BATTERING OF SECTION 6 by P.Valliappan, Advocate, Chennai (email – valliappanadvocate@gmail.com)

BATTERING OF SECTION 6
by P.Valliappan, Advocate, Chennai
(email – valliappanadvocate@gmail.com)

1.1 The endless battle with Covid-19 is still on. The Countries all over the world are taking herculean steps to protect humankind from thhe paroxysm caused by the Coronavirus pandemic. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court of India is continuing its battle with amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (concisely referred to as “the Act”). Earnest attempts to protect the law relating to intestate succession amongst the Hindus have again received a drubbing. This author is at his wits’ end. He is distraught, to say the least and really does not know how to express his anguish.
1.2 In the Article dealing with the same subject, reported in 2020(3) CTC 150 (Journal Section), this author had stated in paragraph 7.5 as follows:
“Eventually, if a question is posed to the author, whether this critique is exhaustive, in relation to the provisions discussed upon, the answer is an emphatic ‘NO’.”
Never did this author visualize that he may have an opportunity to ponder over the same provision within such a short span of time.
2.1 The verdict in the case of Vineeta Sharma versus Rakesh Sharma & others delivered by the Apex Court of the Country on 11.08.2020, has bolted amended Section 6 of the Act yet again. When conflicting views are expressed by coordinate benches of the same Court and the matter is referred to a larger Bench, one normally looks out for elucidation. The larger Bench almost always does not fail to live up to legitimate expectations. Unfortunately, the verdict in the case of Vineeta Sharma versus Rakesh Sharma & others, will only lead to pandemonium.
2.2 In the case under discussion, a three member bench of the Apex Court was called upon to interpret amended Section 6 of the Act, in view of the conflicting views expressed by different benches. Amongst other issues, the core question was whether amended Section 6 of the Act was retrospective or prospective in nature. After recording the submissions of the Solicitor General of India for the Appellant and that of numerous Senior Advocates for the respondents, the Apex Court delivered a verdict running to 121 pages. Plentiful Judgments and Law Commission Reports were seemingly mentioned. Ultimately, in page 119, the reference was answered as follows:
129. Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:
(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities.
(ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004.
(iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.
(iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.
(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected out rightly.
130. We understand that on this question, suits/appeals are pending before different High Courts and subordinate courts. The matters have already been delayed due to legal imbroglio caused by conflicting decisions. The daughters cannot be deprived of their right of equality conferred upon them by Section 6. Hence, we request that the pending matters be decided, as far as possible, within six months.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and answer, we overrule the views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors. The opinion expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar is partly overruled to the extent it is contrary to this decision. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for decision on merits.
3.1 In so far as conclusion (i) is concerned, there is not much of a quarrel. Nevertheless, better clarity was expected from the uppermost Court of the Country.
3.2 There cannot be any squabble over conclusion (ii).
3.3 Conclusion (iii) is the most disturbing one. This will for sure generate confusion and lead to a spurt in vexatious litigations. In fact, this conclusion runs counter to the purport of amended Section 6 of the Act.
3.4 Conclusion (iv) is totally inconsistent with the provisions of the amended Act. If the concept of Notional Partition is abrogated, vested rights will be snatched and closed matters will be sought to be reopened. The view of limiting the concept of Notional Partition appears to be based on the intention to remove gender discrimination. However, this would not tantamount to a proper interpretation of law. It is no doubt true that even after passing of the preliminary decree, a Hindu daughter can claim right but the same is subject to the rigors of the provisions under which she claims right and it is not without fetters.
3.5 Conclusion (v) is a little off the mark. After having held that Oral Partition is not recognized by the amended Act, it is curious to note that in exceptional cases, Oral Partition can be accepted if it was supported by public documents and effected like a decree of a Court. In fact, the concept of oral partition, which is well-known in customary Hindu law, was overlooked by the Act and subsequent amendment.
