Judge pugalenthy/eradicating corruption is effectively realised at every level of governance. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Index : Yes / No

by Sekar Reporter · August 1, 2026

2026:MHC:3178
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dated : 31.07.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.PUGALENDHI
WP CRL.(MD)No.1108 of 2025
R.Rajesh Kanna … Petitioner
Vs
1.The Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department,
No.293, MKN Road, Alandur, Chennai.
2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department,
No.576/4, EB Colony,
Chettinayakkanpatty, Trichy By-pass Road, Dindigul – 624 004.
3.The Inspector of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department,
No.576/4, EB Colony,
Chettinayakkanpatty, Trichy By-pass Road, Dindigul – 624 004.
4.The Superintendent of Police,
CBI / ACB, Madurai, Madurai Zone,
73, Athikulam Main Road, Reserve Line Post, Madurai.
5.Suguna
6.The Principal Secretary to Government,
Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, Chennai.
7.The Chief Secretary,
State of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai.
… Respondents
[R.6 suo-motu impleaded vide order dated 03.07.2026]
[R.7 suo-motu impleaded vide order dated 31.07.2026]
PRAYER :-Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 3 to transfer the pending Vigilance and Anti Corruption Complaint dated 14.07.2025 lodged by the petitioner as against the fifth respondent and subsequent representation dated 13.08.2025 to the fourth respondent.
For Petitioner : Mr.Niranjan S.Kumar
For Respondents: Mr.R.John Sathyan, State Public Prosecutor for R.1 to R.3
Mr.M.Karunanidhi,
Special Public Prosecutor for R.4
Mr.A.Balaji for R.5
Mr.B.Saravanan,
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by
Mr.S.Siva Subramanian,
Government Advocate (Civil Side) for R.6 & R.7
*****
ORDER
The petitioner, claiming to be a trader, has filed this writ petition alleging that the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, in order to shield the fifth respondent, failed to act upon his complaint dated 14.07.2025. He, therefore, seeks a writ of mandamus directing transfer of the said complaint, which is presently with the Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption Department, to the fourth respondent / CBI.
2.Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner purchased 13,430 kgs. of broken rice, loaded the same in a vehicle bearing Registration No.TN 59 AE 6852 driven by one Karnan and dispatched it to Suresh Poultry Farm, Namakkal. The consignment was accompanied by a Bill of Supply (Invoice No.73) indicating that only broken rice was being transported. It is submitted that the said consignment was intercepted by the fifth respondent / Inspector of
Police, CSCID, along with her team at Kodai Road at about 12.30 am. Thereafter, the fifth respondent registered a case in Crime No.157 of 2025 at 04.00 pm on 11.07.2025 for the offences under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the
Essential Commodities Act and Section 6(4) of the Essential Commodities (RCDS) Order, 1982, alleging that 1,000 kgs. of PDS rice had been concealed amidst 13,000 kgs. of broken rice and unlawfully transported. The case was initially registered against the mill owner, the driver of the vehicle and the proposed purchaser of the goods, namely, Suresh of Namakkal. According to the petitioner, upon being informed by Suresh, he contacted the fifth respondent at 05.37 pm and explained that all the documents were in order and that only broken rice was being transported. It is further submitted that, at 05.40 pm, the fifth respondent called the petitioner and demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs for not arraying him as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025. Thereafter, on 12.07.2025 at about 01.38 pm, she allegedly asked the petitioner to meet her on 14.07.2025.
3.Learned Counsel further submitted that, without yielding to the demand, the petitioner approached the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, Dindigul, on 14.07.2025 and informed the authorities about the demand made by the fifth respondent. The second respondent instructed the petitioner to meet the fifth respondent, provided him with an audio recording device to record the alleged demand and deputed one Head Constable, Senthilkumar, to accompany him.
4.It is submitted that the petitioner met the fifth respondent at about 03.45 pm on 14.07.2025 near Perumal Temple, Ramayanapatty Road. According to the petitioner, the fifth respondent once again demanded illegal gratification and insisted that at least Rs.3 lakhs be paid, stating that the amount had to be shared with higher officials. The petitioner is stated to have agreed to pay Rs.1 lakh on 15.07.2025 and the balance of Rs.2 lakhs thereafter. The entire conversation was allegedly recorded both in the audio recording device supplied by the Vigilance Department and in the petitioner’s mobile phone. The recording device was handed over to Head Constable Senthilkumar on the evening of 14.07.2025.
5.According to the learned Counsel, the second respondent informed the petitioner that a trap would be arranged on 15.07.2025. Accordingly, the petitioner arranged the amount and handed it over to the Vigilance officials on the morning of 15.07.2025, whereupon the currency note numbers were noted down by the second and third respondents. However, no trap was conducted on that day. Instead, the petitioner was sent back with an assurance that appropriate action would be taken based on the instructions of the higher authorities. Since no action was taken on his complaint, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 13.08.2025 to the first respondent requesting action against the fifth respondent. However, no action was taken thereon.
6.It is the contention of the petitioner’s Counsel that the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department deliberately refrained from conducting the trap in order to protect the fifth respondent and, instead, proceeded to array the petitioner as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 19.08.2025 seeking transfer of the investigation into his complaint to the CBI.
7.This Court, while entertaining the writ petition on 26.08.2025, directed the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department to file its counter affidavit on or before 29.08.2025. However, the writ petition was not listed thereafter and, during the interregnum, no counter affidavit was filed for nearly a year. It was only pursuant to the specific directions issued by this Court on 12.06.2026 that the first respondent / Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, filed a counter affidavit on 19.06.2026.
