. கவர்னர் வழக்கில் தமிழக அரசு சார்பாக மூத்த வக்கீல் பி.வில்சன் எழுதிய எழுத்துப்பூர்வ வாதம் தாக்கல் 1490-1596 .

வகைப்படுத்தப்படாதது
IA193920/2025 இல் தமிழ்நாடு மாநிலத்திற்கான எஸ்.ஆர். அட்வகேட் பி. வில்சன் எழுதிய எழுத்துப்பூர்வ சமர்ப்பிப்பு.
சேகர் ரிப்போர்ட்டர் · செப்டம்பர் 10, 2025

மாண்புமிகு இந்திய உச்ச நீதிமன்றத்தில்

ஆலோசனை அதிகார வரம்பு

2025 ஆம் ஆண்டின் சிறப்பு குறிப்பு எண். 1

இந்த விஷயத்தில்:

மறுமொழி: பில்களை வழங்குதல், நிறுத்தி வைத்தல் அல்லது முன்பதிவு செய்தல்

இந்திய ஆளுநர் மற்றும் ஜனாதிபதியால்

சார்பாக எழுதப்பட்ட சமர்ப்பிப்புகள்

குறிப்பை எதிர்க்கும் மாநிலங்கள்/கட்சிகள்

காகிதப் புத்தகம்

[குறியீட்டிற்கு உள்ளே பார்க்கவும்]

தொகுதி-II.14 பக்கங்கள் (1488-1596)

மிஷா ரோஹத்கி மோஹ்தா & அமன் மேத்தா

நோடல் ஆலோசனைகள்

குறியீடு

தொகுதி-II.14

இலங்கை. இல்லை.

குறிப்பிட்டவை

பக்கம் எண்.

1.

குறியீட்டு தொகுதி-II.14

1488-1489

2.

IA193920/2025 இல் தமிழ்நாடு மாநிலத்திற்காகவும் தலையீட்டாளராகவும் சர். அட்வகேட் பி. வில்சன் எழுதிய எழுத்துப்பூர்வ சமர்ப்பிப்பு. 1490-1596 .

குறியீடு

வரிசை எண்

விளக்கம்

பக்கம் எண்

ஏ.

எழுத்துப்பூர்வ சமர்ப்பிப்புக்கான திறவுகோல்

1

பி.

ஜனாதிபதியின் அறிக்கையில் எழுப்பப்பட்ட கேள்விகளுக்கான பதில்கள்

11

கேள்வி 4: இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் பிரிவு 361, இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் பிரிவு 200 இன் கீழ் ஆளுநரின் நடவடிக்கைகள் தொடர்பாக நீதித்துறை மறுஆய்வுக்கு முழுமையான தடையா?

கேள்வி 3: இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் பிரிவு 200-ன் கீழ் ஆளுநர் அரசியலமைப்பு விருப்புரிமையைப் பயன்படுத்துவது நியாயமானதா?

கேள்வி 6: இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் பிரிவு 201 இன் கீழ் ஜனாதிபதி அரசியலமைப்பு விருப்புரிமையைப் பயன்படுத்துவது நியாயமானதா?

11

(I) சட்டமன்ற நடைமுறை – அரசியலமைப்பால் பரிந்துரைக்கப்பட்டதா இல்லையா என்பதை எப்போதும் இதன் மூலம் பார்க்கலாம்

நீதிமன்றம்

11

(II) ஆளுநருக்குக் கிடைக்கும் விலக்குரிமை – இந்த நீதிமன்றத்தால் தொடர்ந்து நடத்தப்படும் நடவடிக்கைகளின் செல்லுபடியை ஆராய நீதிமன்றத்தின் அதிகாரத்தைப் பறிக்காது.

13

கேள்வி 1: இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் 200வது பிரிவின் கீழ் ஒரு மசோதா ஆளுநருக்கு சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படும்போது அவருக்கு இருக்கும் அரசியலமைப்பு விருப்பங்கள் என்ன?

கேள்வி 2: இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் பிரிவு 200-ன் கீழ் ஒரு மசோதாவை தாக்கல் செய்யும்போது, ​​அமைச்சர்கள் குழு வழங்கும் உதவி மற்றும் ஆலோசனைகளுக்கு ஆளுநர் கட்டுப்படுகிறாரா?

17

( I ) ஆளுநருக்கு வழங்கப்பட்ட அதிகார வரம்பு – வடிவமைப்பாளர்கள்

அரசியலமைப்பு

17

(II) பிரிவு 200 – அரசியலமைப்பை வடிவமைத்தல் மற்றும் நோக்கம்

அரசியலமைப்புச் சட்டத்தை உருவாக்கியவர்கள்

22 எபிசோடுகள் (1)

கேள்வி 5: அரசியலமைப்பு ரீதியாக நிர்ணயிக்கப்பட்ட கால அவகாசமும், ஆளுநரால் அதிகாரங்களைப் பயன்படுத்தும் முறையும் இல்லாத நிலையில், இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் 200வது பிரிவின் கீழ் உள்ள அனைத்து அதிகாரங்களையும் ஆளுநரால் பயன்படுத்துவதற்கு நீதிமன்ற உத்தரவுகள் மூலம் காலக்கெடுவை விதிக்க முடியுமா?

கேள்வி 7: அரசியலமைப்பு ரீதியாக நிர்ணயிக்கப்பட்ட காலக்கெடு மற்றும் ஜனாதிபதி அதிகாரங்களைப் பயன்படுத்தும் முறை இல்லாத நிலையில், இந்திய அரசியலமைப்பின் 201 வது பிரிவின் கீழ் ஜனாதிபதியின் விருப்புரிமையைப் பயன்படுத்துவதற்கு நீதிமன்ற உத்தரவுகள் மூலம் காலக்கெடுவை விதிக்க முடியுமா மற்றும் பயன்படுத்தும் முறையை பரிந்துரைக்க முடியுமா?

37 தமிழ்

(நான்)

Demarcation Of Power between Union and State – As explained by Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar

37

( II )

Time Taken by Governor with respect to the Bills Deemed to have Been given Assent by this Hon’ble

Court

40

( III )

Time Taken by Hon’ble President and Governor – The Tamil Nadu Admission to Undergraduate Medical

Degree Courses Bill, 2021

42

( IV )

Constitutional Silence – Must be Imbued with substantive Content by Infusing them with a meaning which enhances the Rule Of Law

43

( V )

Indiscriminate use of Article 356 has been curbed by this Hon’ble court through S.R.Bommai case

50

( VI )

As Soon As Possible Cannot be taken as Long as Possible and State Government cannot be indulged in

Litigation Indefinitely

51

Q8: In light of the constitutional scheme governing the powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of a reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India and take the opinion of the Supreme Court when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent or otherwise?

60

Q9: Are the decisions of the Governor and the President under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution of India, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force? Is it permissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law?

Q10: Can the exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of/by the President / Governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?

Q11: Is a law made by the State legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Q13: Do the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 of the Constitution of India extends to issuing directions /passing orders which are contrary to or inconsistent with existing substantive or procedural provisions of the Constitution or law in force?

62

Q14: Does the Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the Union Government and State Governments except by way of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India?

65

C.

Application of Article 143 In Indian Constitutional

Jurisprudence

66

( I )

Supreme Court is not Bound to Answer every reference

67

( II )

Opinion Rendered under Article 143 is not binding

68

( III )

Presidential Reference Cannot be used as Appellate Jurisdiction where there is already Authoritative Pronouncement and only view of Law can be Changed.

69

( IV )

Questions Raised in the Presidential Reference are already adjudicated and decided by this Hon’ble Court

70

JUDGEMENTS REFERED

S.No

Case Name & Citation

1.

A.G. Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police

CBI/SIT/MMDA (2023) 8 SCC 257, – 3J

2.

ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521, – 5J

3.

Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717 (9J) – 9J

4.

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 SCC 228 – 6J

5.

A.K. Kaul v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 73 – 2J

6.

Allocation of Lands and Buildings in a Chief Commissioners Province, In re 1943 SCC OnLine FC 8 – 3J

7.

Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [Election Commission Appointments] (2023) 6 SCC 161 – 5J

8.

Berubari Union (I), In re (1960) 3 SCR 250 – 8J

9.

Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 12 SCC 1 – 2J

10.

B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331 – 5J

11.

Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2) – 5J

12.

Delhi Laws Act, 1912, In Re 1951 SCC 568, Vol V.1 Pg 395 – 7J

13.

Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45 – 3J

14.

Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act Case AIR 1941 FC 72 – 3J

15.

In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380 – 7J

16.

Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 8 SCC 1 – 5J

17.

Jammu and Kashmir Resettlement Act in 1982 – 5J

18.

Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 1 – 5J

19.

Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. (2002) 8 SCC 182 – 5J

20.

Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. (2021) 16 SCC 503 – 3J

21.

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 – 13 J

22.

Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re 1959 SCR 995 – 7J

23.

Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1 – 7J

24.

Kuldeep Kumar v. UT Chandigarh (2024) 3 SCC 526 – 3J

25.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 – 7J

26.

Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 – 5J

27.

Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 – 5J

28.

MP Police Establishments v. State of MP (2004) 8 SCC 788 – 5J

29.

Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh

Legislative Assembly and Ors. 2016 B sec 1 – 5J

30.

Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1- 5J

31.

People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC

399- 3J

32.

Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, In re (1965) 1 SCR 413; (1974) 2 SCC 33 – 7J

33.

Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004, In re (2017) 1 SCC 121, Vol V.23 Pg 9357 – 5J

34.

Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala 1961 SCC OnLine SC 36 – 5J

35.

Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 – 5J

36.

Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal AIR 1967 SC 1857 – 5J

37.

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1 – 5J

38.

Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC 1 – 5J

39.

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 – 6J

40.

Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305 : (1962) 3 SCR 842 – 5J

41.

S. Ramakrishnan v. State of T.N. 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 5207 – – 2J

42.

Sea Customs Act, S.20(2), In re (1964) 3 SCR 787 – 9J

43.

Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1974) 2 SCC 831 – – 7J

44.

Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly (2020) 2

SCC 595 – 3J

45.

Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 (Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid matter), In re (1993) 1 SCC 642- 5J

46.

Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, In re (1998) 7 SCC 739, Vol V.15 Pg 6016 – 7J

47.

Special Reference No. 1 of 2001, In re (2004) 4 SCC 489 – 5J

48.

Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter)

(2002) 8 SCC 237,- 5J

49.

SR Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. – 9J

50.

State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952) 1 SCC 528 – 5J

51.

State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta (2013) 3 SCC 1 – 2J

52.

State of Jharkhand v. State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 431 – 2J

53.

State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab and Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 384 – 3J

54.

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592 – 7J

55.

State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) SCC OnLine SC 770 – 2J

56.

State of Telangana v. Secretary to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana and Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 405 – 2J

57.

Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 – 5J

58.

Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680 – 2J

59.

Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 – 3J

60.

Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324 – 5J

1

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ADVISORY JURISDICTION

SPL. REF. NO.1 OF 2025 IN THE MATTER OF:

IN RE: ASSENT, WITHHOLDING OF RESERVATION OF BILLS BY THE GOVERNOR AND THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA

WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY SR. ADV P WILSON FOR THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND INTERVENOR IN I.A.193920/2025

“A bill passed by the legislature is considered an expression of the collective will of the people and Governor should not be licensed to kill.”

A. KEY TO THE WRITTEN SUBMISSION

Answers to questions raised in the reference are divided in to six parts

1. Questions 3, 4, and 6 (Judicial review and Justiciability) (Pg 11 to 16)

a. Legislative Procedure – Article 200 and 201 falls under the heading of ‘Legislative procedure’. The procedure must be understood in the context of the Constitutional Assembly debates, rule of law and the principles and approaches adopted by the constitutional courts. This includes applying the basic structure doctrine, purposive interpretation, harmonious construction, and ensuring procedural safeguards. The people elect representatives with the fond hope and expectation that they will provide good governance within five years. Therefore, the legislative process should be fair, reasonable, uphold legislative supremacy, respect states’ autonomy, support the federal structure, and promote parliamentary democracy.

b. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) SCC 248 (7JJ) (V.9 Pg 3537, 3594 Para- 5,82,83,85 ) interpreted the procedure employed in Art 21 and held that procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable in terms of Part III of the constitution – ( Para-10, Pg- 11)

2

c. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, (V.53 Para -94 Pg 20904) postulates that mere presidential assent does not validate a law by any method, the Hon’ble supreme court being highest constitutional forum for judicial review, must be provided with enough space for enforcement and protection of constitutional scheme. ( Para-11, Pg- 12)

d. Kaiser-I-Hind 2002 8 SCC 182 (5JJ) (V.17 Pg-6677, Para-29) postulates that Legislative Procedure prescribed by court followed or not can always be looked in to by court. ( Para-12, Pg- 11)

e. Immunity – Immunity available to governor does not take away the power of court to examine validity of actions [Rameshwar Prasad 2006 2 SCC 1 (5JJ) (V.18 , Para 173-179, Pg- 7001)]. Judicial review is basic feature of constitution, the arm of court is long enough to reach injustice and the actions of even highest constitutional functionary is subject to judicial review. [S.R. Bommai 1994 3 SCC 1 (V.14, Pg 5654, 5684, Para 255,200,201,256)]. (Para 13, 14 Pg- 13)

f. It is the duty of the court to define the limits of power, whenever constitutional authority exceed its power and uphold the rule of law by laying down constitutional limitations. [State of Rajasthan vs UOI 1977 3 SCC 592 (7JJ) (V.8, Pg-3311, Para -149)] (Para 15, Pg- 14)

g. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, (V.53 Para -272 to 275 Pg 20984) while interpreting immunity under Article 212 (1) held that immunity available to irregularity in procedure cannot be extended to illegality in procedure. (Para 16, Pg- 14)

h. List of judicial review – Table extracting judgements where actions of the constitutional authority is subject to judicial review (Para 17, Pg- 15)

a. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331 (V.20 pg- 7918) – All constitutional powers, including those of President and Governor, are subject to review against arbitrariness or mala fides.

3

b. Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1 (V.47 pg- 18386) – No institution enjoys absolute power; judicial review ensures all act within constitutional limits.

c. Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184 (V.19 pg- 7652) – Parliamentary proceedings are not immune from review if they violate fundamental rights.

d. A.K. Kaul v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 73 (V.15 Pg- 5822)– Orders under Article 311(2) are reviewable if based on mala fides or irrelevant grounds.

2. Questions 1 and 2 (Article 200 options and discretion) (Pg 17 to 36 )

a. Extent of power given to Governor – Constituent Assembly decided to have nominated governor instead of elected governor and categorically decided that discretion available to governor should be removed. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar used a phrase – no functions governor is required to discharge in his individual judgement. (Para 20, Pg- 18)

b. Framing of Article 200

1935

GOI, 1935

(Para 21,

Pg-22)

I.

In his discretion – assent/withhold/reserve it for president consideration

II.

In his discretion – send it back with a message requesting to reconsider the bill or specific provisions and it must be reconsidered accordingly.

Feb 21,

1948

Draft

Article 175

(Present

200)

I. II.

In his discretion (removed) – assent

/withhold/reserve it for president consideration

In his discretion – send it back with a message requesting to reconsider the bill or specific

4

(Para 22,

Pg-23)

provisions and it must be reconsidered accordingly if passed again with or without amendment , the governor shall not withhold assent therefrom

Feb – Oct

1948

Amendment and suggestion

to draft

constitution from members

(Para 23,

Pg -23)

Constitutional advisor examined and prepared note on each amendment. He explained as follows:

(Please Refer Annexure 2 )

I. The power of governor to declare assent/withhold/reserve it for president consideration will be exercised on aid and advice of ministers .

II. Special committee decided to omit the word discretion in first proviso and power to return a bill with a message under first proviso will be exercised by him aid and advice of ministers. Further, the word as soon as possible was added in line with draft Article 91 (Present article 111)

[Article 91 contained 6 weeks time for president to return with a message, replaced it with word ‘as soon as possible’.

Reason – if 6 week time limit is imposed, parliament may not be in session nor it is possible to summon parliament and best course of action is to return bill as soon as possible, so that it will consider upon reassembling – changes also made in draft Article 175]

(Para 55, Pg – 52)

5

Decision – Remove discretion from first proviso and add as soon as possible

31st July and 1st Aug 1949

Constituent Assembly debate

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar introduced amendments to remove discretion and add as soon as possible in first Proviso and explained there can be no room for governor acting under discretion in responsible government. (Para 24,25 Pg -26)

T.T. Krishnamachari (member of drafting committee) explained – governor return the bill back with a message only under aid and advice of council of ministers. (Para 28 Pg -28) and it can be used to make some changes after it is passed to meet popular opinion.

Amendment passed and adopted

17th Oct

1949

Constituent Assembly debate

(Para 29

Pg -29)

Second proviso to Article 175 was introduced by T.T. Krishnamachari. (discretion given to reserve for president consideration if it derogates power of

High court)

Reason by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar – it is possible for state legislature to pass a bill to reduce the pecuniary jurisdiction of High court by raising the value of suit and state would be in a position to diminish the power of High court)

Second Proviso to Article 175 was adopted.

c. Therefore Governor only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, may

(a) assent to the Bill, or

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(b) withhold assent and return it with a message for reconsideration

(but cannot withhold assent if the Bill is passed again), or (c) reserve it for the President’s consideration.

Reservation on discretion is limited to cases when the Bill derogates from the powers of the High Court. (Para 30,31 Pg- 31)

d. Bill falls through means Bill dies where it is born – Governor cannot withhold bill on his own and bury it in Raj bhavan , as it is explained in constituent Assembly debates that it can be only exercised under the aid and advice of ministers only to remedy a hasty action or when the ministry or government changes before the bill is assented by governor and new ministry or government does not want the bill to be enacted. [Union of India vs Valluri Basavaiah

Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324 (5JJ) (V.9 Pg 3776 Para 19 )] (Para 32 Pg- 32)

e. Samsher Singh 1974 2 SCC 831 (V.7, Pg-2886, Para-54) (7JJ) supports the above interpretation and postulates that Governor has discretion only under second proviso of article 200. (Para 34 Pg- 33)

f. Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 (V.22 Pg 8618 Para 148) postulate that governor has not been assigned any role in executive or legislative functioning of the state and Governor cannot seen to have such power that would assign him a dominating position over State Executive and the State Legislature. (Para 35 Pg- 34)

g. Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182 (V.17 Pg-6692, Para-76) held that enactment of bill is expression of will through the legislation passed by their elected representatives. (Para 36 Pg- 35)

h. The Governor is not constitutional court to decide the question of repugnancy or validity of legislation and his role is confined to acting on ministerial advice. (Para 37 Pg- 35)

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3. Questions 5 and 7 (Time Limit) (Pg 37 to 60 )

a. Federalism and division of power between union and state – Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in his adoption of constitution states that power is divided by constitution and not by any other law and both are co-equal in their own sphere. (Para 40 Pg- 37,38 )

b. Time taken by the Governor to take action on the bill – The elected state government under Article 172 has a tenure of five years and table capturing time taken in clearing the bills by governor in State of Tamil Nadu (Maximum time of 1416 days (46 months, 16 days). (Para 42 Pg- 40)

c. Constitutional Silence – Dr. Rajendra prasad in his adoption speech emphasised that everything is not written in constitution and things should be developed through convention. (Para 43 Pg- 43)

d. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1 (V.37 Pg 14128 Para 91) postulates that constitutional silence must be imbued with substantive content by infusing them with a meaning which enhances rule of law. (Para 44 Pg- 44)

e. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 8 SCC 1, (V.28, Pg 11250 Para 29) held that it is duty of this Hon’ble court to interpret law and say what the silence denotes in the context. (Para 46 Pg- 45)

f. Kesavananda Bharati case 1973 4 SCC 225 (V.4, Pg – 1564) is the best example of how this court has interpreted constitutional silence. (Para 47 Pg- 46)

g. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, (V.24 Pg 9263 Para 345 346) described silence as constitutional dark matter like dark matter in physics, these elements are not directly observable in the text, but without them the

Constitution would collapse into incoherence. (Para 48 Pg- 46)

h. Table extracting judgements where constitutional silence has been interpreted and given life by this Hon’ble court . (Para 49 Pg- 47)

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a. Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 680 (V.53, Pg-20782) – Court filled constitutional silence on workplace harassment by framing binding guidelines under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21.

b. Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 1 (V.53 Pg- 20771)– Court held constitutional silence on no-confidence motions does not bar them, citing value of “abeyances.”

c. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 & Sakal Papers

v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305 (V.52 Pg- 20416) – Court read freedom of the press into Article 19(1)(a) despite no explicit mention.

d. Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (V.52 pg- 20521) – Court expanded “State” in Article 12 to cover varied instrumentalities.

e. Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294 (V.53 Pg- 20647) & PUCL v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 (V.53 Pg- 20713) – Court held right to know candidates’ antecedents is part of Article 19(1)(a).

f. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (V.9 Pg 3537, 3594 Para- 5,82,83,85 ) – Court read “procedure established by law” in Article 21 as fair, just, and reasonable, expanding it to unenumerated rights.

i. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [Election Commission Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161 (V.48 Pg 18908 – 18909 Para 445 455 ) has invoked Article 142 to fill the constitution gaps. (Para 51 Pg- 50)

j. Indiscriminate use of Art 356 curtailed after S.R. Bommai case – Article 356 has been invoked more than 134 times, Sarkaria Commission (Chapter VI, Emergency Provisions) has observed at least one-third of these instances were politically motivated to suit the interest of party in power in union. After the

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authoritative pronouncement of this Hon’ble court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 (V.14, Pg 5684 5654, Para 255,200,201)], the arbitrary invocation of Article 356 was curtailed. (Para 52 to 54 Pg- 50)

k. As soon as possible cannot be taken as long as possible and this court cannot be mute spectator. Therefore, State cannot be indulged in endless litigation and time limit should be laid down to uphold the rule of law, deliver good governance , legislative supremacy, federal structure and parliamentary democracy.. (Para 55 Pg- 52).

l. The fear of H.V.Kamath expressed by him in Constituent assembly debate has turned into reality that Governors in several States have sought refuge under the literal wording of “as soon as possible” to sit on Bills for months, even years, thereby paralysing the functioning of elected governments and negating the legislative will of the people (Para 56 Pg- 53).

m. Time limit prescribed by this Hon’ble court in is not arbitrary but a reasonable time limit based on office memorandum issued by Ministry of Home Affairs for clearing bills. (Para 63 to 65 Pg- 56).

