MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN CRL.A(MD).No.379 of 2019 State Represented by Special Public Prosecutor, CBI, ACB, Madurai. …. Appellant/Complainant

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

Reserved on : 11.06.2024
Pronounced on : : 04.03.2025
&
17.03.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN
CRL.A(MD).No.379 of 2019
State Represented by
Special Public Prosecutor,
CBI, ACB, Madurai. …. Appellant/Complainant
Vs.
1. V.Samuel Jebaraj
2. P.Narayanan …Respondent/Accused No. 1 & 2
Prayer : This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 372 (2) of Cr.P.C. to admit this appeal and call for record of the trial Court and set aside the judgment of acquittal dated 24.10.2018 of the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai, in C.C.No.04 of 2011.
For Appellant : Mr.C.Muthu Saravanan, Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases
For Respondent : R1 died
: Mr.R.Murugan for R2
JUDGMENT
This appeal has been filed by CBI challenging the acquittal judgment passed in C.C.No.04 of 2011 on the file of learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.
2.Brief facts of the case:
The first respondent was working as a Senior Manager, Canara Bank, Nazareth Branch, Toothukudi District and the second respondent was working as a part-time employee in the said branch. P.W.2 was living within the jurisdiction of the said bank. P.W.3 is his daughter. P.W.3 submitted an Educational loan application in the said bank for pursuing nursing Course. The loan of Rs.2,50,000/- was sanctioned on 29.10.2010. At that time, the second respondent visited the house of P.W.2 and demanded a sum of Rs.12,000/- as bribe to give the cheque for the said loan amount. He demanded the said amount on behalf of A1 also. P.W.2 made a complaint to P.W.16 and after receiving the complaint, P.W.16 registered the case and trap was arranged. P.W.4 and P.W.5 official witnesses from other departments were called to act as independent official witnesses, namely as shadow witnesses. In the presence of P.W.4 and
P.W.5, the the phenolphthalein test was demonstrated to P.W.2 and P.W.3. P.W.2 was specifically instructed to give the money, on the demand made by A2 and
A1 and P.W.3 was directed to accompany P.W.2. After the instruction, the Entrustment Mahazar was prepared and same was marked as Ex.P7. Thereafter, they went to the respondent’s office and approached A1 and A2. A2 reiterated the said demand and received the amount. Thereafter, P.W.2 and P.W.3 came out and gave the signal to the trap laying officer and the trap laying officer along with the team entered into the premises and conducted the phenolphthalein test in the hands of A2. In result, A2’s hand wash turned pink in colour and thereafter, on disclosure by A2, the amount was recovered. Apart from the bribe amount, some more amount also was recovered and hence, the Police officers, CBI, registered the case and continued the investigation. Thereafter, they filed a final report against A1 and A2 and the same was taken on file in C.C.No.4 of 2011 by the learned Special Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.
2. 1.After appearance of the accused, copies of records were furnished to them under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The learned Trial Judge, on perusal of records and on hearing both sides and being satisfied that there existed a prima facie case against the accused/appellants, framed charges under Sections 120B, r/w Section 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, and the same was read over and explained to them and on being questioned, the accused/respondents denied the charges and pleaded not guilty and stood for trial.
2.2.During the course of trial, the prosecution, in order to prove its case, had examined 17 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.17 and exhibited 37 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.37. On considering the above evidence of the prosecution, the learned trial Judge examined the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., by putting the incriminating circumstances available against them. The accused denied the same as false and on the side of the accused, no oral or documentary evidence was let in.
2. 3.The learned trial Judge, after considering the oral and documentary evidence acquitted the accused by passing the impugned judgment. Challenging the same, the CBI filed this appeal.
3.Submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for
CBI:-
3. 1.The learned trial judge on the basis of inconsequential contradictions and irrelevant materials, irrelevant omissions, acquitted the accused. P.W.2 to
P.W.5 have categorically deposed before the Court about the demand and acceptance by A2 and the prosecution also proved the conspiracy between A1 and A2, who received the bribe from each and every loanee which was substantiated through the evidence of various victims examined before the Court below.
3. 2.The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that even though P.W.5 was treated as hostile partly, but the major part of the evidence supported the prosecution case. Similarly, the other victim deposed before the Court that A2 demanded money. The same was also not considered by the learned trial judge and he has erroneously acquitted the accused.
3.3.The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that when the demand and acceptance was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption comes into play under Section 20 of Prevention of Corruption Act and the accused has not given any explanation for the receipt of the amount. Considering the object of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it is a well settled principle that when the receipt of illegal gratification was clearly proved through the prosecution witnesses, minor contradictions or immaterial contradictions are not grounds to acquit the accused. When the examination of witnesses was done after number of years, few contradictions tend to occur. The said contradictions will not affect the core of the case. Hence, the learned Special Public Prosecutor seeks for setting aside the acquittal judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.
4.During the pendency of the appeal, A1 died.
5.Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent:
5.1.A2’s counsel vehemently argued that the trial Court after considering the material contradictions acquitted the accused not believing the evidence of P.Ws.2 to 4. In the said circumstances, unless the judgement is perverse, the acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court is not liable to be interfered. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N.Vijayakumar vs State of Tamilnadu reported in 2021 (3) SCC 687 and in the case of K.Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana reported in 2022 (4) SCC 574 and specifically argued that in this case, many views are available from the evidence and hence, the benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused by confirming the judgment of the Court below. The learned counsel reiterated the finding of the learned trial judge, by pointing out various contradictions relied by the trial court. He reiterated the said contradictions and made detailed submissions before this Court.
6.This Court considered the rival submissions made by the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent and perused the materials available on record and also the precedents relied upon by them.
7.Now the question which arises in this appeal is whether the learned trial Judge is correct in acquitting the respondent for the offence under Section 120 B, r/w Section 7 and 13 (2) r/w 13 (1)(a) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?