8.Learned State Counsel appearing for the Vigilance and AntiCorruption Department, by placing reliance upon the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, submitted that the petitioner approached the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, Dindigul, on 14.07.2025 and orally alleged that the fifth respondent had demanded illegal gratification for not arraying him as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025. He further submitted that the petitioner admitted to having paid a monthly mamool of Rs.15,000/- to the fifth respondent and produced screenshots in support thereof. The petitioner was therefore instructed to meet the fifth respondent on the afternoon of 14.07.2025 and was provided with an audio recording device to record the alleged demand. Upon verification of the recording, it was found that the petitioner had attempted to induce the fifth respondent not to array him as an accused and that both of them were conversing casually regarding the payment of monthly mamool. In view of the same, it was considered necessary to verify the motives, reliability and antecedents of the petitioner in terms of Paragraph 42(2) of the Vigilance Manual. Accordingly, the petitioner’s complaint was reduced into writing on 15.07.2025 and forwarded to the Director.
9.He further submitted that the complaint was forwarded for factual verification on 19.08.2025, which was completed on 25.08.2025, whereupon a recommendation was made to conduct a Detailed Enquiry. On 12.09.2025, the Vigilance Commissioner accorded permission to obtain prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and such approval was obtained on 17.11.2025. Thereafter, a
Detailed Enquiry was registered on 28.11.2025 by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Dindigul. Upon completion of the enquiry on 15.06.2026, it was recommended that charges under Section 7(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 be initiated against the fifth respondent and charges under Sections 8 and 10 read with Section 9 of the Act be initiated against the petitioner.
10.According to him, the petitioner was previously involved in a similar case and was arrayed as Accused No.2 in Spl.C.C.No.854 of 2023.
That apart, a final report in Crime No.157 of 2025 (C.C.No.1278 of 2025) was filed on 05.12.2025 arraigning six persons as accused, including the petitioner. The bank records and the screenshots produced by the petitioner himself revealed that he had been paying a monthly mamool of Rs.15,000/- to the fifth respondent through her mother-in-law, one Dhanalakshmi. During the Detailed Enquiry, the fifth respondent also admitted to the receipt of the said amounts through her mother-in-law. Since the enquiry disclosed a continuing pattern of giving and receiving illegal gratification between the petitioner and the fifth respondent, apart from the demand allegedly made for not arraying the petitioner as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025, a recommendation was made to register appropriate cases against both of them. According to the learned State Counsel, the present writ petition has been filed only to thwart the proceedings initiated pursuant to the Detailed Enquiry. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
11.The fifth respondent has also entered appearance. The learned Counsel appearing for the fifth respondent submitted that the allegations levelled by the petitioner are false, vexatious and malicious. According to him, a lawful inspection was conducted by the fifth respondent and the Civil Supplies Flying Squad on 11.07.2025 in respect of the vehicle bearing Registration No.TN 59 AE 6852, during which it was found that 1,000 kgs. of PDS rice had been concealed amidst 13,000 kgs. of broken rice and was being unlawfully transported. Consequently, Crime No.157 of 2025 was initially registered against three accused persons and, upon completion of the investigation, the petitioner was also arrayed as an accused in the final report. According to him, the petitioner was an active participant in a well-organised network engaged in the procurement, storage and diversion of PDS rice for unlawful commercial gain. Having been arrayed as an accused in C.C.No.1278 of 2025 arising out of Crime No.157 of 2025, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition and levelled allegations against the fifth respondent solely with a view to derail the proceedings initiated against him.
12.Having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the writ petition, this Court directed the production of the records relating to
D.E.No.119/2025/POL/DL. The said records were produced and have been carefully perused by this Court.
13.Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the materials placed on record.
14.The petitioner claims that he is engaged in the business of trading broken rice, besides carrying on other businesses. It is his specific case that he lodged a complaint before the Vigilance and AntiCorruption Department, Dindigul, on 14.07.2025 alleging that the fifth respondent had intercepted a truck transporting broken rice under a valid Bill of Supply on 11.07.2025, falsely registered Crime No.157 of 2025 as though PDS rice was being unlawfully transported in the vehicle, and demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs from him for not arraying him as an accused in the said case.
15.Though the petitioner asserts that he had submitted a written complaint on 14.07.2025 itself, the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department has taken a stand that he had only made oral allegations on that day. Even assuming that such a stand is correct, the oral complaint ought to have been immediately reduced into writing in terms of Paragraph 44(1) of the Vigilance Manual, since it disclosed allegations of demand of illegal gratification by a public servant. Strangely, this mandatory procedure was not followed by the second and third respondents. Instead, they chose to proceed on the basis of another written complaint obtained from the petitioner on 15.07.2025.
16.The admitted facts that transpired thereafter assume considerable significance. Acting upon the instructions of the second respondent, the petitioner met the fifth respondent on the afternoon of 14.07.2025 carrying an audio recording device supplied by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. The conversation between them, during which the fifth respondent is alleged to have reduced her demand from Rs.5 lakhs to Rs.3 lakhs, was recorded in the device in the presence of an officer of the Vigilance Department and was thereafter handed over to the Department. The petitioner has further stated that he arranged a sum of Rs.1 lakh towards the trap proceedings and produced the same along with his written complaint dated 15.07.2025. Thus, by 15.07.2025, the Vigilance Department was in possession of the complaint, the audio recording allegedly evidencing the demand and the proposed trap amount.
17.Despite the above materials, the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department chose not to lay the trap. The explanation now offered is that verification undertaken under Paragraph 42(2) of the Vigilance Manual revealed that the petitioner had antecedents, including a previous case under the Essential Commodities Act, and that the conversation recorded in the audio device reflected payment of monthly mamool. On that basis, the Department concluded that the petitioner lacked credibility and decided not to proceed with the trap.
18.This explanation does not merit acceptance. In fact, this Court is shocked by the approach adopted by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
Department. It is the admitted case of the Department itself that the petitioner had disclosed, even on 14.07.2025, that he had been paying a monthly mamool of Rs.15,000/- to the fifth respondent and had produced screenshots in support thereof. Therefore, the Department was fully aware of the petitioner’s antecedents even before it instructed him to meet the fifth respondent. Notwithstanding such knowledge, the Department considered the complaint credible enough to supply a recording device, direct the petitioner to meet the fifth respondent and monitor the conversation. After the alleged demand had been recorded and after the petitioner had arranged the trap amount, the Department abruptly abandoned the trap on the very ground which was admittedly known to it from the inception. Such an explanation is wholly untenable.