A judicially fixed timeline is necessary, failing which the Constitution itself would be rendered unworkable. The court will become a another layer in Legislative procedure and passing of bills.



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4. Questions 8 and 9 (Article 143 opinion at anterior stage) – The Bills before coming into law has been scrutinised in advisory jurisdiction. [Re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, (please refer Vol V.2 Pg 1057 ), In Re Delhi Laws Act, 1951,( V.1 Pg 395)] (Para 66 to 69 Pg- 66).

5. Questions 10, 11, and 13 ( invocation of Article 142 ) – Article 142 can be invoked to fill gaps in constitution. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [Election Commission Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161 Para 450 (V.48, Pg 18910) (Para 60 to 68 Pg- 63).

6. Question 14 (Article 131) – The governor is not part of union government, therefore Article 32 can be invoked for dispute between a state government and constitutional functionary. (Para 76 Pg- 65).

7. Application of Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 143) (Para 80 to 85 Pg- 67 to 70).

a. Supreme court is not bound to answer every reference and some questions may be returned unanswered. re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 ((1979) 1 SCC 380), (V.9 Pg

3661)

b. Opinion rendered under advisory jurisdiction is not binding (Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717 (9JJ) V7 Pg –

2723, Para-109)

c. Presidential reference cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction when there is authoritative pronouncement and only view of law can be changed. [Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2) (V.14 Pg 5417 ) Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1, (V.21, Pg 8123 )]

8. The questions raised in the present presidential reference has been authoritatively answered in catena of judgments (Table). (Para 85 Pg- 70).

9. This Court in The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770 has breathed life into Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, holding that sovereign power lies with the people and their elected representatives. It emphasized

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that a time limit must be imposed to uphold the rule of law and preserve democracy, and there is no justification to unsettle the authoritative pronouncement of this Hon’ble court.

(Para 86 Pg- 76).

B. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCE

Q4: Is Article 361 of the Constitution of India an absolute bar to the judicial review in relation to the actions of a Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Q3: Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India justiciable?

Q6: Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India justiciable?

( I ) LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE – PRESCRIBED BY CONSTITUTION FOLLOWED OR NOT CAN ALWAYS BE LOOKED IN TO BY

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

10. It is submitted that Articles 200 and 201 fall under the subheading of “Legislative Procedure,” specifically within Part VI, Chapter III of the Constitution, which pertains to the State Legislature. Since Article 200 outlines the manner, method, and procedure for dealing with bills, it cannot be read as interfering with the essential functions or powers of the State Legislature.

In this context, a reference to Article 21 is pertinent:

“21. Protection of Life and Personal Liberty

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.”

This Honourable Court, in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) SCC 248, ( Please Refer Vol – V.9, of Judgment Compilation – Pg 3537 3594, Para – 5,82,83,85 ) held that the procedure must be reasonable, fair, and transparent. Consequently, addressing the functions of the Governor, time limits, and the methods of

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handling bills—including reserving them for the President’s consideration and setting time limits for the President’s action— in terms of Constitutional scheme falls well within the jurisdiction of this constitutional court and judicial manageable standards envisaged in the constitution. This Honourable Court is tasked with ensuring that both the procedural and substantive validity of any legislation align with constitutional provisions. This includes interpreting the relevant procedures clearly and ensuring the effective functioning of constitutional institutions. This, in turn, enables the upholding of the Rule of Law, delivering good governance, and fostering meaningful participation by the representatives of the people. These elements are essential for maintaining parliamentary democracy; therefore, this Honourable Court is well within its limits to interpret the legislative procedures embodied in Articles 200 and 201 as exercised by the Governor and the Hon’ble President.

11. It is humbly submitted that Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, (V.53 Para -94 Pg 20904) held as follows :

“Since the Constitution explicitly provides a self-contained detailed procedure for enactment of legislation, and does not suggest that mere assent of the President to a law, by whatsoever method adopted, would become a valid law, it is necessary that this Court being the highest constitutional forum for judicial review is provided with enough space for enforcement and protection of the constitutional scheme.”

Thus, mere presidential assent does not validate a law by any method, the Hon’ble supreme court being highest constitutional forum for judicial review, must be provided with enough space for enforcement and protection of constitutional scheme.

12. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182 (5J) (Please Refer Para 29) ( Please Refer Vol – V.17, of Judgment Compilation – Pg 6677 ) postulates as follows:

“29. We further make it clear that granting of assent under Article 254(2) is not exercise of legislative power of the President such as contemplated under Article 123 but is part

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of the legislative procedure. Whether procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is followed or not can always be looked into by the Court.”

Therefore, granting of assent is not exercise of legislative power such as contemplated under the constitution but is part of the legislative procedure and held that procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is followed or not can always be looked into by the Court. The procedure mandated by the Constitution while enacting a law has been duly complied with, is always justiciable and can be scrutinised by this Hon’ble court as held in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra).

( II ) IMMUNITY AVAILABLE TO GOVERNOR – DOES NOT TAKE AWAY THE POWER OF COURT TO EXAMINE VALIDITY OF ACTION AS

CONSISTENTLY HELD BY THIS COURT.

13. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court in Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1 (5J) ( Para 173, 179 ) ( Please Refer Vol – V.18, of Judgment Compilation – Pg 6871 ) has considered the immunity available to governor under Article 361 and postulates that the immunity granted by Article 361(1) does not, however, take away the power of the Court to examine the validity of the action including on the ground of mala fides.

14. It is humbly submitted that S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (Please Refer Para 255, 200 and 201)(9J) ( Please Refer Vol – V.14, of Judgment Compilation

– Pg 5684 ( para 255 ) , Pg 5654 (para 200 ), Pg 5655 ( 201 ) postulated that Judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and forms the very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme. The arm of this Hon’ble Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it may be found, for no authority created by the Constitution is beyond the reach of the law. Neither the exalted status of an office nor the nomenclature of “constitutional functionary” can place any action above judicial scrutiny. Whether the action emanates from the legislature, the executive, or even from the highest constitutional offices, this Court has consistently affirmed that judicial review remains the ultimate safeguard against illegality, arbitrariness, or mala fides. It is further held that this Hon’ble Court, as the final arbiter in interpreting the Constitution, bears the solemn duty to declare what the law is. The higher judiciary has been entrusted with the delicate task

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of delineating the powers conferred on each branch of Government and ensuring that no branch transgresses its constitutional limitations. As the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, this Court and the High Courts are duty-bound to uphold constitutional values and enforce constitutional restraints. Judicial review, therefore, extends to examining the constitutionality of a Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356. While this task is delicate and often intertwined with political overtones, it must nonetheless be exercised with great care and circumspection. The Court clarified that no rigid or universal principles can predetermine when the President’s satisfaction is justiciable; rather, each case must be assessed on its own constitutional footing. Importantly, it was observed that justiciability is not a fixed legal concept but one shaped by context and judicially manageable standards. While matters of purely political nature may be non-justiciable, legal questions cloaked in political garb remain open to judicial review. Even in cases involving subjective satisfaction of the President, there exists only a rebuttable presumption of regularity, which cannot oust judicial scrutiny altogether.

15. It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592, (7J) (Please Refer para 149), ( Please Refer Vol – V.8, of Judgment Compilation – Pg 3311 – 3313 ) this Hon’ble Court held that whenever a question arises as to whether a constitutional authority has acted within or exceeded its powers, it is the constitutional duty of the Court to decide it. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, binding on every organ of Government—executive, legislature, and judiciary alike. No authority, however high, can be the sole judge of the extent of its powers under the

Constitution. This Court, as the ultimate interpreter, is entrusted with the task of defining the limits of power, ensuring that no branch transgresses them, and upholding the rule of law by enforcing constitutional limitations.

16. It is respectfully submitted that this Hon’ble Court in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, (Please Refer Para 272 to 275) ( Please Refer V.53 of Judgment Compilations – Pg 20983 – 20985 ).while interpreting the Article 212 (1) which grants immunity to the proceedings of the Legislature has drawn a vital distinction between a mere irregularity of procedure and an illegality. The immunity from judicial review may attach to the former, no such protection can extend to the latter. This distinction is not novel but firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence. It found authoritative expression in the seven-Judge Bench decision in Special Reference No. 1 of

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1964 [In re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, AIR 1965 SC 745], where the Court categorically held that Article 212(2) confers immunity on officers and members of the legislature for acts done in exercise of powers regulating procedure, conduct of business, or maintaining order in the legislature. However, Article 212(1) expressly recognises that if proceedings within the legislature suffer from illegality or unconstitutionality, as opposed to a mere procedural irregularity, they remain open to judicial scrutiny.

While certain immunities may shield irregularities of procedure from judicial interference, no such cloak can extend to actions tainted by illegality, unconstitutionality, or mala fides. Applying this principle to constitutional functionaries, it follows that while the Governor may enjoy immunity under Article 361(1) from being personally impleaded, the validity of his constitutional acts remains open to scrutiny. Immunity cannot be allowed to become an armour for unconstitutional exercise of power; judicial review, as the basic feature of the Constitution, ensures that every constitutional office functions within the limits ordained by the Constitution.

17. This Hon’ble Court in catena of Judgements has exercised judicial review on the actions of constitutional functionaries and extracted in the table as follows:

CASE NAME

ARTICLE

RATIO

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

( please refer Vol – V.14, pg 5684 ( para 255 ) , pg 5654 (para 200 ), pg 5655 ( 201 )

356

Judicial review is the basic feature of constitution. The arm of the court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it finds and any order or action is not beyond its ken, whether its reach could be projected to constitutional extraordinary functionary of the coordinate branch of the Government, the highest executive, when it records subjective satisfaction to issue Proclamation under Article 356.

B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331, ( please refer Vol, V 20, 788, Para 76) ( please refer Vol – V.20. pg

7918 – 7919 )

72

The constitutional responsibility to be exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context.

All public power including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide. While the President or the Governor

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may be the sole judge of the sufficiency of facts and the propriety of granting pardons and reprieves, the power being an enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations must be found in the Constitution itself.

Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1, (Please refer Para 222 to 227)

105, 122, 212

Constitutional supremacy mandates that every institution of governance is subject to the norms embodied in the constitutional text. The Constitution does not allow for the existence of absolute power in the institutions which it creates. Judicial review as a part of the basic features of the Constitution is intended to ensure that every institution acts within its bounds and limits. The fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens are an assurance of liberty and a recognition of the autonomy which inheres in every person. Hence, judicial scrutiny of the exercise of parliamentary privileges is not excluded where a fundamental right is violated or a gross illegality occurs.

Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, (Please refer Para 431) ( please refer Vol – V.19 of judgment compilation . pg

7652 )

105, 122, 212

No basis to the claim of bar of exclusive cognizance or absolute immunity to the parliamentary proceedings in Article 105(3) of the Constitution. The judicature is not prevented from scrutinising the validity of the action of the legislature trespassing on the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens;

State of Rajasthan v. Union of

India (1977) 3 SCC 592,

(Para 150) ( Please refer Volume V.8 Pg 3313) ( Please refer Volume V.8 of judgment compilation Pg

3313)

149, 356

Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is confined only to saying whether the limits on the power conferred by the Constitution have been observed or there is transgression of such limits. Exercise of power under Article 356 clause (1) is subject to judicial review

A.K. Kaul v. Union of India,

(1995) 4 SCC 73 (Please refer Para 30) ( Please refer Volume V.15 Pg 5822 ) ( Please refer Volume V.15 of judgment compilation Pg

5822 )

311 (2)

Order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is subject to judicial review and its validity can be examined by the court on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds

Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn.

Legislative Procedure

Legislative procedure prescribed by the

Constitution before enacting the law is

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(Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182 (5J) ( Please refer Volume V.17 of judgment compilation Pg

6654 )

(Including

Article 200 and 201)

followed or not can always be looked into by the Court

Q1: What are the Constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Q2: Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising all the options available with him when a Bill is presented before him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

18. It is respectfully submitted that the fundamental constitutional principle is that the Governor of a State in India acts as the constitutional head of the State but is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister in the exercise of most of his functions under the Constitution. The question as to whether the Governor enjoys any independent discretion in the exercise of powers under Article 200, when a Bill is presented for assent, has been a subject of detailed consideration both in the Constituent Assembly debates and judicial pronouncements.

( I ) EXTENT OF POWER GIVEN TO GOVERNOR – FRAMERS OF CONSTITUTION

19. It is respectfully submitted that question whether the Governor should be elected or nominated was exhaustively debated in the Constituent Assembly on 30th and 31st May 1949. When the framers in their collective wisdom consciously resolved that the Governor shall be a nominated by the President, the apprehension we are facing today has been extensively deliberated and decided that Governor’s role, power and function to be ornamental, symbolic, and strictly limited, with no warrant to encroach upon or interfere in the functioning of the elected State Government. That the Learned Solicitor General argument that Governor has been given discretion and confers substantive, overriding powers upon the Governor not only runs contrary to the framers’ explicit intent but also tears at the delicate fabric of Indian federalism envisaged by the framers of the constitution.

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“ Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru : …I shall take it that my honourable Friend does not now desire that the Prime Minister of India should control Provincial Governments. But he should really then explain to us what he meant by saying that the Prime Minister of India would be able effectively to discharge his duties for the government of India, only if the Provincial Governors were nominated on his recommendation. However, if my honourable Friend Mr. Kher has changed his opinion in the course of a few minutes, I shall not twit him with it. But the important question raised by him, consciously or unconsciously, still deserves the consideration of the House. The Prime Minister of India and his Cabinet are responsible for the good government of the country, only in respect of certain matters, that is, in respect of matters that are under the control of the Central Parliament, or properly belong to the province of the Central Executive. Our Constitution, though it gives a great deal of power to the Central Legislature and Executive, does not provide for a unitary Constitution. It has not reduced the Provinces to the level of Municipalities and District Boards. They will, notwithstanding deductions made from their authority, still have the power exclusively to control certain subjects. The responsibility of the Prime Minister of India for the good government of the country cannot extend to the sphere that will be exclusively under the control of the Provincial Parliament and Executive. I think, Sir, that this should be clearly realised, lest there should be serious conflicts between the Central Government on one side and the Provincial Governments on the other. There are countries in which the federal system of government prevails, and there are differences of opinion there, from time to time, between the Federal and the State Governments. In Canada, a Provincial Government went so far as practically to change the prevailing system of currency. The Centre was able to deal with the situation, because in its opinion this was a matter exclusively under its control. It did not utilise the position of the Governor or any other method of asserting its power for this purpose. Similarly, when conflicts arise between the provinces and the Centre in this country it is very probable that if they are of a serious character they will relate to matters coming within the purview of the Centre and in that case the Centre, will, under the Constitution, have adequate means of dealing with such a situation. But let us divest ourselves completely of the notion that the Governor is to be used in any way in order to carry out the wishes of the Central Executive.

We have also to bear another very important consideration in mind. Our Constitution should be such as to permit of the free and full growth of democracy, and to prevent the establishment of a dictatorship in the country in any event. At the present time, it seems to many of us that greater confidence is reposed by the country in the judgment of the Central Executive than in that of the Provincial Executive. But in the first place, this can be no reason for reducing the Provincial Government to a position of utter subordination to the Central Executive. In the second place, things may not always remain as they are now. It is easy to conceive of a time when the Central Government might not inspire as much confidence as some of the Provincial Governments might. If you entrust the Central Executive with power to exercise control over the Provinces in all important matters, and make them fall in line with the policy of the Centre, there is the serious danger of the country falling under a dictatorship. There are countries in which the federal system of government prevails, and there are differences of opinion there, from time to time, between the Federal and the State Governments. In Canada, a Provincial Government went so far as practically to change the prevailing system of currency. The Centre was able to deal with the situation, because in its opinion this was a matter exclusively under its control. It did not utilise the position of the Governor or any other method of asserting its power for this purpose. Similarly, when conflicts arise between the provinces and the Centre in this country it is very probable that if they are of a serious character they will relate to matters coming within the purview of the Centre and in that case the Centre, will, under the Constitution, have adequate means of dealing with such a situation. But let us divest ourselves completely of the notion that the Governor is to be used in any way in order to carry out the wishes of the Central Executive…”

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“Dr. P.K. Sen: …The function that the Governor has to fulfil, as it is now borne in upon the Members of the House, is that of a lubricator, if I may use the expression. He is not to interfere, but he has just to smooth matters. If there are factions, if the different sections of the community are at loggerheads with each other, it is for him to act more of less as a lubricator, a cementing factor. He is to help the machinery of Government which is in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers; he is not to come and interfere and cause confusion or chaos; he would be the person really to lubricate the machinery and to see to it that all the wheels are going well by reason not of his interference, but his friendly intervention…” ( Please refer Volume IV.21 of Pg 7902 – 7903 )

“ Shri Biswanath Das : … I claim, that the new set-up, unless this House proposes to change the new set-up, invests the Governors with definite and important powers. The powers are the ordinances, powers, of course, in a modified way which you have under the Government of India Act of 1935, to return Bills for consideration of the Assembly and dismissal of Ministers and calling for elections. I claim that these are very important powers under the new set-up. Therefore, a change in the Constitution that we have so far accepted means a change in all these items of responsibility that we have at present. If these powers continue to operate, I claim that the Governor under the new set-up has an important constitutional role to function. I have my bitter experiences in this regard. I was the Prime Minister of a province and I know how the Governor of my province was out to break my party. I know those days are gone and new days are coming ahead and I will plead with my honourable Friends to look at the future. If I were to have my leaders in office continuously, if I were to have men like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. I have absolutely no complaint. But I plead with my honourable Friends that human life is temporary, however long and however much we desire; human life is temporary; the existence of parties, emergence of parties have to face elevation—ups and downs of parties are there, and world history has enough examples of such cases. That being the position. I want to plead with the honourable Members to look into the future and see how far the new set-up that they purpose to have, will work and function properly and well.

