
These petitions have been filed by the petitioners to set aside the impugned proceedings in Crl.MP.No.252 of 2025 and Crl.MP.No.2 of 2026 in C.C.No.7 of 2025 dated 23.03.2026 on the file of the learned II Additional District Judge (CBI Cases), Madurai.
2. Facts of the case :
2.1. The Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR No. ECIR/EJZO/26/2019 dated 10.12.2019 and, upon completion of investigation, filed a complaint before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, designated as the Special Court under Section 43(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the PMLA”), alleging commission of offences under Section 3 read with Section 70, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, against the petitioners.
2.2. According to the complaint, the petitioners were lessees of certain survey fields for the purpose of quarrying granite in various villages. However, during the course of investigation, it was alleged that they had indulged in illegal quarrying beyond the leased area, fabricated records, illegally transported and dealt with the quarried minerals, caused wrongful loss to the Government, damaged public properties, and amassed substantial unlawful gains. Based on the said allegations, several criminal cases came to be registered, namely Crime No.618 of 2012 on the file of Melur Police Station, Crime No.120 of 2012 on the file of Keelavalavu Police Station, Crime No.141 of 2013 on the file of Vikramangalam Police Station, and Crime No.20 of 2015 on the file of the District Crime Branch, Madurai.
2.3. The investigations in the aforesaid scheduled offences culminated in the filing of final reports, which are presently pending in P.R.C. No.10 of 2017, P.R.C. No.32 of 2017, Special C.C. No.35 of 2021 and P.R.C. No.48 of 2021 before the competent criminal courts. The Directorate of Enforcement, on the basis of the materials collected during its investigation, formed an opinion that the proceeds generated from the scheduled offences had been projected and utilised as untainted money through acquisition of several immovable properties worth several crores of rupees. Consequently, after completing the investigation under the PMLA, the Directorate filed a complaint, which has been taken on file as Special C.C. No.7 of 2025 on the file of the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases (Special Court under the PMLA),
Madurai.
2.4. Pending trial, the petitioners filed an application seeking discharge.The learned Special Judge dismissed the discharge petition. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred the present Criminal Revision Case.
3. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners:
3.1. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that several substantial grounds had been raised before the learned Trial Judge seeking discharge. However, the learned Judge dismissed the petition by citing only brief reasons without independently considering and adjudicating each of the contentions advanced by the petitioners. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the impugned order is a non-speaking order and shows now application of mind and suffers from violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further contended that, in the absence of proper reasons, this Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, is deprived of the opportunity to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the Trial Court. Therefore, it is prayed that the matter be remanded to the learned Special Judge for fresh consideration of all the grounds urged by the petitioners.
3.2. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that one of the principal grounds urged before the Trial Court was that no scheduled offence survives in view of the subsequent reports of the Committees constituted by the Government for assessment of the alleged illegal mining and the consequential report dated 31.12.2021. According to him, in the absence of a sustainable scheduled offence, the very foundation of the prosecution under the PMLA crumbles. It is, therefore, contended that the learned Trial Judge ought to have considered these aspects while deciding the discharge petition and his failure to do so vitiates the impugned order.
4. Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent:
4.1. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the Directorate of Enforcement submitted that once cognizance has been taken for the offences under the PMLA, the statutory presumptions available under the Act becomes operative. Whether the properties constitute proceeds of crime, whether the accused had independent lawful sources of income, and whether the prosecution has established the offence of money laundering are all matters requiring appreciation of evidence during trial. Such disputed questions cannot be adjudicated at the stage of discharge.
4.2. It is further contended that the validity or otherwise of the prosecution in the scheduled offences cannot be conclusively examined by the Special Court while considering an application for discharge under the PMLA proceedings, so long as the scheduled offence continues to subsist in the manner known to law. The learned Trial Judge has, therefore, rightly confined himself to examining whether a prima facie case exists under the provisions of the PMLA.
4.3. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that the various defences raised by the petitioners touching upon the correctness of the scheduled offences, the assessment reports, and the alleged absence of proceeds of crime are all matters to be established during the course of trial by adducing evidence. They cannot constitute valid grounds for discharge at the threshold.
4.4. Upon perusal of the materials placed before the Court, the learned Trial Judge has recorded a finding that sufficient materials are available to frame charges against the petitioners for the offences alleged under the PMLA. Therefore, according to the respondent, the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It is, accordingly, prayed that the Criminal Revision
Case be dismissed.
