26.Registry is directed to comply with the orders of the Full Bench of this Court in Arul Daniel’s case (supra), and shall not number any petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS to quash the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the D.V. Act or any order passed under D.V. Act which has not reached the stage of taking cognizance under Sections 31 and 32 of the D.V. Act. 23.09.2025 mkn Internet : Yes Index : Yes / No Speaking order : Yes / No Neutral Citation : Yes / No To 1.The District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Pallipattu. 2.The Registrar General, High Court, Madras. N. SATHISH KUMAR, J. mkn Crl.O.P.SR.No.49341 of 2025 23.09.2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 23.09.2025
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. SATHISH KUMAR
Crl.O.P.SR.No.49341 of 2025
1.S.Dhanalakshmi
2.N.S.Karthick
3.Rupavathi … Petitioners
Vs.
S.Vennila … Respondent
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceedings in D.V.Case No.1 of 2025 pending on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate at Pallipattu as against the petitioners.
For Petitioners : Mr.L.Thiyagaiya
O R D E R
The petitioners seek to quash the complaint filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “D.V. Act” for brevity), in D.V.Case No.1 of 2025, pending on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate at Pallipattu, as against the petitioners, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2.Since the Full Bench of this Court, in Arul Daniel v. Suganya reported in (2022) SCC OnLine Mad 5435, has categorically held that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging a proceeding under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is not maintainable, the Registry has entertained a doubt as to the maintainability of this Criminal Original Petition.
3.Therefore, the matter is listed before this Court under the caption
“for maintainability”.
4.Brief background of the case is as follows :
The respondent/complainant got married to one N.S.Kiran Kumar on 21.10.2018 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. It is the case of the respondent/wife that her husband had illicit relationship with another lady and he exerted tort, assault and inhuman activities on the respondent/wife without even providing her with basic amenities like shelter, food and clothes and used to abuse her in a filthy language. When the respondent/wife questioned the same, her husband as well as her in-laws did not lend their ears to the respondent and they further demanded a dowry of Rs.5,00,000/-. Therefore, the petitioner filed the present complaint in D.V.Case No.1 of 2025 as against her husband and in-laws under Section 12 of the D.V. Act before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Pallipattu, seeking protection order, residence order, compensation order and other reliefs. The petitioners, who are the mother-in-law, brother-in-law and his wife, have filed the present Criminal Original Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashment of the said complaint filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
5.Learned counsel for the petitioners would mainly submit that, in view of the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1158, a complaint filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act can be challenged before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and the same is maintainable.
6.I have perused the entire judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Shaurabh Kumar’s case (supra).
7.The facts in Shaurabh Kumar’s case (supra) are that the wife had lodged an FIR in Crime No.3 of 2022 against her husband and her relatives under Sections 498-A, 504, 506 r/w. 34 IPC, alleging demand of dowry. Besides, she has also lodged a complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act before the Magistrate, alleging that her husband would beat her and throw her out of the house while they were abroad. The husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law have filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint filed by the wife under Section 12 of the D.V.
Act. However, the High Court dismissed the quash petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., holding that the proceedings under Section 12 of the
D.V. Act are purely civil in nature. Aggrieved by which, the brother-in-law
(Shaurabh Kumar) has preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein, it was contended that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as against the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is maintainable and such proceedings can be quashed to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Para No.28(1) of its judgment, has held that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of
Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter-V of the Domestic Violence Act, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the D.V. Act are predominantly of a civil nature. On the other hand, in Para No.29, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an application under Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of D.V. Act is completely different from a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C./Section 223 BNSS. The Apex Court has also held in Para No.30.1 that the word “Court” referred to in Section 482 Cr.P.C. is obviously a Criminal Court within the meaning of Section 6 of Cr.P.C., which includes a Court of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate. The Apex Court also held that an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act seeking the reliefs under the Act have to be made before the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class as per Section 27 of the D.V. Act, which comes under the meaning of Criminal Court as under Section 6 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the Apex Court ultimately held that the orders of such Magistrate is amenable to the jurisdiction of High Court under the second limb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
i.e., to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice.
8.It is relevant to note that an earlier judgment of the co-ordinate
Bench of the Apex Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan reported in
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 446 was not brought to the notice of the Apex Court. In Kamatchi’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has approved the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Dr.P.Pathmanathan v. V.Monica reported in (2021) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 311. The learned Single Judge of this Court, in Dr.P.Pathmanathan’s case (supra), considering the very object of the D.V. Act and considering the Rules provided under the said Act, held that the application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act was not akin to the complaint under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C.; therefore, the learned Magistrate inquiring into an application filed under the D.V. Act cannot issue a summon under Section 61 Cr.P.C., but was required to issue a notice as set out in Form-VII of the Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. On this basis, it was concluded by the learned Single Judge that, in an application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the learned Magistrate was not required to issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C.; consequently, it was held that there was no bar for the persons aggrieved by the notice to approach the learned Magistrate and raise all defenses, including the issue of maintainability, etc. It was also held that aggrieved persons also have a remedy by way of an appeal under Section 29 of the D.V. Act. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge has held that the Magistrate exercising power under the D.V. Act under Chapter-IV is not a Criminal Court and therefore, a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable, however, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is maintainable. The entire view of the learned Single Judge of this Court has been approved by the Apex Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (supra).
