CBI cases, Chennai in CC.NO.26/2011 for the offences under Sections Sections 7 and 15 read with 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.agsinst deemed universityB.D.S and M.B.B.S course, it would cost Rs.35 lakhs and Rs.40 lakhs respectively. Based on the sting

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A.Subramanian Vs. the Inspector of Police – Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation

legalcrystal.com/1168280

Court	Chennai High Court
Decided On	Jun-25-2014
Judge	THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE ARUNA JAGADEESAN
Appellant	A.Subramanian
Respondent	The Inspector of Police

Excerpt:
in the high court of judicature at madras dated:25. .06.2014 coram: the honourable mrs.justice aruna jagadeesan crl.rc.no.124/2013 and crl.op.no.2377/2013 crl.mp.nos.1 and 1/2013 a.subramanian petitioner in both crl.rc & crl.op vs the inspector of police, cbi economic offences unit ii iii floor, cbi head quarters 5b lodhi road, new delhi 110003 respondent in both crl.rc & crl.op prayer:- this criminal revision case is filed to set aside the order dated 23.01.2013 passed in crl.mp.no.330/2011 in cc.no.26/2011 by the learned xiv additional judge for cbi cases i/c xiii additional judge for cbi cases, city civil court, chennai, dismissing the discharge petition. this criminal original petition is filed to quash the order of framing charges dated 23.01.2013 passed by the learned xiv…..Judgment:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:

25. .06.2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE ARUNA JAGADEESAN Crl.RC.No.124/2013 and Crl.OP.No.2377/2013 Crl.MP.Nos.1 and 1/2013 A.Subramanian Petitioner in both Crl.RC & Crl.OP Vs The Inspector of Police, CBI Economic Offences Unit II III Floor, CBI Head Quarters 5B Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003 Respondent in both Crl.RC & Crl.OP Prayer:- This Criminal Revision Case is filed to set aside the order dated 23.01.2013 passed in Crl.MP.No.330/2011 in CC.No.26/2011 by the learned XIV Additional Judge for CBI Cases i/c XIII Additional Judge for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai, dismissing the discharge petition. This Criminal Original Petition is filed to quash the order of framing charges dated 23.01.2013 passed by the learned XIV Additional Judge for CBI Cases i/c XIII Additional Judge for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai in CC.No.26/2011 for the offences under Sections 7 and 15 read with 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. For Petitioner : Mr.A.Ramesh, SC for Mr.C.Arun Kumar For Respondent : Mr.N.Chandrasekaran, SPPORDER

The Revision Petitioner is the accused in CC.No.26/2011 on the file of the learned XIII Additional Judge for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai.

2. The Petitioner filed Crl.MP.No.330/2011 under Section 239 of Cr.PC for his discharge. The said petition was dismissed by the Trial Court. Impugning the same, the present revision is filed.

3. The Petitioner also seeks to quash the proceedings pending on the file of XIII Additional City Civil Judge for CBI cases, Chennai in CC.NO.26/2011 for the offences under Sections Sections 7 and 15 read with 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

4. The crux of the revision petition as well as the quash petition is one and the same, one challenging the order declining to discharge and other challenging the order of framing charge, invoking the inherent powers vested under Section 482 of Cr.PC.

5. The petitioner, who is a Deputy Registrar (Academics) of a Deemed to be University, was arrayed as an accused for the offences under Sections 7 and 15 read with 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (herein after referred to as the Act 1988). The fulcrum of the Prosecution rests on a sting operation conducted by a T.V. Channel in June 2009 in a private medical college, namely, Sri Ramachandra Medical College and Research and Institute. During the sting operation, the Deputy Registrar had responded to a query regarding cost of admission by stating that for B.D.S and M.B.B.S course, it would cost Rs.35 lakhs and Rs.40 lakhs respectively. Based on the sting operation, a case came to be registered and investigated, which culminated into final report being filed by the CBI, New Delhi before the Special Judge for CBI Cases. The Institution was not arrayed as an offender due to non availability of material evidence even as per the final report.

6. The Special Judge took cognizance, issued summons to the Petitioner. He preferred an application seeking the relief of discharge and the same was negatived by the Trial Court. Aggrieved over the same, the Petitioner has come before this court.