8.Discussion on conspiracy:
8.1.The case of the prosecution is that A1 and A2 conspired together to receive the bribe amount from the various beneficiaries of the Education Loan. In pursuance of the conspiracy, they demanded and accepted Rs.8,000/- or Rs. 12,000/- or some varied amounts from each loanee. Some of the loanees appeared before the Court and deposed before the Court stating that they demanded and received the bribe amount. Only on payment of bribe, they were issued with the Demand Draft of the loan amount. In some cases, they deducted the bribe amount and thereafter issued the Demand Draft. In the said circumstances, conspiracy was proved. This Court perused the evidence available on record. P.Ws.2, 3, and 6 to 8 and other witnesses clearly deposed before the Court that A2 demanded the money to hand over the sanctioned Education loan. A1 conspired with A2 to receive the bribe amount is inferential fact from handing over of the Demand Draft to the beneficiary after receipt of the bribe. The Demand Draft was in the custody of A2. As per the evidence, A2 handed over the said Demand Draft for the sanctioned education loan to each party. All the witnesses cogently stated the above fact.
8.2.As per the norms, the bank manager namely A1 alone is supposed to retain the Demand Draft amount and hand over to all the beneficiaries after verification. In this case, the Demand Draft was in the custody of A2. This clearly establishes the conspiracy between A1 and A2 to demand and accept
illegal gratification.
8.3.Apart from that, P.W.6 deposed that when she approached A1 and enquired about her educational loan, A1 asked to meet A2 and act as per his direction. He further warned her that if she has not acted as per direction of A2 he would tear her application and her evidence is as follows:
gpwF mNj tUlk; brk;ghpy; fduh tq;fpf;F ehDk; vd; mk;khTk; nrd;Nwhk;. mq;F Nyhd; te;jpUf;Fk; vd;Wk; bkhz;l; Ntz;Lk; vd;W nrhd;dhh;fs;. MjhtJ &.12 000 Nfl;lhh;fs;. mg;NghJ ehq;f Ngha; NkNd[iu Nfl;Nlhk;. mg;NghJ vd; mk;kh ntspNa ,Ue;jhh;fs;. mth; igrh nfhLf;fDk; ,y;iynad;why; applicatin form – ia fpopj;J Nghl;LtpLNthk; vd;W NkNd[h; nrhd;dhh;. gpwF ehuhazid Ngha; ghh;f; nrhd;dhh;.
1tJ vjphp jug;gpy; njhlh; Fwf;F tprhuiz:
Nghyprhh; tprhuizapy; igrh nfhLf;fDk; ,y;iynad;why; fpopj;J
Nghl;LtpLNtd; vd;W NkNd[h; nrhd;dhh; vd;W Nghyprhh; tprhuizapy; nrhy;ypAs;Nsd;.
8.4.P.W.3 also deposed a similar line and the relevant portion of P.,W.3 is as follow:
ehd; 1 k; vjphpia re;jpj;j NghJ vd; tpz;zg;gk; rhpahf G+h;j;jp nra;atpy;iy Mifahy; ehq;fs; tpz;zg;gj;jij fpopj;Jtpl;Nlhk; eP nrd;W ehuhaziz Ngha; ghh;f;FkhW 1 k; vjphp vd;dplk; $wpdhh; NkYk; ehuhazzplk; vy;yhk; $wpAs;Nsd; vdW;k; $wpdhh;.
8. 5.Therefore, A2 received amount on behalf of A1also. Hence, in this case, theory of constructive receipt of bribe amount has been made out as held by the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
8.6. It is relevant here to extract the following portion of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
D. Velayutham v. State, reported in (2015) 12 SCC 348
14. Any defence of bona fide issuance by Accused 1 of the second notice, putatively issued for limitation purposes, is swiftly undercut by the proven illegality of the notice, prior imprimatur of the Assistant Commissioner neither having been sought, nor received. Both the courts below have rightly recognised the issuance of the notice as a graft-inducing ploy, designed to browbeat the complainant into paying bribes to the accused officers for their recalling/rescinding the demand notice in return.
Billa Nagul Sharief v. State of A.P., reported in (2010) 11 SCC 575
19….. The feeling of a common man that when the work is enshrined to different persons bribe is demanded by one of them, when all are invariably in collusion, cannot be lost sight of. If senior officers ensure that the works of the citizens are done without payment of bribe, junior officers and employees may abandon the demand and this country would not have prominently figured as one of the most corrupt nations of the world, as it is widely accepted that the corruption flows from the top…

8.7. It is well settled principle each conspirator need not involve in every part of the conspiracy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in 2003 3 SCC 6341 has held as follows:
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment.
8.8.In the case of Aravind Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2021 (11) SCC 1, the Hon’ble Three Judges Bench considered the entire gamut of conspiracy and has held that “It is not necessary that all conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy. Some may joint that conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them”.
8. 9.In this case, the charge is that there was conspiracy to receive the bribe amount. As per the norms, the bank manager, namely, A1 alone is supposed to retain the demand draft and hand over to all the beneficiaries after verification. P.W.6 and P.W.3 clearly deposed that when they approached A1 and enquired about their educational loan, A1 asked to meet A2 and act as per his direction. The demand on the part of A1 is inferential fact from his act of entrusting the demand draft in the custody of A2. A2 demanded and received and handed over the same to A1 as part of the conspiracy. Therefore, the prosecution clearly proved the charge under Section 120-B of IPC beyond reasonable doubt.
9. Discussion on Proof of Demand:
So far as demand is concerned, P.Ws.2 and 3 and two other victims have cogently deposed about the demand of Rs.12,000/- to disburse the loan amount. The following portion of the evidences are relevant to appreciate the said finding.
P.W.2.