…The Governor, who is a Constitutional Governor under the Act has to be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister of India, leader of another Party. My honourable Friend, Mr. Kher, made a distinct contribution to this discussion. His contribution is this, viz., the Governor is being appointed in consultation with the Cabinet. If that were so,—I do not know what it is—the selection becomes less objectionable but reference to the Legislative Assembly discussions shows that the Prime Minister appoints the Governor. The Prime Minister today is one of the tallest of the few men in the world. You may expect justice and you do expect justice in his hands. He has no axes to grind. But there may be a Prime Minister in the Centre who may have his own axes to grind. Is it anything serious to expect that a party functioning with its majority in the province may be interfered with if he proposes to play the role that was just now discussed by my honourable Friend the jurist member, Dr. Sen? Therefore, I feel and join issue with those friends who feel that the set-up that we propose under the new Constitution will be useful. I claim that you cannot have both ways. You cannot have democracy and autocracy functioning together. In the provinces you are going to have democracy from toe to neck and autocracy at the head. Both these are bound to fail; you are inviting friction. I know I will not vote against it because as I have stated I submit to the joint wisdom. But, I must clearly state here and place on record my views and what I see the future of it is going to be. I have experienced myself and I have no hesitation that this experience which I have had in my life will repeat itself. If the Honourable Sardar Patel were here, I would have cited how the Governor, who was an agent of British Imperialism, had all along been attempting to smash my party. What was being done by the Governor under British Imperialism may also be repeated by the party, though I have no hesitation in saying that my leaders would not stoop to or even think in the way in which things were being done…”

“Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla : The next point that I would place before you is this: How do we assume that the Cabinet in a province will be of the same political party as the Governor who is

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appointed to that province? Then conditions will be worse and worse confounded. The Governor under instructions from the Centre will try to run the administration in a certain way, while the Cabinet of a different political party would try to run it in their own way. Ultimately in this tussle, the Cabinet must prevail and for the purpose of good government, the Governor appointed by the President would have to be recalled. I think this is a contingency which is not far in the distant future.” ( Please refer Volume IV.21 of Pg 7914 )

Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: …Let me tell my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla what the position of the legislature vis-à-vis the Governor is in the United States. The legislature is not summoned for a year in some states. I suppose in certain States the obligation to summon the legislature for passing the budget does not even exist. The meagre information that we have in regard to the working of the State in the United States Constitution, only makes us glean a little from side remarks here and there. I was reading recently a text book by Justice Roy Jackson, on the supremacy of the judiciary in America, wherein I found a categorical statement that in certain States, the legislature is not summoned for two years. The position is, either you make the legislature supreme or you make the Governor supreme. If you adopt the Presidential system, the Governor is supreme. Under the Parliamentary system, the legislature and the leader of the majority party in the legislature will be supreme. The choice is obvious; and that choice is logical. That is why we have come to this choice of a nominated governor.

… One word more, Sir, in regard to some of the remarks of Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru. I quite agree that the remarks made by him are out of genuine misgivings because, he felt doubts. I would only say this. In regard to the articles as they appear further down in this Draft Constitution, I have no doubt it is the intention of the House to change and shape all those articles to fit in within the changes made earlier on. If he wanted that the provisions of article 175 in regard to reservation of Bills should be specific, let us make it specific. If my honourable Friend wants that the views of the Central Government must be made very clear in regard to those subjects in which the Central Government has got an interest, and the responsibility for reserving the Bills should not be laid on the Governor, thereby creating an atmosphere of odium for him and creating bad blood between him and the Chief Minister, let us make it clear at the appropriate place…” ( Please refer Volume IV.21 of Pg 7918 – 7919 )

20. That after prolonged and meticulous deliberation, settled the role of the Governor with the utmost clarity. The Hon’ble Dr. Ambedkar emphatically explained that the Governor’s office was to be purely ornamental and nominal. He made it clear that the Governor could not, and must not, possess authority to interfere in the internal administration of a duly elected Ministry commanding a majority in the Legislature. Even when queried by members such as Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari about the Governor’s limited role in calling upon a party or individual to form the first Ministry, Ambedkar clarified that this was not a matter of personal discretion or overarching power. At best, it was a procedural necessity, and if a wrong choice was made, the Legislature itself would correct the error by a confidence vote. Thus, the framers’ intention was unambiguous: the Governor is a constitutional figurehead with no independent authority to interfere in the affairs of the State. Any interpretation to the contrary—any suggestion that the Governor has discretion to override

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the will of the elected Ministry—flies in the face of Ambedkar’s categorical declarations and the Constituent Assembly’s deliberate constitutional design.

“The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The Drafting Committee felt, as everybody in this House knows, that the Governor is not to have any kind of functions—to use a familiar phraseology, “no functions which he is required to discharge either in his discretion or in his individual judgment.” According to the principles of the new Constitution he is required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters. Having regard to this fact it was felt whether it was desirable to impose upon the electorate the obligation to enter upon an electoral process which would cost a lot of time, a lot of trouble and I say a lot of money as well. It was also felt, nobody, knowing full well what powers he is likely to have under the Constitution, would come forth to contest an election. We felt that the powers of the Governor were so limited, so nominal, his position so ornamental that probably very few would come forward to stand for election…

.. At the same time I want to warn the House that the real issue before the House is really not nomination or election—because as I said this functionary is going to be a purely ornamental functionary; how he comes into being, whether by nomination or by some other machinery, is a purely psychological question—what would appeal most to the people—a person nominated or a person in whose nominated the Legislature has in some way participated. Beyond that, it seems to me it has no consequence. Therefore, the thing that I want to tell the House is this: that the real issue before the House is not nomination or election, but what powers you propose to give to your Governor. If the Governor is a purely constitutional Governor with no more powers than what we contemplate expressly to give him in the Act, and has no power to interfere with the internal administration of a Provincial Ministry, I personally do not see any very fundamental objection to the principle of nomination. Therefore my submission is……….

Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari: Can he contemplate any situation, where a Governorwhether you call him a mere symbol or not—will not have the power to form the first Ministry? Will he not be competent to call upon any one, whether he has a big majority or a substantial minority? And that is a very big power of which he cannot be deprived under any circumstances.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Well that power an elected or a nominated Governor will have. If he happens to call the wrong person to form a Ministry, he will soon find to his cost that he has made a wrong choice. That is not a thing that could be avoided by having an elected Governor. Such a Governor may have a friend of his choice whom he can call in to form a Ministry and that issue can be settled by the House itself by a motion of no-confidence or confidence. But that is not the aspect of the question which is material. The aspect of the question which is material is. Is the Governor going to have any power of interference in the working of a Ministry which is composed of a majority in the local Legislature? If that Governor has no power of interference in the internal administration of a Ministry which has a majority, then it seems to me that the question whether he is nominated or elected is a wholly immaterial one. That is the way I look at it and I want to tell the House that in coming to their decision they should not bother with the more or less academic question —whether the Governor has to be nominated or to be elected—they should bear in mind this question: What are the powers

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with which the Governor is going to be endowed? That matter, I submit, is not before us today. We shall take it up at a later stage when we come to the question of articles 175 and 188 and probably by amendment or the addition of some other clause which would give him powers. The House should be careful and watchful of these new sections that will be placed before them at a later stage. But today it seems to me, if the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend that it should be, that the Governor should be a purely constitutional Governor, with not power of interference in the administration of the province, then it seems to me quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected.” ( Please refer Volume IV.21 of Pg 7925 )

This makes it abundantly clear that the Governor is constitutionally bound to act solely on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and not as an independent authority. The framers were unyielding in their intention that the office of Governor should remain a neutral and ornamental constitutional head, devoid of any substantive powers. The very architecture of our federal scheme rests on the principle that governance of the State lies exclusively in the hands of the elected Ministry, which derives legitimacy from the confidence of the Legislature. To confer upon the Governor any so-called discretion to interfere with this democratic process would not only contradict the explicit statements of Dr. Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly but also subvert the core design of responsible government under the Constitution. The Governor was never intended to be an alternate power centre, a rival to the elected executive, or a political veto point; his role is that of a constitutional sentinel, symbolic in character, bound in duty, and stripped of independent discretion in the domain of governance of states.

( II ) ARTICLE 200 – FRAMING OF CONSTITUTION AND INTENT OF

CONSTITUTIONAL MAKERS

21. It is respectfully submitted that section 75 of Government of India Act, 1935 reads as follows:

“ A Bill which has been passed by the Provincial Legislative Assembly or, in the case of a Province having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Chambers of the Provincial Legislature, shall be presented to the Governor, and the Governor in his discretion shall declare either that he assents in His Majesty’s name to the Bill, or that he withholds assent there from, or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the Governor General:

Provided that the Governor may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that the Chamber or Chambers will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the Chamber or Chambers shall reconsider it accordingly.” ( please refer Vol IV Pg 383 )

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The Governor was given discretion under Government of India Act, 1935 to grant assent or withhold or reserve the Bill for the Consideration of the Governor General and in case of withholding the assent to such bill, the discretion to return the Bill to the Chamber to reconsider the provisions.

22. That the draft Article 175 of the constitution of India 1948 submitted by drafting committee before the president of constituent assembly reads as follows:

“ A Bill which has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:

Provided that where there is only one House of the Legislature and the Bill has been passed by that House, the Governor may, in his discretion, return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will reconsider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House shall reconsider it accordingly and if the Bill is passed again by the House with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom.”

The draft Article 175 contemplated a discretion only on the Governor to return the Bill with a message requesting the house to reconsider the bill.

23. It is respectfully submitted that amendments to the draft Article 175 were invited from members of the assembly, the constitutional advisor and drafting committee (including Dr. B.R. Ambedkar) carefully examined the proposed amendments, wherein the method of interpretation and the discretion available to governor were explained in the note by Constitutional advisor under Article 175 and reads as follows:

“ARTICLE 175

K. Santhanam, M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, T. T. Krishnamachari and Shrimati G. Durgabai: That in article 175, for the words “declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President”, the words “assent to the Bill” be substituted.

Note : Under article 175, the power of the Governor to declare that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President will be exercised by him on the advice of his Ministers. Accordingly, there will be hardly any occasion to. withhold assent from a Bill which has been passed by the Legislature. There is therefore no harm in retaining the provision with regard to the withholding of assent from a Bill in this article. There may be cases where it might be necessary for the Governor to exercise the power of withholding assent even on the advice of the Ministers. If after a Bill

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is passed by the Legislature, the Ministers resign before the Bill is assented to by the Governor, the new Ministry which would be formed might not want the Bill to be enacted and might advise the Governor to withhold assent from the Bill. But if the provision relating to the withholding of assent is omitted from this article, it will not be possible for the Governor to withhold it. There is thus a distinct advantage in retaining the provision relating to the withholding of assent in this article.

The provision regarding reservation of a Bill for the consideration of the President is also necessary in view of the provision contained in clause (2) of article 231.

Further, the Drafting Committee has recommended that a provision for reservation by the Governor of Bills affecting the powers of High Courts for the consideration of the President on the lines of paragraph XVII(b) of the Instrument of Instructions to the Governor under the Government of India Act, 1935, should be included in the Draft. The Special Committee has also agreed to this recommendation. It is therefore essential that provision regarding reservation of Bills for the consideration of the President should be retained in article 175. The proposed amendment cannot therefore be accepted.

Tajamul Husain : That in the proviso to article 175, the words “Provided that where there is only one House of the Legislature and the Bill has been passed by that House” be deleted.

Note: The proviso to article 175 is intended to apply only to the case where the Legislature of a State is unicameral, to follow the recommendation made by the Provincial Constitution Committee which was subsequently adopted by the Constituent Assembly in July 1947.

Tajamul Husain : That in the proviso to article 175, after the words “return the Bill” the words “to the Legislative Assembly of the State” be inserted.

Note: This amendment is not sufficiently clear. If the intention is that the proviso to article 175 should apply only to the case where a State has only one House of the Legislature, that is the Legislative Assembly, then this amendment is not necessary, and the existing proviso as it is worded will meet the object of the sponsor of the amendment. It, however, the intention is that the proviso should apply both to the case where the Legislature of a State is unicameral and to the case where it is bicameral, then the following amendments would be necessary: In the proviso to article 175, for the words “the House”, in the three places where they occur, the words “the House or Houses” be substituted.

Tajamul Husain: That at the end of the proviso to article 175 the following words be added : But if the Governor does not assent to the Bill, the Legislative Assembly of the State shall automatically dissolve itself, and a fresh election shall be held immediately. If the party that was in power at the time of the dissolution is again returned in a majority, the Governor shall vacate his office and this Bill shall become an Act of the Legislature.

Note: The Special Committee was of opinion that in view of the change suggested by the committee in the mode of selection of Governors, namely, that the Governors should be nominated directly by the President instead of being elected by the Provinces, all references to the exercise of functions by the Governor in his discretion should be omitted from the Draft Constitution. Accordingly if the words “in his discretion” be omitted from the proviso to article 175, the power of the Governor to return the Bill to the Legislature under the proviso will be exercised by him on the advice of his Ministers, and the remarks under article 91 ante will apply to this amendment.

The Bihar Lawyers’ Conference at its fourth session at Gaya has proposed that in article

175 the words “or a Bill passed under article 173(4)” be added after the words “has been

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passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State” and before the words “shall be presented to the Governor” Note: This amendment is not necessary in view of the amendment proposed by the Drafting Committee to article 173. It has been proposed to insert the words “by both Houses in the form in which it was passed” after the words “deemed to have been passed” in clause (4) of article 173.

Jaya Prakash Narayan: The following words should be omitted from article 175 : (i) “or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President”; (ii) “where there is only one House of the Legislature and the Bill has been passed by that House”.

Note: The provision regarding reservation of a Bill for the consideration of the President is necessary in view of the provision contained in clause (2) of article 231. Further, the Drafting Committee has recommended that a provision for reservation by the Governor of Bills affecting the powers of High Courts for the consideration of the President on the lines of paragraph XVII(b) of the Instrument of Instructions to the Governor under the Government of India Act, 1935, should be included in the Draft. The Special Committee has also agreed to this recommendation. It is therefore essential that provision regarding reservation of Bills for the consideration of the President should be retained in article 175. The words “or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President” cannot therefore be omitted from article 175.

So long as the provisions with regard to two chambers in the Legislature of a State are retained, the words “where there is only one House of the Legislature and the Bill has been passed by that House” cannot be omitted from article 175. Further, the provisions of the proviso to article 175 containing the said words follow the decision of the Constituent Assembly as set out in para 24 of the report of the Provincial Constitution Committee, as adopted by the Constituent Assembly in July, 1947.

Drafting Committee : (i) That before the existing proviso to article 175, the following new proviso be inserted :

Provided that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is by this Constitution designed to fill.

(ii) That in the existing proviso to article 175, for the words “Provided that where there is only one House of the Legislature, and the Bill has been passed by that House, the Governor may, in his discretion” the words “Provided further that where there is only one House of the Legislature and the Bill has been passed by that House, the Governor may” be substituted. Note: The judges of almost all the High Courts have stressed the importance of preserving the independence of the judiciary. Some of the High Courts have suggested that all legislation affecting any High Court should be undertaken by the Union Parliament. The Drafting Committee considered the views of the judges and came to the conclusion that a provision for reservation by the Governor of Bills affecting the powers of the High Court for the consideration of the President on the lines of paragraph XVII(b) of the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935, should be included in the Draft. The Special Committee agreed with the Drafting Committee. To give effect to the above suggestion and also to the earlier suggestion of the Special Committee that all references to the exercise of functions by the Governor in his discretion should be omitted from the Draft Constitution, the proposed amendments would be necessary.

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Views of the Federal Court and of the Chief Justices of the Provincial High Courts: The same principle of independence of the judiciary and its freedom from the control of the executive in the administration of justice requires not merely that the appointment of judges should be free from party or political interference, but also that the jurisdiction of the High. Courts, the right to fix the salary, pension, leave and allowances of the judges should be taken out of the purview of the legislative power of the States and should be made Central subjects. The obvious desirability of maintaining uniformity in the position, status and the privileges of the judges of the High Courts in the States also reinforces our recommendation. If, however, it could not for any reason be accepted, legislation in respect of the above matters should be reserved for the President’s approval. In this connection. we should like to invite attention to para XVII(b) of the Instrument. of Instructions issued to the Governors on March 8, 1937, wherein it was provided that the consent of the Governor-General should be required in respect of “any Bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is by the Act designed to fill”. The alternative suggestion we have made above will ensure the continuance of this wholesome safeguard.

Note: The Drafting Committee has already considered this point and has recommended that a provision for reservation by the Governor of Bills affecting the powers of the High Court for the consideration of the President on the lines of paragraph XVII(b) of the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935, should be included in the Constitution and an amendment of article 175 has been suggested for the purpose. The Special Committee has also agreed to this amendment. It may be noted that the powers of the State Legislatures with regard to the constitution and organisation of High Courts have been severely restricted by various provisions contained in the Constitution. Judges are to be appointed by the President; they are removable by the President only on addresses by both Houses of Parliament-so that both appointment and removal have been taken out of the hands of the State authorities and vested in the Centre. Minimum salaries have also been fixed and there is the further provision that neither the salary of a judge nor his rights in respect of leave or pension shall be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. Then there is the provision that every High Court shall have unqualified superintendence over all courts throughout its territorial jurisdiction. Security of tenure, security of remuneration, security of revisional jurisdiction (in the form of superintendence) have all been assured by the Constitution itself. The fixing of the actual salaries has been left to the State concerned because they have to be paid out of the revenues of the State.

Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948: The Drafting Committee decided to omit the words “in his discretion” in the proviso to article 175.”