7. Mr.N.Chandrasekaran, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases raised an objection with reference to the maintainability of the revision on the ground that no revision could be entertained against an order framing charges, which is an interlocutory order. He would submit that though this court has got powers under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.PC to call for the records of any proceedings before any inferior criminal court and go into the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, any such proceedings of such inferior court under Section 397(2), the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to an interlocutory order. It is also pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that under Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the court shall not exercise the powers in revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed by the Special Court in the proceedings under the Act. Therefore, if the court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order framing charges is an interlocutory order, then this court has necessarily to dismiss the revision as not sustainable in law.

8. This is the revision petition filed by the Petitioner against an order dismissing his application by rejecting his discharge petition and framing the charges under the relevant section of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The grievance expressed by the Petitioner in this petition is that without any material, the learned Special Judge framed charge against the Petitioner and rejected to discharge him.

9. In AIR-1980-SC-962 ( V.C.Shukla Vs. State through CBI) the Honourable Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, would hold that the order framing the charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure affecting the rights of the parties cannot be called to be an interlocutory order and it is revisable in the revisional jurisdiction. It is held as follows:- To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgement on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgement. Untwalia, J.

in the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra (1978-Crl.LJ-165:AIR-1978-SC-47) clearly mean to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order…. Thus summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all….. as the decisions of this court in the cases of Madhu Limaye (1978-Crl.LJ- 165:AIR-1978-SC-47) and Amarnath Vs. State of Haryana (1977-Crl.LJ-1891:AIR-1977-SC-2185) were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly S.397(2), they were correctly decided and would have no application to the interpretation of S.11(1) of the Act, which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause…. We are satisfied that so far as the expression onterlocutory order’appearing in S.11(1) of the Act is concerned, it has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Code in S.397(2).

30. Thus, the meaning of interlocutory order as contained in S.11 of Special Courts Act, as contained in S.11 of the Special Courts Act, was given by the Apex Court in consonance with the avowed object of the introduction of the said Act. But, the decision in Madhu Limaye’s case in AIR-1978-SC-47 with which the Apex Court in AIR-1980-SC-962 (supra) agreed, would clearly say that the order framing the charge under Criminal Procedure Code affecting the rights of the parties would be revisable in the revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot be called to be an interlocutory order but as interpreted by the Apex Court, it could be termed as an intermediate order, since it affects the liberty and rights of the parties. 10. Moreover, the impugned order, in the instant case, does not confine itself with the framing of charges alone, but also would advert to consideration of the grounds urged by the Petitioner for discharge and rejection of the same on giving the reasons. All the more reason, that the impugned order giving reasonings passed by the Trial Court for refusing to discharge can be subjected to scrutiny by the revisional court, in order to find out whether order is correct, proper and legal.

11. In AIR-1972-SC-545 (Century Spinning and Manufacturing CO. Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra) it is held as follows:- The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person’s liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charges merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the docuoments referred to in S.173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of frmaing the charges is that of the court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution. It is also held by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996-2-Crimes-64) as thus:- The order of framing of charge substantially affects the liberty of a concerned person. 12. In the decisions rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of R.K.Kapur Vs. State of Punjab (AIR-1960-SC-866), Amarnath Vs. State of Haryana (AIR-1977-SC-2185), Madhulimayee Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR-1978-SC-47) and V.C.Shukla Vs. State through CBI (AIR-1980-SC-962), it has been held that any order which substantially affects the rights of the parties cannot be called an interlocutory order at all.

13. Therefore, in order to find out whether the special court has applied its judicial mind, while passing the impugned order before framing charges, which would substantially affect the right of the accused and while giving the reasons for the rejection of the grounds for discharge, the court in revisional jurisdiction has to necessarily entertain the revision to exercise its powers to correct the illegality committed, if any, by the Trial Court.

14. In view of the above reasoning, I am of the considered view that the impugned order cannot be considered to be an interlocutory order, as it affects the right of the accused, so as to entitle him from approaching this court through this revision and as such, the revision is maintainable.