9.Later, another learned Single Judge of this Court, while dealing with the maintainability of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as against the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act., in Crl.O.P.SR.Nos.31852 of 2022, etc. batch, by order dated 12.08.2022, referred the matter to the Full Bench for authoritative pronouncement. On such reference, a Full Bench was constituted by this Court and the Full Bench, in Arul Daniel v. Suganya reported in (2022) SCC OnLine Mad 5435, has answered the issue as follows :
“86.We now summarise our conclusions to the questions set out in paragraph 1 of this opinion:
a A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging a proceeding under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is not maintainable. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable on a limited ground of patent lack of jurisdiction, as indicated in paragraphs 40 and 41, supra.
b Except on the limited ground indicated, supra, jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution will not be exercised, as a measure of self-imposed restriction, by-passing the statutory remedies under the D.V. Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai, supra.
c In the light of the aforesaid conclusions, we uphold the decision of N. Anand Venkatesh, J. in Pathmanathan, supra, including the directions set out, in paragraph 52 in their entirety, though, in our view, the reference to Section 483 Cr.P.C. therein, may not be appropriate. The decision of the Division Bench in P. Ganesan, supra, to the extent that it is contrary to this opinion, shall stand overruled. Ex consequenti, the decisions of learned single judges in S. Gowrishankar, supra, Sathiyaseelan, supra, G. Jayakumar, supra, Mohana Seshathri, supra, and other cases following or adopting the line of reasoning therein, shall stand overruled, to the extent that they are contrary to the view taken herein.
d As a sequitur to the above, it must necessarily follow that the petitions in this batch are not maintainable. We, therefore, see no useful purpose in remitting the matter to the learned single judge to perform the obsequies. Accordingly, exercising power under Order I Rule 7 of the Appellate Side Rules, we hold that all the petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall stand dismissed at the SR stage itself, preserving all the rights and contentions of the parties and granting liberty to move the Magistrate to agitate their grievances, which shall be considered in consonance with the directions set out in paragraph 52 of the decision in Pathmanathan, supra.”
10.The Full Bench of this Court has also approved the view of the learned Single Judge in Dr.P.Pathmanathan’s case (supra). It is pertinent to note that the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court has been followed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nitash Gupta v. Anshita
Vig reported in (2024) SCC OnLine P&H 2524. Similarly, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Daya v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) SCC OnLine Bom 1118 has also followed the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court. Similarly, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Mohd. Yasin Khan v. Nazia Iqbal reported in (2024) SCC OnLine J&K 973 has also followed the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court.
11.Unfortunately, the above judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Arul Daniel’s case (supra) was also not brought to the notice of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court while passing the judgment in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi’s case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioners herein.
12.It is relevant to note that, though the Apex Court, in Shaurabh
Kumar Tripathi’s case (supra), has considered the scope of Section 6 of Cr.P.C. and Section 27 of the D.V. Act, the fact remains that the earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamatchi’s case (supra) has not been brought to the notice of the Apex Court which dealt with the same
issue.
13.It is further to be noted that a four Judges Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Dargah Committee v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1962 SC 574, held that the Magistrate authorised to decide tax demands, which are civil reliefs, is not an inferior Criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention that the Magistrate is a Criminal Court and thus amenable to challenge under Section 482 Cr.P.C. dehors the nature of the relief sought, was expressly rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its judgment in Dargah Committee’s case (supra), has held as follows :
“6.Now looking at Section 234 it is clear that the proceedings initiated before a Magistrate are no more than recovery proceedings. All questions which may legitimately be raised against the validity of the notice served under Section 153 or against the validity of the claim made by the Committee under Section 222 can and ought to be raised in an appeal under Section 93(1), and if no appeal is preferred or an appeal is preferred and is dismissed then all those points are concluded and can no more be raised in proceeding under Section 234. That is why the nature of the enquiry contemplated by Section 234 is very limited and it prime facie partakes of the character of a ministerial enquiry rather than judicial enquiry. In any event it is difficult to hold that the Magistrate who entertains the application is an inferior criminal court. The claim made before him is for the recovery of a tax and the order prayed for is for the recovery of the tax by distress and sale of the movable property of the defaulter. If at all, this would at best be a proceeding of a civil nature and not criminal.”