24. It is respectfully submitted that when the Article 175 of the draft constitution was taken up for debate during constituent assembly on 30th July 1949 (Volume 9), Dr. B.R. Ambedkar has proposed the amendment accepted by drafting committee to remove the discretionary power of Governor as he wanted the nominated Governor to act only on aid and advice of Council of Ministers

“That for the proviso to article 175 the following proviso be substituted :-

‘Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or

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Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message, and when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom”. ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1174 )

25. The following reason has been provided by Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar for the said amendment:

“Sir, this is in substitution of the old proviso. The old proviso contained three important provisions. The first was that it conferred power on the Governor to return a Bill before assent to the Legislature and recommend certain specific points for consideration. The proviso as it stood left the matter of returning the Bill to the discretion of himself. Secondly, the right to return the Bill with the recommendation was applicable to all Bills including money Bills. Thirdly, the right was given to the Governor to return the Bill only in those cases where the Legislature of a province was unicameral. It was felt then that in a responsible government there can be no room for the Governor acting on discretion. Therefore the new proviso deletes the word ‘In his discretion.’ Similarly it is felt that this right to return the Bill should not be extended to a money Bill and consequently the words ‘if it is not a money Bill‘ are introduced. It is also felt that this right of a Governor to return the Bill to the Legislature need not necessarily be confined to cases where the Legislature of the province is unicameral. It is a salutary provision and may be made use of in all case even where the Legislature of a province is bicameral.” ( Please refer Volume IV.21 of Pg 7972 – 7973 )

26. It is respectfully submitted that above proposed amendment to draft Article 175 was questioned by Brajeshwar Prasad as follows on 1st August 1949 (Volume 9) as he wanted the governor to veto bills in his discretion:

“ Sir, I am not whole-heartedly in favour of Article 175. Under this Article the Governor has no power to veto a Bill in his own discretion or initiative but can do so only if he is so advised by his Ministry. I am not in favour of this provision. Then, he cannot veto a Bill that has been twice passed by the Legislative Assembly; even that is not acceptable to me. He has not got power in his discretion to veto a Bill or to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. There are two classes of cases in which a Bill can be reserved for the consideration of the President. It can be so reserved under certain Article of this Constitution, and also if the Governor is advised by his Ministry to do so. I want that the Governor should have power in his discretion to veto a Bill passed by the legislature, whether passed once or twice by it. Secondly, I am in favour of the President having power to reserve a Bill for his consideration, on his own initiative and authority. He should have power to issue an order to the Governor directing that a Bill passed by the

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legislature should be reserved for his consideration, or that a Bill should be disallowed whether the Governor reserves it or not. I know that this proposition will not be in consonance with what is supposed to be the democratic tendencies of the age. People think they are living in a democratic age. But I feel that we are living in a totalitarian age. I want power to be vested in the hands of the Governor of vetoing unjust and unsound legislation. This provision occurs in the Canadian federation and I want this power in our Constitution having due regard to the facts of our political life. I feel further that if the governor has power to veto a Bill and the President has power to disallow a Bill, it will act as a potential check on disruptive legislative tendencies.” ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1172 – 1173 )

Further he added “The governor is not an outsider. He is the representative of the Government of India. His views should prevail either over the Lower House or over any other authority in the province.” . ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1172 – 1173

27. It is submitted that Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena has replied to the proposed amendment as follows:

“ I know he is the nominee of the President, but it is quite possible that the party in power in the province may not be the same as the party in power in the Centre and the President may not be persona grata with that party. I therefore think that it will introduce a very wrong principle to give the Governor this power to go against the express wish of the Assembly and even of the council. I think that the original proviso should remain and the Governor should have power to send back a Bill only where there is no Second Chamber.” ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1174 )

28. It is submitted that T. T. Krishnamachari, who is part of drafting committee has replied to the above questions and clarified as follows:

“ I am afraid my Friend. Mr. Shibban Lal Saksena, has entirely misconstrued the position. If he construes that this amendment is worse than the proviso in the draft article and that it makes for further dilatoriness in the proceedings of the legislatures in the provinces or the States as the case may be, I would ask him to remember one particular point to which Dr. Ambedkar drew pointed attention, viz., that the Governor will not be exercising his discretion in the matter of referring a Bill back to the House with a message. That provision has gone out of the picture The Governor is no longer vested with any discretion. If it happens that as per amendment No. 17 the Governor sends a Bill back for further consideration, he does so expressly on the advice of his Council of Ministers. The provision has merely been made to be used if an occasion arises when the formalities envisaged in article 172 which has already been passed, do not perhaps go through, but there is some point of the Bill which has been accepted by the Upper House which the Ministry thereafter finds has to be modified then they will use this procedure; they will use the Governor to hold up the further

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proceedings of the Bill and remit it back to the Lower House with his message. ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1174 )

If my honourable Friend understands that the Governor cannot act on his own, he can only act on the advice of the Ministry, then the whole picture will fall clearly in its proper place before him. It may happen that the whole procedure envisaged in Article 172 also goes through and then again something might have to be done in the manner laid down by this particular proviso but it is perhaps unlikely. It is a saving clause and vests power in the hands of the Ministry to remedy a hasty action that they might have undertaken or enable them to take an action which they feel they ought to in order to meet popular opinion which is reflected outside the House in some form or another and for this purpose only this new Proviso has been put in. It does not abridge the power of the responsible Ministry in any way and therefore, it does not detract from the power of the Lower House to which the Ministry is undoubtedly responsible; it does not confer any more power on the Governor. On the other hand it curtails the power of the Governor for the position envisaged in the original proviso which it seeks to supplant. I think with this explanation the House will agree to the amendments without any further discussion.” ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1174 )

Thereafter, the amendment proposed by Hon’ble B.R. Ambedkar was accepted after the above clarification. Thus, the Constituent Assembly consciously removed the discretion vested in the Governor, which was earlier available in the Government of India Act, 1935.

29. It is submitted that T. T. Krishnamachari on 17th October 1949 has moved the following amendment:

“That to article 175, the following proviso be added :-‘Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for consideration of the President any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is by this Constitution designed to fill.” ( please refer Vol IV.2 – Pg 1085 ) The reason for the amendment is explained by Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as follows:

“ Hon’ble B.R. Ambedkar – The clause moved by my friend Mr. Krishnamachari is of old standings & occurs in the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor of the provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935.

Paragraph 17 of the Instrument of Instructions says:

“Without prejudice to the generality of his powers as to reservation of Bills, our Governor shall not assent in our name to, but shall reserve for the consideration of our Governor-General any Bill or any of the clauses herein specified, i.e.

(b) any Bill which in his opinion would, if it became law so derogate from the powers of the High

Court as to endanger the position that that Court is, by the Act, designed to fulfil.”

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This clause is the old Instrument of Instructions the Drafting Committee had bodily copied in the Fourth Schedule which they had proposed to introduce and it will be found in Vol. II of the amendments at pages 368-369. In view of the fact that the

House on my recommendation came to the conclusion that for the reasons which I then stated it was unnecessary to have any such schedule containing instructions to the Governors of the States in Part I, it is felt by the Drafting Committee that, at any rate, that particular part of the proposed Instrument of Instructions, paragraph 17, should be incorporated in the Constitution itself. Now, Sir, the reasons for doing this are these:

The High Court are placed under the Centre as well as the Provinces. So far as the organisation and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court are concerned, they are undoubtedly under the Centre and the Province have no power either to alter the organisation of the High Court or the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. But with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction and the jurisdiction with regard to any matters that are mentioned in List II, the power rests under the new Constitution with the States. It is perfectly possible, for instance, for a State Legislature to pass a Bill to reduce the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court by raising the value of the suit that may be entertained by the High Court. That would be one way whereby the State would be in a position to diminish the authority of the High Court.

Secondly, in enacting any measure under any of the Entries contained in List II, for instance, debt cancellation or any such matter, it would be open for the Provinces to say that the decree made by any such Court or Board shall be final and conclusive, and that the High Court should have no jurisdiction in that matter at all.

It seems to me that any such Act would amount to a derogation from the authority of the High Court which this Constitution intends to confer upon it. Therefore, it is felt necessary that before such law becomes final, the President should have the opportunity to examine whether such a law should be permitted to take effect or whether such a law was so much in derogation of the authority of the High Court that the High Court merely remained a shell without any life in it.

I, therefore, submit that in view of the fact that the High Court is such an important institution intended by the Constitution to adjudicate between the Legislature and the Executive and between citizen and citizen such a power given to the President is a very necessary power to maintain an important institution which has been created by the Constitution. That is the purpose for which this amendment is being introduced.” ( please refer Vol IV 1086 – 1087 )

The amendment was adopted after the explanation by Hon’ble B.R. Ambedkar. This make it clear that bill could be reserved for consideration of President when it derogates the power of High court and no other circumstances.

30. It is submitted that a harmonious reading of Article 200 of the Constitution and intention of constituent assembly postulates the following conclusions

ARTICLE 200 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR

GOVERNOR

When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the

Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall

When the bill is presented to governor for assent, Governor on aid and advice of the council of minister can either

(a) Assent the bill or

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declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:

Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a

Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom:

Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this

Constitution designed to fill.

(b) Withhold the assent therefrom and return the bill with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill.

Provided that Governor shall not withhold assent when it passed again by houses with or without amendment or

(c) Reserve the bill for consideration of president

1. The Governor can only act on aid and advice of council of ministers for assent and withholding of assent when the bill is presented.

2. Withholding of assent can only be done to remedy a hasty situation only on the aid and advice of council of ministers as explained by T.T. Krishnamachari and note of constitutional advisor.

3. The bills could be reserved for consideration of President when it derogates the power of High court as explained by T.T. Krishnamachari.

31. Thus, the course of action available to the Governor under Article 200 when a Bill is presented for assent is illustrated in the following flowchart:

32



32. That one of the argument made by the Learned Solicitor General and raised by this Hon’ble Court is whether governor by withholding assent make the bills fall through as observed i State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh (1952) 1 SCC 528 (5JJ), Union of India vs Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324 (5JJ) ( please refer Vol V.9 – Pg 3768 ) and Hoechst Pharmaceutical vs. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45 (3JJ) ( please refer Vol V.10 – Pg 3159). There is no room for the governor to act on his own to withhold the Bill independently. A Bill “dies where it is born”; the Governor cannot, on his own, cause a Bill to lapse by independently withholding assent. The intention of the words “withholding Assent” has been explained in constituent assembly debates postulates that it can be only exercised under the aid and advice of ministers only to remedy a hasty action or when the ministry or government changes before the bill is assented by governor and new ministry or government does not want the bill to be enacted.

33. That the Article 163(1) of the constitution states that while discharging his functions as governor, he should abide by aid and advice of ministers, “except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion”. The words “by or under” restrict the scope of the discretionary power of the Governor. The

33

emphasis that the Governor may exercise his discretion only where he is ‘required’ expressly or by necessary implication by the Constitution to act in the exercise of his discretion. Therefore, Article 200 does not invest the Governor, expressly or by necessary implication, a general discretion in the performance of his functions.

34. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court in the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831, ( Para 17, 18, 54, 55, 56 ) ( Please Refer Vol V.7 of Judgment Compilation – Pg 2886 ), has postulates discretionary power available to governor under constitution as follows:

“17. It is necessary to find out as to why the words ‘in his discretion’ are used in relation to some powers of the Governor and not in the case of the President

18. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163 in the Constitution. The Draft Constitution in Article 144(6) said that the functions of the Governor under that article with respect to the appointment and dismissal of Ministers shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Draft Article 144(6) was totally omitted when Article 144 became Article 164 in the Constitution. Again Draft Article 153(3) said that the functions of the Governor under clauses (a) and (c) of clause (2) of the article shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Draft Article 153(3) was totally omitted when it became Article 174 of our Constitution. Draft Article 175 (proviso) said that the Governor “may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill”. Those words that “the Governor may in his discretion” were omitted when it became Article 200. The Governor under Article 200 may return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill. Draft Article 188 dealt with provisions in case of grave emergencies. Clauses (1) and (4) in Draft Article 188 used the words “in his discretion” in relation to exercise of power by the Governor. Draft Article 188 was totally omitted. Draft Article 285(1) and (2) dealing with composition and staff of Public Service Commission used the expression “in his discretion” in relation to exercise of power by the Governor in regard to appointment of the Chairman and Members and making of regulation. The words “in his discretion” in relation to exercise of power by the Governor were omitted when it became Article 316. In paragraph 15(3) of the Sixth Schedule dealing with annulment or suspension of Acts or suspension of Acts and resolutions of District and Regional Councils it was said that the functions of the Governor under the paragraph shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Sub-para 3 of para 15 of the Sixth Schedule was omitted at the time of enactment of the Constitution.

54. The provisions of the Constitution which expressly require the Governor to exercise his powers in his discretion are contained in articles to which reference has been made. To illustrate, Article 239(2) states that where a Governor is appointed an administrator of an adjoining Union territory he shall

34

exercise his functions as such administrator independently of his Council of Ministers. The other articles which speak of the discretion of the Governor are paragraphs 9(2) and 18(3) of the Sixth Schedule and Articles 371-A(1)(b), 371-A(1)(d) and 371-A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(f). The discretion conferred on the Governor means that as the constitutional or formal head of the State the power is vested in him. In this connection, reference may be made to Article 356 which states that the Governor can send a report to the President that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. Again Article 200 requires the Governor to reserve for consideration any Bill which in his opinion if it became law, would so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which the High Court is designed to fill under the Constitution.

55. In making a report under Article 356 the Governor will be justified in exercising his discretion even against the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that the failure of the constitutional machinery may be because of the conduct of the Council of Ministers. This discretionary power is given to the Governor to enable him to report to the President who, however, must act on the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters. In this context Article 163(2) is explicable that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity shall not be called in question. The action taken by the President on such a report is a different matter. The President acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers. In all other matters where the Governor acts in his discretion he will act in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The Constitution does not aim at providing a parallel administration within the State by allowing the Governor to go against the advice of the Council of Ministers.

56. Similarly Article 200 indicates another instance where the Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the Council of Ministers. In such matters where the Governor is to exercise his discretion he must discharge his duties to the best of his judgment. The Governor is required to pursue such courses which are not detrimental to the State.”

35. It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 ( please refer Vol V.22 – Pg 8619) postulates as follows:

“148. The above position leaves no room for any doubt that the Governor cannot be seen to have such powers and functions, as would assign to him a dominating position, over the State Executive and the State Legislature. The interpretation placed on Article 163(2), on behalf of the respondents, has just that effect, because of the following contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents. Firstly, whenever a question arises,

35

whether in discharging a particular function, the Governor can or cannot act in his own discretion. According to the respondents, the discretion of the Governor, on the above question, is final. Secondly, since the provision itself postulates, that “… the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion …”, according to the respondents, makes the Governor’s orders based on his own discretion, immune from judicial review. Accepting the above position, will convert the Governor into an all-pervading super-constitutional authority. This position is not acceptable because an examination of the executive and legislative functions of the Governor, from the surrounding provisions of the Constitution clearly brings out that the Governor has not been assigned any significant role either in the executive or the legislative functioning of the State. The position adopted on behalf of the appellants, on the other hand, augurs well in an overall harmonious construction of the provisions of the Constitution. Even on a cursory examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, we are inclined to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants.”

36. It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182 (please refer Vol V.17 Pg-6692, Para-76) postulates as follows:

“76. …The President or the Governor, as the case may be, as and when a Bill after having been passed is presented, may accord assent or as soon as possible thereafter return the Bill to the Houses with a message requesting to reconsider the Bill or any provisions thereof, including the introduction of any amendment as recommended in his message and if thereafter the Houses on reconsideration of the Bill, pass the Bill again with or without amendment and present the same for the assent, the President/Governor, as the case may be, shall not withhold his assent. Being an exercise pertaining to expression of political will, apparently, the will of the people expressed through the legislation passed by their elected representatives is given prominence by specifically providing for a compulsory consent or assent.”

37. It is submitted that the authority to enact laws is vested in the elected representatives of the people, ensuring that legislative decisions reflect the will of the public. The Governor cannot say that a Bill enacted by the legislature is unnecessary. If he has any suggestions while

36

returning the Bill, the same can be only on the aid and advise of the Cabinet. Such a scenario would arise mostly when a Government changes after the Bill has been enacted and sent to the Governor and the new Government wants the House to consider some modifications. In any case, the final authority to accept, modify, or reject the Governor’s suggestions rests solely with the legislature, which retains the ultimate decision-making power in the legislative process. The Governor is bound to accept the aid and advice of council of minister in performance of all functions under Article 200. The Bill is not a proposal of a legislature. To argue that it is a proposal is undermining the popular sovereign and the temple of democracy which is the Legislature. The enactment of a Bill is an expression of political will, apparently, the will of people expressed through the legislation passed by their elected representatives. The Legislature does not propose, it legislates. The act of legislation is a command that the statute will be law in the territory it governs.

38. It is respectfully submitted that If the Governor were to act without being bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, he would effectively transform into an allpervading super-constitutional authority—an entity wielding unchecked and arbitrary power beyond the constitutional design and democratic framework envisioned by the Constitution of India. To allow otherwise would upset the delicate balance of the parliamentary system, transforming the Governor into an unelected “super-constitutional” authority who could arbitrarily override the will of the legislature and the elected executive.

Most importantly, the Governor is not a constitutional court. He is not conferred with the power to decide questions of repugnancy or validity of legislation. His role is confined to acting on ministerial advice. If any repugnancy arises between a State law and a Union law, it duty of constitutional Court alone has the power to adjudicate such questions. The Governor cannot, under the guise of withholding or reserving for consideration of President, usurp the judicial function.

39. In The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025 SCC OnLine SC 770), ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12178 ), this Hon’ble Court has explicitly addressed the question regarding the extent to which the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution. The Court unequivocally held that, as a general principle, the Governor must act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. This principle forms the bedrock of constitutional governance within the framework of a parliamentary democracy, ensuring that

37

the real executive power rests with the elected government and that the Governor acts as a constitutional head rather than an independent authority. It reads as follows

“ 434. ……..

(XV) As the general rule, the Governor in exercise of his functions under Article 200 is required to abide by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The only exceptions to this rule can be traced to the second proviso to Article 200 and Article 163(1) of the Constitution. Thus, only in instances where the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion, would he be justified in exercising his powers under Article 200 contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers. Further, any exercise of discretion by the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 is amenable to judicial review.” ( please refer Vol V.31, Pg 12563).

Q5: In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit and the manner of exercise of the powers by the Governor, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of all powers under Article 200 of the Constitution of India by the Governor?

Q7: In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the President, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India?

( I ) DEMARCATION OF POWER BETWEEN UNION AND STATE – AS EXPLAINED BY HON’BLE DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR

40. It is respectfully submitted that the Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while moving resolution for adoption of constitution on November 26, 1949 has clearly explained the demarcation of power between union and state:

“The There is only one point of constitutional import to which I propose to make a reference. A serious complaint is made on the ground that there is too much of centralization and that the States have been reduced to municipalities. It is clear that this view is not only an exaggeration but is also founded on a misunderstanding of what exactly the Constitution contrives to do. As to the relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the

38

Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The States under our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the States are co-equal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a constitution can be called centralism. It may be that the Constitution assigns to the Centre a larger field for the operation of its legislative and executive authority than is to be found in any other federal Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers are given to the Centre and not to the States. But these features do not form the essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism, as I said, lies in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the Centre and the units by the Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our Constitution. There can be no mistake about it. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the States have been placed under the Centre. The Centre cannot by its own will alter the boundary of that partition. Nor can the judiciary. For as has been well said :

Courts may modify, they cannot replace. They can revise earlier interpretations as new arguments, new points of view are presented, they can shift the dividing line in marginal cases, but there are barriers they cannot pass, definite assignments of power they cannot reallocate. They can give a broadening construction of existing powers, but they cannot assign to one authority powers explicitly granted to another.

The first charge of centralization defeating federalism must therefore fall.

The second charge is that the Centre has been given the power to override the States. This charge must be admitted. But before condemning the Constitution for containing such overriding powers, certain considerations must be borne in mind. The first is that these overriding powers do not form the normal feature of the Constitution. Their use and operation are expressly confined to emergencies only.”

Federalism, as explained by Hon’ble B.R. Ambedkar, rests on the principle that the executive and legislative authority of the States flows directly from the Constitution and not from the Centre, and that both the Centre and the States are co-equal within their respective spheres. This federal compact was never intended to be subverted by allowing the Governor – a mere constitutional head – to obstruct or paralyse the functioning of the elected State government. The absence of a rigid time-line in Article 200 for a Governor to act on Bills must be understood in this constitutional context. It was never designed to confer a carte blanche upon Governors to sit on Bills indefinitely. On the contrary, as Ambedkar himself stressed, overriding powers or extraordinary discretion are exceptional and confined strictly to emergencies; they are not meant to become a “normal feature of the Constitution.” To now permit Governors to exploit this textual silence as a means of delaying, withholding, or

39

nullifying the legislative will of the people amounts to a grave distortion of the Constitution’s design.

The principle of responsible government mandates that the Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and that legislation duly passed by the elected Legislature cannot be held hostage to gubernatorial inaction. To interpret Article 200 otherwise is to undermine federalism, reduce State autonomy to a shadow, and invert Ambedkar’s solemn assurance that States are not mere municipalities subservient to the Union.

Furthermore, if discretion is conferred upon the Governor to decide whether or not Bills should become law, the delicate constitutional balance would be irreparably disrupted. Such an interpretation would place an unelected constitutional head in a position superior to the people’s elected representatives, thereby frustrating the very foundation of parliamentary democracy. It would convert the Governor into an alternate centre of legislative authority, a role never envisioned by the framers. By enabling one individual to effectively veto or stall the will of an entire Legislature, the Constitution would be rendered unworkable in practice, federalism hollow in substance, and democracy reduced to a constitutional façade.

41. It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1( Please Refer Volume V.45 of Judgments Compilation Pg 17934 ) in defines Democracy and postulates as follows:

“Democracy, which has been best defined as the government of the people, by the people and for the people, expects prevalence of genuine orderliness, positive propriety, dedicated discipline and sanguine sanctity by constant affirmance of constitutional morality which is the pillar stone of good governance. While dealing with the concept of democracy, the majority in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1975 Supp SCC 1] , stated that “democracy” as an essential feature of the Constitution is unassailable. The said principle was reiterated in T.N. Seshan, CEC of India v. Union of India [(1995) 4 SCC 611] and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India [Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1] . It was pronounced with asseveration that democracy is the basic and fundamental structure of the Constitution. There is no shadow of doubt that democracy in India is a product of the rule of law and aspires to establish an egalitarian social order. It is not only a political philosophy but also an embodiment of constitutional philosophy.”