15. Mr.N.Chandrasekaran, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, citing catena of decision, submitted that at the time of framing of charge, the court has to prima facie consider, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the court is not required to appreciate the evidence. The learned Special Public Prosecutor cited the following decisions in support of his submissions:- (a). AIR-2007-SC-2149 (Soma Chakraborty Vs. State CBI) (b). 2009-10-SCC-674 (CBI Vs. V.K.Bhutani) (c). 2000-1-Crimes-165-SC (State of MP Vs. S.B.Johari) (d).2005-11-SCC-600 (State Vs. Navjor Sandhu) (e).1996-4-SCC-659 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa and others) (f).2008-2-SCC-561 (Omkar Nath Mistra and others Vs. State) (g).AIr-2009-SC-9 (Sanghi Brothers (Indore) P Limited Vs. Sanjai Choudharay and others) (h).AIR-2013-SC-53 (Shoraj Singh Ahlawat and others Vs. State of UP and another) 16. Mr.A.Ramesh, the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner in order to sustain his plea regarding discharge would put forth a main contention that the Petitioner is not a public servant as defined under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and he cannot be put to trial for the alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

17. It is quite relevant to quote the provisions under which the application was filed by the Petitioner requesting for discharge before the Trial Court. Section 239 of Cr.PC is as follows:- When accused shall be discharged:- If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. 18. A reading of this section would reveal that the decision as to whether to frame charge or not is to be taken by the Trial Court only after the application of judicial mind to the facts of the case. Then, let us see various authorities which would give the guidelines to the trial court for the process of invoking SectionS239and 240 of Cr.PC and other analogous provisions in Cr.PC.

19. In R.S.Nayak Vs. A.R.Antulay (AIR-1986-SC-2045), the Honourable Supreme Court would observe as under (paragraph 44):- The code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in case triable by it. cases instituted upon a police report are covered by S.239 and cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in S.245. The three sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under Section 227, the trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if he ‘considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’. Obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when the Magistrate considers for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction…… In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections,the legal position is that if the Trial Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed. 20. In Ajay Malik Vs. State (1997-1-Cur-Crl-61) the Delhi High Court would make the following observation:- The court is not to frame charge at the mere asking of the Prosecution. It has to direct its judicial mind to the question as to whether or not the charge is required to be framed. It is not a mere empty formality or a mere dressing on the salad. What is expected of the Magistrate is to give reasons so that on the reading of the order one can perceive clearly as to how and on what basis the Trial Court came to the conclusion that a prima facie case was made out against the accused. And while furnishing the reasons he is neither expected nor required to either enter into a lengthy discourse or to bring out a ponderous judgement. But then giving of reasons is among the most important duties of the Court. It is a check on unbridled discretion without which the freedom of Court may perhaps become unfettered and undirected and judging may become arbitrary. 21. Under Section 239 of Cr.PC, the Magistrate is entitled to discharge an accused, if the charge against him is groundless, meaning thereby that there is absolutely no case against him. It goes without saying that if the Trial Court, on consideration of the material contained in the charge sheet, comes to the conclusion that there is no prima facie case for the alleged commission of offence under any of the sections in the Act made out, then there would be no justification for framing of charges under that Section.

22. There is no quarrel over the proposition of law that under Section 239 of Cr.PC, the court is not called upon to embark upon an enquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if, upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the Prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed.

23. In K.Ramakrishnan Vs. State of Bihar (2000-8-SCC-547), it has been held that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.PC can be exercised to quash proceedings, in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It has further held that when there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction.

24. The petitioner raised two fold contentions before the Special Court in support of his plea to discharge him from the charges viz. (i) The petitioner is not a public servant as defined under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (ii) The Petitioner is not a Public Officer required to perform any public duty and hence, he could not be proceeded with under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

25. There are twelve sub clauses in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, which define public servant and those cover a very wide range of persons. It is no longer necessary to refer to Section 21 of IPC for the purpose of interpretation of the expressions public servant.

26. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Prabhakar Rao (2002-7-SCC-636), the Honourable Supreme Court held that Section 21 of IPC is of no relevance to consider the ambit of the expression public servant which has to be on interpretation of the provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act, 1988.

27. The case of the Prosecution is that the Petitioner being en employee of the Deemed to be University is a public servant and he attempted to misconduct himself by demanding illegal gratification. The following sub sections of Section 2(c) of the Act, 1988 have relevance in the case on hand. They are Section 2(c)(iii), (viii) and (xi).

28. Section 2(c)(iii) defines as below:- Public servant means:- (iii) any person in the service or pay of a Corporation established by or under a Central Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. 29. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 2(c)(iii), the Institution where the petitioner is working, should have received any grant or aid from the Central or State. In the case on hand, the Institution, namely, Sri Ramachandra Medical College and Research Institute, does not receive or received any aid from either the Central or the State bodies as defined in the Section. The said Institution is run by a Trust and it is an autonomous body. Therefore, the Institution, in which the Petitioner is working, is not controlled by the Government nor does it receive any aid or grant from the Government and the Petitioner cannot be a public servant as defined under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Act, 1988.

