THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH AND THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE N.ANAND VENKATESH Crl. A. (MD)No.229 of 2020 Karuppaiah .. Appellant். For Appellant : Mr.I.Murugesan Legal Aid Counsel For Respondent : Mr.A.Thiruvadikumar Additional Public Prosecutor JUDGMENT Before parting with the matter, this Court appreciates the efforts taken by the legal aid counsel who appraised this Court with all the available materials it enabled this Court to come to a final conclusion. In view of the same, there shall be a direction to the Legal Services Committee to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) to the legal aid counsel as remuneration. [M.S.R., J.] & [N.A.V., J.] 07.11.2022 Index : Yes Internet : Yes RR To 1.The IV Additional and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli. 2.The Inspector of Police, Tiruvengadam Police Station, Tenkasi District. 3.The Additional Public Prosecutor Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 4.The Record Keeper, Vernacular Records Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. M.S.RAMESH, J AND N.ANAND VENKATESH, J
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dated: 07.11.2022
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH
AND
THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE N.ANAND VENKATESH
Crl. A. (MD)No.229 of 2020
Karuppaiah .. Appellant
Vs.
The State rep by
The Inspector of Police,
Tiruvengadam Police Station,
Tenkasi District. .. Respondent/Complainant
Appeals filed under Section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code, against the judgment and order dated 03.11.2018 in S.C.No.244 of 2018 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli.
For Appellant : Mr.I.Murugesan
Legal Aid Counsel
For Respondent : Mr.A.Thiruvadikumar
Additional Public Prosecutor
JUDGMENT
M.S.RAMESH, J,
AND
N.ANAND VENKATESH, J,
This criminal appeal has been filed against the judgment and order passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, in SC No.244/2018 dated 03.11.2018, convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment.
- The case of the prosecution is that the deceased is the wife of the appellant and both of them were suffering from some health ailments. Prior to 15.08.2017, the deceased was facing serious health ailments and the appellant was not able to properly take care of the deceased since he also had health issues and he did not have any regular earnings. Hence, the appellant seems to have brooded over the fact as to who will take care of his wife after his demise. On 15.08.2017, the appellant was taken to the hospital at about 10.00 a.m. by P.W.1, who is the son of the appellant and he was brought back home. At about 1.00 p.m., the appellant is said to have pushed down the deceased and held her on the floor with his right knee and hacked the deceased with a billhook [M.O.1-], as a result of which, the head was almost severed and the deceased died on the spot. P.W.1, who is the son of the deceased, is said to have seen the occurrence and hence he gave a complaint [Ex.P1] to P.W.12 and an FIR in Crime No.163/2017 came to be registered at about 2.30 p.m. on 15.08.2017.
- The investigation was initially taken up by P.W.13 and he proceeded with the investigation till preparation of the inquest report upon the dead body of the deceased. Thereafter the investigation was taken up by P.W.14 and he completed the investigation and laid the final report before the Judicial Magistrate, Sankarankoil. The copies were served on the accused person and thereafter the case was committed to the file of the Principal District and Sessions Court, Tirunelveli and the case was made over to the Court below.
- The Court below framed a charge against the appellant for offences punishable under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.14 and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P.15 and identified and marked M.O.1 to M.O.7. The defence marked Ex.D1 and Ex.D2 to substantiate their defence. The Court below questioned the appellant under Section 313 (1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by putting the incriminating materials collected during the course of trial and the same was denied as false by the appellant.
- The Court below, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and on appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubts and proceeded to convict and sentence the appellant in the manner stated supra. Aggrieved by the same, the criminal appeal has been filed before this Court.
- Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State.
- The prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.3 as eyewitnesses in this case. P.W.1 is the son of the appellant and the deceased and P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the nearby residents. P.W.3 is the husband of P.W.2. P.W.1, in his evidence, has stated that the appellant and the deceased were suffering from health ailments and the appellant was in a frustrated state of mind thinking about the fate of his wife after his demise. This witness states that the door was locked from inside and he heard the cry of the deceased and he peeped through the keyhole and witnessed the incident, whereby the appellant pulled the deceased by her tresses and by using M.O.1, he caused a cut injury. Thereafter, P.W.2 and P.W.3 are said to have rushed towards the house on hearing the sound. The statement of this witness was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the statement was marked as Ex.D1, since it was used to contradict the evidence of P.W.1. The 164 Cr.P.C., statement is the earlier version that was given by P.W.1, wherein, he states that at the time when he reached the scene of crime, he found the neck of his mother severed and the appellant standing near the dead body. He has further stated that the persons in the locality had caught hold of the appellant after the incident. It is, therefore, clear from the above that there is a vital contradiction between the evidence of P.W.1 and his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The said contradiction makes the evidence of P.W.1, as if he saw the incident, very doubtful.