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42. That the Constitution vests sovereign power in the people, who elect State Governments for a fixed tenure of five years with the expectation that their chosen representatives will deliver governance and implement policies promised in their manifestos. An elected Government comes to power with a mandate for specific programmes, reforms, and legislative measures. These must be enacted and implemented within that limited constitutional window of five years. If crucial Bills are stalled, indefinitely withheld, or sent into oblivion by the Governor, the very essence of representative democracy is rendered meaningless.

The details regarding the time taken by the Governor in discharging functions under Article 200 (in the bills which are deemed to have been given assent) , and by the President in exercising functions under Article 201 (The Tamil Nadu Admission to Undergraduate Medical Degree Courses Bill, 2021, have been enclosed herewith.

( II ) TIME TAKEN BY GOVERNOR WITH RESPECT TO THE BILLS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN ASSENT BY THIS HON’BLE COURT

NAME OF THE

BILL

PASSED ON

RETURN

THE BILL

WITH

MESSAGE

ON

REPASSED

ON

RESERVED FOR

THE

CONSIDERATION

OF HON’BLE

PRESIDENT

TOTAL

TIME

TAKEN

Bill No. 2/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu

Fisheries

University Act, 2012.

13.01.2020

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

1416 days (46 months, 16 days)

Bill No 12/2020 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and

Animal Sciences

University Act,

1989”

18.10.2020

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

1137 days (37 months, 11 days)

Bill No 24/2022 namely “The bill to amend the Universities laws. The Vice Chancellors of all

28.04.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

580 days (19 months, 1 day)

41

Universities

(except

University of Madras) to be appointed by the Government instead of Governor.”

Bill No 29/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University Act, 1996”.

16.05.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

562 days (18 months, 13 days)

Bill No 39/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu

Dr. M.G.R.

Medical

University,

Chennai, Act,

1987”.

16.05.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

562 days (18 months, 13 days)

Bill No 40/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu

Agricultural University Act, 1971”.

16.05.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

562 days (18 months, 13 days)

Bill No 48/2022 namely “A bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu

Universities

Laws.”

27.10.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

398 days (13 months, 2 days)

Bill No 55/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil

University Act,

1982.”

27.10.2022

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

398 days (13 months, 2 days)

Bill No 15/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu

Fisheries

University Act,

2012.”

28.04.2023

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

215 days (7 months, 1 day)

42

Bill No 18/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act, 1989”.

28.04.2023

Assent withheld on 13.11.2023.

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of the President on 28.11.2023.

215 days (7 months, 1 day)

( III ) TIME TAKEN BY HON’BLE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR – THE TAMIL NADU

ADMISSION TO UNDERGRADUATE MEDICAL DEGREE COURSES BILL, 2021

NAME OF THE

BILL

PASSED ON

RETURN

THE BILL

WITH

MESSAGE

ON

REPASSED

ON

RESERVED FOR THE

CONSIDERATION OF HON’BLE

PRESIDENT

WITHHELD

ASSENT

ON

The Tamil Nadu Admission to

Undergraduate

Medical

Degree Courses

Bill, 2021

13.09.2021

01.02.2022

08.02.2022

04.05.2022

27.02.2025

Total Time taken by governor in reserving the bill for the consideration of Hon’ble President is 227 days (7 Months, 15 days).

Time taken by Hon’ble president for withholding Assent is 1031 days (33 Month, 24 days).

The details of time taken by the Hon’ble president in assenting the bills passed by Parliament is annexed herein as Annexure- I

The Governors—unelected appointees of the Union—have arrogated to themselves the role of a “super Chief Minister”, frustrating the implementation of the people’s mandate. By sitting on Bills for years, as has been the case in Tamil Nadu where legislation has been obstructed for nearly four years, Governors are not merely exercising delay; they are usurping the sovereign authority of the electorate and sabotaging governance. This conduct is not only undemocratic but also unconstitutional. The Governor is not meant to be a political counterweight to an elected Government, nor a supervisory authority capable of vetoing policies endorsed by the people. He is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and to respect the will of the Legislature.

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Indeed, the framers of the Constitution – led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar – deliberately chose the model of a nominated Governor rather than an elected one, precisely to avoid the creation of two competing centres of democratic legitimacy in a State. An elected Governor could have claimed to rival the authority of the elected Legislature and Government, thereby destabilising the constitutional balance. To now permit nominated Governors to act as if they were alternate power centres is to defeat the very rationale on which the office was conceived.

Such obstruction strikes at the heart of federalism and democracy. It is nothing less than assault on constitution, reducing the will of millions to the whim of one unelected functionary. The Governor’s role was never intended to be that of an alternate Government or a parallel centre of power; to allow it to continue is to erode the very principle that in a democracy, it is the people—and only the people—who are supreme.

( IV ) CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE – MUST BE IMBUED WITH SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT BY INFUSING THEM WITH A MEANING WHICH ENHANCES THE RULE OF LAW

43. It is submitted that this constitutional silence cannot be abused. The written Constitution seeks to state only what is indispensable. Constitutional silences and abeyances represent those deliberate or incidental gaps within a constitutional framework that remain unoccupied. A Constitution, by its very nature, cannot foresee and codify every conceivable circumstance or eventuality. Instead, it relies on certain silences – sometimes deliberate, sometimes structural. This interpretive exercise falls to the judiciary, which acts as the sentinel on the qui vive, ensuring that such gaps are not exploited for arbitrary or destructive ends. By invoking what is often termed the doctrine of silence, courts breathe meaning into these abeyances, harmonising them with the overall constitutional ethos. That Dr. Rajendra Prasad in his address to the Constituent Assembly while moving the resolution for the adoption of the Constitution stated as follows:

“ ..We have prepared a democratic Constitution. But successful working of democratic institutions requires in those who have to work them willingness to respect the viewpoints of others, capacity for compromise and accommodation. Many things which cannot be written in a constitution are done by conventions. Let me hope that we shall show those capacities and develop those conventions. The way in which we have been able to draw this Constitution without taking recourse to voting and to divisions in lobbies strengthens that hope.

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Whatever the Constitution may or may not provide, the welfare of the country will depend upon the way in which the country is administered. That will depend upon the men who administer it. It is a trite saying that a country can have only the Government it deserves. Our Constitution has provisions in it which appear to some to be objectionable from one point or another. We must admit that the defects are inherent in the situation in the country and the people at large. If the people who are elected are capable and men of character and integrity, they would be able to make the best even of a defective Constitution. If they are lacking in these, the Constitution cannot help the country. After all, a constitution like a machine is a lifeless thing. It acquires life because of the men who control it and operate it, and India needs today nothing more than a set of honest men who will have the interest of the country before them.”

44. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court bears the solemn duty to interpret and declare what such silences denote. It requires the judiciary to act as the guardian of constitutional morality, ensuring that the silences are not misused to undermine democracy, federalism, or the rule of law. In this endeavour, the intent of the framers assumes paramount significance. The silences cannot be treated as unregulated spaces for executive opportunism, but must be construed in light of the framers’ vision, the debates of the Constituent Assembly, and the structural scheme of responsible government. Thus, every interpretation of a constitutional silence must be firmly anchored in constitutional text, spirit, and history. By doing so, the Court transforms silence into meaning—not as an innovation divorced from the Constitution, but as an extension of its underlying principles.

Considering the fact that the fundamental rights of every citizens are involved in delaying in deciding the bills and considering the Lackadaisical approach of governor in deciding the bills. The time has come for this Hon’ble Court to lay down, in unequivocal terms, that the absence of a fixed timeline under Article 200 cannot be construed as conferring unfettered discretion upon the Governor. Only by prescribing such a timeline can the Court ensure fidelity to constitutional morality, preserve the federal balance, and give effect to the framers’ clear vision that the Governor is a nominal head, not a political veto-holder over the will of the Legislature.

It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1 ( Please Refer Volume V.37 of Judgments Compilations Pg 14128) while interpreting the expression cease to operate in Article 213 (2) (a) of the constitution postulates as follows:

45

“ 91.. The preservation of this constitutional value is necessary for parliamentary democracy to survive on the sure foundation of the rule of law and collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature. The silences of the Constitution must be imbued with substantive content by infusing them with a meaning which enhances the rule of law..”

45. That the silence in constitution must be interpreted in consonance with the intent of the framers and the structural principles of the Constitution. Where the text is silent, meaning must be derived not from expediency or executive convenience, but from the foundational values of parliamentary democracy, rule of law, and responsible government.

46. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 8 SCC 1, ( please refer Vol V.28, Pg 11250). postulates as follows:

“As the organ entrusted with the task of interpreting the laws and the Constitution, the word of this Court is final. Undoubtedly its role is as a co-equal branch of governance; nevertheless, its duty to interpret the law and say what its silences (or ambiguities) denote, in the particular contexts that it has to contend with, involve making choices. These choices are not made randomly, or arbitrarily [ Michael Kirby, “Indian and Australian Constitutional Law : A Recent Study in Contrasts”, (2018) 60 JILI 1, p. 30; Also see Herbert Weschler, “Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”, (1959) 73 Harv L Rev 1.] , but based on a careful analysis of the rights involved, the remedies proposed by the legislative or executive measure, the extent of limits imposed by the Constitution, and so on. The history of the legislation or the measure, or indeed the provision of the Constitution plays a role in this process. Interpretation involves an element of line drawing, of making choices. This Court’s decisions are replete with such instances. The doctrine of classification is the first instance where this Court drew a line, and indicated a choice of interpretation of Article 14; likewise, right from Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re [Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re, 1959 SCR 995 : AIR 1958 SC 956] to T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] , a textually absolute fundamental right i.e. Article 30 has been interpreted not to prevent regulation for maintenance of educational standards, and legislation to prevent maladministration. Yet, whenever a choice is made in the interpretation of a provision of this Constitution, and a limit indicated by a decision, it is on the basis of principle and principle alone.” ( please refer Vol V.28, Para 29 Pg 11250 ).

46

That Judiciary as organ and this Hon’ble court has duty to interpret the constitution and to declare what the silences and ambiguities of the Constitution truly denote. Further, it is a constitutional duty of this Hon’ble Court to ensure that silences are not left open to abuse, but are filled with meaning that sustains constitutional morality and advances the larger public interest and will of the people.

47. It is humbly submitted the basic structure doctrine itself is the finest example of how this Hon’ble Court has interpreted constitutional silence. The Constitution nowhere expressly stipulates that Parliament is barred from altering its basic features, nor does it contain a textual reference to a “basic structure”. Yet, this Hon’ble court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225, ( please refer V.4 Pg 1564 ), this Court drew upon the silences of the Constitution, its scheme, its underlying philosophy, and the history of its making to evolve the principle that while the Constitution can be amended, its foundational core cannot be destroyed.

48. It is humbly submitted that Justice Chelameshwar, in his concurring opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, ( please refer Vol V.22 Pg 8716 ), eloquently described such doctrines as the “Constitution’s dark matter” – those invisible yet indispensable elements that give shape, meaning, and coherence to the constitutional universe. Like dark matter in physics, these elements are not directly observable in the text, but without them the Constitution would collapse into incoherence. The implications arising from the scheme of the Constitution—federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, rule of law, and liberty—constitute this “dark matter” and are as essential as the enumerated text. He postulates as follows:

“ 345. The implications arising from the scheme of the Constitution are “Constitution’s dark matter” and are as important as the express stipulations in its text. The principle laid down by this Court in Kesavananda [Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225] , that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be abrogated, is the most outstanding and brilliant exposition of the “dark matter” and is a part of our Constitution, though there is nothing in the text suggesting that principle. The necessity of probing seriously and respectfully into the invisible portion of the Constitution cannot be ignored without being disrespectful to the hard earned political freedom and the declared aspirations of the liberty of “We the People of India”. The text of enumerated fundamental rights is “only the primary source of expressed information” as to what is meant by

liberty proclaimed by the Preamble of the Constitution. ( please refer Vol V.22 Pg 9236 ),

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346. To embrace a rule that the text of the Constitution is the only material to be looked at to understand the purpose and scheme of the Constitution would not only be detrimental to liberties of subjects but could also render the administration of the State unduly cumbersome. Fortunately, this Court did not adopt such a rule of interpretation barring exceptions like Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan

v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 : AIR 1950 SC 27 : 1950 SCR 88] and ADM, Jabalpur [ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207] . Else, this Court could not have found the freedom of press under Article 19(1)(a) and the other rights [Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.

v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305“29. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way and not in a narrow and pedantic sense. Certain rights have been enshrined in our Constitution as fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content of those rights the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language of the Constitution in so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand the Court must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable the citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure subject, of course, to permissible restrictions. Bearing this principle in mind it would be clear that the right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one’s ideas, opinions and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication, subject again to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of Article 19. The first decision of this Court in which this was recognised is Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1514. There, this Court held that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that this freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. In that case this Court has also pointed out that freedom of speech and expression are the foundation of all democratic organisations and are essential for the proper functioning of the processes of democracy.” (AIR p. 311, para 29)] which were held to be flowing from the guarantee under Article 21. Romesh Thappar [Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1514] and Sakal Papers [Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305 : (1962) 3 SCR 842] are the earliest acknowledgment by this Court of the existence of the Constitution’s dark matter. The series of cases in which this Court subsequently perceived various rights in the expression “life” in Article 21 is a resounding confirmation of such acknowledgment.” ( please refer Vol V.22 Pg 9236 – 9237),

49. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court, in a catena of judgments, has consistently held that constitutional silences are not empty spaces but fertile ground for principled interpretation. These silences have been imbued with substantive content, so as to preserve the vitality of the Constitution as a living document. The following case law demonstrates this trajectory:

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CASE NAME

INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE BY

THIS COURT

Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 680 ( Please Refer V.53 of Judgment Compilations – Pg

20782 – 20784 ).

Recognising the silence of the Constitution and statutory law in protecting women against sexual harassment at the workplace. This court rather than treating this silence as a void, the Court filled it by laying down binding guidelines, drawing upon Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, and international conventions. This case is a classic example of how constitutional silence was judicially transformed into a source of rights-protection.

Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010)

12 SCC 1 ( Please Refer

V.53 of Judgment Compilations – Pg

20771 ).

While dealing with validity of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007, on the ground that the Constitution was silent on no-confidence motions against the Chairperson of a Panchayat. Rejecting this contention, the Court held that the Constitution cannot be read as excluding such mechanisms merely because they were not expressly provided for. The court relied on Michael Foley treatise on The Silence of Constitutions (Routledge, London and New York) and agreed that in a Constitution “abeyances are valuable, therefore, not in spite of their obscurity but because of it. They are significant for the attitudes and approaches to the Constitution that they evoke, rather than the content or substance of their strictures”

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 and Sakal Papers v. Union of

India AIR 1962 SC 305

( Please Refer V.52 of Judgment

Compilations – Pg

20416 – 20417 ).

This Hon’ble court interpreted Article 19(1)(a) beyond its text to encompass freedom of the press, even though the Constitution does not expressly mention it.

Rajasthan Electricity

Board v. Mohan Lal

This Hon’ble court expanded the scope of term “State” in Article 12 to include wide variety of instrumentalities.

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AIR 1967 SC 1857 ( Please Refer V.52 of Judgment

Compilations – Pg

20521 – 20522 ).

Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic

Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC

294 ) ( Please Refer V.53 of Judgment Compilations – Pg 20647 – 20648 ) and People’s Union for

Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 ( Please Refer V.53 of Judgment

Compilations – Pg

20713 – 20714 ).

This Hon’ble court expanded that right to know about public functionaries, including the antecedents of electoral candidates is a facet of Article 19(1)(a). These interpretations arose from the Court reading into silences, to make democratic participation meaningful.

Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , ( please refer Vol V.9, Pg 3504)

This Hon’ble court expanded the phrase “procedure established by law” in Article 21 and held that procedure must be “just, fair and reasonable.” Article 21 has since been interpreted to encompass a wide array of unenumerated rights – dignity, privacy, livelihood, education, environment- none of which are mentioned in the text but flow from its silences.

50. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331, ( please refer Vol, V 22, 788 ) while interpreting Article 156 which grants governor can hold office “during the pleasure of the President.” and dealing with removal of governor held that a Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is not in sync or refuses to act as an agent of the party in power at the Centre.

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51. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [Election Commission Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161 ( Please Refer V.48 of Judgment Compilations – Pg 18908 – 18909 ) invoked Article 142 to fill the legislative vacuum in appointment of Chief Election commissioner and postulates as follows:

“ 445. This Court has plenary power under Article 142 to issue directions to do “complete justice”. An analysis of the judgments of this Court shows that the Court has created a jurisprudence, where it has exercised its power under Article 142 to fill legislative gaps. [ Krishnan R.H. and Bhaskar A., “Article 142 of the Indian Constitution : On the Thin Line between Judicial Activism and Restraint” in Salman Khurshid and others (eds), Judicial Review : Process, Powers, and Problems (Essays in Honour of Upendra Baxi) (Cambridge University Press 2020).] Reference can also be made to the speech given by Dr B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly on 4-11-1948, where he noted that the Drafting Committee had tried to include detailed processes to avoid the misuse of power. Dr Ambedkar was emphasising on a constitutional design which would prevent arbitrariness by laying down legal procedures to regulate power. [ .]

455. That Article 324(2) refers to the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners which shall, subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President. It contemplates that Parliament makes a law laying down the procedure of selection for appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners, but such law has not been made by Parliament, even after 73 years since the adoption of the Constitution. In order to fill the legislative vacuum i.e. the absence of any law made by Parliament for the appointment of members of the Election Commission and in the light of the views expressed in various reports of the Law Commission, Election Commission, etc. this Court is of the considered view that the instant case thus aptly calls for the exercise of the power of this Court under

Article 142 to lay down guidelines to govern the process of selection and removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners, till the legislature steps in.”

( V ) INDISCRIMINATE USE OF ARTICLE 356 HAVE BEEN CURBED THROUGH S.R. BOMMAI CASE

52. It is submitted that It is respectfully submitted that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, one of the principal architects of the Constitution, had clarified during the Constituent Assembly Debates that Article 356 was intended to remain a “dead letter” to be invoked only in the rarest of rare situations of genuine constitutional breakdown. However, constitutional practice proved

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otherwise. Since 1950, Article 356 has been invoked more than 134 times across States and Union Territories. The Sarkaria Commission (Please refer Chapter VI, Emergency Provisions) found that at least one-third of these instances were politically motivated and to suit the political interests of the party in power in the Union, deployed not to address breakdowns of constitutional machinery but to dislodge democratically elected State Governments led by political opponents of the ruling party at the Centre.

53. This Hon’ble Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, put a decisive check on this misuse by laying down strict guidelines. This Hon’ble Court held unequivocally that: “The arm of this Hon’ble Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it may be found, for no authority created by the Constitution is beyond the reach of the law.” Neither exalted office nor nomenclature of “constitutional functionary” can shield unconstitutional action from judicial scrutiny. The Court unanimously affirmed that Presidential Proclamations under Article 356 are subject to judicial review, and further emphasised that Article 356 can only be a measure of last resort in cases of proven constitutional breakdown—not an instrument of political convenience. The jurisprudence in Bommai led to a significant decline in the arbitrary invocation of Article 356, marking a watershed moment in preserving federal balance and the autonomy of elected State Governments.

54. Today, however, an analogous misuse is witnessed in a different form. Governors, by exploiting the textual silence in Article 200, are indefinitely withholding assent to Bills duly passed by State Legislatures, keeping them pending at their personal discretion and frustrating the will of the people. This practice, like the earlier misuse of Article 356, amounts to a subversion of federalism and democratic governance. Therefore, just as this Hon’ble Court stepped in through Bommai to curb the abuse of Article 356, it is now imperative for this Court to exercise its constitutional duty to ensure that gubernatorial inaction under Article 200 does not become a new weapon of obstruction. The Court’s arm must once again be “long enough” to reach this injustice, set a judicially manageable timeline for constitutional functionaries to act, and uphold the rule of law by protecting the sovereignty of the people as expressed through their elected Legislatures.