3.6 Not stopping with answering of the reference, the Apex Court also requested the different High Courts and Subordinate Courts to decide pending matters within six months. The request to decide pending matters is bound to have serious repercussions. The High Courts and the Subordinate Courts will be constrained to follow the decision in Vineeta Sharma versus Rakesh Sharma & others, though it may not reflect the correct position of law and will be confronted by production of conflicting decisions of identical strength. Forcing the Courts subordinate to the Apex Court to apply the interpretation of law based on the strength of the Bench, rather than on the correct exposition of law, may not augur well for the poor and unlucky litigants.
3.7 Eventually the views expressed in Prakash versus Phulavati, reported in (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Mangammal versus T.B. Raju, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 662 were expressly overruled and the view expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. versus Amar, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 343 was partly overruled.
4.1 Apart from answering the reference, various appalling observations were made in the decision.
4.2 The Apex Court has discussed about prospective, retrospective and retroactive statutes and their implications. A statute that has prospective application creates new rights and obligations from the date on which it comes into force. When a statutory provision operates backwards by taking away vested rights or imposes new obligations, it is retrospective. Retroactive statute is one that applies subsequent to its enactment, but its operation is based upon the status that has arisen prior to it, drawn from antecedent events. The Apex Court has opined that amended Section 6 confers a right to daughters by birth and that such right is to be claimed prospectively, on and from the date of the amended Act. It is also held to be based on the birth of the daughter, which is an antecedent event. The twin interpretations viz. (a) that amended Section 6 is not retrospective as the vesting of rights in a daughter takes effect from 09.09.2005 on the one hand and (b) that amended Section 6 is retroactive, since the daughter would become a coparcener from the time of her birth on the other hand, are evidently incongruous. Curiously, the question as to whether amended Section 6 is prospective or retrospective or retroactive in nature is not answered in explicit terms and the discussion too ends rather abruptly.
4.3 Sub-sections 1 & 5 of amended Section 6 of the Act have been discussed in very many places, but not in the manner in which they ought to have been examined.
5.1 Amended Section 6 of the Act, which is significant for understanding this critique, is extracted below for uncomplicated reading:
Section 6. Devolution of interest in Coparcenary property —
(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall —
(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the Coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said Coparcenary property as that of a son,
and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.
(2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of Coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition.
(3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the Coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and —
(a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son;
(b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and
(c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be.
Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.
(4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no Court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt:
(5) Nothing contained in this Section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004.
Explanation — For the purposes of this Section “ partition” means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by the decree of a Court.”
5.2 As per amended Section 6 of the Act, the ‘daughter of a coparcener’ by birth becomes a coparcener in her own right, in the same manner as the son. It starts with the words “on and from the commencement of the Act” and details the right of the daughter, which is to be treated on par with that of a son, subject to the Proviso contained therein. The reference to a ‘daughter of a coparcener’ in amended Section 6 is of great significance. Had the legislature been of the view that the daughter is to be treated on par with the son retrospectively, the words ‘daughter of a coparcener’ would have simply been mentioned as a ‘daughter’. Right by birth is the rule by which a coparcener becomes a part of the Coparcenery and acquires an undivided share. This right by birth cannot be interpreted to mean an unregulated right. The intention of the legislature is quite apparent. The wordings of the amended Section 6 are lucid to the effect that it has to be applied prospectively. Therefore, due importance has to be given to the wordings of the provision.
5.3 The Section further provides that any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled to by virtue of the provision, shall be held by her with the incidents of Coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition.
5.4 In one of his preceding Articles, the author had dealt with the rights of a daughter, pursuant to amendment of Section 6 of the Act and the dissension of views by different Courts. The author had expressed that as per amended Section 6 of the Act, a Hindu daughter is entitled to the benefit of the amended provision, if she satisfies two tests viz. (a) that her father was alive as on 09.09.2005, so that the Coparcenery was kept intact, with no devolution of interest having taken place and (b) that there was no disposition or alienation including a partition (through Court or by registered instrument) or testamentary disposition prior to 20.12.2004. Sub-section (1) of amended Section 6 improves the status of a daughter to a coparcener. Sub-section (2) postulates that the property acquired by operation of sub-section (1) shall have the incidents of Coparcenary ownership. But sub-section (3) stipulates that the interest of a Hindu in a ‘Joint Hindu Family’ (later referred to as ‘Coparcenary’ – the author treats the reference to ‘Joint Hindu Family’ to imply a ‘Coparcenary’) shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship.