19.The petitioner may have been paying the mamool to the fifth respondent. The fifth respondent officer is vested with the power of registering a case under the Essential Commodities Act. The available audio recording produced before this Court discloses the manner in which the fifth respondent has demanded money for not registering a case. If the attitude of the officers are like this, then even a genuine person cannot do business without paying any illegal gratification. Every citizen of this State knows very well that corruption is deep rooted and it has became an order of the day. It is expected that the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department would also be aware of the same. While so, the Vigilance Department has to focus on ensuring integrity of the government officers, instead of analysing the integrity of the complainant. If the complainant is also a bribe giver, necessary action has to be initiated, but the same cannot be done by avoiding action as against an official, who openly demanded bribe for not registering a case.
20.The factual materials available with the Vigilance Department on 14.07.2025 and 15.07.2025 were, therefore, of considerable importance. Crime No.157 of 2025 had already been registered by the fifth respondent on 11.07.2025. The petitioner was admittedly the sender of the goods seized in the said crime. He claimed that the consignment was supported by valid documents. The fifth respondent has not added him as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025 until she was the Investigating Officer in the case. The fifth respondent has went to Namakkal in her private vehicle, is said to have demanded money from the consignee and has called the petitioner over phone and demanded bribe. She has met the petitioner near a temple, away from her office, had a discussion regarding demand of bribe of Rs.5 lakhs, the same was bargained and reduced to Rs.3 lakhs. This conversation was recorded in the device, provided by the Vigilance Department. The petitioner was accompanied to the meeting place along with a Head Constable from the Vigilance Department. The very conduct of the fifth respondent in blatantly dealing with a proposed accused in a private place can be ascertained from the officer of the Department, who accompanied the petitioner on 14.07.2025. Apart from the same, the recording of the conversation was also available with the Vigilance Department.
21.The complaint of the petitioner dated 15.07.2025 reveals that the complaint was lodged along with a sum of Rs.1 lakhs. It is well settled that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for prosecuting a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, a trap assumes great significance as it enables the investigating agency to secure direct and reliable evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.
22.In Som Parkash v. State of Delhi [(1974) 4 SCC 84], Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer observed that, having regard to the clandestine nature of bribery, trap proceedings constitute one of the most effective methods of detecting and proving offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act. The relevant observations are extracted below:
“6. … Where you intercept the natural course of the corrupt stream by setting an invisible contraption, its ethics is above board. On the contrary, to test the moral fibre of an officer whose reputation is suspect, if you lay a crime “mine” which explodes when he, in a weak moment, walks on it the whole scheme is tainted. Of course, our social milieu is so vitiated by a superstitious belief that any official can be activised by illegal gratification, so confidential is the technique of give and take in which the white collar offender is adept and so tough is the forensic problem of proof beyond reasonable doubt by good testimony in this area, that the only hope of tracking down the tricky officers is by laying traps and creating statutory presumptions. Even Kautilya has stated that “just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water so government servants cannot be found out while taking money. …”
23.In fact, even Paragraph 42 of the Vigilance Manual recognises the importance of trap proceedings and specifically provides that successful traps yield both direct and circumstantial evidence capable of sustaining a prosecution. Therefore, the decision to abandon a trap cannot be taken lightly and must be supported by exceptional reasons. However, in this case, the trap was not laid for the reasons best known to the Vigilance Department. A justification has been made by the Vigilance Department that they have verified the antecedents of the petitioner as required in Paragraph 42(2) of the Vigilance Manual. Such verification is only a matter of precaution and not a ground to abandon an otherwise legitimate trap. Further, this paragraph does not prevent the Vigilance Department from laying any trap if the antecedents of the complainant are bad. Surprisingly, the Vigilance Department has interpreted the provision in a manner completely contrary to its object and has used it as a reason to avoid conducting the trap itself.
24.Had the trap been conducted on 15.07.2025, one of two consequences would have inevitably followed. Either the allegations would have stood disproved, thereby exonerating the fifth respondent at the earliest point of time, or she would have been caught while accepting or attempting to accept illegal gratification, enabling immediate action in accordance with law. Instead, by abandoning the trap without any legally sustainable justification, the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department itself created the situation which it later attempted to justify by invoking Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The subsequent events clearly demonstrate how this initial error set in motion a chain of avoidable delays.
25.The present case also exposes certain structural deficiencies in the existing functioning of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. Though every district has a detachment headed by a Deputy Superintendent of Police assisted by an Inspector of Police, these officers appear to possess little or no effective decision-making authority.
Every important step, including factual verification and further course of action, has to await instructions from the Directorate at Chennai. Consequently, complaints remain pending at multiple levels without any officer being personally accountable for the delay. The present case is a classic illustration of the consequences of such excessive
centralisation.
26.The complaint dated 15.07.2025, despite being accompanied by the recorded conversation and the proposed trap amount, was merely forwarded to the Directorate. Even factual verification was not immediately ordered. It was only after the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition on 19.08.2025 seeking transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation and after this Court called upon the Vigilance Department to respond, that the Directorate, on 25.08.2025, completed the factual verification. The available materials create a presumption that somebody in the Directorate has cautiously prevented the trap as against the fifth respondent.
27.The other circumstances leading to this case is also disturbing. The petitioner has submitted a representation on 13.08.2025 in the form of a reminder as to the course of action taken on his complaint dated 15.07.2025 to the first respondent. Strangely, within five days of the said representation, the fifth respondent was repatriated from the Civil Supplies CID pursuant to the orders of the Inspector General of Police, Civil Supplies CID, on 18.08.2025. The reasons for such repatriation are known only to the authorities concerned. Till the fifth respondent was repatriated from the CSCID, the petitioner has not been shown as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025, which was registered on 11.07.2025. After submitting the representation dated 13.08.2025 to the first respondent, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on 19.08.2025 before this Court. Considering the serious allegations made by the petitioner and the factual background, this Court, by its order dated 26.08.2025 directed the Vigilance Department to file their counter affidavit on or before 29.08.2025. However, the counter affidavit has not been filed by the Vigilance Department nearly for a period of one year. Instead, they have completed factual verification on the complaint of the petitioner dated 15.07.2025, on 25.08.2025, after a delay of 41 days.