2k; vjphp ehuhazd; ghh;j;jTld; gzj;ij nfhz;L te;jpUf;fpwPh;fsh vdW; Nfl;lhh;. rhl;rp 2k; vjphpia milahsk; fhl;bdhh;. gpd; ehd; 2k; vjphpaplk; gzj;ij nfhLj;Njd;. 2k; vjphp vd;dplk; vt;tsT cs;sJ vd;W Nfl;lhh;. mjw;F ehd; &.8000 cs;sJ vd;W $wpNdd;. mth; vz;zp ghh;j;J me;j gzj;ij
Nki[ buhahpy; Nghl;L tpl;lhh;. gpd; b.b.ia D.D dated 03.01.2011 vLj;J vd; kfsplk; nfhLj;J ed;whf gb vdW; $wpdhh;. me;j b.b.apd; efy; m.rh.M.8 MFk;. (efy; vd;gjhy; Ml;NrgidAld; Fwpf;fg;gLfpwJ). gpd; ehDk; vd; kfSk; jdp egh; rhl;rpahd MWKfKk; ntspapy; te;J tpl;Nlhk;.
P.W.3
mjw;F ehuhazd; vd; je;ijia ghh;j;J gzj;ij nfhzL;te;jpUf;fpwPh;fsh vd;W Nfl;lhh;. vd; je;ij &gha; 8000 vdW; $wpdhh;. vd; je;ij gzj;ij vLj;J mthplk; nfhLj;jhh;. mth; mij ngw;W vz;zpg;ghh;j;jhh;. gpd;G gzj;ij drawer y; Nghl;Ltpl;L DD vLj;J vd;dplk; nfhLj;J All the Best vd;W $wpdhh;. P.W.4.
jdghy; tre;jpAk; cs;Ns te;J ehuazdplk; 8000 gzk; cs;s ftiu nfhLj;jhh;fs;. ehuazd; gzj;ij thq;fpf; nfhzL; ,th;fSf;Fhpa demand draftia nfhLj;jhh;.
9.1.From the above evidence of the witnesses, it is clear that A2 demanded the bribe amount. The evidence of P.W.2 to P.W.4 are cogent. On the date of the trap, the demand was reiterated and the said amount was accepted. There is no infirmity in the material portion of the evidence relating to the above aspect. In the said circumstances, the demand was clearly proved. Apart from that, the other witnesses have also deposed that the accused demanded and accepted the amount to grant educational loan. From the above depositions, it is seen that the prosecution has clearly proved the demand. The trial judge, without considering the above evidence, only on the basis of some irrelevant and immaterial contradictions and omissions, has held that the prosecution failed to prove the case. The Honourable Supreme Court repeatedly held that in the case of the corruption case, appreciation of evidence is to be in such a way as to achieve the object enshrined in the Act. While appreciating the evidence, it is the duty of the Court to read the entire evidence of the witnesses. Picking one sentence from the evidence and disbelieving the entire evidence is not appreciable. There should be a holistic reading and a segmented/selective reading cannot be accepted. The same has been underscored by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of appreciating the evidence in the following judgments:
Mustak Alias Kanio Ahmed Shaikh vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2020) 7 SCC 237 Rakesh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2021) 7 SCC 188
34.With the greatest of respect, the evidence of the witnesses have to be read as a whole Words and sentences cannot be truncated and read in isolation. 14. One is required to consider the entire evidence as a whole wiht the other evidence on record. Mere on sentence here or there and that too to the question asked by the defence in the cross examination cannot be considered stand alone.
9. 2.When P.W.2 and P.W.3 made a complaint to CBI and CBI conducted a trap and the independent official witness namely P.W.4 also supported the prosecution case, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence and hence, the acquittal judgment passed by the learned trial judge on the basis of the irrelevant and immaterial contradictions, by magnifying the same to the extent of overlooking and disbelieving the material evidence, cannot be upheld. In the circumstances, the finding of the learned trial Judge is erroneous.
10.Acceptance:
10. 1.As per the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5 and 17, the amount was recovered. The 2nd accused after receipt of the amount, counted the money and put it in his pocket and his hand wash was positive. This shows the acceptance of bribe money. Apart from that, the independent official witnesses who had no enmity with A2 have clearly deposed about the receipt of the bribe amount by A2. The fact that A2 received the bribe amount is also substantiated by the other material circumstances that he immediately handed over the D.D for the loan. It is the cogent evidence of all the witnesses that after receipt of the bribe amount only he issued the Demand Draft.
10.2.The loan was sanctioned on 29.10.2010 and Demand Draft was also taken. But, the Demand Draft was granted only on the date of the trap proceedings. This clearly proves the acceptance as well as the demand. The acceptance of money is further strengthened through the recovery of the said amount on the disclosure by A2. A2 disclosed about the money and the money was recovered from the almirah. The said conduct is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in 1979 (3) SCC 90 and the relevant paragraph is as follows:
8. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused when challenged by the Inspector was inadmissible as it was hit by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. He relied on a decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in D.V. Narasimham v. State [AIR
1969 AP 271 : 1969 Cri LJ 1016 : 1969 MLJ (Cri)
687] . We do not agree with the submission of Shri Anthony. There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
What is excluded by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence, relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradesh
Administration v. Om Prakash [(1972) 1 SCC 249 :
1972 SCC (Cri) 88 : AIR 1972 SC 975] ).
10.3.Apart from that, the recovery of amount clearly shows that he received the money. Under these circumstances, the acceptance of money is also proved. From the sequence of events, the prosecution has clearly proved the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by the appellant. Once the bribe amount was recovered and the demand was proved, it is the duty of the Court below to invoke the presumption under section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. When he accepted the money, there was no explanation on the side of the accused during the course of questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C. There was no explanation on the side of the accused for these facts. A2 has reiterated the demand of the amount on the date of the trap. The receipt of the amount is also spoken by P.Ws.2 to 4. The recovery also is proved through the evidence of the recovery witnesses. The recovery from A2 was also proved through the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5. Apart from that, A2 has handed over the Demand Draft after receipt of the bribe amount.