30. Now, we have to see whether the Petitioner comes under the definition of 2(c)(viii) of the Act. The Petitioner is a Deputy Registrar (Academics) and is not concerned with the admission process in the College, which is substantiated by Prosecution witnesses, namely, LW.13, 23 and 25.

31. According to Section 2(b) of the Act, ‘public duty’ means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. The expression ‘public duty’ is also found in sub clause (viii) of clause (c) by which any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized or required to perform any public duty, is a public servant. The rule that a meaning should, as far as possible, be given to every word in the Statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the words add something which would not be there if the words were left out. Therefore, the presence of the words, who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required cannot be ignored. It is well settled law that the term ‘office’ has various meanings and it has to be seen which is the appropriate meaning to be ascribed to this word in the context. For the purpose of 2(c) of the Act, the person must not only be holding an office, but also by virtue of the office he is authorised or required to perform any public duty.

32. In the case on hand, the Petitioner is only a Deputy Registrar and in the very nature of the position of his Office (Academic), no public duty is imposed on him. In other words, he is not authorised or required to do any public duty. He is not concerned with the admission process in the college which is revealed from the statements of LW.13, 23 and 25. That apart, merely because the college is involved in the Educational Process, the same cannot be branded to be a public duty performed as per Section 2(c)(viii) of the Act, 1988.

33. Mr.A.Ramesh, the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner referred to a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, wherein a similar issue cropped up for consideration and the Honourable Supreme Court quashed the charges holding that a private tuition centre is not performing any public duty.

34. In State of Punjab Vs. Nirmal Kaur (2009-13-SCC-418), the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:- 6. Stand of the appellant-State is that in any event by running coaching centre, the respondent was performing public duty. The submission overlooks basic requirement of clause (vii) of Section 2(c) which is applicable only when a public servant holds an office by which he authorized or required to perform any public duty. In the instant case it is nobody’s case that the respondent was holding an office by virtue of which she was authorized to perform any public duty. That being so there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 35. The learned senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner will not come under the definition of Section 2(c)(xi) also. He submitted that while defining Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, the legislation intended to cover only University and not Deemed to be University. He pointed out that University is defined under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act and Section 3 deals with the deemed to be University. For better appreciation, it is necessary to extract the definition of Section 2(f) of the UGC Act, 1856 as follows:- 2(f):- Universitymeans a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation with the University concerned, be recognized by the Commission in accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under this Act.

36. Section 3 of the said Act states about deemed to be University as below:- Section 3: The Central Government may, on the advice of the Commission, declare by notification in the Official Gazette, that any institution for higher education, other than a University, shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act, and on such a declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such institution as if it were a University within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2. The incorporation of Section 3 in the UGC Act 1956 indicate that the framers of the Act have distinguished Universityand Institutions other than Universities.

37. The learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in 2000-2-SCC-699 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Laljit Rajshi Shah and others) wherein it is held that a legal fiction enacted for the purpose of one Act cannot be extended to cover another Act.

38. Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 defines public servant under this clause as under:- 2(c)(xi): any person who is a Vice Chancellor or member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher or employee by whatsoever designation called, of any University and any person whose services have been availed of by a University or any other pubic authority in connection with holding or conducting examination. 39. The learned senior counsel contended that even though Section 2(c)(xi) contemplates that any employee by whatever designation called, or any person whose services have been availed of by University is a public servant but that will not include Deemed to be University and if it was intended by the Legislature to include the same, it could have been distinctly mentioned as Deemed University in the Prevention of Corruption Act.

40. There is every force in the contention of the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner. The definition clause 2(c)(xi) under the Act 1988 does not include deemed to be University. It mentions only about ‘University’. Sri Ramachandra Medical Education and Higher Medical Education Institute has been accorded the status of Deemed to be Universityby University Grants Commission (UGC) on the application received from the said Institution, under Section 3 of the UGC Act. Except getting such status of recognition, the Deemed University has no other connection to the provisions of the UGC Act.