- P.W.2 is a nearby resident. Even though she states that she saw the appellant running out of the house by carrying M.O.1 in his hand, in the cross-examination, she has stated that by the time she came out of her house, the appellant was standing along with the police and others. Hence, P.W.2 could not have seen the appellant immediately after the occurrence.
- P.W.3 is the husband of P.W.2 and it is clear from his evidence that he does not know anything about this incident till he heard about it later. The evidence of this witness does not help the prosecution in any manner.
- The overall appreciation of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 shows that the appellant was with the deceased at the time of occurrence. In view of the same, the appellant must explain as to what actually happened at the time of the incident. When the appellant was questioned in this regard under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he has not given any explanation and he has merely denied the same as false.
- The principle under Section 106 of the Evidence Act will clearly apply to the facts of the present case. There is no doubt that the appellant was present with the deceased at the time of occurrence and hence, the burden is upon the appellant to prove the fact, which is especially within his knowledge. There is an unnatural death of the deceased and he was present in the house and there is no evidence to show that anybody else had entered the house and in view of the same, the appellant ought to have given an explanation, failing which, there is a strong presumption that the appellant had only murdered his wife.
- Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh reported in (2014) 12 SCC 211 and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder:
“15. We find that the High Court has not at all considered the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 [ “106.Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.Illustrations(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”] . This section provides, inter alia, that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
- Way back in Shambhu Nath Mehrav. State of Ajmer [Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794 : 1956 SCR 199] this Court dealt with the interpretation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that the section is not intended to shift the burden of proof (in respect of a crime) on the accused but to take care of a situation where a fact is known only to the accused and it is well-nigh impossible or extremely difficult for the prosecution to prove that fact. It was said: (AIR p. 406, para 11)
“11. This [Section 101] lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.
The word ‘especially’ stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.”
(emphasis supplied)
- In a specific instance in Trimukh Maroti Kirkanv. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 10 SCC 681 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 80] this Court held that when the wife is injured in the dwelling home where the husband ordinarily resides, and the husband offers no explanation for the injuries to his wife, then the circumstances would indicate that the husband is responsible for the injuries. It was said: (SCC p. 694, para 22)
“22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.”
- Reliance was placed by this Court on Ganeshlalv. State of Maharashtra [(1992) 3 SCC 106 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 435] in which case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.
- Similarly, in Dnyaneshwarv. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 10 SCC 445 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 728] this Court observed that since the deceased was murdered in her matrimonial home and the appellant had not set up a case that the offence was committed by somebody else or that there was a possibility of an outsider committing the offence, it was for the husband to explain the grounds for the unnatural death of his wife.
- In Jagdishv. State of M.P. [(2009) 9 SCC 495 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 21] this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 503, para 22)
“22. … It bears repetition that the appellant and the deceased family members were the only occupants of the room and it was therefore incumbent on the appellant to have tendered some explanation in order to avoid any suspicion as to his guilt.”
- More recently, in Gian Chandv. State of Haryana [(2013) 14 SCC 420 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 226] a large number of decisions of this Court were referred to and the interpretation given to Section 106 of the Evidence Act in Shambhu Nath Mehra [Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794 : 1956 SCR 199] was reiterated. One of the decisions cited in Gian Chand [(2013) 14 SCC 420 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 226] is that of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] which gives a rather telling example explaining the principle behind Section 106 of the Evidence Act in the following words: (Mir Mohammad Omar case [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] , SCC p. 393, para 35)
“35. During arguments we put a question to the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents based on a hypothetical illustration. If a boy is kidnapped from the lawful custody of his guardian in the sight of his people and the kidnappers disappeared with the prey, what would be the normal inference if the mangled dead body of the boy is recovered within a couple of hours from elsewhere. The query was made whether upon proof of the above facts an inference could be drawn that the kidnappers would have killed the boy. The learned Senior Counsel finally conceded that in such a case the inference is reasonably certain that the boy was killed by the kidnappers unless they explain otherwise.”
- The law, therefore, is quite well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused is on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts pertaining to a crime that can be known only to the accused, or are virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove. These facts need to be explained by the accused and if he does not do so, then it is a strong circumstance pointing to his guilt based on those facts.
- Applying this principle to the facts of the case, since Dhapu Kunwar died an unnatural death in the room occupied by her and Thakur Singh, the cause of the unnatural death was known to Thakur Singh. There is no evidence that anybody else had entered their room or could have entered their room. Thakur Singh did not set up any case that he was not in their room or not in the vicinity of their room while the incident occurred nor did he set up any case that some other person entered the room and caused the unnatural death of his wife. The facts relevant to the cause of Dhapu Kunwar’s death being known only to Thakur Singh, yet he chose not to disclose them or to explain them. The principle laid down in Section 106 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to the facts of the case and there is, therefore, a very strong presumption that Dhapu Kunwar was murdered by Thakur Singh.”