10. 4.In the said circumstances, the prosecution has clearly proved the demand and acceptance and hence, the presumption can be entertained and no rebuttable evidence was adduced by the accused to disprove the said presumption. Under these circumstances, this Court finds that the acquittal judgment passed by the learned trial judge is not in accordance with law.
11.Discussion on the trial Court Judgement:
11. 1.In paragraph No.30, of the judgment the learned trial Judge has discussed about the absence of the signature of P.W.3 in the complaint Ex.P6 and has also stated that P.W.2 only stated about the demand made by A2. In paragraph No.31 of the judgment the learned trial Judge, discussed about the discrepancy relating to the preparation of the place of the entrustment mahazar between the evidence of P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.5, P.W.14 and Ex.P7. Further, in paragraph No.31 of the judgment the trial court has also discussed about P.W.2 not mentioning the date and time of the demand. The trial court has also held that P.W.3 has no knowledge about the demand of illegal gratification made by A1 and A2 from her father P.W.2. The trial court has also held that P.W.4 does not speak about demand and speaks only about acceptance of the bribe amount. The learned trial Judge has also held that P.W.2 and P.W.3 are to be treated as accomplices and their evidence need independent corroboration. It has also found that the bribe amount was not handed over by the second accused as stated in Ex.P9.
11.2.In paragraph No.32, of the judgment the learned trial Judge has rejected the evidence of P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.15 only on the ground that they have not mentioned the date and time of the demand of bribe. In final conclusion, in paragraph No.32 of the judgment the learned trial judge has held that conspiracy between A1 and A2 is not established. The learned trial Judge in paragraph No.33 of the judgment has held that the loan was granted earlier to the date of the complaint ie., on 03.01.2011. Therefore, there was no question of demand on 04.01.2011 by the second accused. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the case under the charged offence.
11. 3.This Court perused the entire records and evidence and finds that the educational loan application was submitted on 29.10.2010. The amount of Rs.
62,500/- was sanctioned and disbursed through the demand draft dated 03.01.2011. The said demand draft was in the custody of A2. On 04.01.2011, A2 reiterated the demand of bribe amount and received the bribe amount and handed over the demand draft to P.W.2 and thereafter, credited in the account of P.W.3. P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4, cogently deposed about the demand of the bribe amount by A2 and A2 receiving the amount and handing over the demand draft. This Court finds no material discrepancy in their evidence in the above material portion of their evidence.
11.4. Ex.P9, a contemporaneous document shows the recovery of the bribe amount on the disclosure made by A2. P.W.4, P.W.5 and P.W14 have cogently deposed about the same. The positive phenolphthalein test also affirms the receipt of the bribe amount. P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4 clearly deposed about the receipt of the bribe amount. P.W.2, clearly deposed about the demand made by A2 and A1. He was subjected to cross examination but nothing has been elicited to disbelieve his version about the demand. Further, P.W.6, P.W.8 and
P.W.15 clearly deposed about the demand and acceptance made by A1 and A2 in similar circumstances. Merely, because, they have not mentioned about the date of demand, their evidence should not have been brushed aside by the learned trial Judge. They have clearly deposed about the demand made by A2. More particularly, P.W.6, P.W.15 deposed that A2 issued the demand draft for the educational loan only upon receipt of the bribe amount of Rs.8,000/-. P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5 and P.W.14 clearly deposed about the preparation of the entrustment mahazar under Ex.P7 at the Police Station. But, the learned trial Judge without any material contradiction, has held that the preparation of the entrustment mahazar was doubtful. The learned trial Judge without properly appreciating the evidence of P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.5, P.W.14 and Ex.P9 has erroneously held that bribe money was not handed over by the second accused. P.W.4, P.W.5 and P.W.14 deposed that A2 disclosed that he kept the amount in the locker. Before that the phenolphthalein test was conducted and the result was positive. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the independent official witness ie., P.W.4 and P.W.5 with respect to the recovery. The learned trial Judge has failed to consider that only on 04.01.2011 after receipt of the bribe amount, the demand draft was handed over to P.W.3. Therefore, the proseuction proved the case beyond reasonable doubt that A2 demanded and accepted the bribe amount and hence, he is liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. From the above discussion, this Court finds that the only view possible is, A2 had demanded and accepted the bribe amount.
11.5. The learned trial Judge has committed error in acquitting the accused by giving perverse findings in all aspects. The learned trial Judge has also erroneously held that the trap witnesses are accomplices, which is against the principles laid down by theHon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, reported in AIR 1958 SC 500 and the Hon’ble Three
Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1323 and 1995 3 SCC 351. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.O.Shamsudin vs. State of Kerala reported in 1995 (3) SCC 351 has considered the Hon’ble Constitution Bench Judgement in “Basawan Singh”, and also considered the Bhanuprasad
Hariprasad Dave case and held as follows:
22. Now coming to the witnesses in trap cases, as held in Basawan Singh case [AIR 1958 SC 500 : 1958 Cri LJ 976 : 1959 SCR 195] by a Bench of five Judges, if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charge, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices in that sense but are only partisan or interested witnesses who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested which may vary from case to case and the corroboration in the case of such interested witnesses can be in a general way and not as one required in material particulars as in the case of an approver. Therefore in seeking corroboration for the evidence of trap witnesses a distinction has to be drawn where participation of an individual in a crime is not voluntary but is the result of pressure. In such a case the element of mens rea to commit the crime is not apparent and (sic) cannot strictly be classified as an accomplice and at any rate he cannot be treated as being on the same footing. Where a bribe has already been demanded from a man and if without giving the bribe he goes to the police or magistrate and brings them to witness the payment it will be a legitimate trap and in such cases at the most he can be treated as an interested witness and whether corroboration is necessary or not will be within the discretion of the court depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However as a rule of prudence, the court has to scrutinise the evidence of such interested witnesses carefully.