6. It is necessary to assess as to why the words ‘daughter of a coparcener’ assume significance. It is primarily because, if the coparcener father of a daughter seeking rights on par with a son, had died before the cut-off date 09.09.2005, his rights would have crystallized in terms of Section 8 of the Act and vested upon his heirs. The Coparcenary would have come to an end. Suppose a family consists of father A, son B and daughter C, with father A and son B constituting a Coparcenary. On the intestacy of father A prior to 09.09.2005, the Coparcenary would no longer exist. Daughter C cannot claim right as a coparcener, under amended Section 6 due to the fact that father coparcener is dead and no Coparcenary exists. It is rather unfortunate that there is no whisper about Section 8 of the Act in the entire Judgment under discussion. With a view not to make the same mistake, Section 8 is extracted for the benefit of the readers:
Section 8. General rules of succession in the case of males —
The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter—
(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule;
(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule;
(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.
7.1 The concept of Notional Partition has suffered a huge setback. It has been concluded as if a notional or deemed partition is not conclusive and shares are subject to change, as and when the provisions are altered or new provisions are introduced. If such an interpretation is made, it will clearly undo the rights which have already vested by operation of amended Section 6 & Section 8 of the Act. Explanation appended to amended Section 6(3) resorts to the simple measure, that the interest of a coparcener ”shall be deemed to be” the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death. What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. The assumption that a partition had in fact taken place must include the process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs. All the consequences which flow from a real partition are to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the lifetime of the deceased. The likely result of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the Coparcenary property at the time of, his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the Notional Partition. By virtue of Notional Partition, the share of the Coparcener dying intestate, devolves upon his heirs in accordance with Section 8 of the Act. Such Notional Partition results in cessation of that Coparcenary.
7.2 The concept of Notional Partition leading to ascertainment and vesting of shares is well recognized by Courts. As early as on 27.04.1978 in Gurupad Khandappa versus Hirabai Khandappa & others reported in AIR 1978 SC 1239, the Apex Court had held that in order to determine the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener, it is necessary to ascertain the share of the deceased in the Coparcenary property. It was held that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener ”shall be deemed to be” the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death and that it was necessary to assume that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. It was also held that this assumption which the statute required to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages and that all the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the lifetime of the deceased. It was held further that the allotment of shares has to be treated as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled and that the inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the Coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the Notional Partition.
7.3. Thus Notional Partition is not just a paper partition but a real conferment of rights which cannot and ought not to be taken away by misconstruing the rights conferred upon daughters.
7.4 It would not be out of place to mention here that even as per the customary Hindu Law, actual division by metes and bounds was not essential to constitute a concluded partition.
7.5 No doubt that the Parliament has definitely committed a few errors in framing of amended Section 6 but the lawmakers have definitely not enacted Section 6 in the manner in which the Apex Court has interpreted. The concept of Notional Partition has been completely misconstrued. The interpretation given by the Apex Court could also create an anomalous situation that may lead to disparities in deciding the rights amongst Hindus in respect of Coparcenary property. The same can be demonstrated by an illustration. Suppose there exists a Coparcenary consisting of father A, sons B & C and daughter D. Father A had died intestate prior to 09.09.2005 and son B had alienated his share of properties on the basis of the deemed Partition prior to 20.12.2004. Coparcenary is broken, as only son C alone will have his share of Coparcenary properties. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment under discussion, the daughter cannot claim any right as the Coparcenary is no longer intact. However, if no alienation had taken place after the intestacy of father A, daughter D can stake a claim on the basis of the judgment under discussion. This unquestionably is an anomalous situation. Moreover, there cannot be two methods of inheritance viz. one for the heirs of a dead coparcener and another for the heirs of a living coparcener.
