https://frontline.thehindu.com/news/supreme-court-presidential-reference-governor-federalism/article70333764.ece [01/12, 19:29] Sekarreporter: “Leading the Debate Since 1984 Packages HOME NEWS NEWS ANALYSIS DIGITAL EXCLUSIVE An ‘opinion’ that strains India’s fragile federal balance The apex court’s opinion hands the Centre fresh leverage, leaves States uneasy, and turns an already messy row over gubernatorial power even murkier. Published : Dec 01, 2025 14:30 IST – 17 MINS READ RICHARDSON WILSON

[01/12, 19:29] Sekarreporter: https://frontline.thehindu.com/news/supreme-court-presidential-reference-governor-federalism/article70333764.ece
[01/12, 19:29] Sekarreporter: “Leading the Debate Since 1984
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An ‘opinion’ that strains India’s fragile federal balance
The apex court’s opinion hands the Centre fresh leverage, leaves States uneasy, and turns an already messy row over gubernatorial power even murkier.
Published : Dec 01, 2025 14:30 IST – 17 MINS READ

RICHARDSON WILSON
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The Supreme Court, where two contrasting views on gubernatorial powers, first rebuking delay in Bill assent, then softening judicial scrutiny—have reignited debate over federalism and constitutional accountability. | Photo Credit: Arnav Pratap Singh/Getty Images

On April 8, the Supreme Court pronounced a landmark judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu case. Widely hailed as a watershed moment in India’s Union-States relationship, the judgment was a forceful and much needed reiteration of the federal nature of our polity and the role of Governors. It came in the backdrop of Union-appointed Governors obstructing democratically elected governments in West Bengal, Kerala, and Punjab—all States governed by parties that are in opposition to the BJP-led NDA alliance. Rather than carrying out their constitutional duties, these Governors were acting as political opponents of the elected State governments, questioning policies, criticising leaders, and obstructing the passage of Bills.

The Union government’s reaction to the judgment was to seek a Presidential Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution, effectively questioning the correctness of the original judgment. On November 20, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court answered the reference through an opinion that was diametrically opposite to the court’s ruling in the Tamil Nadu Governor case and previous cases dealing with powers of the Governor.

Also Read | Editor’s Note

The opinion has given rise to several questions in the minds of citizens and leaders alike: does it overrule the previous judgment? Is it now the law of the land? What is the role of governors after this judgment? Have the scales of power tipped in favour of the Union? What is the future of federalism in India? Before I unpack all of that, a more fundamental question needs to be answered:

Why do we have a Governor?

In 1857, when Indians waged the first war of Independence, the British monarch Queen Victoria responded with the proclamation of 1858, which dropped all pretexts of the British being just traders via the East India Company and formally announced India as being part of the British Empire. The British Parliament enacted the Government of India Act, 1858, vesting India’s administration with a Governor General.

The 1858 Act provided for the British monarch to appoint Governors to administer the presidencies in India, who would report to the Governor General. And, after the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, Britain enacted the Government of India Act, 1919, introducing a diarchy system of government. Under this, there was more “Indian participation” at the provincial level, and legislative councils, comprising elected and nominated members were created. But the Governor administered the provinces with a Council of Ministers appointed by him and who held office at his “pleasure”. The 1919 Act conferred on the Governor ultimate legislative and executive powers, whereby he/she could overrule the will of the elected legislature.

In 1927, the Simon Commission was sent to review the working of the Indian government. Acting on its recommendations, the Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted which, for the first time, contemplated some degree of self-governance at the provincial levels through provincial legislatures. However, the Council of Ministers still served at the absolute pleasure of the Governor, who continued as the head of the government with all discretionary powers in legislative and executive matters vested with him.

When a Bill was passed by the provincial legislature and presented to the Governor for assent under Section 75 of the 1935 Act, the Governor had