11.6. When the available evidence amply proved, the demand and acceptance, splitting the evidence by the learned trial Judge to suit the convenience by looking at every contradiction out of proportion, resulted in gross miscarriage of justice which led to the unmerited acquittal. The learned trial Judge ought to have convicted the accused. In the said circumstances, this Court exercises the power under Section 378 Cr.P.C to interfere with the unmeritted acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge.
11.7. In all aspect, the prosecution clearly proved the case of the demand and acceptance. Once the tainted currency was recovered on the disclosure of the accused officer, then the presumption that it was accepted as a bribe amount, comes into play as per the manual and also as per the provision of Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Further there was no explanation on side of accused for the positive result of the phenolphthalein test on his hand and shirt pocket and recovery of tainted currency. The Honourble Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 548and AIR1964 SC 575 and Hon’ble Three Member Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in 1974
4 SCC 560 and the number of the Hon’ble Two Member Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1982 3 SC 466 etc., have held that once the prosecution proved that appellant received the illegal gratification it is the duty of the appellant to dispel the presumption through legal evidence. There is no explanation on the side of accused. In the said circumstances, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the prosecution proved the case of demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore the accused is liable to be convicted for the offence under 7,13(1)(d) of the Act.
11.8. The learned trial Judge erroneously acquitted the accused, when the available evidence leans towards the only possible view of conviction under the above section. The learned trial Judge stated that there were lot of loopholes in the case of the prosecution. The loopholes assumed by the learned trial Judge is not at all significant and worthwhile to be considered in these type of cases, more particularly, when the examination of witnesses took place after number of years from the date of occurrence. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to plug the said immaterial loopholes to ensure the criminal justice system is vibrant as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinubhai Boghabhai
Solanki v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2018) 11 SCC 129 at page 154:
36.That apart, it is in the larger interest of the society that actual perpetrator of the crime gets convicted and is suitably punished. Those persons who have committed the crime, if allowed to go unpunished, this also leads to weakening of the criminal justice system and the society starts losing faith therein. Therefore, the first part of the celebrated dictum “ten criminals may go unpunished but one innocent should not be convicted” has not to be taken routinely. No doubt, latter part of the aforesaid phrase i.e. “innocent person should not be convicted” remains still valid.
However, that does not mean that in the process “ten persons may go unpunished” and law becomes a mute spectator to this scenario, showing its helplessness. In order to ensure that criminal justice system is vibrant and effective, perpetrators of the crime should not go unpunished and all efforts are to be made to plug the loopholes which may give rise to the aforesaid situation.
11.9. The learned trial Judge on the basis of the irrelevant consideration rejected the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4 and committed error in not considering the evidence on the contemporaneous record, namely, recovery mahazar prepared in the presence of the officials of the accused office. The recovery mahazar contains all material facts to constitute the offence. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4 are cogent and trustworthy to prove the demand and acceptance and recovery and the only view that emanates from their evidence is that the prosecution proved the charged offence beyond any reasonable doubt i.e., Respondents have demanded and accepted Rs.12,000/- as illegal gratification and hence, the view taken by the learned trial Judge is not a “possible view”. Further, as the finding of the learned trial judge is perverse in all aspects, this Court finds “substantial and compelling reasons” to interfere with the impugned acquittal Judgement. This Court, in view of the above discussion finds that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is perverse and there is substantial and compelling reason to interfere with the order of the learned trial Judge. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence, for which there is no legal impediment. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held in the case of the appeal against acquittal, this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence.
11.10. Earlier the “Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court”, in the case of M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1962 SCC
OnLine SC 22 has held the same in the following paragraph:
16….But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, “the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons” : vide Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207 : (1952) SCR 193 at p. 201] . Similarly in Ajmer
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 2 SCC 709 : (1953) SCR
418] it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are “very substantial and compelling reasons to do so”. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” or for “strong reasons”. In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial”. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression “substantial and compelling reasons” should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 715] and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1962 SC 439] and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse.
11.11. Hon’ble Three Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Ashok
Kumar Singh Chandel Vs. State of U.P reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1525 has crystallized following principles;
70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal:
1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.
A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:
i. The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is
palpably wrong; ii. The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous
view of law; iii. The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave
miscarriage of justice”; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with
the evidence was patently illegal;
v. The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and
unreasonable;
vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the
material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.
vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached – one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction – the High Courts/Appellate Courts must rule in favor of the accused.”
11.12.In the case of Geeta Devi v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 12
SCC 741
.Against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court the High Court would be justified on re-appreciation of the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly erroneous.
11.13.In the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 471 the Hon’ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court has held as follows:
31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice:
(a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 288 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 420]
] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based
in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu [State of U.P. v. Pussu, (1983) 3 SCC 502 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 713 : AIR 1983 SC 867] ].
11.14.The Hon’ble Supreme Court”, in the case of Babu v. State of Kerala [Babu v. State of Kerala,, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 189 has considered following earlier precedents and reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC.
Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219
Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17
Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699
Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731
State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102
S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535
Arulvelu v. State of T.N. [Arulvelu v. State of T.N., (2009) 10
SCC 206
Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98
Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445
‘12.While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court.
11.15.Hon’ble the Supreme Court”, in the case of State of U.P.v.Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court.
The circumstances include : (SCC p. 286, para 28)
“28. … (i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the
High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.”
11. 16.When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in para 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9
SCC 189
‘20. “findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material” or if they are “against the weight of evidence” or if they suffer from the “vice of irrationality”..
11.17. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.’