28.The complaint lodged by the petitioner was not a vague or anonymous complaint warranting prolonged preliminary scrutiny. It was accompanied by screenshots allegedly evidencing payment of monthly mamool. More importantly, the Department itself had facilitated recording of the alleged demand through a recording device supplied by it. The petitioner had also produced the trap amount. Ordinarily, such materials would require immediate investigative action. They did not call for prolonged administrative processing or repeated movement of files from one authority to another. While so, the complaint of this petitioner was kept in a cold storage from 15.07.2025 till 19.08.2025. The available materials disclose a calculative attempt made in the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department to protect the fifth respondent Officer, who demanded bribe from the petitioner, for not adding him as an accused, in Crime No.157 of 2025.
29.The factual verification on the complaint of this petitioner appears to have been completed on 25.08.2025 and a recommendation was made to conduct a Detailed Enquiry on the complaint of the petitioner. However, instead of proceeding to that stage without further delay, the Department embarked upon obtaining prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This Court is unable to appreciate how such a course of action was considered
necessary in the facts of the present case.
30.Section 17A was introduced by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 to afford protection to honest public servants against frivolous enquiries in respect of bona fide decisions taken in discharge of their official duties. The provision was never intended to operate as a shield against allegations of demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. The provision is extracted hereunder for easy reference:
“Section 17A:Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public
servant in discharge of official functions or duties –
(1)No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or
investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval-
(a)in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;
(b)in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;
(c)in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month.”
31.The first proviso to Section 17A expressly excludes cases where a public servant is arrested on the spot while accepting or attempting to accept an undue advantage. Had the trap been conducted as originally planned, the question of obtaining prior approval under Section 17A would not have arisen in the present case. Instead, by abandoning the trap, the Department itself created a situation to justify a prolonged delay on the ground that prior approval under Section 17A was required.
32.Even otherwise, the statute is very clear that prior approval under Section 17A is required only when the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in the discharge of his or her official functions or duties. In the present case, the allegations as against the fifth respondent relate to the receipt of monthly mamool and the demand of bribe, for not adding the petitioner as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025. Such allegations can never be treated as acts performed in the discharge of official duties.
33.The Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court have clarified the above position on the requirement of prior permission from the competent authorities under Section 17A on more than one occasion. The relevant decisions are enumerated as under for easy understanding:
(1) In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Santosh Karnani and Another [2023 SCC OnLine SC 427], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that allegations regarding demand of a bribe does not require prior approval under Section 17A:-
“34. As may be seen, the first proviso to Section 17A refers to cases wherein a public servant is charged with acceptance of an undue advantage or attempt thereof. A prior approval or sanction to investigate such an officer in a trap case is likely to defeat the very purpose of trap and the investigation, which is not the underlying intention of the legislature. The investigation against Respondent No. 1, being an accused of demanding a bribe, did not require any previous approval of the Central Government. That apart, the accusation against Respondent No. 1 does not revolve around any recommendations made or decisions taken by him in his quasi-judicial or administrative capacity.”
(2) The above position was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Daima etc. v. State of Rajasthan [2026 INSC 72], wherein it has been categorically held that prior approval under Section 17A has no application to cases involving demand of illegal gratification. The relevant observations are extracted below:-
“7.The entire submission of the learned counsel is thoroughly misconceived. Section 17-A came to be enacted with a particular object. Section 17-A talks about enquiry or inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties. Section 17A by any stretch of imagination cannot be applied to cases of demand of illegal gratification.”
(3) In K. Athinarayanan v. The State, represented by Additional Chief Secretary to Government [WP(MD) No. 34197 of 2025 dated
20.02.2026], a Division Bench of this Court, comprising of Manindra
Mohan Shrivastava, J., (then Chief Justice of this Court) and Arul Murugan, J., has held that where the information received by the investigating agency discloses commission of cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR is mandatory and the credibility or worthiness of such information cannot be tested at that stage:-
“33. The judicial pronouncements, as discussed above in extenso, clearly rule that where the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, registration of FIR is must and that, at that stage, the credibility or worthiness of the information cannot be tested. Moreover, it has also been held that it is enough if the Police Officer, on the basis of the information, suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed.”
(4) In Dhandapani v. Vigilance Commissioner [W.A.(MD)No.903 of 2021 dated 30.04.2021], a Division Bench of this Court has held that when the act of a public servant amounts to or constitutes an offence by itself, prior sanction or approval from the Government would not be necessary:-
“9.In the case on hand, the complaint is not during discharge of his official duties. The First Information Report also registered for disproportionate assets.
10. The learned Single Judge of this Court has referred to the decisions of the Delhi High Court and Chhattisgarh High Court reported in 2019 (1) Crimes (HC) 726 (Devender Kumar Vs. CBI and (2020) 0 Supreme (CHH) 149, Sathish Pandey vs. Union of India, has specifically held that Section 17(A) of Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be made applicable to those cases where the act of the public servant that amounts to an offence, appears on the face of it lacking in good faith. Considering the above provision and the above decision, it is clear that Section 17 (A) has been inserted only to give protection to the honest officers, but when the act of a public servant amounts to or constitutes an offence by itself, prior sanction or approval from the Government would not be necessary. Viewing from this angle also, I hold that Section 17 (A) of Prevention of Corruption Act has no application to the case on hand. As already pointed out, since FIR has already been registered and is pending investigation, the relief sought for by the petitioner has become infructuous.
11. In the case of Ranjib Ranjan Vs. R.Vijayakumar, reported in 2015(1)SSC 513, the Apex Court held that in paragraph No.18, “while discharging his official duties, if a public servant enters into a criminal conspiracy or indulges criminal misconduct such misdemeanour on his part is not to be treated as an act in discharging of his official duties”.”