7.6 It is unfathomable that the Apex Court has answered the reference, oblivious of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act.
7.7 There is no dispute regarding amended Section 6(5) of the Act and the reference to partition made thereunder. The Act recognizes only partitions made by a registered document or effected by a Decree of the Court. The Act does not recognize severance of status by unilateral declaration of the coparcener. Ancient Hindu law recognised the concept of severance of status which could be made by a coparcener expressing his intention to separate. However, as per amended Section 6 of the Act, such severance in status is not recognised as a complete partition, due to absence of actual division by metes and bounds. In fact as early as on 30.09.1985, the Apex Court in Bhagwant P. Sulakhe versus Digambar Gopal Sulakhe reported in AIR 1986 SC 79, held that the character of any joint family property does not change with the severance of the status of the joint family and it continues to retain its joint family character so long as the joint family property is in existence and is not partitioned amongst the co-sharers. It was also held that it is not open to any member of the joint family to unilaterally convert any joint family property into his personal property.
8. There is also great misconception regarding the effect of obstructed and unobstructed heritage in the Judgment under discussion. It is no doubt true that when right is created by birth, it is unobstructed heritage and if right is acquired, because of there being no male issue, it is obstructed heritage. The property which devolves upon the death of the last owner who can be a parent, brother, nephew or uncle is obstructed heritage. Obstructed heritage devolves by succession and unobstructed heritage devolves by survivorship. But the question of applicability of unobstructed heritage or obstructed heritage depends upon various factors. To come to the conclusion that the coparcener father need not be alive as on 09.09.2005 because the right of the daughter is by unobstructed heritage is, with great respect, illogical. This finding has been rendered without considering the vesting of shares that would have taken place on the death of the coparcener father prior to 09.09.2005. Right of the daughter to claim equal status does hinge upon the continued existence of the coparcener father on the date of coming into force of the amended provision. It is pertinent to mention here that by applying what the Apex Court has held, every daughter whose father had passed away after 1956, i.e., after coming into force of the Act can now seek partition, if there had not been any partition in terms of Section 6(5) of the Act. This is awful, as it would open the Pandora’s Box with a spate of litigation by avaricious daughters.
9. The Apex Court has also overlooked the distinction between unamended Section 6 and amended Section 6 of the Act in and by which the concept of survivorship has been narrowed down. The implication of amended Section 6(3) has been completely disregarded. Yes, the Hindu daughter has right by birth, but it is subject to certain restrictions apart from what is stated in the Proviso to amended Section 6(1) & Section 6(5) of the Act. The wordings “shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition prior to 20.12.2004” in the Proviso to amended Section 6(1) and the definition of ‘partition’ in the Explanation to amended Section 6(5) are relatively wide-ranging. In fact, the Proviso to amended Section 6(1) and the Explanation to amended Section 6(5) are sufficient with regard to the nature of ‘partition’ recognized by the amended Act. Consequently, the provisions of Section 6(5) excluding the Explanation appear to be clearly superfluous.
10. In paragraph 50 of the Judgment, reference is made to Savita Samvedi (Ms) & Another versus Union of India & Ors., reported in 1996 (2) SCC 380, stating that a daughter always remains a loving daughter, whereas a son is a son until he gets a wife. This could only be a personal opinion and not an expression of law. In the guise of removing gender discrimination, obviously, a Hindu son cannot be discriminated.
11. The entire objective seems to have been to render a popular verdict, which one would normally expect from lawmakers. It is rudimentary that a Court of law has to interpret the statute and not frame the statute. As is known, Article 141 of the Constitution of India, stipulates the binding nature of the law declared by the Supreme Court. At times, the power of the legislature to enact laws is usurped by the Apex Court, overlooking the fact that such power continues to remain within the domain of the Legislature.