11.18. As early as in 1973, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] outlined the guiding principle to be kept in mind by an appellate court while deciding an appeal from an acquittal in the following manner
“5. … an acquitted accused should not be put in peril of conviction on appeal save were substantial and compelling grounds exist for such a course. In India it is not jurisdictional limitation on the appellate court but a Judgemade guideline of circumspection. … In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.19. In the case of K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 309 at page 314
5… If the judgment of the trial Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong testimony, it would be proper for the High Court to interfere and reverse an order of acquittal.
11. 20.The Hon’ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of the State of Karnataka vs. Chandrasha reported in MANU/SC/1255/2024 has held as follows:
24.We are conscious of the fact that in an appeal
against acquittal, of two viewsd are possible and the Court below has acquitted the accused, the appellate Court would not be justified in setting aside the acquittal merely because the other view is also possible. In the present case, the recovery of bribe amount from the respondent having been proved, the explanation offered by the respondent in the abscene of any concrete material, is clearly of the wall. Once the aspects of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of the bribe amount havong been established beyond doubt, in our opinion, no two views are possible in the matter, and thus the approach adopted by the High Court is perverse and liable to be interfered with.
11.21. In the totality of the circumstances, the learned trial Judge magnified every minute irrelevant fact and made mountain out of a molehill and acquitted the respondent which resulted in miscarriage of justice. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of
Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple, reported in (1984) 1
SCC 446 at page 463 dealing the appeal against acquittal has held as follows:
36. .. It seems to us that the approach made by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is manifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. In fact, the learned Judge appears to have been so much prejudiced against the prosecution that he magnified every minor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence. This is the very antithesis of a correct judicial approach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed, if such a harsh touchstone is prescribed to prove a case it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish any case at all.
11.22. The learned trial Judge allowed himself to be beset with fanciful doubts and rejected the creditworthy evidence of independent trap witness for slender reasons and has misguided himself by chasing the bare possibilities of doubt and exalting them into sufficiently militating factors justifying acquittal. Therefore, there is an obligation on the part of this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the Court below, in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule and the same was emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases:
18.In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus : (SCC p. 799, para 6)
“6. … The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.”
In State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277 : (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
“23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and fantasy… Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”
11.23. The learned trial judge relied number of immaterial circumstances which itself shows that material portion of the evidence which was admissible against the accused, has been overlooked. The learned trial judge is not correct in relying on the immaterial and unworthy contradiction relating to the cover from which, the money was recovered and other aspects. It is well settled that it is not every doubt, but only a reasonable doubt of which benefit is to be given to the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases has cautioned the Courts not to extend the proof of benefit of doubt so as to cause the disastrors result and unmerited acquittal:
11.24.In the case of Wazir Khan v. State of Uttarakhand, reported
in (2023) 8 SCC 597, The Hon’ble Supreme Court while cosidering the plea of beyond reasonable doubt, after considering the earlier precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the proof of beyond reasonable doubt and held that proof beyond reasonale doubt cannot be distorted into a doctrine of acquittal and the relevant paragraph is as follows:
26. In the aforesaid context, we may profitably quote the following observations made by this Court in para 14 in Dharm Das Wadhwani v. State of U.P. [Dharm Das Wadhwani v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 267 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 429 : AIR 1975 SC 241] : (SCC pp. 272-73)
“14. The question then is whether the cumulative effect of the guilt-pointing circumstances in the present case is such that the court can conclude, not that the accused may be guilty but that he must be guilty. We must here utter a word of caution about this mental sense of “must” lest it should be confused with exclusion of every contrary possibility. We have in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] , explained that proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be distorted into a doctrine of acquittal when any delicate or remote doubt flits past a feeble mind. These observations are warranted by frequent acquittals on flimsy possibilities which are not infrequently set aside by the High Courts weakening the credibility of the judicature. The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct. At the same time, it may be affirmed, as pointed out by this Court inKali Ram v. State of H.P. [Kali Ram v. State of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048] , that if a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that cannot be withheld from him.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
11.25. In the case of Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of W.B., reported in
(2017) 16 SCC 466 at page 476 it is observed:-
16.. A doubt of a timid mind which is afraid of logical consequences, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. The experienced, able and astute defence lawyers do raise doubts and uncertainties in respect of evidence adduced against the accused by marshalling the evidence, but what is to be borne in mind is—whether testimony of the witnesses before the court is natural, truthful in substance or not. The accused is entitled to get benefit of only reasonable doubt i.e. the doubt which a rational thinking man would reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has no moral courage and prefers to take shelter itself in a vain and idle scepticism.
11.26. In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., reported in (2020) 10 SCC 740 at page 749 it is observed:
15… Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists…
11.27. In the case of Bhim Singh Rup Singh Vs. State of Maharastra reported in 1974 3 SCC 762 it is observed:
“A reasonable doubt”, it has been remarked, “does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons
11.28. In State of U.P. Vs. Anil Singh reported in (1988) Supp SCC
686 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follow:
Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth.
11.29. In the case of Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) reported in
[(1978) 4 SCC 161 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish.
11.30.The Hon’ble Supreme Court on various occasions cautioned the Courts not to extend the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt to render unmerited acquittals by nurturing fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions causing miscarriage of justice. It is not only the duty of the Court to acquit an innocent, it is also the paramount duty of the Court to see that a guilty man does not escape and hence extending the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt in the present case, cannot be appreciated. The relevant precedents in this aspect is as follows:
The lord Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] held as follows: “[A] Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. … Both are public duties….”
11.31. In the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh reported in
1990 (1) SCC 445 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
17…. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law….
11.32. In the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., reported in
(2016) 4 SCC 357 at page 365, it is observed:
20. …we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.
11.33.The function of the criminal Court is to find out the truth and it is not a correct approach to pick up the minor lapse of an investigation, irrelevant omission and minor contradiction to acquit the accused when the ring of the truth is undisturbed from the cogent and trustworthy. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4 reveal about the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount of Rs.