( VI ) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CANNOT BE TAKEN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND STATE

GOVERNMNET CANNOT BE INDULGED IN LITIGATION INDEFINETLY

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55. It is respectfully submitted that the draft Article 91 (Present Article 111) of the constitution of India had mandated 6 weeks of timeline for president to act upon bills and reads as follows:

“91. When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament, it shall be presented to the President, and the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill, or that he withholds assent therefrom:

Provided that the President may, not later than six weeks after the presentation to him of a Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill to the Houses with a message requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified provision thereof, and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message, and the Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly.”

The drafting committee in their note before recommending the amendment has explained the need for replacing the words as soon as possible;

“ Note: In the proviso to article 91, a time-limit of six weeks has been fixed for the President to return a Bill for reconsideration by the Houses of Parliament. Parliament may not be in session during that period, nor may it be possible to summon Parliament for a long time afterwards. The best course would, therefore, be to leave it to the President to return the Bill as soon as possible without fixing any time-limit, so that Parliament, if not in session, may consider the Bill immediately upon re-assembling.

Some critics have expressed the view that there should be a provision similar to that contained in the proviso to article 175 that if after a Bill has been returned by the President to the Houses of Parliament for reconsideration, the Bill is passed again by the Houses with or without amendment and presented to the President for assent, the President shall not withhold assent therefrom. There does not appear to be any objection to the inclusion of such a provision in article 91 to bring it into line with article 175.

Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948: The Drafting Committee decided to sponsor the amendments proposed by it.”

This makes intention behind the constitutional makers clear that president and governor are constitutionally obliged to act upon Bills as soon as possible without delay, always guided by the aid and advice of their respective Councils of Ministers.

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56. It is humbly submitted that when the amendment to replace six week with phrase as soon as possible was debated on 20th May 1949, the H.V. Kamath stated as follows:

“ That such an experienced man, not only an experienced public man, but an experienced Minister of the State cannot recognise the distinction between a definite period of time and the word “as soon as possible” rather appears to me strange, to say the least. In human nature, if you will permit me to say so, unless there is a compelling sense of duty of service, there is always a tendency to procrastinate.

Our wisemen have recognised this by saying:

Alasyam hi manuyanamsh, Sharirasyo maharipuh.

This tendency to inertia, this inclination to procrastinate has to be rooted out, by infusing the ideal of duty or service. We cannot be sure that every President of the Union of India will always be guided by this ideal, by this compelling ideal of duty and service. Of course we hope and party that it may be so, but there is no guarantee. Therefore, it is very necessary, to my mind, that the Constitution should provide specifically a time limit for a contingency of this nature. As a minister, Dr. Ambedkar, I am sure, must be aware that in the Secretariat various files are knocking about with tags of labels attached to them, some being “Immediate”, some “urgent,” some “early” and so on. Files marked “Immediate” reach the honourable Minister in a day, those marked “urgent” reach him in a couple of days and those marked “early” have been known to sleep in the Secretariat for two of three months. Further latterly, Government has devised new forms such as “consideration” and ‘active consideration”. I therefore wish to obviate any difficulty arising from substitution of the words “as soon as possible”. Nobody knows what they mean, what “as soon as” means. We know in the Legislative Assembly Ministers are in the habit of answering questions by saying “as soon as possible”. When we ask, ” When will this thing be lone?” the answer is “As soon as possibly or very soon.” But six months later, the same question is put, and the answer is again, “As soon as possible,” or “very soon”. This phrase is vague, purposeless and meaningless and it should not find a place in the Constitution, especially in an article of this nature where we specify that the President must do a thing within a certain period of time. Why do we do it? We do it in order to see that Bills are not left hanging fire in the President’s Secretariat–and I know his secretariat is not going to be different in any way from other secretariats. And so I request Dr. Ambedkar to withdraw his amendment. It serves no purpose whatsoever, and I request that the article which is quite clear as it stands may be passed. I oppose the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar and support that moved by Mr. Misra.” ( please refer Vol IV. 2 936 – 937 )

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The fear of H.V. Kamath has now turned into reality that Governors in several States have sought refuge under the literal wording of “as soon as possible” to sit on Bills for months, even years, thereby paralysing the functioning of elected governments and negating the legislative will of the people. Such conduct amounts to a constitutional fraud, a distortion of the text, and a betrayal of the very spirit of parliamentary democracy. The framers were unequivocal that the Governor, like the President, is not an independent centre of power but a nominal head, bound to give effect to the decisions of the Cabinet. Any attempt to convert “as soon as possible” into a shield for inaction or delay is plainly unconstitutional, militates against the doctrine of responsible government, and strikes at the heart of federalism.”

57. That the phrase “as soon as possible” implies a requirement of reasonable promptness, aimed at preventing any undue delay in the legislative process of the State legislature concerning the particular Bill.

58. This Hon’ble Court, in State of Telangana vs. Secretary to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana and Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 405, Para 2, ( please refer Vol V.29, Pg 11691), has emphasized that the expression “as soon as possible” carries significant constitutional weight and must be diligently observed by constitutional authorities, Vol V.29, Pg 11692. Similarly, in State of Punjab vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor and Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 384, Para 24, ( please refer Vol V.29, Pg 11660 ) , the Court interpreted this phrase as imposing a constitutional mandate for expedition. The Constitution clearly enshrines this provision recognizing the paramount importance of legislative power, which rests squarely within the domain of the State Legislature. Therefore, the Governor is not at liberty to keep a Bill pending indefinitely without taking timely action.

59. It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court, while examining the decisions in A.G. Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA (2023) 8 SCC 257, (please refer Vol V.29), Pg 11586 and Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 36, ( please refer Vol V.3, Pg 1185) observed that although a specific time-limit was not provided within which the Governor must act, this cannot be interpreted to permit the Governor to indefinitely delay or avoid taking action on bills presented for assent, thereby effectively stalling the State’s legislative process. Further, the Court clarified that prescribing a general timeframe within which the Governor is expected to exercise powers does not equate to amending the constitutional text by inserting a formal time-limit. Rather, it reinforces the constitutional expectation of expedition and urgency that has been emphasized repeatedly since the Constitution’s adoption. The Court explained that the prescribed

55

timeframe should not be viewed as an inflexible mandate that would automatically result in the bill’s deemed assent upon non-compliance by the Governor. Instead, this prescription is better understood through the lens of judicial review.

60. It further submitted that comparable provisions in other constitutions—such as Article 75 of the Constitution of Pakistan or Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution—where failure by the President to act within the prescribed timeframe results in the bill being deemed assented.

“Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution

Clause 1 Revenue

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Clause 2 Role of President

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its

Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.” ( please refer Vol IV., Pg 1690 – 1691 ),

“ Article 75 of the Constitution of Pakistan

75. (1) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent, the President shall, within [ten] days,—

(a) assent to the Bill; or

(b) in the case of a Bill other than a Money Bill, return the Bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with a message requesting that the Bill or any specified provision thereof, be reconsidered and that any amendment specified in the message be considered.”

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61. It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. (2021) 16 SCC 503, ( please refer Vol V.29, Pg 11555) , at Paragraph 30, established a “three months outer limit” for the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions, recognizing this as a constitutional function despite absence of stipulated timeline. ( please refer Vol V.29, Pg 11577)

62. It is humbly submitted that the Sarkaria Commission, in its Report on Centre-State Administrative Relations concerning Public Order, recommended that the Governor should act “within one month from the date on which the Bill is presented.” (See Para 5.16.04, Chapter V.) Similarly, the Punchhi Committee Report on Centre-State Relations suggested that the Governor’s exercise of power under Article 200 should be subject to a maximum time limit of six months from the date the Bill is presented. ( please refer Vol IV.3, Pg 1315)

63. It is humbly submitted that the office memorandum dated 04.02.2016 has been issued by Ministry of Home affairs imposing timeline in respect of bills reserved under Article 200 for consideration of President and reads as follows: ( The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770, ( Para 385,387 please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12526))

“Urgent

State Bill File No. 23/18/2015-Judl & PP (Part III)

Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home

Affairs/Grih Mantralaya (Judicial & PP Section)

NDCG-II Building, 4” Floor Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001

The February 4th of 2016

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject : Guidelines on State Legislations – regarding.

The undersigned is directed to invite to this Ministry’s D.O. letter no : 23/33/1992Judi dated 22.09.1992 duly conveying the guidelines formulated and approved by the Cabinet for disposal of State legislative proposals. Despite these clear guidelines, it is observed that undue delay is caused in taking a final decision on such Bills.

2. The matter has been recently reviewed and a set of supplementary guidelines for expeditious examination and disposal of State Legislative proposals by the Central Ministries/Departments/State Governments has been formulated. These are stated below for strict adherence:

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State Bills/Legislative proposals are to be examined in such a way that objections/views of the concerned Central Departments/Ministries, if any, be meaningful as addressing the unreasonable queries/observations delays the entire process.

ii). A time limit of maximum 3 months be strictly adhered to for finalizing the Bills

after their receipt from the State Governments.

iii). The Ministry concerned should communicate their view on substantive issues within 15 days from the date of receipt of communication and if they are not able to communicate, they should mention the reasons for the delay. In case Departments/Ministries are not able to communicate their comments/views in a period of one month, it will be construed that they have no comments to offer on the proposal.

iv). The substantive issues involved in the Bills should be dealt by the Ministries concerned and issues relating to language/drafting and Bill’s constitutional validity should be checked by the Ministry of Law.

v). As regards Ordinances, which are of urgent nature and are promulgated in view of the urgency, presently a time limit of 2 weeks has been permitted to the Ministries/Departments concerned for offering their views, but often the comments are not received within the prescribed time limit. Hence, as in the case of State Bills, if the Ministries/Departments are not able to communicate their comments/views on the Ordinances in a period of two weeks, it will be construed that they have no comments to offer on the proposal, and MHA will process in consultation with D/o Legal Affairs of the M/o Law and Justice so as to dispose the Ordinances off within a period of one month from the date of their receipt in the MHA.

3. It is requested that all State Bills/Ordinances be processed in the light of aforesaid guidelines and within the time limit as specified. All the currently pending Bills/Ordinances may be reviewed urgently in terms of above guidelines in order to ensure their disposal within three weeks’ time.

4. The receipt of this letter may kindly be acknowledged.

Sd/-

Thangkholun Haokip

Under Secretary to the Govt. of India

Tel./Fax : 011-23438095”

Urgent

State Bill File No. 23/18/2015-Judl & PP (Part III)

Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya (Judicial & PP Section)

NDCG-II Building, 4” Floor Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001

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The February 4th of 2016

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject : Guidelines on State Legislations – regarding.

The undersigned is directed to say that the Ministry of Home Affairs is the nodal Ministry for processing and conveying a final decision with respect to State Legislations under Article 201 read with Article 254(2) of the Constitution; State Legislations requiring previous sanction of the President under Article 304(b) of the Constitution and Ordinances for the instructions of the President under Article 213(1) etc.

2. On receipt of such a reference, this Ministry examines and seeks the views of the concerned Central Departments/Ministries. Once the views of the Central Departments/Ministries concerned are obtained, these are again examined and in case of any objections, the same are shared with the State Government concerned seeking their views/clarifications so that the Central Departments/Ministries concerned can be apprised of the clarifications of the State Government. This is an integral part of the present processing system. However, it has been observed that State Governments do not send requisite clarifications/views on the comments made by the Central Departments/Ministries and thus, a decision in the matter gets unduly delayed.

3. Recently, the matter has been reviewed and a timeline of maximum three months has been fixed for disposing State Bills/cases of previous instructions/Ordinances from the date of their receipt from the State Government. A maximum period of one month has been kept for Inter-Ministerial consultation and next one month has been kept for obtaining the comments/clarifications of the State Government on the views as conveyed by the Central Departments/Ministries. Since a time bound disposal of State Legislations etc. is in the interest of the State Governments, it is requested that appropriate instructions may be issued to all concerned to adhere to the timeline of one month for responding to the comments/views of the Central Departments/Ministries as conveyed by the MHA. If the requisite clarifications/views are not received from the State Government within the stipulated one month’s time, it will be construed that the State Government agrees with the observation and has no comments to offer.

4. It has also been observed that many a time the Bill etc, contains drafting errors and State Governments, despite repeated persuasion, do not withdraw such Bills. Since a Bill containing errors cannot be presented to the President, State Governments are requested to kindly verify and check that a Bill is free from any drafting/typographical error. It is also observed that many a time the State Governments agree to make amendments as per the suggestions of Central Ministries/Departments, but still keeps on insisting for assent of the Bill in its original form. It is therefore requested that once the State Government tends to agree with the objections/views of the Central Departments/Ministries, the State Government may consider sending a consolidated proposal alongwith suggested amendments/modifications instead of insisting for assent of the Bill in their original form

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4. It is requested that all concerned may be instructed to follow the aforesaid guidelines scrupulously. All the existing cases pending with the State Government may kindly be reviewed in the light of these guidelines in a time-bound manner.

5. The receipt of this letter may kindly be acknowledged.

Sd/-

Thangkholun Haokip

Under Secretary to the Govt. of India

Tel./Fax : 011-23438095”

64. This Hon’ble Court in The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770, ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12178) , has addressed the question directly as follows:

“434. (XII) The settled position of law is that where no time-limit for the exercise of a power is prescribed, the same must be exercised in a reasonable time period. Guided by the decisions of this Court in A.G. Perarivalan (supra) and Keisham (supra), we find that it is no more res-integra that the courts are well-empowered to prescribe a time-limit for the discharge of any function or exercise of any power which, by its very nature, demands expediency. ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12568 )

(XIII) Prescription of a general time-limit by this Court, within which the ordinary exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 must take place, is not the same thing as amending the text of the Constitution to read in a time-limit which would fundamentally change the procedure and mechanism stipulated by Article 200. Prescription of such time-limits within the scheme of Article 200 is with a view to lay down a determinable judicial standard for ascertaining the reasonable exercise of such power and to curtail any arbitrary inaction. This Court while prescribing a time-limit for the exercise of power, is guided by the inherent expedient nature of the procedure prescribed under Article 200.

(XIX) The position of law is settled that even where no time-limit is prescribed for the exercise of any power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. The exercise of powers by the President under Article 201 cannot be said to be immune to this general principle of law. Keeping in mind the expedient nature of the provision and having regard to the reports of Sarkaria and Puncchi Commissions, as well as the Memorandum dated 04.02.2016 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, we prescribe that the President is required to take a decision on the bills reserved for his consideration by the Governor within a period of three months from the date on which such reference is received. In case of any delay beyond this period, appropriate reasons would have to be recorded and conveyed to the concerned State.” ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12575 )

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65. It is respectfully submitted that the Constitution does not contemplate the creation of an additional, unelected organ in the legislative process that can indefinitely suspend or frustrate the will of the elected Legislature. Once a Bill has been duly passed by the Legislature, the Governor or the President is constitutionally obliged to act within a reasonable time. This Hon’ble Court cannot be a mute spectator to such inaction. The Office Memorandum relied upon clearly captures the application of mind in prescribing a reasonable timeline, which is not arbitrary but grounded in constitutional principle and practical necessity. Judicial recognition of such a standard would ensure that legislative business is not paralysed and that constitutional silences are not converted into instruments of obstruction.

Where the prescribed timeline is breached, the matter can be subjected to judicial review, thus ensuring accountability. Conversely, if the argument of the Learned Solicitor General is accepted—that delays or inaction must be resolved only in the political domain—it would strike at the very federal scheme of the Constitution. There would be no purpose in the careful demarcation of Union, State, and Concurrent Lists if an unelected authority could indefinitely hold up a Bill passed within the exclusive competence of the State Legislature, thereby nullifying the mandate of the people. This is not an isolated grievance; several States are grappling with the same constitutional impasse. If no judicially enforceable timeline is recognised, States would be compelled to engage in endless litigation over every Bill despite having only a limited constitutional window of five years to deliver on their mandate. The adoption of a judicially sanctioned standard of reasonableness would thus preserve federal balance, safeguard democratic governance, and enhance the Constitution as a workable instrument.

Q8: In light of the constitutional scheme governing the powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of a reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India and take the opinion of the Supreme Court when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent or otherwise?

Q9: Are the decisions of the Governor and the President under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution of India, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the

61

law coming into force? Is it permissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law?

66. It is respectfully submitted that the Article 143 of the Constitution of India empowers the President to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law or fact that, in the President’s view, is of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the Supreme Court’s opinion. This provision serves as a constitutional mechanism for advisory opinions by the Court, enabling the President to refer matters arising in various contexts, including the legislative process.

There is no explicit constitutional or legal bar preventing the Supreme Court from adjudicating on the validity or constitutional questions relating to a Bill prior to it becoming law under Article 143, advisory jurisdiction . The Court has, on multiple occasions, exercised its advisory jurisdiction in such situations. For instance, in In Re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, (please refer Vol V.2 Pg 1057 ) the Supreme Court considered the validity of a Bill passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly but reserved for the President’s consideration under Article 200. The Court, while relying on earlier Federal Court precedents such as In Re Delhi Laws Act, 1951,( please refer Vol V.1 Pg 395 ) emphasized that questions referred under Article 143 relating to a Bill yet to be enacted are justiciable and should not be dismissed merely on the ground that the Bill is not yet law. The decision to refer such a question lies solely with the President, who determines the public importance and urgency of the matter.

Similarly, in Special Courts Bill, 1978 (In re), ( please refer Vol V.9 Pg 3661 ), the Supreme Court interpreted Article 143(1) as conferring broad powers upon the President to refer any question of law or fact, whether it has already arisen or is likely to arise, provided it is of sufficient public importance. The Court underscored that the President’s satisfaction regarding the nature and timing of the question is a prerequisite for the reference. Importantly, the Court acknowledged that references might involve hypothetical or prospective questions, and these are valid so long as there is a continuing context or condition that gives rise to the question.

67. On the question of judicial review of functions exercised by the Governor under Article 200 and by the President under Article 201, it is a well-established principle that these functions are subject to judicial scrutiny prescribed under the constitution. Consequently, the courts are

62

empowered to examine the legality, propriety, and constitutional validity of functions exercised by the Governor or President under Article 200 and 201 of the constitution, before the Bill is formally enacted into law. This implies that judicial intervention is permissible at the stage when the Bill is reserved for assent or when the President withholds or grants assent, thereby preventing any undue or arbitrary delay in the legislative process. The power of judicial review at this antecedent stage ensures a system of checks and balances that preserves the constitutional framework, protecting the democratic will expressed by the legislature while guarding against potential misuse of discretion by constitutional functionaries. It maintains the rule of law and ensures that the Governor’s or President’s decisions are not arbitrary, mala fide, or extraneous to constitutional provisions.

Therefore, it is both constitutionally permissible and necessary for the courts to undertake judicial adjudication over questions arising from Bills presented to the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201, even before those Bills become law. This judicial oversight safeguards the legislative process, upholds constitutional mandates, and prevents the subversion of the democratic process by unwarranted withholding or reservation of assent.

68. This Hon’ble court in The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770, ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12178) , has addressed the question as follows:

“434 (XX) Whenever, in exercise of the powers under Article 200 of the Constitution, a bill is reserved for the consideration of the President on grounds of patent unconstitutionality that are of such a nature so as to cause peril to the principles of representative democracy, the President, must be guided by the fact that it is the constitutional courts which have been entrusted with the responsibility of adjudicating upon the questions of constitutionality and legality of an executive or legislative action. Therefore, as a measure of prudence, the President ought to make a reference to this Court in exercise of his powers under Article 143 of the Constitution.”, ( please refer Vol V.31 Pg 12575)

Q10: Can the exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of/by the President / Governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?

Q11: Is a law made by the State legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

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Q13: Do the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 of the Constitution of India extends to issuing directions /passing orders which are contrary to or inconsistent with existing substantive or procedural provisions of the Constitution or law in force?