(5) In CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [(2021) 18 SCC 135], a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, headed by Dr.Justice D.Y.Chandrachud [then Chief Justice of India], held that preliminary enquiry was not required in all corruption cases and if the information received discloses the commission of a cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary enquiry would be required:-
“39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in all cases which involve allegations of corruption. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that if the information received discloses the commission of a cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary enquiry would be required. It also clarified that the scope of a preliminary enquiry is not to check the veracity of the information received, but only to scrutinise whether it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a preliminary enquiry is required only if the information (whether verified or unverified) does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Even when a preliminary enquiry is initiated, it has to stop as soon as the officer ascertains that enough material has been collected which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. A similar conclusion has been reached by a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition that a preliminary enquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary to law, for it is not only contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] but would also tear apart the framework created by the CBI Manual.”
34.Therefore, the legal position is very clear that prior permission under Section 17A is required only when the alleged offence is relatable to the recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant in discharge of official functions or duties. In matters such as demand for illegal gratification or accumulation of disproportionate assets, there is no requirement of prior approval under Section 17A. Therefore, this Court fails to understand how the authorities proceeded on the assumption that prior approval under Section 17A was necessary.
35.The Government vide G.O.Ms.No.173, P & AR Department, dated 09.12.2018, laid down certain guidelines in processing the complaints of alleged corruption against public servants, pursuant to the incorporation of Section 17A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Even as per the procedure laid out under this government order, prior permission under Section 17A is required from the competent authority, only in cases where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in
discharge of his official functions or duties.
36.This is a case wherein prior permission under Section 17A was not required in the first place. However, based on this factual verification report, the Directorate has made a request to the Vigilance Commissioner for further course of action on 26.08.2025. It is not known why the Vigilance Commissioner’s advice has been sought for prosecuting an Inspector of Police, who has demanded bribe for adding the petitioner as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025. A request has been made in this regard to the Vigilance Commissioner on 26.08.2025 and a decision has been taken by the Vigilance Commissioner for proceeding to get prior permission from the concerned Department only on
12.09.2025. Neither the proposal nor the permission granted discloses any independent examination as to whether Section 17A was at all attracted to the facts of the present case. The Vigilance Commissioner took 17 days in processing the request and granting permission. Neither in the Prevention of Corruption Act nor in the Vigilance Manual, such a procedure has been prescribed.
37.Thereafter, another mechanical exercise followed. A request seeking prior approval under Section 17A was forwarded to the Inspector General of Police, Civil Supplies CID, on 22.09.2025. By communication dated 09.10.2025, the Inspector General informed the Vigilance Department that since the fifth respondent had been repatriated, he was not the competent authority to accord such approval. The allegations against the fifth respondent relate to the period during which she was serving in the Civil Supplies CID. Therefore, the competent authority could only be the authority under whom she was serving when the alleged offences were committed. Her subsequent transfer could not have altered the identity of the competent authority. Instead of examining this elementary aspect, the Inspector General simply passed the buck onto another authority. The Vigilance Department, without raising any objection, forwarded the proposal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tiruchirappalli, on 17.10.2025, who granted prior permission only on 17.11.2025. Only thereafter did the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, direct registration of a Detailed Enquiry against the fifth respondent on 24.11.2025, which ultimately came to be registered on 28.11.2025.
38.The shortcomings noticed by this Court in the handling of the petitioner’s complaint are summarised as follows:-
● Failure to reduce the petitioner’s oral complaint dated 14.07.2025 into writing in accordance with Paragraph 44(1) of the Vigilance Manual.
● Despite being aware from the very inception that the petitioner claimed to have been paying monthly mamool to the fifth respondent, supplying him with a recording device, deputing a Vigilance Officer to accompany him, facilitating the recording of the alleged demand, and thereafter abandoning the proposed trap
on the very same ground.
● Ignoring the audio recording allegedly containing the demand, though it was secured under the supervision of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department itself.
● Abandoning the proposed trap despite the availability of the complaint, the recorded conversation allegedly evidencing the demand and the trap amount produced by the petitioner.
● Treating the antecedents of the complainant as a ground to abandon the trap, contrary to the object of Paragraph 42(2) of the Vigilance Manual.
● Failure to take any other investigative steps, such as, collecting the CDR particulars, despite the fact that the fifth respondent met the petitioner in a private place and openly demanded bribe not to register the case.
● Keeping the petitioner’s complaint pending without any
meaningful progress until he approached this Court.
● The fifth respondent being repatriated from the Civil Supplies CID immediately after the petitioner submitted a representation seeking action on his complaint, while the complaint itself remained unattended.
● Completing the factual verification only after the filing of the writ petition and pursuant to the intervention of this Court.
● Abandoning the trap and giving room to invoke Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, thereby delaying the process of Detailed Enquiry.
● Invoking Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, even though the allegations relate to demand of illegal gratification and not to any recommendation made or decision taken in the discharge of the official functions or duties.
● Accepting the stand of the Inspector General of Police, Civil
Supplies CID, regarding competency to accord approval under Section 17A, without examining the correctness of such a stand.
● Allowing the proposal under Section 17A to move from one
authority to another, resulting in avoidable administrative delay. The above sequence of events reveals either a lack of application of mind or a deliberate attempt to safeguard the fifth respondent.
39.Ultimately, pending this writ petition, the Vigilance and AntiCorruption Department has completed the Detailed Enquiry and recommended initiation of proceedings under Section 7(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the fifth respondent and under Sections 8 and 10 read with Section 9 of the said Act against the petitioner. Thus, though belatedly, the Department has ultimately reached the conclusion that sufficient materials exist for proceeding against both the alleged recipient and the alleged giver of illegal gratification.
40.This Court has repeatedly observed that corruption is not merely an offence against an individual complainant. It strikes at the very foundation of public administration and erodes the confidence of citizens in the fairness of governance. Every allegation of demand of illegal gratification deserves prompt, professional and fearless investigation. Delay in such matters is not a mere procedural irregularity. Time invariably works in favour of the corrupt. Every day’s delay increases the possibility of destruction of evidence, influencing of witnesses and obliteration of the trail of illegal gratification.