8,000/- by the respondents. Therefore, the learned trial Judge has not properly addressed the issue of “reasonable doubt”. The cherished principles of golden thread of proof of reasonable doubt which runs through web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubts.
11.34.Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. P.W.2, is the father of P.W.3. He approached the appellants and requested to give educational loan to meet out the collegiate education of P.W.3. The loan amount was Rs.62,500/-. To grant the said amount of Rs.62,500/-, the respondents had demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.8,000/-, ie, more than 12% of the total loan amount. It is not the case of the respondents, that P.W.3 was not eligible to get the said loan amount. The application had been submitted in the month of October and the same was granted only on 04.01.2011. The evidence of P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4 are cogent and trustworthy. They categorically deposed about the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by A2. P.W.2, felt the pangs of pain because of continuous visit to the office of the accused officer to get the eligible educational loan. Therefore, he made a complaint and had undergone all hardship, as painfully observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 9 of the following case ;
11.35.State of U.P. v. G.K. Ghosh, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 254 at page
261
9. By and large a citizen is somewhat reluctant, rather than anxious, to complain to the Vigilance Department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded by a Government/servant. There are numerous reasons for the reluctance. In the first place, he has to make a number of visits to the office of Vigilance Department and to wait on a number of officers. He has to provide his own currency notes for arranging a trap. He has to comply with several formalities and sign several statements. He has to accompany the officers and participants of the raiding party and play the main role. All the while he has to remain away from his job, work, or avocation. He has to sacrifice his time and effort whilst doing so. Thereafter, he has to attend the court at the time of the trial from day to day. He has to withstand the searching cross-examination by the defence counsel as if he himself is guilty of some fault. In the result, a citizen who has been harassed by a
Government officer, has to face all these hazards. And if the explanation offered by the Accused is accepted by the court, he has to face the humiliation of being considered as a person who tried to falsely implicate a Government servant, not to speak of facing the wrath of the Government servants of the department concerned, in his future dealings with the department. No one would therefore be too keen or too anxious to face such an ordeal. Ordinarily, it is only when a citizen feels oppressed by a feeling of being wronged and finds the situation to be beyond endurance, that he adopts the course of approaching the Vigilance Department for laying a trap. His evidence cannot therefore be easily or lightly brushed aside. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that it does not mean that the court should be oblivious of the need for caution and circumspection bearing in mind that one can conceive of cases where an honest or strict Government official may be falsely implicated by a vindictive person to whose demand, for showing favours, or for according a special treatment by giving a go-bye to the rules, the official refuses to yield.
12.Conclusion:
In this largest democratic country, officers find ways to indulge in corruption while discharging their duty either by acting contrary to the guidelines or deviating the guidelines. The spectrum of mode of corruption spreads in various angles and dimensions. If one angle is closed, another angle sprouts. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of corruption always took a different stand against what is applicable to the ordinary penal provisions. The learned trial Judge without adherence to the above principle, erroneously acquitted the respondents inspite of the cogent and corroborating evidence of P.W.2, unchallenged testimony of P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.7, P.W.8 and
P.W.9. Upon the appreciation of the above evidence, this Court finds no other view except to convict the respondents for the offence under sections 7, 13(1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the respondents guilty for the offences under sections 120-B of IPC and Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Since, A1 is died, no punishment can be given. Dehors the death of A1 during the pendency of Appeal, A2 is liable to be convicted for offence sections 120-B of IPC and
Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

12.1.In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed by setting aside the acquittal judgment dated 24.10.2018 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai, in C.C.No.04 of 2011 and the respondent No. 2/A2 is convicted for the offence under Sections 120(b) of IPC, 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
13.List this case for the appearance of 2nd respondent/accused ( A2) for questioning the sentence of imprisonment on 17.03.2025.
04.03.2025
NCC : Yes / No
Index : Yes / No
Internet :Yes / No sbn
14. As per the direction of this Court, dated 04.03.2025, accused No.2 appeared before this Court. When the accused were questioned under Section 235(2) of Cr.P.C., about the sentence of imprisonment to be passed, he has pleaded as follows:
Sl.
No. Accused Name Answer of the Accused
2 P.Narayanan(_A2_) ehd; ve;j jtWk; nra;atpy;iy. ,e;j tof;fpd; Gfhh;jhuh; mth;fs;>; mtUf;F toq;fpa Ml;Nlh Nyhd; rk;ge;jkhf Vw;gl;l Kd;tpNuhjk; fhuzkhf vq;fs; kPJ ngha; tof;F jhf;fy; nra;Js;shh;. vdf;F 63 taJ Mfptpl;lJ. NkYk;> gy;NtW Neha;fs; v; df;F cs;sJ. Mifahy;> vdf;F Fiwe;jgl;r jz;liz toq;f Ntz;LfpNwd;.
15. Discussion on sentence:
Before going into the sentence of imprisonment, this court made a discussion about white collar crimes.
15. 1.Discussion on the White Collar Crimes:
From reading the various articles and precedents, this Court holds that white collar crimes are defined as non violent crimes committed by the person enjoying high social status, great repute and Government professionals with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal benefit at the cost of public, regardless of the consequence of the economic disaster.
15.1.1 Edwin Hardin Sutherland he most influential criminologist of the 20th century and also a sociologist,, for the first time in 1939, defined white collar crimes as “crimes committed by people who enjoy the high social status, great repute, and respectability in their occupation”.
15.1.2 These crimes can not eyewitnesses as they are committed in camera, which means that the offenders commit these crimes while sitting in a closed room or in their personal space using their computers, and nobody could know about what they are doing on their computer. This makes it difficult to track the offenders. All these loopholes becomes an incentive for the offenders to fearlessly commit such crimes because the punishment is also for a short term unlike in blue-collar crimes. Offenders are mostly seen roaming freely which poses danger to the society.