(emphasis supplied)
14.In the same judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, further referring to the judgment in Crown through Municipal Committee, Ajmer
v. Amba Lal [Ajmer-Merwara Law Journal, Vol.V, p.92], wherein, the Judicial Commissioner Mr.Norman held that a Magistrate entertaining an application under Section 234 of the Regulation is an inferior criminal court, has held that “the only reason given in support of this view appears to be that the Magistrate before whom an application under the said section is made is appointed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and so he is a criminal court although he is not dealing with crime. That is why it was held that he had jurisdiction to decide whether the conditions under which the Municipality can resort to the Magistrate are fulfilled. Having come to this conclusion the learned Judicial Commissioner held that a revision against the Magistrate’s order was competent. In our opinion this decision does not correctly represent the true legal position with regard to the character of the proceedings under Section 234 and the status of the
Magistrate who entertains them.”
15.Ultimately, the four Judges Bench of the Apex Court, in Dargah Committee’s case (supra), held that the Magistrates hearing tax recovery cases, which are civil reliefs, are not inferior Criminal Courts within the meaning of Cr.P.C.
16.Further, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas reported in (1965) 57 ITR 149, has explained the expressions “civil proceedings” and “criminal proceedings”. The expression “civil proceedings” was explained as “The expression in our judgment covers all proceedings in which a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil law or by statute, and claims relief for breach thereof.” The term “criminal proceedings” was explained as “A criminal proceeding on the other hand is ordinarily one in which if carried to its conclusion it may result in the imposition of sentences such as death, imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of property. It also includes proceedings in which in the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of the peace, orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and order, or orders aimed at preventing vagrancy are contemplated to be passed.” Thereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “the character of the proceeding, in our judgment, depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed.”
17.Unfortunately, the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dargah Committee’s case (supra) and S.A.L. Narayan Row’s case (supra) have not been brought to the notice of the Apex Court while deciding the Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi’s case (supra).
18.Further, it is also to be noted that, though the D.V. Act provides various reliefs under Chapter-IV, viz., Protection Orders under Section 18, Residence Orders under Section 19, Monetary Reliefs under Section 20,
Custody Orders under Section 21, and Compensation Orders under Section 22, the breach of a Protection Order or an interim Protection Order alone is made cognizable under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. Only when the Court takes cognizance, the very Code of Criminal Procedure will come into play. Against such cases alone, a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable before the High Court, not against every other order passed. As against every other order passed under the provisions of Chapter-IV, an alternative remedy of appeal is provided under Section 29 of the D.V. Act
itself.
19.In Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi reported in (2022) 8 SCC 90, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the D.V. Act is a piece of civil code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship.
20.Similarly, in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma reported in (2013) 15 SCC 755, the Apex Court has held that the D.V. Act has been enacted so as to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women in relationships, which are in the nature of marriage.
21.In another judgment in Kunapareddy v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari reported in (2016) 11 SCC 774, the Apex Court has held that “the purpose of enacting the law was to provide a remedy in the civil law for the protection of women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society. It is for this reason, that the scheme of the Act provides that in the first instance, the order that would be passed by the Magistrate, on a complaint by the aggrieved person, would be of a civil nature and if the said order is violated, it assumes the character of criminality.”
22.Therefore, the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also make it very clear that the reliefs granted under Chapter-IV of the D.V. Act remain civil in nature and do not partake the character of criminal proceedings till such proceedings culminate into proceedings under Section 31 of the D.V. Act. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.A.L. Narayan Row’s case (supra), has also categorically differentiated civil and criminal proceedings and has clearly held that the character of the proceeding does not depend upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed.
23.Therefore, this Court is of the view that the earlier judgments of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.A.L. Narayan Row’s case (supra) and the judgment of the four Judges Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dargah Committee’s case (supra) are the binding precedents, particularly when those judgments as well as the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Arul Daniel’s case (supra) have not been brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi’s case (supra).
24.In such view of the matter, this Court is of the view that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS to quash the proceedings under Chapter-IV of D.V. Act, which has not assumed the character of criminality under Section 31 or has not reached the stage of taking cognizance under Section 32 of the D.V. Act, is not amenable for challenge under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as held by the Full Bench of this Court in Arul Daniel’s case (supra).
25.Accordingly, this Court holds that this Criminal Original Petition is not maintainable and therefore, the same is dismissed at SR
stage itself.
26.Registry is directed to comply with the orders of the Full Bench of this Court in Arul Daniel’s case (supra), and shall not number any petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS to quash the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the D.V. Act or any order passed under D.V. Act which has not reached the stage of taking cognizance under Sections 31 and 32 of the D.V. Act.
23.09.2025
mkn
Internet : Yes
Index : Yes / No
Speaking order : Yes / No
Neutral Citation : Yes / No
To
1.The District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Pallipattu.
2.The Registrar General, High Court, Madras.
N. SATHISH KUMAR, J. mkn
Crl.O.P.SR.No.49341 of 2025
23.09.2025