41.In the present case, the investigation has already progressed beyond the stage at which transfer to another agency would serve any useful purpose. The Detailed Enquiry has concluded and the Department has recommended registration of a regular case. In these circumstances, transferring the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation would only result in duplication of effort, further delay and commencement of the entire process afresh. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to transfer the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
42.However, refusal to transfer the investigation cannot be understood as approval of the manner in which the Vigilance and AntiCorruption Department dealt with the petitioner’s complaint. On the contrary, this case has revealed serious institutional deficiencies which require immediate attention at the highest level of the Government. The chronology narrated above demonstrates that the delay was not occasioned by complexity of investigation but by avoidable administrative procedures, excessive centralisation of decision-making and an erroneous understanding of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Unless these systemic deficiencies are addressed, similar delays are bound to recur in future cases involving allegations of corruption.
43.These observations are not confined to the facts of the present case alone. Within a short span of three months, this Court has had occasion to deal with several matters concerning the functioning of the
Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, exposing deficiencies in (i) carrying trap proceedings to their logical conclusion despite the availability of prima facie material; (ii) allegations of planted traps; (iii) prompt identification and securing of properties in disproportionate assets investigations; (iv) timely processing of vigilance complaints; and (v) the practice of merely forwarding complaints to the Heads of
Departments without effective follow-up. Though the factual situations differ, they disclose recurring institutional concerns which cannot be brushed aside as isolated aberrations.
44.In the present day scenario, it is not easy for an ordinary citizen to lodge a complaint against an erring public servant. The apprehension is far greater when the complainant is a businessman whose day-to-day activities are dependent upon various governmental authorities. Such complainants are often exposed to the risk of victimisation and retaliation. Therefore, it is imperative that the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption inspires confidence that every genuine complaint, irrespective of the rank or status of the public servant involved, would receive prompt, impartial and fearless consideration. While the Directorate has undoubtedly registered cases against Village
Administrative Officers, Panchayat Secretaries, Village Assistants, Constables and other officials at the grassroots level, cases against higher-ranking officers such as Sub-Registrars, Tahsildars, Inspectors of Police and officers above them are comparatively few. This Court has also examined the nature of the Prevention of Corruption Act cases presently pending before it and finds that prosecutions beyond the level of Tahsildar are relatively uncommon. If that is so, it would mean that only lower-level officials are corrupt and all higher officials are above board. If that were really the position, corruption at the grassroots level itself should not exist. This Court finds it difficult to accept such a conclusion. While this Court does not suggest that corruption is confined to any particular level of administration, the existing pattern necessarily raises a legitimate concern as to whether allegations involving higher functionaries are receiving the same degree of institutional attention as those involving officials at the lower levels.
45.This Court has also called upon the Directorate to place the particulars relating to its organisational structure, manpower, functioning and administrative framework. The materials furnished reveal that while the Directorate has made some efforts in combating corruption, certain structural and administrative deficiencies continue to impede its optimal functioning.
46.This Court also takes judicial notice of the consistent commitment expressed by the present Government to eradicate corruption from public administration. The recent policy initiatives demonstrate that such commitment exists at the highest levels of governance, and the positive changes are increasingly becoming visible. The challenge, however, lies in ensuring that the same commitment effectively reaches the grassroots, where the ordinary citizen comes into contact with public administration on a daily basis. That objective cannot be achieved merely through policy declarations. It requires a strong, efficient and independent institution capable of translating governmental resolve into effective enforcement. The Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption is the principal institution entrusted with that responsibility.
47.The existing administrative structure appears to concentrate almost every important decision at the Directorate. District Vigilance units, though headed by Additional Superintendent / Deputy Superintendent level officers, are left with little operational autonomy. Consequently, complaints, factual verification reports and proposals move from one office to another before any meaningful action is taken. The result is institutional delay without corresponding accountability. Anti-corruption agencies are expected to function with speed, secrecy and decisiveness. Administrative structures which unnecessarily postpone operational decisions ultimately defeat the very purpose for which such specialised agencies have been constituted.
48.The effectiveness of any anti-corruption institution depends not merely upon the statutory powers conferred upon it but, more importantly, upon the credibility of its leadership. The office of the Vigilance Commissioner occupies the apex of the vigilance administration and has a direct bearing on the supervision of investigations and the overall functioning of the Directorate. Such an institution deserves the undivided attention of a full-time head. However, for years together, the office is being held as an additional charge by a senior officer who is already heading another major and sensitive Department. This Court finds it difficult to accept that, in a
State having a large pool of experienced officers of the Indian Administrative Service, it is not possible to identify one officer of unquestioned integrity, independence and administrative ability to exclusively lead the vigilance administration. Appointment of a full-time Vigilance Commissioner is not merely a matter of administrative convenience; it is a reflection of the importance that the State attaches to combating corruption and an essential step towards strengthening public confidence in the institution.
49.Equally disturbing is the apparent misunderstanding regarding the scope of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The object of Section 17A is to protect honest public servants from vexatious prosecution. It is not intended to become a shield for delaying or defeating legitimate vigilance enquiries. Despite repeated pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court clarifying that allegations relating to demand or acceptance of illegal gratification, accumulation of wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income, etc., do not attract the protection under Section 17A, valuable time continues to be wasted in seeking approvals, in cases which the law itself does not contemplate. Such an approach not only delays investigation but also frustrates the object underlying the Prevention of Corruption Act.
50.This Court is surprised to note that the Vigilance Department, which is expected to oversee nearly fifteen lakh Government servants across the State, has a sanctioned strength of only 152 investigating officers. Even out of this dismal strength, 14 posts are currently vacant. With such limited manpower, the Department is often reduced to functioning as a post office, merely forwarding a substantial number of complaints to the respective Heads of Departments, instead of independently verifying them. From the materials placed, this Court found that even the available investigating officers are investigating merely 1 or 2 Preliminary Enquiries and 1 or 2 Detailed Enquiries, per year, only as a formality. The Vigilance Department has registered only
117, 134 and 182 cases during the years 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2025-26 respectively. Thus, it is clear that on an average, each investigation officer is dealing with only one or two regular case throughout a year and that too, as against Group C and Group D officials.