15.1. 3.Therefore, His Excellency former president of India Dr.Radhakrishnan, in the following words emphasized the requirement of the strenuous action against the white collar crimes:
“The practitioners of evil, hoarders, the profiteers, the black marketeers, and speculators are the worst enemy of our society. They have to be dealt with sternly. However well placed important and influential they maybe, if we acquiesce in wrongdoing, people will lose faith in us.
15.1.4.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 364 also reiterated the said requirement of the strenuous action in the following terms:
5. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an evenhanded manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.
15.1.5.The said requirement also reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 641
381. … the need to pierce the facadial smokescreen to unravel the truth to lift the veil so that the apparent, which is not real, can be avoided. The proverbial red herrings are to be ignored, to find out the guilt of the accused.
382. The cause of the community deserves better treatment at the hands of the court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The community or the State is not a persona non grata whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book.
383. Unfortunately in the last few years, the country has seen an alarming rise in white-collar crimes which has affected the fibre of the country’s economic structure. These cases are nothing but private gain at the cost of the public, and lead to economic disaster.
15.1.6.The father of modern political philosophy, Machiavelli, strongly believed that men by nature are greedy. He said that a man can sooner and easily forget the death of his father than the loss of his inheritance. The same is true in the case of commission of white collar crimes. Why will a man of high social status and importance, who is financially secure, commit such crimes if not out of greed?
15.1.7. It is said that crimes have been taking place since the time human beings started living together. There are various crimes which have swept away with times and there are some which have found different dimensions to them with the society becoming modern. The ancient Vedic text says that the concept of white collar crime has existed in society from the very beginning.
15.1.8. Yagnavalkya once had proposed that the king, the supreme authority, should kill the dishonest officer and reward the honest ones. He further adds that those people who will try to extort a person, their property would be confiscated and then transported.
15.1.9. The need and greed of people have driven them to the extent of exploiting any possible field. The exploitation of the money of the other person by doing the act of fraud to get gain at the loss of other side usually form part of the white collar crimes. In the case of fraud, greedy person gains at the loss of another. This case is no exception. The responsible bank officers, namely accused officers to grant education loan of Rs.62,500/- they demanded and accepted 12% to total loan amount i.e. Rs.8000/- as bribe without any disqualification on the part of loanee to get education loan.
15.1.10.Without adequate financial resources, number of poor student are not able to continue their collegiate education. Financial constraints do not prevent any student from pursuing quality higher education. The Central Government brought the education loan scheme as a welfare measure to achieve social justice. One of the major objectives of Central Government is to ensure that no student is denied the opportunity to pursue higher education due to lack of financial resources. Sympathetic attitude should always be shown towards female students who are approaching the bank for education loan. In this case, the responsible bank officer namely accused officers to grant education loan of Rs.62,500/- they demanded and accepted 12% to total loan amount i.e. Rs. 8000/- as bribe without any disqualification on the part of loanee to get education loan. As observed earlier PW2 felt pangs of pain because of continuous visit to the office of accused to get their eligible educational loan from month of October to the date of Trap i.e. 4.1.2011. A1/Manager went on extent of threatening loanee to tear their loan application. He entrusted custody of over “DD” with A2 officer to receive the bribe amount till the receipt of bribe amount. This Court unable to accept the plea of the Accused that there was dispute between P.W.2 and the bank manager on the ground that there was no material adduced. apart from that, other victim P.W.6 clearly deposed about the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount. Age of the accused in this case is irrelevant to award minimum sentence. These circumstances warrant imposition of proper punishment. This court does not want to show any mercy to these accused officer which amount to misplaced sympathy. Therefore this court inclines to impose following sentence of imprisonment with fine and all the substantive sentences of imprisonments are run concurrently.
15.1.11. Since, A1 died during the pendency of Appeal and there is no legal bar to impose the sentence of imprisonment agaisnt the A2 who is alive U/s.120 (B) of IPC and U/s.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and same is fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of
Karanataga Vs.. J.Jayalalitha reported in 2017 6 SCC 263.

The period already undergone by the accused is ordered to be set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.,
Sl.
No
. Under Section Accused Nos. Sentence of Imprisonment Fine Amount Default Sentence
1 120-B of IPC A2 Four years of
Rigorous
Imprisonment Rs.50,000/- each Six months of
Simple
Imprisonment
2 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 A2 Four years of Rigorous imprisonment Rs.50,000/-each Six months of
Simple
Imprisonment
3 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 A2 Four years of
Rigorous
Imprisonment Rs.50,000/-each Six months of
Simple
Imprisonment
15.3. Considering P.W.3, P.W.6 had undergone unbearable hardship during the course of obtaining loan and also before this Court by subjecting themselves for incisive cross examination, this Court is inclined to grant compensation to the victim P.W.3 and P.W.6 by exercising power under Section 357 of Cr.P.C., and accordingly, this Court is hereby directed the learned trial Judge to give a sum of Rs.35,000/- to each P.W.3 and P.W.6 as a compensation out of the fine amount of Rs.1,50,000/-.
Summary of discussion:
Sl.No. Summary of discussion Paragraph No.
1 Brief Facts of the case 2-2.3
2 Submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI 3-3.2
3 Submission of the learned counsel forappearing for the second respondent 5-5.1
4 Discussion on conspiracy 8-8.9
5 Discussion on the proof of demand 9-9.2
6 Discussion on acceptance 10-10.4
7 Discussion on the trial Court Judgment 11-11.35
8 Conclusion 12-12.1
9 Discussion on sentence of imprisonment 15-15.3
17.03.2025
NCC : Yes / No
Index : Yes / No
Internet :Yes / No sbn
Note: Issue order copy on 17.03.2025
To
1. The II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.
2. The Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
3. The Section Officer,
Criminal Section(Records),
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
4.The Superintendent of Prison, Central Prison, Madurai. 
K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN,J.
sbn
CRL.A(MD).No.379 of 2019
04.03.2025
&
17.03.2025