5. This Court carefully considered the rival submissions and perused theentire materials available on record.
6.Discussion:
6.1. The present revision is a classic illustration of an attempt to misuse the process of law by inviting the Special Court constituted under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) to adjudicate upon issues which lie exclusively within the domain of another Court dealing with the scheduled (predicate) offences. A recent trend has emerged in several PMLA prosecutions wherein accused persons file discharge petitions or petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. questioning the legality or sustainability of the predicate offence before the PMLA Court, overlooking the statutory scheme and object of the Act.
6.2. The PMLA is a special legislation enacted to prevent money laundering and to confiscate property derived from or involved in money laundering. The offence under Section 3 is directed not merely against the commission of the scheduled offence but against every process or activity connected with the “proceeds of crime”, including its concealment, possession, acquisition, use, projection or claiming of such proceeds as untainted property.
6.3. Section 3 of the Act specifically provides that whoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge, knowingly assists, knowingly is a party to, or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime commits the offence of money laundering. The essence of the offence is the projection or use of tainted money as untainted money.
6.4. In the present case, the allegation is that huge proceeds were generated through illegal granite mining constituting the scheduled offences and that such proceeds were utilised for acquisition of immovable properties described in the complaint, thereby projecting the proceeds of crime as legitimate assets. Such allegations, if accepted at their face value, clearly constitute the ingredients of Section 3 of the PMLA.
6.5. Further, Sections 23 and 24 of the PMLA introduce statutory presumptions and place a reverse burden upon the accused in respect of interconnected transactions and the legitimacy of the assets. At the stage of framing of charge or consideration of a discharge petition, the Court is not expected to adjudicate whether the accused has satisfactorily discharged such burden. Those are matters which are to be left in the hands of the trial Judge.
6.6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India reported in (2022) 10 SCC 386, has authoritatively held that the offence under Section 3 is an independent offence relating to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and that the burden contemplated under Sections 23 and 24 is a statutory feature of the enactment. The Supreme Court further recognised the validity of the reverse burden provisions incorporated under the Act.
6.7. Likewise, in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement reported in (2020) 13 SCC 791, the Supreme Court observed that economic offences constitute a distinct class and stand on a different footing considering their serious impact upon the nation’s economy. Courts must therefore exercise caution before interfering at the threshold of prosecution.
6.8. Again, in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709, the Supreme Court reiterated that while considering discharge, the Court is only required to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists and cannot conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudicate upon probable defences.
6.9. In the case of Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in
(1979) 3 SCC 4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchndra Patel vs The State Of Gujarat (2019) 16 SCC 547, State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768 , Sajjan Kumar vs C.B.I (2010)9 SCC 368. held that at the stage of framing charge or deciding a discharge application, the Court is only required to determine whether the materials disclose a strong suspicion of commission of the offence and not whether the prosecution case is likely to end in conviction.
6.10. In spite of the above settled legal position, the petitioner has drafted several pages of grounds in the discharge petition questioning the correctness of the scheduled offence, the investigation conducted therein and the alleged absence of illegal mining. Such grounds are wholly misconceived. The Special Court under the PMLA cannot assume the jurisdiction of the Court trying the scheduled offence and adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of the prosecution launched therein.
6.11. The submission of the learned counsel that the trial Court ought to have separately answered each of those grounds is equally misconceived. A judicial order is not liable to be set aside merely because every contention has not been individually addressed. Where the Court has correctly identified the determinative issue and applied the relevant statutory provisions, the order cannot be faulted merely on the ground of brevity. The learned Special Judge rightly confined the enquiry to the scope permissible under the PMLA and found that the complaint and accompanying materials disclosed a prima facie case.
6.12. It requires emphasis that a discharge petition under the PMLA cannot be maintained solely on the ground that the scheduled offence is allegedly false or unsustainable when such proceedings are still pending before the competent Court. Unless the accused obtains a final judicial determination resulting in acquittal, discharge or quashing of the scheduled offence in accordance with law, the Special Court under the PMLA cannot foray into the legality of the predicate offence.
6.13.1. More importantly, the petitioner has suppressed a material development. This revision was presented before the Trial Court on 16.04.2026. However, prior thereto, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with proceedings arising out of the very same illegal mining allegations, had observed that prima facie materials existed against the petitioner warranting continuation of the prosecution.
“IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 495 /2026 [SLP [CRL.] NO.153/2824]
THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, DISTRICT CRIME BRANCH
The Inspector of Police,
District Crime Branch Appellant(s)
VERSUS
P PERIYASAMY & ORS. Respondent(s)
ORDER
Leave granted.
We have heard the learned AAG appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
We have also perused the impugned order passed by the High Court.
The respondent(s) were chargesheeted for the offences punishable under
Sections 304-Part II, 379, 428, 439, 434, 447, 465, 467, 468 and 471 read with
Sections 109, 114, 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for short, the ‘IPC’),
Sections 3(i), (ii) and 4 of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and
Loss) Act, 1992 (for short, the ‘TNPPDL Act’), Section 6 read with Sections
3(a), 4(a) of Explosive Substances Act, 1998 read with Section 120-B of the IPC and Section 3(1) of the TNPPDL Act read with Sections 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3) and 21(b)(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. By the impugned order, the High Court was pleased to quash the criminal proceedings qua the respondents on the premise that they cannot be held responsible for the illegal mining on the land as the Land has been subsequently sold by them. The charge against the respondent(s) is that, from the year 2003 onwards, which is when the original lease had been granted to them, illegal mining of granite has been carried out by them over and above the permissible quantity on the leased land and also by encroaching into the adjacent Government land which was not even leased out to them. This aspect has not been gone into by the High Court.
We are not concerned with the sale made by the respondent(s) in favour of the other accused. We are only concerned with the question of illegal mining and the effect of it.
In such view of the matter, we are not in a position to sustain the impugned order by the High Court and the same is set aside. Thus, the criminal proceedings qua the respondents stand restored.
All issues are left open to the Trial Court to be decided without being influenced by the observations made in the impugned order which are only prima facie in nature.
The appeal stands allowed, accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………..J,
[M.M.SUNDRESH]
……………………………..J,
[NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 29, 2026.”
6.13.2. In spite of specific finding and direction by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to proceed the trial relating to the illegal mining (predicate offence), he continued to file discharge petitions and raise ground before this Court that there is no predicate offence made out. Despite such order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no disclosure was made before this Court. Such suppression of a relevant judicial order disentitles the petitioner from seeking any
discretionary relief.
6.14. In view of the prima facie findings recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the illegal mining allegations, coupled with the materials collected by the Directorate of Enforcement tracing the proceeds of crime into acquisition of properties, sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against the petitioner under the PMLA.
6.15. The remaining contentions regarding the absence of proceeds of crime, the existence of independent sources of income, the legitimacy of the acquisitions, and the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish the scheduled offence are all matters of defence. These issues require appreciation of evidence and can be adjudicated only during the course of trial. They do not furnish valid grounds for discharge.
6.16. This Court has also noticed that in several PMLA prosecutions, discharge petitions and quash petitions are routinely filed raising identical grounds that the predicate offence is not made out and, therefore, the PMLA proceedings should automatically fail. Such an approach ignores the statutory framework of the Act and unnecessarily delays the trial.
6.17. As explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the offence of money laundering is concerned with the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. At the stage of framing charge, the Special Court is only required to ascertain whether the complaint and accompanying materials disclose the essential ingredients of the offence. A detailed adjudication regarding the merits of the scheduled offence or the defence of the accused is wholly impermissible.
7.Conclusion:
The learned Special Judge has, therefore, correctly confined himself to the legally relevant issues, found the existence of abundant prima facie materials for framing charges, and dismissed the discharge petitions. This Court finds no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction.
8. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Petitions stand dismissed and the impugned order passed by the learned II Additional District Judge (CBI Cases), Madurai, in Crl.MP.No.252 of 2025 and Crl.MP.No.2 of 2026 in C.C.No.7 of 2025 dated 23.03.2026, is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
[N.A.V.,J.] & [K.K.R.K.,J.]
24.06.2026
NCC :Yes/No
Index :Yes/No Internet:Yes/No dss
To
1.The Assistant Director,
Directorate of Enforcement,
Chennai Zone-II, 3rd Floor, Tower-II, BSNL Administrative Building, Greams Road, Chennai-600 006.
2.The Section Officer,
VR Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. N.ANAND VENKATESH,J. and K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN,J.
dss
Order made in
Crl.RC.(MD).Nos.736 & 737 o 2026 and C.M.P.(MD).Nos.8790 & 8791 of 2026 Dated: 24.06.2026