12. The reference to ‘living daughters’ in the case of Prakash versus Phulavati is clearly erroneous since sub-sections (3)(b) & (3)(c) of amended Section 6 provide for exigencies where a daughter is not alive. If the father coparcener is alive in 09.09.2005, even a deceased daughter’s heirs enumerated in amended Section 6 can claim right over Coparcenary property. Having observed that in case of death of a coparcener, succession is not by survivorship but in accordance with amended Section 6(3)(1) in paragraph 61 and that provisions of amended Section 6 are not retrospective, the Apex Court erred in applying the Act retrospectively, without explicitly saying so. The further finding that the concept of uncodified Hindu law on unobstructed heritage has been given concrete shape by amended Section 6 is not in conformity with the provision.
13. In paragraph 64, it is held that a Coparcenary must exist on 09.09.2005 to enable the daughter of the coparcener to enjoy rights conferred upon her, as the right is by birth and not by inheritance. This estimation is mystifying. As stated supra, right by birth is subject to the prerequisites of amended Section 6. Suppose a Coparcenary consists of father A, mother B, son C and daughter D and the father had died on 08.09.2005. On such date, only the father A and son C were coparceners. On the intestacy of father A, his ½ share would have devolved upon wife B, son C and daughter D, each being entitled to 1/6th share in terms of Section 8 of the Act. Eventually, the son will become entitled to ½ share on his own plus 1/6th share acquired from his father, in all to 4/6th share and the daughter D and wife B each will be entitled to 1/6th share.
14. The date of death of the coparcener father is highly relevant. To hold that conferral of right upon daughter is not based on the date of death of coparcener father is, with respect, a certain death-knell for the law relating to intestate succession. A proper understanding of the provision would lead to the irresistible conclusion that only the daughter of a living coparcener (as on 09.09.2005) is entitled to claim the benefit of the amended provision. Deemed legal fiction applied for ascertaining the share of the deceased coparcener and the consequent application of Section 8 is not for a limited purpose. As stated supra, it leads to vesting of rights.
15. The concept of legal fiction made applicable to treat daughters as coparceners is not extended to sons. The view that there would be a denial of right of a daughter conferred by the legislature, if such right is based on the death of the coparcener father is based on a miscomprehension of the amended provisions of the Act. The failure to consider the impact of the date of death of the coparcener father is fatal to the conclusion. The death of the coparcener father would straightaway attract the provisions of amended Section 6(3) and consequently Section 8 of the Act. On a proper construal of the provisions it can be seen that whatever has been conferred by the legislature upon the daughter cannot be denied and is not denied.
16. The author reiterates that this write-up is not intended against Hindu daughters. It would not be out of place to mention that every time a Hindu son gets a share in the Coparcenary property, a Hindu daughter, who could either be that son’s wife or daughter or mother, gets benefitted. This author is also not against the laudable objective of removing gender discrimination in respect of inheritance amongst the Hindus. This author is only concerned about the misinterpretation of the statute. This author is also concerned about the fact that, like the daughters have right, the sons too have a right and in cases where Notional Partition had taken place and applying the deemed fiction, shares have been determined, the entitlement of the sons to such shares cannot be taken away by a subsequent enactment.
17. The verdict under discussion will lead to ire between members of Hindu families in general and siblings in particular, since established rights will be sought to be reopened and unsettled. The Apex Court, which relied on several judgments, has certainly disregarded the purport of amended Section 6 and omitted to consider Section 8 of the Act.
18. Now the misstep has to be set right either by way of a Review Application, which is highly improbable or by a larger Bench. It would not be out of place to mention here that the Parliament being the supreme legislative authority, it can destroy the effects of precedents, established by the Apex Court, by way of new legislation. Such legislation can invalidate the precedent impliedly or expressly. For the meantime, the uncertainty will continue, much to the indignation of a large section of the society, which includes judicial officers, lawyers and unfortunate litigants. Sooner the problem is resolved, the better it is for the stake-holders.