- It is clear from the above that even though the burden of proving the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubts is upon the prosecution, there are certain facts, which are well within the personal knowledge of the appellant, which cannot be proved by the prosecution and which requires a specific explanation from the appellant and if the same is not given, there is a strong circumstance pointing to the guilt of the appellant. Hence, the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 along with the facts and circumstances of the case clearly points the finger against the appellant and unfortunately the appellant was not able to give any explanation and that by itself results in a strong circumstance against the appellant pointing to his guilt.
- The evidence of P.W.7, who is the postmortem Doctor, through whom Ex.P6 was marked reveals the following injuries:
“On external examination: (1) near decapitation of head with head attached to the remaining body only at the level of skin on left side with no bony or muscle attachment. The dimension of injury are 29 cm in length extending and 7 cm in breadth. The cut injury in neck was passing through the level of thyroid cartilage.
2) Laceration in left ear lobule 2 x 1 cm
3) A laceration in R side chin 3 x 1.5 cm upto bone depth.
On internal examination:
1.Abdomen – I) stomach – 100 gm of digested food (ii) intestine empty (iii) liver, kidneys, spleen, pancreas pale. 2) chest – heart pale and empty; lungs – pale 3) skull – brain parenchyma soft and pale.”
The final opinion of the Doctor was that the cause of death is due to the consequences of viz., (1) hypovolemia / asphyxia.
- The doctor has specifically stated that such an injury can be caused with M.O.1. The evidence of P.W.9 read along with Ex.P10 and Ex.P11 also assumes significance in this case. P.W.13, who conducted the initial investigation after the FIR was registered, had visited the scene of crime on 15.08.2017 at about 3.13 p.m. and had prepared the observation mahazar (Ex.P3) and rough sketch (Ex.P13). M.O.6 and M.O.7 were also collected from the scene of crime in the presence of P.W.4. That apart, after the postmortem was conducted, the clothes of the deceased was collected (M.O.3 to M.O.5). After the accused was arrested on 16.08.2017 at about 7.00 a.m., his bloodstained shirt was also recovered (M.O.2). All these were sent for scientific analysis and it is clear from the serological report that the bloodstain found in all these clothes including the weapon (M.O.2) matched with the blood group (O) of the deceased.
- All the above evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and the available evidence along with the non explanation on the part of the appellant about the incident clearly establishes the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. This Court, therefore, holds that it is appellant, who had done to death his wife.
- The Court below has convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of P.W.1 clearly shows that the appellant and the deceased were having serious health problems and the appellant was always worried about the health issues faced by his wife and was brooding as to who will take care of his wife after his death. This thought in the mind of the appellant seems to have grown to such an extent that he wanted to kill his wife and thereby save her from the agony. There is no material to show that the appellant wanted to murder his wife with any bad motive or intention.
- The present case can be brought within exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. Even though this provision insists for grave and sudden provocation, this Court developed the concept of sustained provocation, which was held to come within the fold of first exception to Section 300 IPC. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in Suyambukkani v. State reported in 1989 Law Weekly (Crl) 86.
- The Apex Court in a recent judgment has accepted this theory of sustained provocation in Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chattisgarh reported in 2022 Live law (SC) 650. The relevant portions in the judgment are extracted hereunder:
“10. Interpreting Exception 1 to the Section 300 in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, 10 this Court has held that the conditions which have to be satisfied for the exception to be invoked are (a) the deceased must have given provocation to the accused; (b) the provocation must be grave; (c) the provocation must be sudden; (d) the offender, by the reason of the said provocation, should have been deprived of his power of self-control; (e) the offender should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of power of self-control; and (f) the offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or the death of any other person by mistake or accident. For determining whether or not the provocation had temporarily deprived the offender from the power of self-control, the test to be applied is that of a reasonable man and not that of an unusually excitable and pugnacious individual. Further, it must be considered whether there was sufficient interval and time to allow the passion to cool. K.M. Nanavati (supra) succinctly observes:
“84. Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden” provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision: it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self-control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.
- The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.”
- K.M. Nanavati (supra), has held that the mental background created by the previous act(s) of the deceased may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused sudden and grave provocation for committing the offence. There can be sustained and continuous provocations over a period of time, albeit in such cases Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC applies when preceding the offence, there was a last act, word or gesture in the series of incidents comprising of that conduct, amounting to sudden provocation sufficient for reactive loss of self-control. K.M. Nanavati (supra) quotes the definition of ‘provocation’ given by Goddard, C.J.; in R. v. Duffy, 11 as :
“…some act or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of selfcontrol, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his own mind…[I]ndeed, circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that the person had the time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-control which is of the essence of provocation…”.