41. In a similar situation, in the case of Dental Council of India and Hari Prakash and others (2001-8-SCC-61), the Honourable Supreme Court held as extracted here under:- The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used in the Statute thus paying attention to what has been said as also to what has not been said. When the words used are not ambiguous, literal meaning has to be applied, which is the golden rule of interpretation. 42. The Apex Court commented upon the exercise done by the High Court in interpreting the meaning of the expression University by examining various dictionaries and observed that the said exercise could not have been undertaken by the High Court in view of the fact that the expression used in Section 3(d) of the UGC Act, 1956 is a University established by law. It held as extracted below:- 8. The expression used is not just a University but University established by law and the expression University cannot be divorced from the following words established by law. Entire expression University established by law constitutes one concept and is well known in law as indicated in Section 22 of the UGC Act. Hence, construction of the expression used in the Act with reference to dictionaries is not called for. Such a course will result in either omission of words in the Act such as established by law or to add different words which is not permissible in the language of the Act.

9. The learned counsel for respondents referred to large number of decisions where the meaning of the expression used in an enactment has been given a wider meaning or even to cover a situation which could not have arisen when the law was enacted. But we are afraid, these principles cannot be applied in the present context, for the Parliament is well aware of the situation of University, deemed University and the institutions constituted and empowered under relevant enactments to confer degrees and the Act has been amended from time to time, to suit fresh needs as and when they arose. Thus, the Act has not remained static but is catching up with times. Therefore, what is not included by the legislature cannot be undone by us by adopting the principle of purposive interpretation.  43. The legislature specifically has not provided the deeming fiction in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act and it is relevant to state that whenever the legislature has thought it fit and necessary, the deeming fiction had been provided for. For instance, in the same Act 1988, Sections 5(2)(3), 23, 25(2), 26 and 30(2) deeming fictions had been provided. Moreover, in the Companies Act, Section 210(A), it has been specifically mentioned about Universityand Deemed University demarcating the difference.

44. In Naresh Kumar Madan Vs. State of MP (2007-2-Crimes-260-SC) the Honourable Supreme Court observed that by giving effect to the definition of Public Servantin the 1988 Act, the legal fiction is not being extended beyond the purpose for which it was created or beyond the language of the Section in which it was created.

45. The Institution in which the Petitioner is employed cannot be stamped and equated to be a University, when the language of the Section does not provide for. It is held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Admedabad Vs. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana (AIR-1998-SC120) that the rule of construction of a charging section is that before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section. No one can be taxed by implication. It further held that if a person has not been brought within the ambit of the charging section by clear words, he cannot be taxed at all.

46. Therefore, it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that one must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used. The particular words used by the legislative has to be understood according to the common commercial understanding of the terms and not in their scientific and technical sense. The criminal statute must be interpreted strictly according to language in such statute. There is no scope for interpreting criminal statute broadly, liberally and progressively when the scheme of a statute clearly shows that certain words were deliberately omitted by the legislature for a particular purpose or motive, it is not open to the court to add those words either by conforming to the supposed intention of the legislature or because the insertion or the omission suits the ideology of the court. Such a course of action would amount to not interpretation, but to interpolation of the statutory provisions.

47. If it was intended by the legislature to include Deemed to be University it could have been distinctly mentioned as Deemed to be University in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act. The Institution in which the Petitioner is employed, cannot be stamped and equated to be a University when the language of the Section does not provide for. A person cannot be deprived of his liberty unless a law operates in the field. Such law must be given publicity so as to enable a person to know whether by reason of his carrying on business he is contravening the same. An interpretation, which may be applicable in a case of beneficial legislation, cannot be applied in a penal statute.

48. I, thus, conclude that the Petitioner herein is not a public servant and does not come under the purview of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In these circumstances, the Petitioner is entitled to succeed.

49. In the result, these Criminal Revision Petitions and the Criminal Original Petition are allowed and the impugned order dated 23.01.2013 passed in Crl.MP.No.330/2011 in CC.No.26/2011 declining to discharge the Petitioner from the charges and the order framing charges dated 23.01.2013 consequently, passed by the learned XIII Additional Judge for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai in CC.No.26/2011 are set aside and the Petitioner is discharged. Consequently, the connected MPs are closed. 25 .06.2014 Index:Yes/No Web:Yes/No Srcm To:

1. XIV Additional Special Judge i/c XIII City Civil Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai 2. Inspector of Police, CBI, Economic Offences Unit II, III Floor, CBI Head Quarters, 5B Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003 3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras. ARUNA JAGADEESAN, J.

Srcm Pre Delivery Order in Crl.RC.No.124/2013 and Crl.OP.No.2377/2013 25.06.2014