51.Another issue of considerable importance is the tenure of officers serving in the Directorate. The Government has itself prescribed a tenure policy to preserve institutional neutrality, prevent organisational stagnation and facilitate induction of officers with fresh perspectives and proven competence. Under GO.Ms.No.39, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 13.04.2009, the normal tenure is three years, extendable by a further period of two years in special circumstances and by another two years in extraordinary circumstances based on the performance of the officer. Thus, even in exceptional cases, the maximum permissible tenure is seven years. This Court has, however, noticed that officers continue in the Directorate for more than ten years beyond the prescribed tenure and some officers are continuing for nearly twenty years. In fact, this Court has already taken note of this issue in G.Senthilkumar v. Director General of Police [WP(Crl.)(MD)No.1299 of 2026, dated 19.06.2026]. If such prolonged continuation is to be justified as being indispensable in the institutional interest, the performance of such officers must demonstrably warrant such exceptional retention. However, the materials placed before this Court do not indicate that the number of vigilance cases detected or registered, or the overall outcomes achieved by such officers, are so exceptional so as to justify repeated extensions or prolonged continuance in deviation from the normal tenure policy.
52.If the same set of officers are perceived to be indispensable year after year, it would unfairly imply that, among the lakhs of police personnel serving the State, there are no other officers possessing the integrity, competence and dedication required for vigilance administration. This Court is unable to accept this assumption. Prolonged continuance of the same officers beyond the prescribed tenure also carries the risk of groupism and concentration of influence in a few individuals. A specialised anti-corruption agency cannot afford such a situation. These are precisely the consequences which the tenure policy seeks to prevent. Strong institutions are built not by the indefinite continuation of individuals but by adherence to institutional values, periodic rotation and the continuous induction of officers of unquestionable integrity and professional competence.
53.This Court is also constrained to observe that accountability within the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department cannot end with identifying the officer against whom allegations are made. Administrative accountability must equally extend to officers responsible for unexplained delay in processing complaints. Every complaint involving demand of illegal gratification loses its evidentiary
value with the passage of time. Consequently, unexplained administrative delay in dealing with such complaints deserves as much attention as the investigation itself.
54.Apart from the institutional deficiencies noticed above, this Court also considers it necessary to emphasise the need for technological modernisation in the functioning of the Directorate. The Directorate continues to depend substantially upon conventional paper-based administration. Internal communications, movement of files, monitoring of enquiries and investigations, maintenance of records and several other administrative processes are still largely carried out through physical files and manual procedures, resulting in avoidable delay and administrative inefficiency. At a time when technology has transformed policing and criminal justice administration, such dependence on conventional methods does not appear consistent with the needs of a specialised anti-corruption agency. Since the officers of the Directorate are police officers, the technological measures recognised under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 also deserve to be effectively utilised, wherever legally permissible, in aid of investigation and administration. The object of embracing technology is not merely to replace paper with electronic records, but to ensure prompt decisionmaking, effective supervision, greater institutional accountability and efficient vigilance administration. In anti-corruption investigations, every avoidable delay ultimately benefits the wrongdoer.
55.Having regard to the recurring institutional deficiencies noticed in the present case as well as in the other matters dealt with by this Court, this Court directs the Chief Secretary to the State of Tamil Nadu to constitute a High Level Committee, headed by the Chief Secretary, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing functioning of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, particularly with reference to the following aspects:-
A. Leadership and Institutional Governance
(i) Appointment of a full-time Vigilance Commissioner exclusively to head the vigilance administration instead of continuing long-term arrangements through additional charge.
(ii) Strict adherence to the tenure policy prescribed by the Government, permitting deviations only in exceptional circumstances supported by recorded reasons.
(iii) Periodic induction of officers possessing integrity, competence and professional ability into the Directorate so that vigilance administration continually benefits from fresh perspectives and wider institutional experience.
(iv) Review of the continued retention of officers serving in the Directorate beyond the prescribed tenure and ensuring that the tenure policy is implemented in its true spirit.
B. Strengthening Institutional Capacity
(v) Comprehensive review of the sanctioned strength of the Directorate and provision of adequate investigating officers commensurate with its expanding responsibilities.
(vi) Decentralisation of appropriate administrative and supervisory powers to suitable levels so that investigations and vigilance activities are not delayed by avoidable administrative bottlenecks.
(vii) Strengthening the Directorate by providing adequate technical support, including officers possessing expertise in engineering, accounts, finance, cyber forensics and other specialised disciplines, wherever the nature of investigation so demands.
C. Strengthening Investigation and Preventive Vigilance
(viii) Establishment of a dedicated Intelligence Wing exclusively for gathering actionable intelligence relating to corruption and identifying sectors vulnerable to corrupt practices.
(ix) Establishment of separate Vigilance Cells in every district for preventive vigilance, surprise inspections and detection of systemic corruption, independent of officers engaged in investigation of regular cases.
(x) Ensuring that supervisory officers (Range
Superintendents of Police) are stationed within their respective territorial jurisdictions to facilitate closer supervision, prompt decision-making and effective preventive vigilance.
(xi) Establishment of an institutional mechanism, including an appropriate Trap Money Suspense Account, to ensure immediate availability of funds required for trap proceedings, subject to proper accounting and audit.
D. Administrative Reforms
(xii) Issuance of comprehensive administrative guidelines, supported by illustrative examples, regarding the applicability of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, so that investigations are not delayed.
(xiii) Ensuring that requests requiring prior approval are processed and decided within the time contemplated by law, thereby preventing unnecessary delay in investigation.
(xiv) Establishment of an accountability mechanism whereby, whenever unexplained delay occurs in processing vigilance complaints, enquiries, investigations or in granting sanctions, the supervisory authority shall examine the reasons therefor and, wherever warranted, initiate appropriate administrative action against the officers responsible for such delay.