69. It is submitted that the Article 142 of the Constitution confers upon this Hon’ble Court exceptionally broad powers to do “complete justice” in any matter before it. The scope of Article 142 is not confined by the limitations of any particular law. Its very nature implies that it is intended to be exercised sparingly and only in those rare and exceptional circumstances where, based on the facts and the particular context of the dispute, the Court finds it necessary to issue directions that ensure the fulfillment of complete and substantial justice.

70. However, despite the expansive nature of Article 142, this Hon’ble Court recognizes the need to exercise such powers within reasonable limits. Ordinarily, the Court must respect statutory provisions and legal frameworks that govern the subject matter of the dispute. The invocation of Article 142 to override or disregard such provisions is permissible only when it serves to balance competing equities or to resolve conflicting claims between parties, effectively “ironing out the creases” in a cause before the Court. The Supreme Court’s role transcends mere dispute resolution—it has always played a proactive and law-making role, shaping constitutional and legal doctrines beyond the confines of adjudication. (Refer Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India, 1998 (4) SCC 409 at Para 48). ( Please refer Vol V.15 Pg 6001).

71. This power has been exercised in various contexts to uphold justice where procedural or administrative delays have prejudiced the rights of individuals or the public interest. In A.G. Perarivalan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2023) 8 SCC 257, ( please refer Vol V. 29 Pg 11586), the Court used Article 142 to declare that a prisoner was deemed to have served his sentence due to an unreasonable delay of over two and a half years in the consideration of his mercy petition under Article 161. This was despite the fact that the State Cabinet had recommended remission and the Governor had delayed decision-making for over a year after the reference. Similarly, in Kuldeep Kumar v. UT Chandigarh (2024) 3 SCC 526, ( Para 37 ) ( Please Refer V.53 of Judgment Compilations – Pg 21044 – 21045 ), this Hon’ble Court invoked

64

Article 142 to annul the results of the Chandigarh Mayor elections due to serious misconduct by the presiding officer. The Court then directed the declaration of the election in favor of the other candidate, thereby preserving the fundamental democratic mandate and integrity of local elections.

72. It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 ( please refer Vol V.14 Pg 5478 ) has invoked Article 142 against the proclamation issued by Hon’ble President and restored status quo ante, which reads as follows:

“114. Our conclusion, therefore, firstly, is that the President has no power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly of the State by using his power under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 356 till the Proclamation is approved by both the Houses of Parliament under clause (3) of the said article. He may have power only to suspend the Legislative Assembly under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of the said article. Secondly, the court may invalidate the Proclamation whether it is approved by Parliament or not. The necessary consequence of the invalidation of the Proclamation could be to restore the status quo ante and, therefore, to restore the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly as they stood on the date of the issuance of the Proclamation. The actions taken including the laws made during the interregnum may or may not be validated either by the court or by Parliament or by the State Legislature. It may, however, be made clear that it is for the court to mould the relief to meet the requirements of the situation. It is not bound in all cases to grant the relief of restoration of the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry. The question of relief to be granted in a particular case pertains to the discretionary jurisdiction of the court.” ( please refer Vol V.14 Pg 5478 )

73. It is submitted that the State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025 SCC OnLine SC 770), ( please refer Vol V. 31 Pg 12178 ) , the Court again exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 in a matter of profound constitutional significance. The Court declared that ten bills passed by the Tamil Nadu legislature were deemed to have been assented to, based on several crucial considerations.

Initially, the Governor withheld assent to these bills. Subsequently, even after the bills were repassed by the State legislature and presented again under the first proviso to Article 200, the Governor reserved them for the President’s consideration without any accompanying message or justification as required under the Constitution. Since the bills were repassed in the original form and presented anew, the Governor had no constitutional authority to reserve them and was constitutionally obliged to grant assent. ( please refer Para 430, please refer

65

Vol V. 31 Pg 12178 ). Significant time had elapsed since the bills were first passed, with two dating back to 2020. Given that the State legislature’s tenure is limited to five years, and representatives are accountable to the electorate to legislate on pressing issues within that period, the undue delay in granting assent undermined the very essence of representative democracy. Prolonged withholding of assent effectively thwarts the democratic process by obstructing the timely implementation of laws passed by the elected legislature. (please refer Para 431)

74. It is submitted that this Hon’ble in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [Election Commission Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161 Para 450 ( Please Refer V.48 of Judgment Compilations – Pg 18910) has invoked Article 142 to fill legislative gap in the constitution.

75. It is submitted that after taking these facts into account, this Hon’ble Court found that the Governor’s conduct throughout this litigation exhibited a lack of bona fides. The Governor repeatedly failed to respect the Court’s judgments and directions, undermining judicial authority and constitutional norms. As such, the Court concluded that entrusting the matter back to the Governor to dispose of the bills in accordance with the judgment would serve no meaningful purpose. Invoking its plenary power under Article 142, the Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction to grant relief directly-declaring the bills to have been assented to, thus safeguarding the constitutional process and ensuring that the State’s legislative function was not rendered nugatory by executive inaction or mala fide conduct. (Refer Para 432). In essence, it was due to these exceptional circumstances-the excessive delay, the absence of constitutional justification for withholding assent, and the Governor’s conduct lacking good faith-that the Court felt compelled to invoke Article 142 to do substantial and complete justice. This action underscores the Court’s vital role in preserving the constitutional framework under Articles 200 and 201, preventing any abuse of power that could frustrate the legislative will and democratic governance.

Q14: Does the Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the Union Government and State Governments except by way of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India?

76. It is respectfully submitted that the Article 131 of the constitution reads as follows:

66

“ 131. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute– (a) Between the Government of India and one or more Slates;

(b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or

(c) between two or more States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends:

Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, named or other similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution, continues in operation after such commencement, or which provides that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute.”

Therefore, this question has clearly addressed in the plain reading of article 131.

77. It is submitted that the Governor is the constitutional head of the State, a representative of the people of the State and a formal repository of the State’s executive power (as recognized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 8, 2 June 1949). Although the Governor is the titular head, he cannot act independently but is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State in the exercise of most of his powers (see Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107, Para 61). ( please refer Vol V. 10, Pg 3901) , Importantly, the Governor is not an organ or extension of the union Government. Consequently, disputes involving the Governor’s exercise of constitutional functions-such as assent to bills under Article 200-cannot be construed as disputes between the Union Government and the State Government for the purpose of invoking Article 131.

78. It is submitted that the judicial review of the Governor’s actions under Article 200 or other constitutional powers is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution as a fundamental rights or constitutional remedy, rather than by way of an original suit under Article 131. The disputes between a State Government and its own constitutional functionaries, including the Governor, do not fall within the ambit of Article 131 but are subject to appropriate constitutional remedies as it is not dispute between two governments.

A. APPLICATION OF

JURISPRUDENCE

ARTICLE

143

IN

INDIAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

67

79. It is respectfully submitted that since the commencement of the Constitution, a total of fifteen Presidential References have been made to the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 143. These references have spanned a wide range of subjects—constitutional interpretation, questions of law of public importance, issues involving inter-governmental disputes, and matters bearing significant political or economic consequences. Each reference has provided an opportunity for the Court to clarify the contours of its advisory jurisdiction, shaping the scope, nature, and influence of Article 143 in Indian constitutional jurisprudence.

I. Delhi Laws Act, 1912, In Re, 1951 SCC 568, please refer Vol V.1 Pg 395. II. Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re, 1959 SCR 995, please refer Vol V.2 Pg 1057.

III. Berubari Union (I), In re, (1960) 3 SCR 250, please refer Vol V.2, Pg 1112.

IV. Sea Customs Act, S. 20(2), In re, (1964) 3 SCR 787

V. Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, In re, (1965) 1 SCR 413

VI. Presidential Poll, In re, (1974) 2 SCC 33, please refer Vol V. 7 Pg 2860

VII. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 1 SCC 380, please refer Vol V.9 Pg 3661.

VIII. Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2), please refer Vol V. 14 Pg 5417.

IX. Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 (Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid matter), (1993) 1 SCC 642,

X. Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re, (1998) 7 SCC 739, please refer Vol V. 15 Pg 6016

XI. Special Reference No. 1 of 2001, In re, (2004) 4 SCC 489,

XII. Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter), please refer Vol V. 17 Pg 6701.

XIII. (2002) 8 SCC 237 Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1, please refer Vol V. 21 Pg 8121

XIV. Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004, In re, (2017) 1 SCC 121, please refer Vol V.23 Pg 9357.

XV. Jammu and Kashmir Resettlement Act in 1982, please refer Vol V. 16 Pg 6435.

( I ) SUPREME COURT IS NOT BOUND TO ANSWER EVERY REFERENCE

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80. It is submitted that this principle has been consistently acknowledged in post-Constitutional jurisprudence. In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (1959 SCR 995), (please refer Vol V.2 Pg 1057), the Court distinguished between the two clauses of Article 143. It observed that when a reference is made under clause (2) of the Article, it is obligatory for the Court to entertain it and report its opinion to the President. However, under clause (1), the Court retains full discretion to decline to answer the questions posed, provided there exist good and sufficient reasons for doing so. The scope of this discretion was further clarified in In re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 ((1979) 1 SCC 380), (please refer Vol. V.9 Pg 3661), where the Court held that its right to decline to answer a reference does not rest solely on the difference in wording between clauses (1) and (2)—where clause (1) uses the term “may” and clause (2) uses “shall.” The Court emphasised that even under clause (2), although the matter did not directly arise in that case, it could legitimately return a reference unanswered if there were valid reasons to conclude that the questions referred were incapable of being answered in a judicially manageable form.

81. It is respectfully submitted that this Hon’ble Court in M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, please (refer Vol V.15 Pg 5839) declined to answer the presidential reference made under Article under 143 as it appeared to confer advantage upon one religious community while disadvantaging another.

( II ) OPINION RENDERED UNDER ARTICLE 143 IS NOT BINDING

82. It is humbly submitted that this principle was reiterated by this Hon’ble Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717 (9J)., (please refer Vol. V.7, Pg 2723), The relevant portion reads as follows:

“109. The opinion expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education Bill was of an advisory character and though great weight should be attached to it because of its persuasive value, the said opinion cannot override the opinion subsequently expressed by this Court in contested cases. It is the law declared by this Court in the subsequent contested cases which would have a binding effect. The words “as at present advised” as well as the preceding sentence indicate that the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education Bill in this respect was hesitant and tentative and not a final view in the matter. It has been pointed out that in Re Levy of Estate

69

Duty [AIR 1944 FC 73 : (1944) 6 FCR 317 : (1944) 2 Mad LJ 234] Spens, C.J., referred to an observation made in the case of Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1912 AC 571] that the advisory opinion of the Court would have no more effect than the opinion of the law officers. I need not dilate upon this aspect of the matter because I am of the opinion that the view expressed by this Court in subsequent cases referred to above by applying the general principles laid down in the Re Kerala Education Bill is correct and calls for no interference..” ( please refer Vol. V.7, Pg 2798).

( III ) PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCE CANNOT BE USED AS APPELLATE JURISDICTION WHERE THERE IS ALREADY AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENT AND ONLY VIEW OF LAW CAN BE CHANGED.

83. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2) ( please refer Vol V. 14 Pg 5417 ) held as follows:

“85. In the first instance, the language of clause (1) of Article 143 far from supporting Shri Nariman’s contention is opposed to it. The said clause empowers the President to refer for this Court’s opinion a question of law or fact which has arisen or is likely to arise. When this Court in its adjudicatory jurisdiction pronounces its authoritative opinion on a question of law, it cannot be said that there is any doubt about the question of law or the same is res integra so as to require the President to know what the true position of law on the question is. The decision of this Court on a question of law is binding on all courts and authorities. Hence under the said clause the President can refer a question of law only when this Court has not decided it. Secondly, a decision given by this Court can be reviewed only under Article 137 read with Rule 1 of Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and on the conditions mentioned therein. When, further, this Court overrules the view of law expressed by it in an earlier case, it does not do so sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent power and only in exceptional circumstances such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and productive of public mischief. [See: Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1955) 2 SCR 603 : AIR 1955 SC 661 : (1955) 6 STC 446] ]. Under the Constitution such appellate jurisdiction does not vest in this Court, nor can it be vested in it by the President under Article 143. To accept Shri Nariman’s contention would mean that the advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 is also an appellate jurisdiction of this Court over its own decision between the same parties and the executive has a power to ask this Court to revise its decision. If such power is read in

70

Article 143 it would be a serious inroad into the independence of judiciary.” ( please refer Vol V. 14 Pg 5454 ).

This pronouncement makes it abundantly clear that Article 143 cannot be employed to circumvent the settled rules of finality in judicial decision-making, nor to enable the Executive to reopen adjudicated controversies.

84. In Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1, ( please refer Vol V.21, Pg 8123 ) this Hon’ble Court reiterated the principle that the Presidential Reference power is circumscribed by constitutional propriety and cannot be invoked for purposes inconsistent with its intended function and held as follows:

“63. From the aforesaid analysis, it is quite vivid that this Court would respectfully decline to answer a reference if it is improper, inadvisable and undesirable; or the questions formulated have purely socio-economic or political reasons, which have no relation whatsoever with any of the provisions of the Constitution or otherwise are of no constitutional significance; or are incapable of being answered; or would not subserve any purpose; or there is authoritative pronouncement of this Court which has already decided the question referred.” ( please refer Vol V.21, Pg 8187 ).

Thus, the consistent judicial view is that where a question has already been conclusively adjudicated upon by this Court in exercise of its binding jurisdiction under Article 141, a Presidential Reference cannot be used to revisit, re-interpret, or nullify that decision. To do so would erode the certainty and stability of the law, violate the doctrine of separation of powers, and compromise the independence of the judiciary.

IV. QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE PRESIDNETIAL REFERENCE ARE

ALREADY ADJUDICATED AND DECIDED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT

85. It is humbly submitted that the Questions referred in the present reference are authoritatively answered in the catena of judgements and extracted in the table as follows:

S NO.

QUESTION RAISED

IN THE

PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCE

DIRECTLY

ADDRESSED

IN STATE OF TN VS

INDIRECTLY

ADDRESSED

IN STATE OF TN VS

QUESTION DIRECTLY

ANSWERED IN OTHER

JUDGEMENT

71

GOVERNOR

OF TN

GOVERNOR

OF TN

1.

What are the constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Para 434(I),

434(II) and

434(VII)

(Pg 12563)

Reasoning @Para

180

(Pg 12326), 185189 (Pg 12333 – 12337), 194-198

(12340 – 12343)

1. State of Punjab Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab and Anr. 2024 1 SCC 384 (Para20-26).( Pg

11672 – 11674 )

2. State of Bihar v.

Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528 (5J) (Para – 235) ( Pg 648 )

3. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 (Para-85)

( Pg 4213 )

2.

Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising all the options available with him when a Bill is presented before him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Para 434(XV)

( Pg 12569 )

Reasoning @Para 292-297(12419 – 12427) , 303-306 (12439 – 12445),

307-312 (12447 – 12450) , 315-318

(12452 – 12455)

1. Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 1974 {2} sec 831 (7J) , (Para 2024 ( Pg 2894 ), 28( 2895 ), 54-56( Pg 2903 – 2904 ),

154( PG 2940 ))

2. Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107

(Para 61) ( Pg 3901 )

3. MP Police Establishments vs. State of MP 2004 8 SCC 788 ( Para 8(Pg 6837 ), 11( Pg 6838), 12( Pg

6838 ), 19( 6844)

4. Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix Vs. Deputy Speaker,

Arunachal Pradesh

Legislative Assembly and Ors, 2016 B sec 1 (5J) (Para 147.1( Pg 8617 ), 147.2( Pg 8617 ), 148( Pg 8619 ), 149(8619) , 154( Pg 8622 ), 155.5( Pg 8622)

5. State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1

(Para-35) ( Pg 8295 )

72

3.

Is the exercise of

constitutional

discretion by the

Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India justiciable?

Para 434(XXII),

434(XXIII),

Para 434(XXIV)

(Pg 12576 –

12578)

Reasoning @Para

332.

(12470), 335

(12473), 338 (Pg

12476), 344 (Pg

12482), 348-350

(Pg 12487 –

12489) , 357 (Pg

12502), 358 (Pg 12503), 363-367

(Pg 12506 –

12509)

6. Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 1974 {2} sec 831 (7J) , Para 2024 ( Pg 2894 ), 28( 2895 ), 54-56( Pg 2903 – 2904 ),

154( PG 2940 ))

1. Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 (Para 62 (Pg 3902 ),63( Pg 3902 ), 65( Pg 3904 ) , 76(

Pg 3911)

2. BP Singhal vs. Union of India 2010 6 SCC 331

(Para 72, 73)(Pg 7916 )

3. Rameshwar Prasad vs

Union of India (2006) 2

SCC 1( 6871 – 7110 )

4. SR Bommai and Ors vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 3 SCC 1(Para 96( Pg 5589 ), 100( Pg 5592 ), 249( Pg 5682 ), 258( Pg

5685 )) (9J)

4.

Is Article 361 of the Constitution of India an absolute bar to the judicial review in relation to the actions of a Governor under Article 200 of the

Constitution of India?

Para 333

1. Rameshwar Prasad vs

Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1(Para 173( Pg 7002

), 178( Pg 7004 ))

2. S. Ramakrishnan v. State of T.N., 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 5207 (para -6, 7) ( Pg

11249 )

5.

In the absence of a

constitutionally prescribed time limit, and the manner of exercise of powers by the Governor, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of all

Para 434(XII),

Para 434(XIII)

( Pg 12568 )

Reasoning @Para

223-224(Pg

12356 – 12357),

231(Pg 12375),

1. Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. 2021 16 SCC 503 (Para-30) (

Pg 11577 )

2. A.G. Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA

(2023) 8 SCC 257

73

powers under Article 200 of the Constitution of India by the

Governor?

236 to 250 (Pg

12379 – 12388)

3. Purushothaman

Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 36 ( Pg 1185 )

4. State of Telangana vs. Secretary to Her

Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana and Anr. 2024

1 SCC 405

6.

Is the exercise of

constitutional

discretion by the

President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India justiciable?

Para 368

Reasoning @Para

357-367) Pg

12502 – 12509)

1. Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 1974

{2} sec 831 (7J) , (Para 2024, 28, 54-56, 154)

2. Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 (Para 62 (Pg

3902 ),63( Pg 3902 ), 65( Pg

3904 ) , 76( Pg 3911 ))

3. BP Singhal vs. Union of India 2010 6 SCC 331 (Para

72, 73) ( Pg 7916 )

4. Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India (2006) 2 SCC

1( Pg 6871 – 7110 )

5. SR Bommai and Ors vs.

Union of India and Ors. (1994) 3 SCC 1( Para 96( Pg 5589 ), 100( Pg 5592 ), 249( Pg 5682

), 258( Pg 5685 )

7.

In the absence of a

constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the

President, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion

Para 434(XIX)

( Pg 12575 )

Reasoning @Para

379-391 (Pg

12524 – 12535)

1. Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. 2021 16 SCC 503 (Para-30) (

Pg 11577 )

2. A.G. Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA (2023) 8 SCC 257 ( Pg

11586 )

74

by the President under Article 201 of the

Constitution of India?

3. Purushothaman

Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, 1961 SCC OnLine

SC 36 ( Pg 1185 )

4. State of Telangana vs. Secretary to Her

Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana and Anr. 2024

1 SCC 405 ( Pg 11691 )

8.

In light of the constitutional scheme governing the powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of a reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India and take the opinion of the Supreme Court when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent or otherwise?

Para 434(XX)

( Pg 12575 )

Reasoning @Para

410-412 (Pg

12548 – 12549),

414-421 (12551 –

12556)

1. In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979)1 SCC 380 (Para 34 ( Pg 3687

),143 (Pg 3733)

2. In Re Delhi Laws Act 1951

SCC 568 ( Pg 232 )

3. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, 1979 1 SCC 380 (

Pg 3661 )

9. A

Are the decisions of the

Governor and the

President under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution of India, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force? Is it permissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law?