- The question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact. Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable. The law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC. First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind. Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given. The retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation. The first part lays emphasis on whether the accused acting as a reasonable man had time to reflect and cool down. The offender is presumed to possess the general power of self-control of an ordinary or reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the same situation in which the accused is placed, to temporarily lose the power of self-control. The second part emphasises that the offender’s reaction to the provocation is to be judged on the basis of whether the provocation was sufficient to bring about a loss of self-control in the fact situation. Here again, the court would have to apply the test of a reasonable person in the circumstances. While examining these questions, we should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation. Gravity of provocation turns upon the whole of the victim’s abusive behaviour towards the accused. Gravity does not hinge upon a single or last act of provocation deemed sufficient by itself to trigger the punitive action. Last provocation has to be considered in light of the previous provocative acts or words, serious enough to cause the accused to lose his self-control. The cumulative or sustained provocation test would be satisfied when the accused’s retaliation was immediately preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative conduct, which would satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediate provocation.
- Thus, the gravity of the provocation can be assessed by taking into account the history of the abuse and need not be confined to the gravity of the final provocative act in the form of acts, words or gestures. The final wrongdoing, triggering off the accused’s reaction, should be identified to show that there was temporary loss of self-control and the accused had acted without planning and premeditation. This has been aptly summarised by Ashworth13in the following words: “[T]he significance of the deceased’s final act should be considered by reference to the previous relations between the parties, taking into account any previous incidents which add colour to the final act. This is not to argue that the basic distinction between sudden provoked killings and revenge killings should be blurred, for the lapse of time between the deceased’s final act and the accused’s retaliation should continue to tell against him. The point is that the significance of the deceased’s final act and its effect upon the accused – and indeed the relation of the retaliation to that act – can be neither understood nor evaluated without reference to previous dealings between the parties.” Exception 1 to Section 300 recognises that when a reasonable person is tormented continuously, he may, at one point of time, erupt and reach a break point whereby losing self-control, going astray and committing the offence. However, sustained provocation principle does not do away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, which should be verifiable. Further, this defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.
- Following the view expressed in K.M. Nanavati (supra), this Court in Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh observed that in the test for application of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC, the primary obligation of the court is to examine the circumstances from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence, if there was such grave and sudden provocation, as to reasonably conclude that a person placed in such circumstances can temporarily lose self-control and commit the offence in the proximity to the time of provocation. A significant observation in Budhi Singh (supra) is that the provocation may be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of the injury. The idea behind this exception is to exclude the acts of violence which are premeditated, and not to deny consideration of circumstances such as prior animosity between the deceased and the accused, arising as a result of incidents in the past and subsequently resulting in sudden and grave provocation. In support of the aforesaid proposition and to convert the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I of the IPC in Budhi Singh (supra), the Court also relied upon Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.”
- The Apex Court, on the facts of the case on hand, came to a conclusion that there were series of incident, which ultimately led to the final incident and the Apex Court has termed it as slow burn reaction. Accordingly, the Apex Court converted the conviction of the appellant therein from Section 302 IPC to Section 304(I) IPC.
- The above test is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. The appellant and his wife were suffering from nervous problems for a very long time and the appellant was continuously brooding over the fact as to who will take care of his wife, after his death. This thought seems to have occupied his mind and sustained for a long time and ultimately the appellant thought that the only relief he can give his wife is by putting her to death. This is also one form of sustained provocation, which led to the final act of murder. This Court, therefore, is inclined to bring this case within exception I to Section 300 IPC.
- In view of the above discussion, this Court is inclined to modify the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304(I) IPC and the appellant is sentenced to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment.
- In the result, the criminal appeal is partly allowed in the following terms:
(a) the conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside, instead the appellant is convicted under Section 304(I) IPC;
(b) the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment; and
(c) The period of sentence already undergone by the accused/appellant is ordered to be set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C.
- Before parting with the matter, this Court appreciates the efforts taken by the legal aid counsel who appraised this Court with all the available materials it enabled this Court to come to a final conclusion. In view of the same, there shall be a direction to the Legal Services Committee to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) to the legal aid counsel as remuneration.
[M.S.R., J.] & [N.A.V., J.]
07.11.2022
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
RR
To
1.The IV Additional and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli.
2.The Inspector of Police,
Tiruvengadam Police Station,
Tenkasi District.
3.The Additional Public Prosecutor
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,
Madurai.
4.The Record Keeper,
Vernacular Records Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
M.S.RAMESH, J
AND
N.ANAND VENKATESH, J
RR
Judgment made in
Crl. A. (MD)No.229 of 2020
07.11.2022