E. Technology and Public Interface
(xv) Progressive adoption of a secure and confidential electronic platform for the functioning of the Directorate, including internal communications, movement of files, monitoring of enquiries and investigations, maintenance of records and other administrative processes, and effective utilisation, wherever legally permissible, of the technological measures contemplated under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, with necessary assistance from the State Crime
Records Bureau (SCRB).
(xvi) Ensuring appropriate confidentiality and protection for genuine complainants in accordance with law.
(xvii) Strengthening authorised digital service delivery mechanisms so as to progressively reduce the scope for unauthorised intermediaries.
56.For the above purpose, the Chief Secretary to Government, State of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai, is suo-motu impleaded as a party to this petition and Mr.B.Saravanan, learned Additional Advocate General, Assisted by Mr.S.Siva Subramanian, learned Government Advocate (Civil Side), is to take notice on behalf of the newly impleaded respondent.
57.We must have the courage to accept the deep rooted corruption in the system that needs to be addressed imminently. The present Government has consistently expressed its resolve to eradicate corruption and to promote transparent and accountable governance. This Court has also noticed that the recent policy initiatives reflect that commitment at the highest levels of administration. However, such commitment can achieve its intended objective only when it effectively spreads through every level of governance. The ordinary citizen judges the success of governmental policy not by official declarations, but by the fairness, transparency and integrity experienced in everyday
interactions with public authorities. It is at that level that the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption assumes immense significance.
58.Corruption has taken deep root over several decades. It cannot be eradicated either by enacting laws alone or by occasional enforcement measures. Equally, it cannot be expected that an institution entrusted with combating corruption can achieve optimum results unless it is provided with adequate leadership, sufficient manpower, efficient administrative support and functional autonomy. Sustained political commitment must therefore be matched by sustained institutional strengthening.
59.This Court is conscious that implementation of some of the above suggestions may require additional financial allocation by the Government. However, such expenditure should not be viewed as a burden upon the State exchequer, but as an investment in strengthening the institutional framework for combating corruption. The principle, “Spend a little to save a lot,” aptly applies in this context. A comparatively modest investment in improving the vigilance machinery would go a long way in safeguarding the proper implementation of Government projects and welfare schemes involving public expenditure many times over. The financial commitment required for strengthening the vigilance administration is insignificant when compared to the enormous public funds that stand protected by an effective anti-corruption mechanism.
60.The suggestions indicated above are intended to serve as institutional measures for consideration by the Government. This Court is conscious that matters relating to policy, allocation of resources and administrative restructuring primarily fall within the domain of the Executive. The recommendations made herein are not intended to supplant executive wisdom, but to assist it by drawing attention to recurring institutional deficiencies which have repeatedly surfaced before this Court.
61.Before concluding, this Court reiterates that the Prevention of Corruption Act, was enacted to prevent corruption in public administration. It is intended to protect honest public servants while ensuring that corrupt public servants are brought to justice. It cannot be permitted to become an instrument for shielding the corrupt or delaying legitimate enquiries and investigations. The effectiveness of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption depends upon honest leadership, efficient administration, adequate manpower, professional investigation and prompt decision-making. If these foundational requirements are strengthened, the Directorate will be better equipped to fulfil the object of the Prevention of Corruption Act and translate the Government’s commitment to eradicate corruption into a reality.
62.The High Level Committee shall not confine its exercise merely to examining the institutional reforms suggested by this Court. It shall also independently examine the shortcomings identified by this Court in paragraph no.38 of this order, the manner in which the petitioner’s complaint was dealt with, fix responsibility upon the officers concerned, and recommend appropriate administrative action. The Committee shall submit its cumulative report to the Government within a period of four months from its constitution.
63.Upon receipt of the report, the Government shall examine the recommendations of the High Level Committee and take appropriate decision on the institutional measures within a period of three months thereafter. As regards the recommendations relating to the handling of the petitioner’s complaint and the responsibility of the officers concerned, appropriate action shall also be taken in accordance with law within the said period.
64.Registry is directed to list this matter under the caption “For Reporting Compliance” during the second week of April, 2027. By then, the Chief Secretary shall file a status report indicating (i) the action taken on the recommendations relating to the institutional reforms; and (ii) the action taken on the findings and recommendations relating to the handling of the petitioner’s complaint.
65.This Court hopes and trusts that the Government will bestow due consideration upon the institutional measures indicated in this order and continue its efforts to strengthen the vigilance administration so that the objective of eradicating corruption is effectively realised at every level of governance.
With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
Index : Yes / No 31.07.2026
Internet : Yes / No gk
Note:
Mark a copy of this order to
1. The Secretary to Government,
Home Department,
State of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai.
2. The Secretary (I) to the Hon’ble Chief Minister, State of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai.
3. The Vigilance Commissioner, State of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai.
4. The Director,
Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Chennai.
5. The Director,
State Crimes Record Bureau (SCRB), Chennai.
6. The Director General of Police [HoPF], Chennai.
7. The Inspector General of Police (Intelligence), O/o.Director General of Police, Chennai.
8. The Central Vigilance Commissioner,
Satarkta Bhavan, Block A, GPO Complex, INA, New Delhi – 110 023.
To
1.The Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department, No.293, MKN Road, Alandur, Chennai.
2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department,
No.576/4, EB Colony,
Chettinayakkanpatty, Trichy By-pass Road, Dindigul – 624 004.
3.The Inspector of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption Department,
No.576/4, EB Colony,
Chettinayakkanpatty, Trichy By-pass Road, Dindigul – 624 004.
4.The Superintendent of Police,
CBI / ACB, Madurai, Madurai Zone,
73, Athikulam Main Road, Reserve Line Post, Madurai.
5.The Principal Secretary to Government,
Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, Chennai.
6.The Chief Secretary,
State of Tamil Nadu,
Secretariat, Chennai.
B.PUGALENDHI, J.
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