Para 434(XIX)

( Pg 12575 )

Reasoning @Para

231-234(Pg

12375 – 12376),

250-251 (Pg

12388 – 12389)

& Para 411(Pg

12548), 412(Pg

12549), 414-417

(Pg 12551 –

12553)

1. In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979)1 SCC 380 (Para 34 ( Pg 3687 ),

143( Pg 3733 )

2. In Re Delhi Laws Act 1951

SCC 568 ( Pg 232 )

3. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, 1979 1 SCC 380 (

Pg 3661 )

75

10.

Can the exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of/by the President / Governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?

Para 432-433

( Pg 12561 –

12562 )

Reasoning @Para

426, 430-433

1. A.G. Perarivalan v. State of T.N., (2023) 8 SCC 257

(para-37) ( Pg 11601 )

2. Kuldeep Kumar vs UT Chandigarh 2024 3 SCC

526

11.

Is a law made by the State legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

Para 435 (c)

(Pg 12585 )

12.

In view of the proviso to Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, is it not mandatory for any bench of this Hon’ble Court to first decide as to whether the question involved in the proceedings before it is of such a nature which involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of constitution and to refer it to a bench of minimum five Judges?

1. Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC

595

13.

Do the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 of the Constitution of India extends to issuing directions /passing orders which are contrary to or inconsistent with existing substantive or procedural provisions

Para 432-433

( Pg 12561 –

12562 )

1. A.G. Perarivalan v. State of T.N., (2023) 8 SCC 257

(para-37) ( Pg 11601 )

2. Kuldeep Kumar vs UT Chandigarh 2024 3 SCC

526

76

of the Constitution or law in force?

14.

Does the Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the Union Government and the State Governments except by way of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India

1. State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4

SCC 608 (Para – 200)

2. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3

SCC 592

3. State of Jharkhand v. State of Bihar, (2015) 2 SCC

431

86. It is respectfully submitted that the questions raised in the present Reference already stand concluded by the authoritative pronouncement of this Hon’ble Court in The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770. In unequivocal terms, this Court postulated that the Constitution vests sovereign power in the people, who elect State Governments for a fixed tenure of five years with the expectation that their chosen representatives will deliver governance and implement policies promised in their manifestos. An elected Government is constitutionally entitled to have its legislative programme examined, assented to, or returned within the prescribed framework, failing which the very essence of representative democracy is eroded. It is humbly urged that constitutional silences must be interpreted in consonance with the framers’ vision—that democratic will must not be frustrated—and that a definite and reasonable timeline must be read into Articles 200 and 201. Only such a construction would safeguard the rule of law, preserve the accountability of the executive to the legislature, and uphold the foundational principle that sovereignty ultimately resides in the people. Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court shall postulate the constitutional silences under Articles 200 and 201 by interpreting in a manner that obligates timely action by the Governor and the President, so as to preserve the essence of representative democracy and the sovereignty of the people.

ILLUSTRATIVE TABLE HIGHLIGHTING DELAYS OF MORE THAN 30 DAYS IN STATE OF TAMIL NADU

S.NO.

BILL NO.

BILL NAME

DATE OF

PASSING BY

LEGISLATURE

ASSENT BY

THE

GOVERNOR

DATE OF

RE-PASSING

& RETURN

RESERVED FOR

THE PRESIDENT BY

THE GOVERNOR

ASSENT BY

THE

PRESIDENT

TOTAL

TIME

TAKEN

1.

43 OF

2021

THE TAMIL

NADU

ADMISSION TO

UNDERGRADUAT

E MEDICAL

DEGREE

COURSES BILL,

2021

13.9.2021

Returned on

01.02.2022 for reconsideration of the House

Re-passed on

08.02.2022

Reserved for the

President on

22.04.2022

Assent

Withheld by the President on 21.02.2025

WITHHEL

D AFTER

1257 DAYS

2.

25 OF

2022

THE CHENNAI

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

25.4.2022

Reserved for the consideration of

President on 14.11.2023

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 1193

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

3.

16 OF

2022

THE CHIKKAIAH

NAICKER

COLLEGE, ERODE

24.3.2022

Reserved for the President on 04.05.2022

04.02.2025

1048 DAYS

1 |

(TRANSFER AND

VESTING) BILL,

2022

4.

27 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

SILKWORM SEED (PRODUCTION,

SUPPLY AND

DISTRIBUTION)

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2023

11.10.2023

Reserved for

Consideration of the

President on 07.11.2023

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 659

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

5.

24 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

UNIVERSITIES

LAWS

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

25.4.2022

Assent Withheld and returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for the consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 26.02.2024.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received

572 DAYS

2 |

the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

6.

29 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU DR.AMBEDKAR

LAW UNIVERSITY (AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

10.5.2022

Assent Withheld

and returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for the consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 15.02.2024.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

557 DAYS

7.

40 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

AGRICULTURAL

UNIVERSITY

10.5.2022

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023.

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President on 18.02.2024.

557 DAYS

3 |

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

8.

39 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU DR.M.G.R.

MEDICAL

UNIVERSITY,

CHENNAI

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

10.5.2022

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 16.02.2024.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received

557 DAYS

4 |

the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

9.

12 OF

2024

THE TAMIL

NADU FISCAL

RESPONSIBILTY (AMENDMENT )

BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

Returned the

Bill on

25.08.2025 for reconsideration of the House

549 DAYS

10.

15 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

STATE MEDICAL

COUNCIL BILL,

2024

22.2.2024

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 20.3.2024

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 525

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

11.

48 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

UNIVERSITIES

LAWS (SECOND

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

395 DAYS

5 |

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

12.

55 OF

2022

THE TAMIL

UNIVERSITY

(SECOND

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 18.03.2024.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

395 DAYS

13.

27 OF

2021

THE

REGISTRATION (TAMIL NADU

SECOND

2.9.2021

27.09.2021

6.8.2022

338 DAYS

6 |

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2021

14.

10 OF

2023

THE INDIAN

STAMP (TAMIL NADU

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

21.4.2023

Reserved for the consideration of

President on 03.05.2023

Assented by the President on 04.03.2024

318 DAYS

15.

22 OF

2021

THE

REGISTRATION

(TAMIL NADU

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2021

2.9.2021

27.09.2021

07.05.2022

247 DAYS

16.

57 OF

2022

THE CIGARETTES

AND OTHER

TOBACCO

PRODUCTS

(PROHIBITION OF

ADVERTISEMENT

AND

REGULATION OF

TRADE AND

19.10.2022

Reserved for the consideration of

President on 28.12.2022

Assented by the President on 21.06.2023

245 DAYS

7 |

COMMERCE,

PRODUCTION,

SUPPLY AND

DISTRIBUTION)

TAMIL NADU

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2022

17.

31 OF

2022

THE TAMIL

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

10.5.2022

9.1.2023

244 DAYS

18.

42 OF

2021

THE

BHARATHIAR

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2021

13.9.2021

10.5.2022

239 DAYS

19.

46 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PUBLIC

PREMISES

(EVICTION OF

UNAUTHORISED

10.12.2024

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 7.1.2025

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 233

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

8 |

OCCUPANTS)

AMENDMENT

AND VALIDATION

BILL, 2024

20.

42 OF

2024

THE CHENNAI

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

10.12.2024

18.7.2025

220 DAYS

21.

32 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

APARTMENT

OWNERSHIP BILL,

2022

10.5.2022

Reserved the Bill for consideration of

President on 18.7.2022

Assented by the

President on

15.12.2022

219 DAYS

22.

15 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

FISHERIES

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

21.4.2023

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 26.02.2024.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

211 DAYS

9 |

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

23.

18 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

VETERINARY

AND ANIMAL

SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

21.4.2023

Assent Withheld and Returned on

13.11.2023

Re-passed on

18.11.2023

Reserved for consideration of

President on 28.11.2023

Assent withheld by

the President

on 24.02.2025.

As per the orders of the

Hon. Supreme

Court on

8.4.2025, the

Bill deemed to have received the assent of

the Governor on 18.11.2023.

211 DAYS

10 |

24.

2 OF 2025

THE CRIMINAL

LAWS (TAMIL

NADU

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2025

11.1.2025

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 22.1.2025

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 201

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

25.

51 OF

2024

THE TAMIL

NADU COOPERATIVE

SOCIETIES

(AMENDMENT)

BILL,2024

10.12.2024

Returned the

Bill on

16.06.2025 for reconsideration of the House

RETURNE

D BILL

AFTER

188 DAYS

26.

53 OF

2022

THE TAMIL

NADU

PROHIBITION OF

ONLINE

GAMBLING AND

REGULATION OF

ONLINE GAMES

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

Returned the

Bill with a note on 06.03.2023

Re-passed on

23.03.2023.

Assented by

Governor on

07.04.2023

170 DAYS

11 |

27.

6 OF 2025

THE TAMIL NADU

FOREST

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2025

11.1.2025

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 21.1.2025.

Assented by the President on 17.6.2025

157 DAYS

28.

20 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCE

MARKETING

(REGULATION) AMENDMENT

BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

9.7.2024

138 DAYS

29.

30 OF

2023

THE CHIT FUNDS

(TAMIL NADU

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

10.10.2023

Reserved for the

Consideration of

President on 24.11.2023

Assent withheld by

President on

16.02.2024

WITHHELD

AFTER 129

DAYS

30.

36 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

LOCAL

AUTHORITIES

ENTERTAINMENT

S TAX

10.12.2024

17.4.2025

128 DAYS

12 |

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

31.

37 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PANCHAYATS

(SEVENTH

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

10.12.2024

17.4.2025

128 DAYS

32.

35 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PUBLIC

BUILDINGS

(LICENSING)

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2024

10.12.2024

10.4.2025

121 DAYS

33.

43 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PRIVATE

UNIVERSITIES

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

10.12.2024

9.4.2025

120 DAYS

34.

21 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

LAND

CONSOLIDATION

21.4.2023

14.8.2023

115 DAYS

13 |

(FOR SPECIAL

PROJECTS) BILL,

2023

35.

31 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCE

MARKETING

(REGULATION)

SECOND

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2023

11.10.2023

30.1.2024

111 DAYS

36.

23 OF

2021

THE TAMIL NADU

AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCE AND

LIVESTOCK

CONTRACT

FARMING AND

SERVICES

(PROMOTION

AND

FACILITATION)

13.9.2021

18.12.2021

96 DAYS

14 |

REPEAL BILL,

2021

37.

18 OF

2025

THE

REGISTRATION

(TAMIL NADU

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2025

29.4.2025

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 5.6.2025

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 93

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

38.

19 OF

2025

THE KALAIGNAR

UNIVERSITY

BILL, 2025

29.4.2025

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 14.7.2025

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 93

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

39.

21 OF

2025

THE TAMIL NADU

PHYSICAL

EDUCATION AND

SPORTS

UNIVERSITY

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2025

29.4.2025

Reserved for consideration of the

President on 14.7.2025

ASSENT AWAITED

PENDING

FROM 93

DAYS

(As on

31.07.2025)

15 |

40.

49 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

UNIVERSITIES

LAWS (THIRD

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

10.01.2023

83 DAYS

41.

45 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

MINERAL

BEARING LAND

TAX BILL, 2024

10.12.2024

20.2.2025

72 DAYS

42.

17 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

DEVELOPMENT

ACTION PLAN

FOR THE

SCHEDULED

CASTES AND THE

SCHEDULED

TRIBES BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

9.5.2024

77 DAYS

43.

32 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

PROTECTED

AGRICULTURAL

ZONE

11.10.2023

27.12.2023

77 DAYS

16 |

DEVELOPMENT (AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

44.

51 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

BUSINESS

FACILITATION

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

28.12.2022

70 DAYS

45.

52 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

TRANSPARENCY

IN TENDERS

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

28.12.2022

70 DAYS

46.

54 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU CO-OPERATIVE

SOCIETIES (FIFTH

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

19.10.2022

28.12.2022

70 DAYS

47.

56 OF

2022

THE TAMIL NADU

PROHIBITION

19.10.2022

28.12.2022

70 DAYS

17 |

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

48.

1 OF 2023

THE TAMIL NADU

AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCE

MARKETING

(REGULATION) AMENDMENT

BILL, 2023

13.1.2023

15.3.2023

61 DAYS

49.

4 OF 2023

THE TAMIL NADU

GOVERNMENT

SERVANTS

(CONDITIONS OF

SERVICE)

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2023

13.1.2023

13.3.2023

59 DAYS

50.

26 OF

2023

THE TAMIL NADU

PROHIBITION

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

11.10.2023

6.12.2023

56 DAYS

18 |

51.

3 OF 2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PANCHAYATS

(SECOND

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

15.2.2024

9.4.2024

54 DAYS

52.

2 OF 2023

THE TAMIL NADU

REPEALING BILL,

2023

13.1.2023

6.3.2023

52 DAYS

53.

1 OF 2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PANCHAYATS

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

15.2.2024

6.4.2024

51 DAYS

54.

2 OF 2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PURATCHI

THALAIVI DR. J

JAYALALITHAA

MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION

(REPEAL) BILL,

2024

15.2.2024

6.4.2024

51 DAYS

19 |

55.

6 OF 2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PANCHAYATS

(FOURTH

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

9.4.2024

47 DAYS

56.

7 OF 2024

THE TAMIL NADU

PANCHAYATS

(FIFTH

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

9.4.2024

47 DAYS

57.

16 OF

2024

THE TAMIL NADU

HINDU

RELIGIOUS AND

CHARITABLE

ENDOWMENTS

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2024

22.2.2024

8.4.2024

46 DAYS

20 |

ILLUSTRATIVE TABLE HIGHLIGHTING DELAYS OF MORE THAN 30 DAYS IN STATE OF KERALA

S.NO.

BILL NO.

BILL NAME

DATE OF

PASSING BY

LEGISLATURE

ASSENT BY

THE

GOVERNOR

DATE OF

RE-PASSING

& RETURN

RESERVED FOR

THE PRESIDENT BY

THE GOVERNOR

ASSENT BY

THE

PRESIDENT

TOTAL

TIME

TAKEN

1.

141 of

2022

THE KERALA

CASHEW

FACTORIES

(ACQUISITION) AMENDMENT

BILL, 2022

08.12.2022

Assented by the President on 05.07.2024

575 DAYS

2.

133 of

2022

THE KERALA LOK

AYUKTA

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

30.08.2022

Assented by

President on

09.02.2024

528 DAYS

3.

156 of

2023

THE KERALA

DAIRY FARMERS’

WELFARE FUND (AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

11.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

26.04.2024

228 DAYS

21 |

4.

172 of

2023

THE KERALA

CONSERVATION

OF PADDY LAND

AND WETLAND (AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

13.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

26.04.2024

226 DAYS

5.

151 of

2022

THE KERALA CO-

OPERATIVE

SOCIETIES

(THIRD

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

14.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

26.04.2024

225 DAYS

6.

173 of

2023

THE KERALA

GOVERNMENT

LAND

ASSIGNMENT

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

14.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

26.04.2024

225 DAYS

7.

127 OF

2022

THE KERALA CO-

OPERATIVE

SOCIETIES

29.08.2022

Assented by

Governor on

20.03.2023

203 DAYS

22 |

(SECOND

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2022

8.

168 of

2023

THE KERALA

BUILDING TAX

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

14.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

02.04.2024

201 DAYS

9.

138 of

2022

THE KERALA

PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION

(ADDITONAL

FUNCTIONS AS

RESPECTS THE

SERVICES UNDER

THE WAQF

BOARD)

REPEALING BILL,

2022

01.09.2022

Assented by the

Governor on

20.03.2023

200 DAYS

10.

167 of

2023

THE INDIAN

PARTNERSHIP

(KERALA

14.09.2023

Assented by the President on 18.02.2024

157 DAYS

23 |

AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

11.

162 of

2023

THE KERALA

PRIVATE FORESTS (VESTING AND

ASSIGNMENT)

AMENDMENT

BILL, 2023

21.03.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

31.07.2023

132 DAYS

12.

164 of

2023

THE ABKARI

(AMENDMENT)

BILL, 2023

12.09.2023

Assented by the

Governor on

26.04.2024

52 DAYS

NB: It is noteworthy that:

a. The Chart above between Page No. 1 to Page No. 20 has 57 Bills in the State of Tamil Nadu wherein the minimum delay is 46 days and the maximum is 1257 days.

b. The Sno. 1 to 3 at Page No.1 contain 3 Bills each having a delay of over 1000 days.

c. The Sno. 4 to 9 between Page No. 2 to 5 contain 6 Bills each having a delay above 500 days and less than 1000 days.

d. The Sno.1 at Page No. 1 is an example of a Bill simply returned by the Governor, re-passed by Assembly and then referred to the President.

e. The Sno. 5 to 8, 11, 22 to 23 are all cases of withholding assent followed by returning of the Bill; no case where there is so called withholding assent simpliciter and not returning.

24 |

f. The Chart above between Pg. No. 21 to 24 show 12 Bills in the State of Kerala with minimum delay of 52 days and maximum of 575 days.

g. The point (e) above applies to the State of Kerala as well.

25 |

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நீதிபதிகள் வேலுமணி, ஹேமலதா அமர்வில் விசாரணைக்கு வந்தபோது, ​​சேவல் சண்டையின் போது சூதாட்டம் நடத்தப்பட மாட்டாது; சேவல்கள் துன்புறுத்தப்பட மாட்டாது என உறுதி அளித்தால், சேவல் சண்டைக்கு அனுமதிக்கோரிய மனுக்கள் பரிசீலிக்கப்படும் என அரசுத்தரப்பில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது. இதையடுத்து, சேவல்களை துன்புறுத்தக்கூடாது, போட்டி நடைபெறும் இடத்தில் ஒரு கால்நடை மருத்துவர் இருக்க வேண்டும், சூதாட்டத்தில் ஈடுபடக்கூடாது, சேவலுக்கு மது கொடுக்க கூடாது, காலில் கத்தி கட்டக் கூடாது என்பன உள்ளிட்ட நிபந்தனைகளுடன் சேவல் சண்டை நடத்த அனுமதியளித்து உத்தரவிட்டார் நீதிபதிகள், குறிப்பிட்ட சமூகத்தை பெருமைப்படுத்தும் வகையில் எந்த நடவடிக்கையிலும் ஈடுபடக்கூடாது எனவும் வலியுறுத்தியுள்ளனர்.
நீதிபதிகள் வேலுமணி, ஹேமலதா அமர்வில் விசாரணைக்கு வந்தபோது, சேவல் சண்டையின் போது சூதாட்டம் நடத்தப்பட மாட்டாது; சேவல்கள் துன்புறுத்தப்பட மாட்டாது என உறுதி அளித்தால், சேவல் சண்டைக்கு அனுமதிக்கோரிய மனுக்கள் பரிசீலிக்கப்படும் என அரசுத்தரப்பில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது. இதனையடுத்து, சேவல்களை துன்புறுத்தக்கூடாது, போட்டி நடைபெறும் இடத்தில் ஒரு கால்நடை மருத்துவர் இருக்க வேண்டும், சூதாட்டத்தில் ஈடுபடக்கூடாது, சேவலுக்கு மது கொடுக்க கூடாது, காலில் கத்தி கட்டக் கூடாது என்பன உள்ளிட்ட நிபந்தனைகளுடன் சேவல் சண்டை நடத்த அனுமதியளித்து உத்தரவிட்ட நீதிபதிகள், குறிப்பிட்ட சமூதகத்தை பெருமைப்படுத்தும் வகையில் எந்த நடவடிக்கையிலும் ஈடுபடக்கூடாது எனவும் வலியுறுத்தியுள்ளனர்.
January 15, 2023
மாண்புமிகு நீதிபதி ஸ்ரீ பரேஷ் ரவிசங்கர் உபாத்யாய் பதவியேற்பு விழா இன்று 09/10/202 அன்று காலை 11.00 மணிக்கு மாண்புமிகு நீதிபதிகள் டி.எஸ். சிவஞானம் ஜே பதவியேற்பு விழாவை நடத்துவார் என்று தெரிவிக்கப்படுகிறது.
It is intimated that Hon’ble justice shri paresh Ravisankar Upadhyay swearing function will be held on 09/10/202 today at 11.00 hrs Conference hall Hon’ble judges TS Sivaganamam J will do the honour.
October 9, 2021
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